THE

JOURNAL

OF

ORIENTAL RESEARCH

MADRAS

1929 1929

तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय

MADRAS

PRINTED AT THE MADRAS LAW JOURNAL PRESS, MYLAPORE

1930

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RĀVAṆA-BHĀṢYA

BY

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There is a tradition that a commentary called *Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya* on Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika sūtras was written by an ancient philosopher called Rāvaṇa and that this work preceded the famous commentary by Praśastapāda on the same sūtras, which has been preserved under the name *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha* and generally accepted as one of the most important basic works of the Vaiśeṣika system. The tradition about Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya is supported by certain references which ought to carry considerable weight with all discerning critics.

In his commentary called Kiraṇāvalī, on Praśastapāda's *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha*, Udayanācārya (circa 984 A. D.) annotates the phrase *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha* as follows :—

"पदार्थधर्मसङ्ग्रह इति ॥ पदार्था द्रव्यादयः; तेषां धर्माः साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यरूपाः । त एव परस्परं विशेषणीभूतास्तेऽनेन सङ्गृह्यन्ते, शास्त्रे नानास्थानेषु वितता एकत्र सङ्कलय्य कथ्यन्ते इति सङ्ग्रहः ; स प्रकृष्टो वक्ष्यते ; प्रकरणशुद्धेः सङ्ग्रहपदेनैव दर्शितत्वात् ; वैशद्यं लघुत्वं कृत्स्नत्वं च प्रकर्षः ; सूत्रेषु वैशद्याभावात्, भाष्यस्य च विस्तरत्वात् प्रकरणादीनां चैकदेशत्वात् ॥"

Benares Sanskrit Series, Kiraṇāvalī, page, 5.

Padmanābhamiśra, who flourished in the latter part of the 16th century, has the following note in his Kiraṇāvalī-Bhāskara, a commentary on Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī, with reference to the concluding part of the extract given above.

"ग्रन्थान्तरेणान्यथासिद्धिमपाकरोति—सूत्र इति ।"

Padmanābhamiśra is an authority on the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, who cannot be easily brushed aside. According to him and according to Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī as interpreted by him, Praśastapāda should be understood to have presupposed Rāvaṇa's

Bhāṣya which was too big and extensive to be controlled by ordinary readers, and should therefore be taken to have designed his own work as a comprehensive treatise of an epitomical type (saṅgraha), though Udayana, Śrīdhara and later exponents of the Vaiśeṣika system would unhesitatingly apply the designation—Bhāṣya—to Praśastapāda's work as well, chiefly, perhaps, in view of Praśastapāda's rank as a *ṛṣi*.

Śrī Saṁkarācārya, in his Bhāṣya on 2-2-11 of the Brahma-sūtras, makes the following statements in the course of his exposition of Paramāṇu-Kāraṇa-vāda :—

"यदापि द्वे द्व्यणुके चतुरणुकमारभेते, तदापि समानं द्व्यणुकसमवायिनां शुक्लादीनामारम्भकत्वम् । अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे तु द्व्यणुकसमवायिनी अपि नैवारभेते, चतुरणुकस्य महत्वदीर्घत्वपरिमाणयोगाभ्युपगमात् । यदापि बहवः परमाणवः बहूनि वा द्व्यणुकानि द्व्यणुकसहितो वा परमाणुः कार्यमारभते तदापि समानैषा योजना ॥"

With reference to the first sentence in the above extract, Ratna-prabhā has the following note :—

"प्रकटार्थकारास्तु[1] यद्वाभ्यां द्व्यणुकाभ्यामारब्धे कार्ये महत्त्वं दृश्यते तस्य हेतुः प्रचयो नाम प्रशिथिलावयवसंयोग इति रावणप्रणीते भाष्ये दृश्यते इति चिरंतनवैशेषिकदृष्टयेदं भाष्यमित्याहुः ।"

In the course of his exposition of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, Śaṁkara relies upon Kaṇāda's sūtras and Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya. As the author of the Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa rightly points out, Śaṁkara seems to utilise also the theories of older Vaiśeṣikas like *Rāvaṇa*. The first sentence in the above extract from Śaṁkara's Bhāṣya would present an insuperable difficulty, if one should proceed to interpret it in the light of what Praśastapāda has said about the formation of *dvyaṇukas, tryaṇukas* and *caturaṇukas* from *paramāṇus*. According to Praśastapāda, Udayana, Śrī-dhara and all the later Vaiśeṣikas, two *paramāṇus* or atoms combine to form a binary product (*dvyaṇuka*); three *dvyaṇukas* or *aṇus* combine to form a ternary product (*tryaṇuka*); and four *tryaṇukas* or *truṭis* combine to form a quaternary product

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1. The passage in the Prakaṭārtha runs as follows :—

परिमामाणादेरपि तत्तदासाधारण्यात् व्यभिचारप्रदर्शनायैव चिरन्तनवैशेषिकाणामुदाहरणान्तरमाह—यदा द्वे इति । तथा हि—रावणप्रणीते भाष्ये दृश्यते "यद्द्वाभ्यां द्व्यणुकाभ्यामारब्धे कार्ये यन्महत्त्वमुत्पद्यते तस्य प्रचयोऽसमवायिकारणम्" इति.

P. 278 of the Madras Manuscript of the Prakaṭārtha

(*caturaṇuka*). According to the Vaiśeṣika authorities, it is only in this way that the difference in the *parimāṇa* or size of a *dvyaṇuka* and a *tryaṇuka* may be accounted for, though the size in both of these cases is the result of the *saṅkhyā* of the component parts. Śaṁkara, however, says that two *dvyaṇukas* form the component parts of a *caturaṇuka*. This remark is not consistent with the atomic theory as set forth by Praśastapāda and his followers. Vācaspatimiśra, in his Bhāmatī, seeks to forcibly dragoon Śaṁkara's text into Praśastapāda's mould, by suggesting an emendation to the effect that "यद्यपि द्वे द्व्यणुके" in the text of Śaṁkara quoted above ought to be read as "यद्यपि द्वे द्वे द्व्यणुके". The alternative explanation which Vācaspatimiśra suggests in his Bhāmatī on the text of Śaṁkara under consideration is in no sense less strained than the emendation referred to. Vācaspatimiśra must have reconciled himself to the idea of doing so much violence to Śaṁkara's text in this connection, either because he was not familiar with the views of earlier Vaiśeṣikas like Rāvaṇa or because he deliberately sought to ignore those views perhaps for the reason that he considered them quite untenable. It is difficult to accept the former of these two alternatives, having due regard to the fact that Vācaspatimiśra was a polymathic philosopher of encyclopaedic knowledge. What Ratnaprabhā has said in explaining of the text of Śaṁkara under consideration has been verified by me and found correct, after consulting the manuscript of the Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa, which was acquired by me several years ago for the Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, through a peripatetic party working under me. It may be useful to note here that the author of the commentary called Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa on Śaṁkara's Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya, generally maintains the view of Sureśvara and Prakāśātman and differs from Maṇḍana and Vācaspatimiśra, not hesitating to expose, wherever possible, the weak points in Vācaspati's Bhāmatī. The tradition regarding Rāvaṇa's Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, which the author of the Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa relies upon, must be fairly earlier than the 13th century A. D., when Ānandagiri who used the Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa in one of his works, flourished.[1]

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1. *Vide* page xiv of the late Mr. Tripathi's introduction to Ānandagiri's Tarkasaṅgraha published as No. iii of the Gaekward's Oriental Series.

An interesting confirmation of the tradition about Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya comes from a rather unexpected quarter. In the latter part of the somewhat lengthy viṣkambha of the fifth act of the Anargharāghava, the following passage deserves attention :—

[नेपथ्ये—एकतः]

"भो भो लक्ष्मण, वैशेषिककटन्दीपण्डितः जगद्विजयमानः पर्यटामि। क्वासौ रामः? तेन सह विवदिष्ये ।

[अन्यतः]

भो भोः परिव्राजक, कालसर्पखलीकारखर्जूलता न खलु सुखाकरी वृश्चिकमन्त्रतान्त्रिकस्य । जाम्बवान्—कथं लक्ष्मणपरिव्राजकौ संलपतः । श्रुणोमि तावत् (इत्यवधत्ते)

(नेपथ्ये—पुनरेकतः)

आः लक्ष्मण, सर्वविद्रावणः खल्वहम् ; को मया जनितमानभङ्गो न पराजीयते ।"

(Anargharāghava, Nirnayasagar Edition, page, 161.)

With reference to the above extract, Rucipatyupādhyāya has the following note :—

"नेपथ्ये रावणवचनम् । कटन्दी वैशेषिकशास्त्रव्याख्याग्रन्थः, कटन्द इति यस्य प्रसिद्धिः । सा च रावणेन कृतेति छलतो ज्ञापयति । 'कन्दली' इति पाठे कन्दली वैशेषिकटीका सापि रावणेनैव कृता ॥"

It may be inferred from the above extract that the tradition about Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras must be much earlier than the Anargharāghava and that this Bhāṣya might have been known by the designation of Kaṭandī or Kandalī. If the latter of these two names should be correct, Śrīdhara's Kandalī a commentary on Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya, should be taken to have borrowed the name that was given to Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya. It would scarcely be difficult to see that, in the days of Murāri, the tradition about Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya must have become sufficiently old to admit of that Vaiśeṣika work being ascribed to the notorious Pratināyaka of the Rāmāyaṇa, in the same mytho-poetic vein that is responsible for the author of the Nyāyasūtras being equated with the saintly husband of Ahalyā. From the reference to Murāri, the dramatist, in verse 67 of canto 38 of the Haravijaya by Ratnākara, a Kashmirian poet belonging to the middle of the 9th century A. D., it may be made out that the author of the Anargharāghava should be

assigned to a date not later than that of Ratnākara. These evidences might well support the belief that Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras might have been earlier than Praśastapāda's *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha.* It would be thus quite reasonable to suggest that Praśastapāda did not proceed to write a Bhāṣya in the usual style but wrote only an epitomical treatise, perhaps because he felt the pre-existing Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya would render another Vaiśeṣika-Bhāṣya superfluous. Though the fact that there was a Vaiśeṣika-Bhāṣya ascribed to Rāvaṇa can no longer be doubted, still the name *Kaṭandī* occurring in the Anargharāghava requires further confirmation before it could be accepted as the original name which Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya bore.

In this connection, it may not be out of place to invite attention to the manner in which Buddhist tradition connects the name of Rāvaṇa, the Lord of Laṅkā, with one of the oldest texts of the Buddhists, called the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. The following quotation is given in the footnote 35 to page 252 of Vol. ii of Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western Countries:—"The second treatise or sūtra in the fifth volume of the *Mdo* is entitled in Sanskrit 'Ārya-Laṅkāvatāra-mahāyāna-sūtra', a venerable sūtra of high principles on the visiting of Laṅkā. This was delivered at the request of the Lord of Laṅkā by Śākya, when he was in the city of Laṅkā on the top of the Malay mountain on the seashore, together with many priests and Bodhisattvas." This association, legendary as it may be, of Rāvaṇa's name with Buddhism and the similar association of the same name with the oldest Vaiśeṣika-Bhāṣya may be considered together with the way in which Praśastāpada's Bhāṣya came to completely supersede the earlier Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya. Such considerations may lend support to the conjecture that the earlier Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya was perhaps dominated by atheistic and pro-Buddhist proclivities, such as might have been quite in keeping with the text of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the Vaiśeṣikas as *ardha-vaināśikas,* while the work of Praśastapāda gave the Vaiśeṣika system a theistic turn and presented its doctrines in an anti-Buddhist Āstika setting.

When I was at Lahore in November, 1928, in connection with the Fifth All-India Oriental Conference, I happened to see in the Lalchand Library there a manuscript of the Ṛg-Veda-pada-pāṭha attributed to Rāvaṇa. It is not at present possible to connect the author of this Vedic work with the author of the Vaiśeṣika-Bhāṣya attributed to Rāvaṇa.

ONE OF THE SOURCES OF THE BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ[1]

BY

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In a well-known passage in his Sūtra-Bhāṣya, Śrī Śaṁkarācārya says :—

"न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्, किं तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम्, अनुभवावसानत्वाद्भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।"

Therefore for Brahma-jñāna to become real, two things should co-operate; namely, acquiescence in the authority of the Śruti, and the testimony of one's own spiritual experience. The one is as essential as the other. Without conformity to an objective standard of experience there is no guarantee of truth in religion, and without an earnest spiritual quest there can be no vitality in religion. Hence authority in religious matters is not only a principle of continuity, but also a principle of sanity. It not only binds the past, present and future generations into a single community and animates them with a zeal for a common end, but also restrains erratic individuals, checks all spiritual vagaries and provides a touchstone of religious experience.

But a blind obedience to authority paralyses the soul. It kills all life in religion. It is the epitaph written on the gravestones of many a priesthood in the history of the world. In our own individual lives, how often are we prone to forget that a knowledge of scriptures is not a knowledge of God! How often do we fail to say to ourselves "मन्त्रविदेवास्मि नात्मवित्!" And all the while the Śruti herself whispers in our ears :—

"नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।"

And likewise :—

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[1] A lecture delivered under the auspices of the Sanskrit Academy on the Bhagavad-Gītā-Day celebrated on the 23rd December 1928.

"नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यो न च प्रमादात्तपसो वाप्यलिङ्गात् ।"

And again :—

"तस्माद् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेद्बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिः अमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः ।"

The drift of these texts is clear. Mere acquiescence in the spiritual experience embodied in the Śruti is not enough. Mere obedience to this or that ancient rule of wisdom is not enough. There are no fixed formulas, no cut and dried methods in spiritual life. Asceticism might easily became as wrong as indulgence ; and child-like innocence could easily be made a fetish as much as arrogant learning. The path of the spirit is narrow and there are deep gulfs on either side.

"क्षुरस्य धारा निशिता दुरत्यया दुर्गं पथस्तत्कवयो वदन्ति ।"

Sharp as a razor's edge and hard to traverse is that difficult path. Therefore spiritual life is an adventure. It is for the brave and the strong, not for the weakling and the coward. The man who has begun the quest has frequently to go forth alone, out of the sight and the hearing of men. Single-handed, he has to meet unknown terrors that lie in wait for him. His foes are many, and their guile is endless. He has to fight out every inch of his ground, and he often finds that those whom he vanquished and trampled upon one day, appear again on the next, in a different guise and at a different corner of the road. Vanquished as vices, they re-appear as virtues, and offer battle to his soul. No fixed rules, no formulas got by heart, no mantra, charm or spell can avail him in such perils. None can help him save the purity of his own heart and faith in the invisible presence of the Master who prompted the quest. The weapons that he carries in his hands, though forged by the wisdom of ages, cannot be effective in the absence of sincerity, courage and faith. And he will see on the way many a traveller lying dead, buried under the burdens he had attempted to carry or pierced with the weapons with which he had equipped himself. If epitaphs could be written on the dead that lie rotting in the valley, the words egotism, bigotry, relegiosity, ritualism, obscurantism etc. should be graven in shining letters as a warning to all travellers. One in a thousand, or a million perhaps, lives to see the end of his journey, to find himself at the feet of Him who says :—

"मनुष्याणां सहस्रेषु कश्चिद्यतति सिद्धये ।
यततामपि सिद्धानां कश्चिन्मां वेत्ति तत्त्वतः ॥"

Of the numerous testimonies, which generation after generation has adduced from its own spiritual experience to the eternal truth of the Śruti during the long course of our history, none is so complete and satisfying as the Bhagavad Gītā. The greatness of this scripture lies not only in its loyalty to the spirit of the Veda, but also in its bold enthusiasm in endeavouring to infuse that spirit into all the details of every-day life. Its divine author cannot be described as a mere conformist on the strength of the passage:—

"तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ।"

For He also says:—

"श्रुतिविप्रतिपन्ना ते यदा स्थास्यति निश्चला ।
समाधावचला बुद्धिस्तदा योगमवाप्स्यसि ॥"

And one can imagine His gesture of contempt as He exclaims:—

"यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्त्यविपश्चितः ।
वेदवादरताः पार्थ नान्यदस्तीति वादिनः ॥"

Moreover, with a daring originality He brings the message of the Indian forests to the battlefield of life. For he knows that the din of the world is only a prelude to the eternal music of of silence, that this earth of ours is the outer Court of Heaven and that the whole creation is running a confused race to catch the Infinite. He has laid to His heart the lesson of His favourite Upaniṣad:—

"यदेवेह तदमुत्र यदमुत्र तदन्विह ।
मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥"

The living presence of God everywhere in the world is a tremendous fact, which it is difficult for us to remember, but which it is difficult for a man of vision to forget. It is the continuous consciousness of this fact that distinguishes a mystic sharply from other men.

"या निशा सर्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्ति संयमी ।
यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः ॥"

Īśwara who is the standard of holiness is ever with us frowning at our sins. The ideal of beauty—He is ever with us turning away from our uglinesses. And the perfection of truth —He is ever with us pitying our delusions. But the veil of ignorance is across our eyes, and we cannot see Him. Or we see Him only at rare intervals through a rent in the veil, as it were.

"विमूढा नानुपश्यन्ति पश्यन्ति ज्ञानचक्षुषः ॥"

And the blessedness of that experience it were better not to tell. For it is a delicate sweet that sustains one's life through many a wearisome day and night. It is a silent memory that encourages one through dull routine and many a heart-breaking sorrow. Our life here would be dark indeed but for this fugitive gleam to which our hearts can bear witness along with the scriptures of the world. But for this half-forgotten tune which haunts the memory with a persistence, which it is impossible to resist, the Śruti itself would be music to the deaf. We lift up our hands in gratitude to those who can help to make steady this fitful light, to those who can enable us to listen for a longer while to this eternal melody. Teachers who cannot do this for us are no teachers; and scriptures which cannot guide us here are no scriptures. The former may be great scholars, and the latter may be sound theology. The noise of both may fill our ears, but it leaves the heart hungering. How often one feels while traversing the sandy deserts of theological literature that the Śruti-vākyas quoted there are like bubbling springs of living water, whose coolness is in refreshing contrast to the heat of the desert. The Gītā is one of such springs. Or rather it is a reservoir which collects the waters of many springs. And of these the Kaṭhopaniṣad seems to me to be the most important. I think it would be a profitable task if we should compare the Gītā with its prototype, and see how the gospel of the hermitage in one generation was expanded into a gospel of the battlefield in another.

Certain obvious resemblances between the Upaniṣad and the Gītā have been noticed by all scholars eastern and western. There are six or seven ślokas in the latter scripture which are practically quotations from the Kāṭhaka mantras. For the sake of completeness let me first briefly remind you of these.

Firstly, the two following Kāṭhaka mantras have become well-known by being quoted in the Gītā:—

"न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन्नायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित् ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥
हन्ता चेन्मन्यते हन्तुं हतश्चेन्मन्यते हतम् ।
उभौ तौ न विजानीतो नायं हन्ति न हन्यते ॥"

The Gītā, reversing the order and making a few alterations in the पूर्वार्धे of each of them, reads them as follows:—

"य एवं वेत्ति हन्तारं यश्चैनं मन्यते हतम् ।
उभौ तौ न विजानीतो नायं हन्ति न हन्यते ॥
न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचिन्नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥"

It will be observed how the Gītā avoids here the difficult problem of creation by changing नायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित् into नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः । And it is interesting to note, in passing, that it is the Upaniṣadic mantra rather than the Gītā śloka that Emerson had in his mind when he wrote in his poem on Brahma:—

" If the red slayer think he slays,
Or if the slain think he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass and turn again."

Secondly, the figure of the world-tree called Aśvattha employed in the first four verses of the Chapter XV of the Gītā beginning with ऊर्ध्वमूलमधःशाखम् is obviously an elaboration of the Upaniṣadic mantra beginning with ऊर्ध्वमूलोऽवाक्शाख एषोऽश्वत्थः सनातनः । Śrījut Tilak in his commentary on the Gītā has a very interesting note on this conception of the world-tree. He glances at the parallel conception of Igdrasil in Norse mythology, quotes references to the tree from the Ṛg Veda, the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the Atharva Veda, the Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata, examines the derivation of the word अश्वत्थ and discusses the identification of the tree with न्यग्रोध, वट and उदुम्बर. It is to be observed that the Upaniṣad, after describing the world-tree, does not speak of cutting it down, as the Gītā does. The Gītā wants us to imagine the tree as standing in the way of the seeker after God. Therefore it is only after cutting it down with the sword of detachment that one can set one's feet on the path.

"ततः पदं तत्परिमार्गितव्यं यस्मिन्गता न निवर्तन्ति भूयः ।"

The Upaniṣad, on the other hand, says,

"तदेव शुक्रं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवामृतमुच्यते ।"

The commentator, no doubt, explains तदेव शुक्र as यदस्य संसार-वृक्षस्य मूलं तदेव शुक्रं शुभ्रं शुद्धं, ज्योतिष्मच्चैतन्यात्मज्योतिःस्वभावं तदेव ब्रह्म, and introduces into his eloquent comment on the mantra the Gītā notion of cutting down the tree:—

"वेदान्तविहितब्रह्मात्मदर्शनासङ्गशस्त्रकृतोच्छेद एष संसारवृक्षः ।"

But these ideas are not found in the original.

Thirdly, the eleventh verse of the Chapter VIII of the Gītā viz.

"यदक्षरं वेदविदो वदन्ति विशन्ति यद्यतयो वीतरागाः ।
यदिच्छन्तो ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति तत्ते पदं सङ्ग्रहेण प्रवक्ष्ये ॥"

is obviously an adaptation of the Upaniṣadic mantra:—

"सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद्वदन्ति ।
यदिच्छन्तो ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति तत्ते पदं सङ्ग्रहेण ब्रवीमि ॥ ओमित्येतत् ।"

It is remarkable that the author of the Gītā in this section of ओङ्कारोपासन, though quoting actually one mantra from his favourite Upaniṣad, has in his mind some four or five different Upaniṣads. The expression आदित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् is from the Śvetāśvatara and the Ṛg Veda; the verse beginning with प्रयाण-काले मनसाचलेन is reminiscent of the section in the Praśnopaniṣad beginning with the question

"स यो ह वैतद्भगवन्मनुष्येषु प्रायणान्तमोङ्कारमभिध्यायीत । कतमं वा व स तेन लोकं जयतीति;"

the formula अणोरणीयान् is from the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara; and the use of the word अक्षर in the double sense of Brahman and syllable implies a glance at the Māṇḍūkya as well as the Kaṭha.

Fourthly, the analysis of personality that the Gītā gives in Chapter III viz.,

"इन्द्रियाणि पराण्याहुरिन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्यो बुद्धेः परतस्तु सः ॥"

is obviously only a simplification of the analysis given in the two Kāṭhaka mantras whose meaning is discussed in the आनुमानिकाधिकरणम् of the Brahma-sūtras:—

"इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान्परः ॥
महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।
पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥"

Fifthly, the stanza in the second Chapter of the Gītā viz.,

"आश्चर्यवत्पश्यति कश्चिदेनमाश्चर्यवद्वदति तथैव चान्यः ।
आश्चर्यवच्चैनमन्यः शृणोति श्रुत्वाप्येनं वेद न चैव कश्चित् ॥"

is evidently reminiscent of the Kāṭhaka mantra:—

"श्रवणायापि बहुभिर्यो न लभ्यः शृण्वन्तोऽपि बहवो यं न विद्युः ।
आश्चर्यो वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्धाश्चर्यो ज्ञाता कुशलानुशिष्टः ॥"

Sixthly, the line न तद्भासयते सूर्यो न शशाङ्को न पावकः occuring in Chapter XV of the Gītā is a faint, though real, echo of the mantra which is well-known for its poetic beauty and which occurs in three Upaniṣads—the Kaṭha, the Muṇḍaka and the Śvetāśvatara, and which will bear repetition any number of times :—

"न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥"

These six passages are so striking in their resemblance that even a casual reader of the Gītā and the Upaniṣad cannot fail to notice them. But the resemblance between the two scriptures does not end here. There are a number of other passages in the Gītā in which the resemblance to the Upaniṣad is not so striking, but which are, nevertheless, either in the idea or in the phrasing, derived from the same source.

Firstly, the famous description of the yoga-samâdhi, in Chapter VI seems to be based partly on the Śvetāśvatara and partly on the Kāṭhaka. The former part of the description dealing with the fit place and posture for the practice of yoga is, no doubt, derived from the second adhyāya of the Śvetāśvatara where the mantras beginning with त्रिरुन्नतं स्थाप्य समं शरीरं and समे शुचौ शर्करावह्निवालुकाविवर्जिते are prototypes of the ślokas beginning with समं कायशिरोग्रीवम् and शुचौ देशे प्रतिष्ठाप्य. But the latter part of the description seems to be a wonderful expansion of the two Kāṭhaka mantras:—

"यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।
बुद्धिश्च न विचेष्टति तामाहुः परमां गतिम् ॥
तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम् ।
अप्रमत्तस्तदा भवति योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ ॥"

The parallel verses in the Gītā begin with यदा विनियतं चित्त मात्मन्येवावतिष्ठते and end with:—

"तं विद्याद्दुःखसंयोगवियोगं योगसंज्ञितम् ।
स निश्चयेन योक्तव्यो योगोऽनिर्विण्णचेतसा ॥"

We have to note carefully here not only the लक्षण of yoga described but also the caution given at the end. योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ says the Upaniṣad. Yoga comes and goes. And hence, adds the Gītā, स निश्चयेन योक्तव्योयोगोऽनिर्विण्णचेतसा. A yogin should not be depressed at his failure, but pursue his end with determination.

But it is well-known that the words योग, युक्त and अयुक्त are used in the Gītā in a much wider sense than that of mere thought-control or concentration. The Gītā is a yoga-śāstra in a much more comprehensive sense than Patāñjali's aphorisms. Yoga in the Gītā means spiritual life which brings one into fellowship with God, and a Yogin is a holy man who lives in God whatever may be his mode of life—सर्वथा वर्तमानोऽपि स योगी मयि वर्तते. In fact, as I have elsewhere maintained, the aim of the entire scripture is to convert a सक्त into a युक्त--that is, a man of the world into a man of God. The words युक्त and अयुक्त occur in close proximity in the Gītā as in the Upaniṣad; but they have a much deeper significance than in the formulas युक्तेन मनसा सदा and अयुक्तेन मनसा सदा. Numerous examples might be quoted from the Gītā to illustrate the wider meaning attached to these words :—

"युक्त इत्युच्यते योगी समलोष्टाश्मकाञ्चनः ॥"
"नैव किञ्चित्करोमीति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्ववित् ॥"
"स बुद्धिमान्मनुष्येषु स युक्तः कृत्स्नकर्मकृत् ॥"
"जोषयेत्सर्वकर्माणि विद्वान्युक्तः समाचरन् ॥"

And above all:—

"युक्तः कर्मफलं त्यक्त्वा शान्तिमाप्नोति नैष्ठिकीम् ।
अयुक्तः कामकारेण फले सक्तो निबध्यते ॥"

Yoga is only a part of the Vidyā or a means to the Vidyā in the Upaniṣad; whereas Yoga *is* Vidyā in the Gītā. This is indicated significantly enough in the concluding formulas of the two scriptures. The Upaniṣad has विद्यामेतां योगविधिं च कृत्स्नम्. The two nouns are in conjunction. The Gītā has ब्रह्मविद्यायां योगशास्त्रे. The two nouns are in apposition.

Secondly, the description of ज्ञेय given in Chapter XIII of the Gītā in five verses teeming with metaphysical antinomies is, again, partly based on the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad and partly on the Kāṭhakopaniṣad. The first of these verses is taken bodily from the Śvetāśvatara.

"सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत्सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखम् ।
सर्वतः श्रुतिमल्लोके सर्वमावृत्य तिष्ठति ॥"

The first half of the second verse also is from the same Upaniṣad:—

"सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितम् ।
असक्तं सर्वभृच्चैव निर्गुणं गुणभोक्तृ च ॥"

But let us take the next two verses:—

"बहिरन्तश्च भूतानामचरं चरमेव च ।
सूक्ष्मत्वात्तदविज्ञेयं दूरस्थं चान्तिके च तत् ॥
अविभक्तं च भूतेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम् ।
भूतभर्तृ च तज्ज्ञेयं ग्रसिष्णु प्रभविष्णु च ॥"

These seem to me to be reminiscent of two mantras from the Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad and one from the Īśa Upaniṣad:—

"आसीनो दूरं व्रजति शयानो याति सर्वतः ।
कस्तं मदामदं देवं मदन्यो ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥
अशरीरं शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् ।
महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥
तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्वदन्तिके ।
तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः ॥"

Note especially the parallelism between:—

"अविभक्तं च भूतेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम् ।"

and

"अशरीरं शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् ॥"

And note also, in passing, that the rhetorical question कस्तं मदामदं देवं मदन्यो ज्ञातुमर्हति indicates the sublime egotism of all great mystics. The Gītā, of course, escapes from the charge, if charge it is, by making Īśvara himself the teacher.

Thirdly, there are three ślokas in Chapter XIII namely,

"अनादित्वान्निर्गुणत्वात्परमात्मायमव्ययः ।
शरीरस्थोऽपि कौन्तेय न करोति न लिप्यते ॥
यथा सर्वगतं सौक्ष्म्यादाकाशं नोपलिप्यते ।
सर्वत्रावस्थितो देहे तथात्मा नोपलिप्यते ॥
यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।
क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥"

which describe how the divine spark at the centre of our souls is untouched by sin and suffering, as ether and sunlight are unaffected by the dirt of the world. Though the words क्षेत्र and क्षेत्रज्ञ do not occur in the Kāṭhaka but occur in the Śvetāśvatara, the foregoing verses seem to be a paraphrase of the following Kāṭhaka mantra :—

"सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षु-
र्न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्बाह्यदोषैः ।
एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा
न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः ॥"

Fourthly, the last two ślokas in Chapter II of the Gītā viz.,

विहाय कामान्यः सर्वान्पुमांश्चरति निःस्पृहः ।
निर्ममो निरहङ्कारः स शान्तिमधिगच्छति ॥
एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः पार्थ नैनां प्राप्य विमुह्यति ।
स्थित्वास्यामन्तकालेऽपि ब्रह्मनिर्वाणमृच्छति ॥

seem to be, again, a paraphrase of an ancient verse quoted in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad and Kaṭhopaniṣad :—

"यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवति अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥"

The second stanza in the Gītā extract expands the meaning implied in the Upaniṣadic expression अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते—even here he becomes Brahman. And Śrī Śaṅkarācārya expands it still further when he says in his commentary on the Gītā किमु वक्तव्यं ब्रह्मचर्यादेव संन्यस्य यावज्जीवं ब्रह्मण्येवावतिष्ठते, स ब्रह्मनिर्वाणमृच्छतीति—thus probably striking a personal note.

Fifthly, the two ślokas in Chapter XI of the Gītā viz.,

"नाहं वेदैर्न तपसा न दानेन न चेज्यया ।
शक्य एवंविधो द्रष्टुं दृष्टवानसि मां यथा ॥
भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्य अहमेवंविधोऽर्जुन ।
ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परन्तप ॥"

seem to be an echo of the well-known Kāṭhaka mantra which I have already quoted in part:—

"नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः तस्यैषात्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम् ॥"

The only difference between the two passages is that the Gītā emphasises the bhakti of the worshipper and the Upaniṣad the grace of Īśwara. Both are at one in condemning the soulless ritualism which tries to do duty for religious emotion.

Sixthly, the line in the Gītā न मां दुष्कृतिनो मूढाः प्रपद्यन्ते नराधमाः which conveys the ethical implications of spiritual life is again an echo of the Upaniṣadic lines:—

"नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः ।
नाशान्तमनसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्नुयात् ॥"

Similarly, the downward path of sinful souls described by the Gītā in the verse:—

"आसुरीं योनिमापन्ना मूढा जन्मनि जन्मनि ।
मामप्राप्यैव कौन्तेय ततो यान्त्यधमां गतिम् ॥"

is reminiscent of the mantra :—

"न साम्परायः प्रतिभाति बालं प्रमाद्यन्तं वित्तमोहेन मूढम् ।
अयं लोको नास्ति पर इति मानी पुनः पुनर्वशमापद्यते मे ॥"

Seventhly the verse :—

"यदा भूतपृथग्भावमेकस्थमनुपश्यति ।
तत एव च विस्तारं ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते तदा ।"

which describes the unity of all things perceived by a seer expresses in plain unfigurative language what the Upaniṣad says in two figurative mantras :—

"यथोदकं दुर्गे वृष्टं पर्वतेषु विधावति ।
एवं धर्मान्पृथक् पश्यंस्तानेवानुविधावति ॥
यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्तं तादृगेव भवति ।
एवं मुनेर्विजानत आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥"

Lastly, there are a number of phrases in the Gītā which seem to me to be reminiscent of the Upaniṣadic phrases. I give them below:—

Gītā.	*Upaniṣad.*
1. तद्धाम परमं मम	1. तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्
2. प्राक्शरीरविमोक्षणात्	2. प्राक्शरीरस्य विस्रसः
3. य इदं परमं गुह्यम् मद्भक्तेष्वभिधास्यति	3. य इमं परमं गुह्यं श्रावयेद्ब्रह्मसंसदि
4. विवृतं सद्म नचिकेतसं मन्ये	स्वर्गद्वारमपावृतम्
5. नायं लोकोऽस्ति न परः	5. अयं लोको नास्ति पर इति मानी
6. मनुष्याणां सहस्रेषु कश्चिद्यतति सिद्धये	6. कश्चिद्धीरः प्रत्यगात्मानमैक्षदावृत्तचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन्
7. ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति	7. अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये संनिविष्टः

Moreover I find from the Concordance to the Gītā and the Upaniṣads that certain expressions like हर्षशोकौ, शरीरस्थः, पृथग्भावः occur only in the Gītā and Kaṭhopaniṣad and not in the other principal Upaniṣads. And it is rather astonishing that the word आनन्द, which plays such an important part in our Vedāntic literature, does not seem to occur either in the Gītā or the Kāṭhaka

Upaniṣad. But much cannot be made of these facts, if facts they are, which might be purely accidental.

We are on firmer, if rather too extensive, ground when we come to the form and the scope of the two gospels. Some critics are of opinion that the idea of making the Gītā a dialogue between Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the charioteer and Arjuna, the hero in the chariot drawn by white horses may have suggested itself to the author by the well-known simile in the Kaṭhopaniṣad :—

"आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु ।
बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च ॥"

Well, whatever that may be, the form of the Upaniṣad seems to have suggested some points to the author of the Gītā in choosing a form for his gospel. For both are dialogues. Both utilise an ancient story. Both have a dramatic beginning. Both employ the machinery of temptation, sorrow and death. The heroes in both the poems are disgusted with life, though the disgust of one of them is rather sudden and momentary. "अपि सर्वं जीवितमल्पमेव, तवैव वाहास्तव नृत्यगीते", says Naciketas. "किं नो राज्येन गोविन्द किं भोगैर्जीवितेन वा," says Arjuna. And the tension of the situation is very artistically intensified in the Gītā by the tears that fill the eyes of a great and world-renowned warrior.

"तं तथा कृपयाविष्टमश्रुपूर्णाकुलेक्षणम् ।
विषीदन्तमिदं वाक्यमुवाच मधुसूदनः ॥"

Disgust with life, in which death is such a tremendous and mysterious factor, is with most of us the beginning of spiritual life. Everyone who has experienced great sorrow knows that sorrow is sacred in that it very soon takes us away from our little selves and makes us throb with the throbbing heart of humanity. It teaches us many things we have not known before. It gives us a new sense by which we perceive what we have not perceived before. It makes us quiveringly sensitive to the sufferings of all creatures to which we have been indifferent before. In the temple of sorrow there is no Time. We have a taste of eternity, as we face the eternal questions of whence, and whither. Death has been the teacher of many a man besides Naciketas. Sorrow har driven many a man besides Arjuna to a mood of despair and rénunciation. There was a time when I used to laugh at the title of अर्जुनविषादयोग given to the first

Chapter of the Gītā. I now know better. We live and learn. We learn that विषाद leads to Yoga or union with God, as well as कर्म or भक्ति, and that sorrow-mysticism is as real as nature-mysticism. Dante expressed a profound truth when he said that sorrow remarries us to God. It is a subject which has had a remarkable development in Christian theology.

When we come to the scope of the teaching of the Upaniṣad and the Gītā the two scriptures at first sight appear to be poles asunder. The Upaniṣad has little reference to the duties of life. The word कर्म which plays such an important in the Gītā occurs very rarely in the Upaniṣad. The latter seems simply to brush aside the world, saying न ह्यध्रुवैः प्राप्यते हि ध्रुवं तत्. And it mentions the social orders only to say that they are swallowed up in the Absolute.

"यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च उभे भवत ओदनः ।"

On the other hand the Gītā is mainly concerned with the right way in which a man should discharge his duties. It evinces great solicitude for the maintenance of the world. It describes Īśwara as a शाश्वतधर्मगोप्ता who comes down in the form of man for धर्मसंस्थापन. The author is very anxious that Dharma should be maintained, that every man should discharge his duty according to his station in life in a selfless manner as a servant of God, and that even a wise man should set an example in this matter to the world. And hence the word लोकसङ्ग्रह which does not occur in the Upaniṣads, has became an important one in all discussions regarding the import of the Gītā. In fact, the whole trend of this scripture seems at first sight as though it reversed the Śruti-vākya न ह्यध्रुवैः प्राप्यते हि ध्रुवं तत् and read instead अप्यध्रुवैः प्राप्यते हि ध्रुवं तत् and understood literally the words अनित्यैर्द्रव्यैः प्राप्तवानस्मि नित्यं which give such trouble to commentators. For, its sublime pronouncement स्वे स्वे कर्मण्यभिरतः संसिद्धिं लभते नरः may be interpreted as an application in their literal sense of the words अनित्यैर्द्रव्यैः प्राप्तवानस्मि नित्यम्.

But the contradiction is only apparent. A closer study of the Upaniṣad and the Gītā shows that the goal of their teaching is the same. In comparing the two scriptures we should not forget the question which each of them attempts to answer. The question of Arjuna is entirely different from that of Naci-

ketas. He says पृच्छामि त्वां धर्मसम्मूढचेताः. He wants to know what his dharma really is in the peculiar circumstances in which he is placed. His question is entirely an ethical one. Whereas the question of Naciketas is a metaphysical one. 'Does the soul survive after death ?' That may sound as a curious question on the part of one who has undergone death, and who is alive enough to carry on a conversation in the other world. But, as the Vedānta-sūtras point out, the meaning of Naciketas is made clearer by his next question :—

"अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात् ।
अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च यत्तत्पश्यसि तद्वद ॥"

He does not want to know anything about dharma. On the other hand he expressly says that what he wants to know is whether there is any absolute Reality beyond the moral categories of dharma and adharma, the physical categories of cause and effect, and the temporal categories of past, present and future. Hence the Upaniṣad proceeds to establish, by means of intuitive experience, the positive character of the One, who is नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्, who is सुप्तेषु जागर्ति, who is मध्ये वामनमासीनम्, who is यतश्चोदेति यत्र च सूर्योऽस्तं गच्छति and who is above all स एवाद्य, स उ श्व एतद्वै तत्. The Gītā is not concerned with such metaphysical and psychological proofs of the existence of the Absolute.

However, divergent as their aims are, the teaching of both is essentially the same. Both deal with the reality of spiritual life, and not with the abstractions which we term religion and morality which are inseparable. Only the Gītā lays emphasis on the earlier stages of the pilgrim's progress, while the Upaniṣad lays emphasis on the later stages. The Gītā was a message delivered to the man of the world, while the Upaniṣad was a message delivered to the recluse in the forest. Nevertheless the Upaniṣad is not unmindful of the early stages, nor the Gītā of the later stages. It is pointed out by commentators that the characters introduced in the Upaniṣad—Vājaśravasa, Yama and Naciketas—represent respectively the three stages of spiritual life viz., karma, upāsanā aud jñāna. The first goes back to *saṁsāra*, the second goes by way of *krama-mukti* and the third attains *sadyo-mukti*. Moreover there are several mantras in the Upaniṣad setting forth the ethical impilications of spiritual life, the

importance of faith and the indispensable necessity of the grace of God. Similarly, there are several ślokas in the Gītā setting forth the goal of all moral endeavour and religious worship.

"सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते ।"

It is interesting to observe that the use of the word योगक्षेम in the Upaniṣad and the Gītā clearly brings out the resemblance and the difference between the two scriptures. The Upaniṣad says that it only a dull fool that concentrates his attention on योगक्षेम and prefers what is pleasant to what is good.

"प्रेयो मन्दो योगक्षेमाद्वृणीते"

Similarly the Gītā advises us not to pay attention to योगक्षेम but to possess our souls.

"निर्द्वन्द्वो नित्यसत्त्वस्थो निर्योगक्षेम आत्मवान् ।"

But it does not stop there. In another place it points out that if we renounce everything and concentrate our minds on God He will bring us back the योगक्षेम we have renounced.

"अनन्याश्चिन्तयन्तो मां ये जनाः पर्युपासते ।
तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां योगक्षेमं वहाम्यहम् ॥"

One is reminded of what the Hound of Heaven says in Francis Thompson's famous poem :—

"All which I took from thee I did but take,
Not for thy harms,
But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms."

Thus the distinction between the Upaniṣad and the Gītā is analogous to the distinction between the classical drama and the romantic drama. In the classical drama, as in the modern short story, only the crisis is visualised, and all the steps leading to it are indicated in retrospect. A strict economy of means is observed. The effect is produced by suggestion, and not by actual description. And all irrelavent matters that do not contribute to the unity of impression are scrupulously avoided. Whereas in the romantic drama, as in the modern novel, the whole story is visualised. All the steps leading to the crisis are represented. There is considerable time for growth of character and the representation of the various phases of life. Therefore the unity that this art-form aims at is a much more complex affair than the simple unity of the classical drama. In fact, its unity is unity in diversity. Similarly, while the Upaniṣads intended for the specialist

deal with the final stages of spiritual life, taking for granted the early stages, the Gītā, which is intended for the layman, covers the whole ground, works out in detail the suggestions of the Upaniṣads and emphasises that part of the teaching which is of the greatest moment to us in practical life. For this purpose the later scripture lays under contribution not one Upaniṣad but several, and not the Upaniṣads alone but several other scriptures. The Kāṭhaka-Upaniṣad is only *one* of its sources. Īśa and Śvetāśvatara Uapaniṣads are next in importance among other sources. For instance the Gītā's characteristic message of selfless action is developed out of the opening verses of the former, especially :—

"कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः ।
एवं त्वयि नान्यथेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यते नरे ॥"

and its so-called Sāṅkhya and Yoga conceptions and partly its theism are derived from the latter.

But the value of the Gītā lies to us, not in its being simply a synthesis of various Śrutis, but in its being a sincere and adequate expression of the experience of a great personality into whose being have entered not only all the Śrutis but almost all that is best in the wisdom of India. In his mouth the words of ancient wisdom become instinct with life, because he tried to tread the path which the ancient Ṛṣis had trodden, he tried to see the visions they had seen, and he tried to make their experience his own. His loyalty to the spiritual traditions he inherited was not a mere lip-loyalty. Hence his soul was not cramped by it. He lived in an era of expansion and threw open the gates of the temple of the Spirit to all classes. Let us follow his example. We too live in an age of Renaissance. We too swear by the Veda. But have we got his catholicity, his courage, his sanity, his moral grandeur and his spiritual insight? If wo don't have them, and if don't mean to have them the Gītā was written in vain.

AN AUTOLYCUS IN THE CAMP OF ZULFAQAR KHĀN AT JINJI (1690 A. D.).

BY

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*This paper is based on Ms. No. 484 of the Tamil Manuscripts preserved in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. In Vol. I of the Descriptive Catalogue of that Library (1912) it is described as follows :—" Substance, palm-leaf. Size 14¾ x 1 inches. pages, 53. Lines 5 on a page. Character, Tamil. Condition, good. Appearance, somewhat old. Complete ". The Ms. has been kindly placed at my disposal by the Curator, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.

It contains a poem entitled *Saiyakkādi pēril noṇḍi nāḍagam.* Literally translated, the title would mean the drama of the lame man (sung) about Sayyad Qādir. More freely rendered, it is the dramatic lay of the lame man, composed for the purpose of eulogizing Sayyad Qādir.

Noṇḍi nāḍagam, the drama of the lame one, is a species of Tamil drama of which there exist several specimens. It is more properly a lay, for it is but a monologue narrating in autobiographical fashion the adventures of a thief. It is called a drama because the hero puts on barbaric actor's trappings and mounts a platform and recites the poem with appropriate gestures and dance before a crowded audience. Tamil literary convention has inexorably fixed the plot of this kind of dramatic composition. It ought to begin with a prayer to some God or other and then go on to praise the God or man in whose honour it is composed. Then the thief enters on the stage in conventional actor's panoply and narrates his genealogy and his early education, wherein the thief underwent not only a practical training in the artifices of his profession, but studied the theory of the subject as expounded in books. Many such books on thief-craft, according to the evidence of Sanskrit and Tamil literature,

* The author's own system of transliteration is retained in the paper at his request.

existed in India, composed by authors, both superhuman and human. The hero then describes, according to the literary tradition prescribed for this kind of literature, how he amassed a fortune by the practice of his honourable calling and then squandered it on women. He then started on a great adventure in search of wealth. He was caught and his feet and hands were cut off. He then wandered about till he miraculously recovered them by the intervention of some supernatural power. This is the unalterable plot of dramas of this class, the only permissible variation being in the *deus ex machina* invoked to enable the hero to recover his lost limbs.

This species of drama ought to be recited as a Noṇḍiccindu. Cindu is a kind of simple tune used frequently in Tamil dramas as a contrast to the more elaborate melodies in which they abound; and though brought under one or other of the numerous melody-types (rāgas) into which all Indian musical compositions are classified, it is yet devoid of the involutions and convolutions, glides and graces, trills and tremors by means of which great singers make their mark in the musical world, and which I may briefly describe as musical punditry. The poem besides is marked by a peculiar lilt, which cannot be reproduced in an English translation. As the catalogue rather quaintly puts it, "the drama is written chiefly with a view to exemplify poetic rhythm", which is an awkward way of saying that the music of the verse can best be brought out by its being sung in the special mode called Cindu. Dramas of this class are to-day being played, just as in old times, in villages, the actor strutting on a primitive platform built on bamboo props and covered with a thatch of cocoanut leaves, and the audience, men, women and squeaking children, being seated on the sands of the village street. They attract a large audience of unsophisticated villagers. Though thus it is but the illiterate masses that to-day enjoy this kind of drama, yet it is composed in the refined literary dialect by poets who are masters of Tamil verse.

The poem is not only a Noṇḍināḍagam, a drama of the lame one, but is also sung in honour of Saiyakkādi. This name is a corruption in Tamil mouths of Sayyad Abdul Qādir. This person was a merchant-prince of Kāyal, on the Madura coast. Kāyal became the chief sea-port of the Pāṇḍyas of Madura, after the sea had retreated from Korkai, the great sea-port where the Roman ships from the age of Augustus to that of Alaric

were laden with pepper, 'dear to the Yavanas', as it is named in Sanskrit, and the muslins and the silks, the sapphires and the pearls, which gratified the vanity of the Roman ladies of those remote times and the emerald cups out of which Roman leaders of fashion drank wine. Before 100 A. D., Kolchi, as the Greek merchants called Koṟkai, was replaced by Kāyal as the great South Indian sea-port, the trade with India had passed to the hands of Arabs and Kāyal had become a Muslim town. Here at the end of the XIII century, according to Abdullah Wassāf, Takīud dīn Abdur Raḥmān was the deputy minister and adviser of Sundara Pāṇḍya Dēvar, the great Pāṇḍya Emperor of the time. A similar position was held by Sayyad Abdul Qādir under Vijaya Raghunātha Dēvar, the Sētupati, or Lord of Adam's Bridge, at the end of the XVII century.

This Sayyad Abdul Qādir was a Maraikkāyar ; the Maraikkāyar are Muslims of South India who speak a Tamil mixed with much Tamilized Arabic words. They write Tamil in Arabic character and call it Arabuttamiḻ. Their religious literature is mostly in Arabuttamiḻ. This is due to the feeling of the Moulvis who regard Tamil as the language of Kafirs and would have a special language for the Maraikkāyar if they could; but as they could not create a language for them, they tried to save the face of orthodoxy by adopting the Arabic script. A similar spirit makes Brahmanas charge their vernaculars heavily with long Sanskrit words all over India, thus gaining holiness at the expense of vigour of diction ; this same desperate bid for sanctity on the part of ecclesiastics subjugated the sturdy linguistic independence of the Anglo-saxons and changed their pithy phrase 'agenbite of inwyt' into the lumbering locution, 'remorse of conscience'. This spirit is fast dying out now and during the last twenty years serious attempts are being made to discard Arabuttamiḻ and write all books on religion, Hadīth etc., in pure Tamil. The obverse movement also existed among the Maraikkāyar. For tempering the wind to the shorn lamb, formerly they wrote select verses and Sūras and the Qurān itself in the Tamil script for the use of those who could not read Arabic. But these books are fast disappearing now.

The Maraikkāyar are passionately attached to Tamil, as the Moplahs to Malayalam. The Maraikkāyar have Tamil names, besides Muslim ones. Sayyad Abdul Qādir was known to con-

temporaries as Periya Tambi Maraikkāyar, which name assumed, in the hands of the writers of the East India Company, the form Pereatombee Mercawn. Tambi, meaning in Tamil 'younger brother', an affectionate cognomen attached to proper names, is a part of the names of many Maraikkāyar. In accordance with the custom prevalent in Tamil India from early times, by which Rājas invested their favourites with their own names and titles, Abdul Qādir was called Vijaya Ragunāda Periya Tambi, because he was the 'Minister', *i.e.*, chief adviser and a sort of Secretary of State of Vijaya Ragunāda Dēvar, the Sētupati, ruler of Ramnad.

Vijaya Ragunāda Dēvar, better known as Kiḻavaṉ Sētupati to students of South Indian history, was the strongest character amongst the South Indian Rājas of the last quarter of the XVII century. He it was that helped his brother-in-law, Ragunāda Toṇḍaimāṉ, to found the state of Pudukottah, which is to-day the only relic of Tamil rule, and the Rājas of which have been unswervingly loyal to the British ever since the East India Company entered into the whirlpool of South Indian politics in the XVIII century. Śokkanāda Nāyakan, the Rāja of Madura, was delivered from the tyranny of a usurper called Rustam Khān by the Sētupati; so he gave Vijaya Ragunāda Dēvar the title of Para Rāja Kēsari, Lion to other kings. At first Vijaya Ragdunāda Dēvar was nominally subordinate to the Nāyaka Rājas of Madura, but very soon established his independence and thus founded the line of the Sētupati Rājas of Ramnad, who have been the greatest patrons of Tamil poets since his time (1673-1710).

Friend of this Sētupati was Sayyad Abdul Qādir, Vijaya Ragunāda Periya Tambi Maraikkāyar. He had so much influence with the Sētupati that, as we shall see later, the Council of Fort St. George thought it necessary to offer him special trade privileges at Madras to induce him to secure permission for them to build a factory in the Sētupati's dominions. Periya Tambi was the Maecenas of his age. He lavishly patronized Tamil poets, of whom there were many in his time, both among the Hindus and the Muslims. During the last three hundred years there have flourished many eminent Tamil poets among the Maraikkāyar of the Madura country. These poets write pure literary Tamil, observing all the age-long conventions of

Tamil verse. Of these, Umar Pulavar, the author of Śīrāppurāṇam, a poem of about 4,000 stanzas on the life of the prophet, in excellent Tamil verse, was chief. Besides Umar, there were Kandasvami Pulavar, author of Āppanār Purāṇam, a poem in praise of Śiva, enshrined in the ancient temple of Āppanār, fifteen miles from Ramnad; Paḍikkāśu Pulavar, author of Toṇḍaimaṇḍalacatakam, an account of the geography and the literature of the Kañcīpuram country, and several others. These poets affectionately contracted the name Sayyad Qādir into Śeydakkādi or Śīdakkādi which became Śidakkāḷi in the spoken dialect. They sang his generosity in numerous stanzas of which one is translated below.

"When the clouds failed and famine prevailed, and one scalepan of rice was sold for one scalepan of gold, though his servants attempted to close his doors (against beggars) the great Śīdakkādi, the bountiful lord, proclaimed himself, by tapping his breast, as the giver of food to all". This is another. "What does it matter if the mean ones who do not give in charity live or die? What does it matter if the nux vomica tree bears fruit or no? To those who spread open their hands and beg, the great Śīdakkādi alone is the tireless giver of handfuls of red gold." When he died, numerous elegies were sung In Memorium Śīdakkādi, of which the following are two specimens. "Śīdakkādi, the Lord of Kāyal of the excellent Vajra country, who has earned much wealth, has raised a pillar of praise. Now that he has entered the grave and is hidden there, he had made poets carry the beggar's bowl and thrown a handful of dust in their mouths". "Does it at all matter whether the fools who even in a fit of abstraction will not give a Kāśu (*i.e.*, paisā), live on the earth or die? Unless Śīdakkādi, the Lord of Kāyal, who is dead and leads an excellent life in Heaven, comes back and is re-born (on earth), there is no redemption for poets".

Local tradition (of Kāyal) has it that Sayyad Qādir was a friend and disciple of Shaykh Sadaqattullāh, who was a great Arabic scholar and a Muslim saint of Kīḻakkarai, near Kāyal, and is much venerated even to-day in South India. It is said that Aurangazeb was a great admirer of this scholar-saint and invited him in vain to his court and also desired to appoint him as his Khalīfa. The saint declined the honour, but requested the Emperor to appoint his disciple, Śīdakkādi, to some high office,

Aurangazeb made him his representative in Bengal, but Śīdakkādi was too religious-minded to continue long in the office. He resigned it and on his return sent the emperor a rosary (tasbīḥ) of pearls, each as big as the bitter berry of Solanum Pubesecens, called in Tamil śuṇḍaikkāy*.

It was in honour of this Peria Tambi that the poem about which this paper is written, was composed. It was composed by a Muslim Tamil poet at about the end of the XVII century. It appropriately begins with an invocation to the Lord of all creatures, the sole Lord who is formless and at the same time not formless. It then praises the feet of Muhammad, the Anbiya who was like a cloud-like umbrella to the world, then Abu Bakr who gave to the Prophet his daughter (Āyesha) who was like the lotus-seated Lakṣmī, then Umar who cut off his dear son for misbehaving to an old man, then ' Usman who collected (in book from) the extensive Veda of Islam (Qurān), then Ali who rode the horse Duldul, faster than the wind, then Hasan and Husain, sons of Ali, the tiger (of Allāḥ) who lived in Medina, and then the Supreme Guru Muhid-Dīn. It will be noticed that the Mussulman poet follows the tradition of Hindu poets in singing the line of teachers from God downwards and, like the Puritan poet Milton, does not hesitate to introduce allusions to Pagan deities. In every stanza of this invocation to the Muse, the author announces that his object is to sing the greatness of Periya Tambi, of Vagudai in the Vajra country.

After these introductory verses, the hero enters the stage dressed as actors should. He is his own herald and announces to the world that he has tied, for the purpose of praising the greatness of Vijaya Ragunāda Periya Tambi, anklets with bells to tinkle when he dances or keeps time to his song with his feet. He has decked himself with the sarband (*i.e.* chara-band or bracelets on the upper arm), a coat of broad-cloth, (introduced by the East India Company into India), sounding anklets of heroes, and bangles of sea-shells. He has taken up a sword in one hand and in another a buckler with pieces of glass stuck on. He has trimmed his whiskers and he will show his teeth, which are like pebbles of limestone, and dance and sing the glory of Periya Tambi. He announces that he will kick all those who will

* From the life of this saint printed in the *Friend* of *Islam*, an ephemeral Tamil magazine.

not bow before his patron. After these preliminaries, he begins his autobiography. But before I summarise the account of the adventures in the exercise of the qualities of amativeness and acquisitiveness, which this light-fingered Lothario was amply endowed with, and which may be interesting to students of human nature and critics of the lighter forms of Tamil literature, but is not likely to appeal to sober historical investigators, I ought to describe the historic occasion when our Autolycus claims our notice, for thereby he has contributed in his small but humble way to help us in our historical studies.

In the year 1690, the Maratha fort of Miraj fell and Rājārām, ruler of the Maratha Empire on behalf of Sāhu, then a captive of the Emperor Aurangazeb, expecting that the next move of the Emperor would be against Vishalgadh, along with Prahlād Nīrāji, Dhāna Jādahv and Santoji Ghorpaḍe, left the place, all disguised as Liṅgāyata pilgrims. They wandered to Bangalore, where the immediate risk of detection compelled them to flee to Jinji. Rājārām installed himself there, (November, 1689) as Rāja and assumed the royal insignia. Jinji, about 80 miles south-west of Madras, thus became for a time the capital of the Marathas.

The arrival of Rājārām at Jinji caused a flutter in the bosoms of the European merchants in South India. For we find that Governor Elihu Yule and the six other persons who constituted the Council of Fort St. George meeting on the 14th November 1689 and placing on record in their Diary and Consultation Book, " We having certaine advice that Rāma Rājah king of the Marathas is come privately from His Kingdome of Punnaree to the Chingye (Jinji) countrey leaveing his Uncle, in charge of the Kingdom and family to manage the warr against the Mogull, his designe of comeing hither being reported to divert the Mogulls Army from thence and joine with the several Gentue Naigues and raise a considerable army to retake the Golconda and Vizapore Kingdomes, which there is great probability of, both places being at present very weakly gaurded and we having had several factorys under the Chingee Government where he now is, 'twas proposed and debated whether 'twas not absolutely necessary to congratulate his arrival and some suitable present be sent to soe great Prince and friend, he haveing lately been very kind and assisting to the Generalle at Bombay in their troubles, and very just and favourable to our factoryes and trade

under his Government in these parts, but considering that our appearance from hence may exasperate the Mogulls forces agst us,' twas therefore thought more safe and prudent, such civillityes be paid and managed by our chief at Conymere (Kūnimēḍu) who are directly under his Government, aud therefore can be less resented, but yt do first observe wt the french and dutch do therein, something following their methods both in respects and presents, and that we take the opportunity to improve our privilege in those parts".[1] On the 4th December, the Council resolved that "the cheif at Conimere with a suitable ritinnue do goe and Vissit King Rāma Rājah at Chingye with a present from thence wherein not much to exceed the amount of Pags 600, since the french circumstances and ours in those parts are different, where they, haveing their cheif residence and settlement in that Government, and lately built a considerable fort at Pullicherry, The Particulars of our present to be one of the Rt Honble Compas Persia horses with handsome furniture three four pieces of Broadcloth Fine and ordinary, Fyre Armes, wth : some other varityes, that may be most pleasing and acceptable to Him".[2] Again on 10 March 1690, Fort. St. George recorded a "General from Conimere of the 6th instant Adviseing of Rama Rajah's King of the Morattaes intention of visitting those parts. And on account of useing his ceremonyes about the Eclipse of the Moon wash himself in the sea which possibly may occasione a Present from them wherein they desire to be directed".[3]

Rājā Rām was in great need of money, which mere presents could not satisfy. And the Council of Fort St. George "very desireous of a Fort on those parts, which never was more necessary then now the Mogull being likely to be conqueror of these parts, notwithstanding the present rebellion, and therefore the Rt : Honble : Compas interest to have a fortifyed settlement in those parts, under another government, as well for the safety and supply of that as the security of their future trade in these parts". So they instructed Mr. Thomas Mavell & Mr. Henry Alford that "we hear that Rāma Rājah's occasions now incline him to sell it, and that the Dutch and french are treating with him about it"

1. Diary and Consultation Book, 1689, p. 92.
2. Ib. p. 94.
3. Madras Diary and Consultation Book of 1690, p. 20.

and, directed them to buy it [1] (7th May 1690). After much higgling, Tevanapatnam (afterwards Fort St. David, where Clive served soon after as a writer), was bought from Rājārām for 51,500 chuckrams on 7th September 1690.[2]

The Maratha army was now reorganised and inflicted severe losses on the Moghuls. Aurangazeb sent a small force to keep Rājarām in check until the Emperor could engage him with his main army. This scheme might have succeeded but for the activity of Santoji Ghorpaḍe and Dhānāji Jādhav. These enterprising commanders aided by Prahlād Nīrāji soon collected fresh bodies of troops and raised them to a high state of efficiency; when the Moghul force appeared that was to keep in check Rāja Rām, Santoji Ghorpaḍe and Dhānāji Jādhav at once attacked and destroyed it."[3]

After the detachment sent against Jinji had been destroyed, Santoji Ghorpaḍe and Dhānāji Jādhav developed an offensive against the Mughal, taking as usual, fort after fort, says the Muntakhabu-l-Lubāb, " Messengers now brought to the knowledge of the Emperor that the forces of Rāma Rāja had marched in various directions to ravage the territories and reduce the forts belonging to the Imperial throne. The fort of Parnala was one of the highest and most celebrated of the forts belonging to Bījāpūr, and had been captured by the royal forces with a good deal of difficulty. It was now taken with little exertion by Rāma Rāja's officers and its commandant was wounded and taken prisoner. It was also reported that Rāma Rāja had gone to the assistance of the chiefs of Jinji and was busy collecting men...... ...Many of the Mahratta chieftains received instructions from Rāma Rāja to ravage the country. They hovered round the Imperial armies and were exceedingly daring......Among them was Santa Ghorpura and Dahina Jadu, two experienced warriors and leaders of from fifteen to twenty thousand horse. Other Mahratta chiefs submitted to their leadership, and great losses were inflicted on the Imperial forces.

" Santa more especially distinguished himself in ravaging the cultivated districts, and in attacking the royal leaders. Every

1. Ib. p. 34.
2. Ib. p. 65, 72.
3. Kincaid and Parasnis. History of the Maratha people. Vol. ii, p. 78.

one who encountered him was either killed or wounded and made prisoner; or, if any one did escape, it was with his mere life, with the loss of his army and baggage. Nothing could be done for where-ever the accursed dog went and threatened an attack, there was no Imperial Amīr bold enough to resist him, and every loss he inflicted on their forces made the boldest warriors quake."

"Ismail Khān was accounted one of the bravest and most skilful warriors, but he was defeated in the first action, his army was plundered and he himself was wounded and made prisoner. After some months he obtained his release, on the payment of a large sum of money. So also Rustam Khān, otherwise called Sherza Khān, the Rustam of the time and as brave as a lion, was defeated by him in the district of Sattara, and after losing his baggage and all that he had with him, he was taken prisoner, and had to pay a large sum for his ransom.[1] Aurangazeb, "detached from the Imperial Court at Koregaon at the end of November 1689, the General Zulfaqār Khān who "marched by way of Rāichūr, Karnūl, Nandyāl, Kaḍapa, and Garamkoṇḍa and then descended into the Karnatak plain (about June 1690), fighting and capturing many forts on the way and reaching Conjeeveram in August and the environs of Jinji at the beginnings of September. Rājarām had sent his own troops with the contingents of his allies, Tanjore Trimbak Rao and Yāchappa Nāyak (who had just deserted the side of Aurangazeb, because the promises made by the Emperor on the annexation of Golkonda were not kept), north-westwards into the Karnatak plateaw to prevent the Mughal General's descent into the Eastern plains, but the terror of his name was too great and they retured without doing anything."[2] Yāchappa Nāyaka seems to have rejoined the Mughal side at this moment, for he is mentioned as one of the leaders of one of tne contingents of Zulfaqār's army by the hero of our poem.[3] Zulfaqār Khān soon reached Jinji.

Another person in whom we are more interested reached Jinji at about the same time. He was our hero, the devotee of St. Nicholas, or to be more swadeśi in phrase, the worshippr

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1. Sir H. Elliott. History of India Vol. vii, p. 346-7.
2. J. N. Sarkar's Hist. of Aurangazeb, Vol. v, pp. 68-69.
3. *Vide* extracts from Noṇḍi Nāḍagam given later on.

of "the fair God, dark as the night", enshrined "on a hill situated in the middle of a forest", the God of thieves, Kaḷḷaḻakar, the handsome God of thieves, a curious metamorphosis of Krishna, who resided in one of the oldest temples of South India, Tirumāliruñcōlai, 10 miles from Madura and was sung by Tamil poets of fifteen centuries ago in excellent Tamil verse. Our hero was the head of the thieving community of the district and as he says of himself, "one who could draw milk from a stone cow". He went to Madura to worship the God of the place, Cokkar; but he fell a victim to the charms of one of the servant-maids of the God and she relieved him of all his wealth. He then proceeded to Śrīraṅgam, where he wreaked his vengeance on ladies of easy virtue by easing one of them of her load of jewels while she was asleep. He then proceeded to Jiñji.

From now we may follow his adventures as narrated by himself. "I saw the fort of Jiñji (which is so high that) the crescent moon crawls (on its top); I saw the pettah in front of it. I saw its many streets, its flat-roofed sheds and bazaar streets". The thief observes things differently from the author of a military history. This is how Muḥammad Hāshim Khāfi Khān, author of Muntakhabu-l-Lubāb describes Jiñji. "The fortress of Jinji occupies several adjacent hills, on each of which stands a fort bearing a distinct name. Two of these hills are very high, and the forts are well-furnished with artillery, provisions, and all necessary stores.[1]" To return to the story of the thief. "In the city of Jiñji lived the son of Sivāji Rāja, the bull among the lords of war. His feet were worshipped by his enemies. The light of his face shone in all directions in the great city. He was the controller of Governors of various provinces. He was the Lord of Love and from his face issued sweet scent. He enjoyed the pleasure of drink and intoxicating drugs. He was a tiger to the enemies that opposed him, this Rāma Rāja. He owned elephants which were very fierce. He was a magnificent warrior. He wielded his sceptre in the world in accordance with the Dharma propounded by Manu. Then Sulū Kan, (the Tamil rendering of Zulfaqār Khān, a generous cloud among lords, Maka Ismāil Khān, the lion-like lord of lords, Dāud Khān

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1. He was "constantly intoxicated by the habitual use of gañja and opium". Wilkes i. 133. quoted by Jadu Nath Sarkar, History of Aurangazeb, V. p. 64

lord of men, Yāchappa Nāyaka (the ruler of Venkatagiri, and the last feeble relic of the mighty line of Vijayanagaram Emperors)" and other generals marched South. Here our hero gives the names of a number of Mughal commanders who led contingents, but the names are so heavily Tamilized, that behind the strange sea-change these names have undergone, it is almost impossible to discover their original forms. As far as it is possible to make them out they were Bahadūr Khān, Jawād Khān, Sadr Khān, Shamsheer Khān, Mā'būd Khān, Yadul Khān, Imām Khān, Khān-i-khān, Malik Candā Khān. This list is a more complete list of Mughal commanders at Jiñji than that given by existing histories and can be rivalled only by the official despatch regarding the expedition, if it is available. To return to the story, "By the order of Aurangazeb Saheb, ruler of Agra (āgarai in Tamil), these men gathered together. The Wazīrs proceeded to collect tribute from the whole of the Southern region; they had many elephants in rut, 60,000 horses, and Bundeli soldiers. The northern mountain trembled. The heads of enemies turned giddy. The pregnancy of women came to a premature end. They reached Vellore and with their cavalry they captured that place and also Wandewash. They defeated in battle Santosh Vairoj Ghorpade and drove away his army. Their enemies paid them tribute. They then proceeded against the fort of Jiñji. The drums of the Rājas whose lances were streaked with blood were sounded and they encamped near the fort. They came with great energy and, round Jiñji, like the eight elephants round the chief mountain, they pitched their tents and planted their flages (nishān). The crowds of fierce elephants surrounded the place like rows of black hills. Bushes and trees were lopped off, the forests cut down and horses were tied (to the stumps of trees). Crowds of camels and bulls that carried baggages were tethered in many rows. They placed patrols in the eight directions to guard against thieves. Vaḍugas (Telugus) and Kannaḍas (the Telugu and Canarese soldiers of Yāchappa Nāyaka) were stationed in topes and in houses. As the sea surrounds the earth, kings surrounded the camp and were allotted tents. It was not the (despicable) army of the Uriya, of Katti (a petty chief), of Nālgoṇḍa or of Golgoṇḍa. As the tide of the sea rushes over the land so the Tulukkas (literally Turks, but used wrongly in Tamil for Mussulmans generally) came, speaking an unintelligible tongue. Fearing that the Tulukkas who were full of

stratagems would take them as captives, the Marathas, no more desiring to rule, ran away from their houses. They did not mind their houses, their tape-cots, beds, pillows and standing-lamps (*i. e.*, the furniture of their bed-rooms). They did not mind their cattle, nor their children who could not run along with them. Some carried on their hips their dearly loved babes; others fond of their wealth concealed themselves near; yet others missed their beloved children and wandered hither and thither in search of them, weeping bitterly the while; not being able to recover them, they went away with intense pain in their hearts. Like the birds that wander in the sky, some took refuge in forests; others suffered from hunger. Yet others, bewailing their sad fate, stayed in mutts, and spread their cloth (on the floor) for going to sleep. Others, unable to escape, were caught and joined their palms in supplication. Thus all the people, in great distress, deserted their homes. I entered the deserted houses, and looked round as a rat in a house which the tiger has abandoned. I went back to my place and I thought that by adverse fate I could not get any booty. So I resolved to steal one of Zulfaqār Khān's horses".

The thief then disguised himself as a faqīr. Provided with a wand, a cocoanut-steel for smoking gañja, a small mat, a pair of long tongs, a bunch of peacock feathers, a cord of black wool, and other paraphernalia of a faqīr, he dressed himself in rags and tied a cummerband round and rubbed ashes on his body. His eyes were red like those of a fierce tiger. He then went in front of the tents of the Wazīrs. To resume the narrative in his own words. "They said, 'āure Kānse āye'. I replied, 'Saheb, from abil kabul āye'. They said, 'kāvure k(h) āna'. I thought that this was my good karma and went near. They ordered the churned gañja-water to be poured into my vessel. I thought that this was Brahma's dispensation and without delay, knelt, said 'bisumila' and swallowed it. Without hesitation, like a sage, I ate it in the orthodox manner. On account of the intoxication of bhang my eyes became red, my tongue and teeth became dry. I became very giddy and doubled up my legs and arms and lay bunched up in a corner. The sun set. By the grace of Yāchappa Nāyaka whose breast is adorned with a sweet-swelling garland of flowers, the cooks shouted, 'bhōn ceyya āure'." He then ate to his heart's content and went to sleep. He prowled about the camp till the night of the new moon, learning the language of the horse-grooms. At midnight,

tightening his breeches, he approached the horse of Zulfaqār Khān which looked as if it were a statue of emerald. He touched the hoofs of the horse, bowed to it, passed his hand over its face, put the bit into its mouth, and waited till the white foam came out of its mouth. He then cut off its tether, and led it outside. Then, lo ! the guards woke up and turned the night into day by lighting innumerable torches. Then our hero concealed himself in a stack of firewood, where a scorpion stung him. Like a Brāhmaṇa lady who had lost the salted fish which she had kept in secret, he could not cry out ; he gently rolled on, his skin pierced by thorns. He then dropped with a thud into a dirty pit and was caught, washed and taken to the presence of Dāūd Khān. This chief smiled and sent him on to Zulfaqār Khān who ordered his legs and arms to be chopped off. The punishment was at once executed. We may take it that the chopping off was only symbolically given effect to; very soon Māmūn Nayinār, the younger brother of Sayyad Qādir of Kāyal, happened to reach Jiñji from Chennapaṭṇam[1] (Madras).

The poem does not tell us what business Māmūn Nayinār had at Madras. But we find that on 14th November 1689 the President of Fort St. George "proposed to the Council the settling of a Factory near Tutecarry [now called Tuticorin], which we were lately encouraged to by an Invitation and hopes of procuring great quantities of Pepper"[2]. At a consultation held on 9th January 1690 it was recorded that "Haveing been long treating about a settlement in Eccogees country, [the name for the Tanjore Principality used in the Company's records even after Ekōji died] or somewhere towards Tutecaree and Comoreen to engage the peper trade in those parts, which now they invite us to, butt haveing yet come to noe agreemt : about our fortifying eta : priviledges a letter of proposalls was sent to them, which when confirmed, Tis agreed that we sent fitting Persons to settle and build a factory and commence a trade."[3]

On 30th January 1690, it was recorded at a consultation that "Prince Devora [*i. e.*, Vijaya Ragunāda Dēva, the Sētupati], near Cape Comoreen haveing often corresponded with the Pre-

1. This is the first mention of the name Chennapaṭṇam in Tamil literature.

2. Madras Diary and Consultation Book 1689 p. 91.

3. Ib. 1690 p. 2.

sident for a settlement and trade in his country, and in a late letter in answer to the President's promises to mediate with the new king of Candy on Zealon [Vimala Dharma II, acc. 1687] freedome of the English captives there as desired which he doubts not to effect, haveing a good correspondence with him and that he had lately sent the king a Present at his own charge for that purpose desireing us that we would Permitt his Merchant Pereatombee Mercawn (Periyatambi Maraikkāyar) to trade here and pay no more custome or other dutyes then the English, which in consideration of the above said is agreed to and the customer for the future orderd to receive no more of them then the English pay on noe pretence whatever".[1]

These extracts from the Madras Diary enable us to understand what business Māmūn Nayinār had in Madras. He had gone thither for furthering the cause of his brother's trade and conducting negotiations on behalf of the Sētupati to induce the East India Company to open a settlement on the Madura coast. To return to the story, Māmūn Nayinār kindly asked me 'from what town, from what country are you ?' I told him I was a thief from Tirumāliruñcolai. He said 'sabash' and gave me money for purchasing lime-fruits and oil". The slices of the acid fruit dipped in hot oil are an excellent fomentation for wounds. He gave him more money and told him to present himself, after his wounds were healed, before Periyatambi Maraikkāyar. The thief bought a horse with the money and rode on to Vālikoṇḍapuram, the southernmost outpost of the Bījāpūr Sultanate, then passed through Ariyalūr and Pudukottah, Tirumayam, Toṇḍi and other places famous in South Indian history, till he reached Rāmnād, the capital of the Sētupati. He went to the house of the crest-jewel of merchants, Periyatambi Maraikkāyar Rāja, but learnt that he was away. The thief then went to Kāyal where Māmūn Nayinār introduced our hero to Periya Tambi. The generous merchant was seated along with noblemen and the Tamil poets of his court, in right royal state. " Sīdakkādi's face brightened and his heart cooled and he listened to my story. He relieved my distress by speaking kind words to me. He said, ' let us turn this vagrant to the path of Islam', and gave me a thousand pieces". Our hero then presented himself at the Khutba paḷḷi, [Jāmi Masjid] where on

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1. Ib. p. 7.

Fridays a sermon is read before the prayer with Imām, and begged to be admitted to Islam. Sadaqatullāh recited the Kalima and the lame one repeated it after the sage. He was then taught how to say the farl prayer (farz) compulsory on every one, the sunnat, or practice of Muhammad and the nafil or supplementary prayer. He then repeated the Fātīha or benediction. He was instructed to observe the fast during Ramzān and give Zakats. He was then advised to perform the Haj pilgrimage. He got into one of Śīdakkādi's boats, reached Calicut, whence he embarked for Mecca. He saw the K a j, a b a t u l l a h. He got his initiation (Murīd) from the Sharīfs there, worshipped the Supreme God in accordance with the injunctions of the Furqān (Qurān). He then went to Medina, saw its forts (burj), the place "where the holy feet of the Nabi slanted" (*i. e.* he died). He circumambulated the house of him who drank the milk from the withered breast (of Halima). He then went to sleep and lo! during the sleep his legs and arms grew again. He suddenly got up, rendered shukr to Alla and uttered benedictions to all his patrons. The poem ends with "blessed be Rabbul A'lamīn, the Lord of all the worlds", as it began with Bismillāhi.

THE DATE OF ŚRĪ ŚAṄKARĀCĀRYA AND SOME OF HIS PREDECESSORS

BY

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There is no name in the history of Indian Philosophy which is more honoured, which is more esteemed, which is more inspiring, or perhaps which is more prominent than that of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, the illustrious son of India and the ablest exponent of the most subtle and supremely intellectual system of philosophy —the Advaita of the Upaniṣads. It is indeed very unfortunate that a trustworthy biography of such a famous philosopher has not come down to posterity; and more so, that the period in which he actually flourished is sealed to us. If the date of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya could be satisfactorily determined, it would form a landmark, an important landmark, in the history of Indian Philosophy in general and Advaita Vedānta in particular. After a good deal of controversy for more than half a century, orientalists have come to the conclusion that Śrī Śaṅkara should have flourished between 788-820 A. D. This has become a superstition amongst orientalists of modern times and to swerve from this is viewed with strong disfavour. But still, in the interests of historical truth, we have to look at these things from a scientific point of view and judge with an impartial mind. A large mass of new and interesting material throwing much light on the vexed question of the date of Śrī Śaṅkara has now become available and consequently we have to start afresh another discussion regarding his date.

I shall, at the outset, for the sake of easy reference, summarise the various theories that have been so far advanced regarding the date of Śaṅkara.

i. Śaṅkara lived in the 5th cent. B. C. and he attained *Brahmībhāva* in 476 B. C.[1].

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1. *Vide* " Age of Śaṅkara " by T. S. Narayana Sastri, Madras.

ii. The Keraḷotpatti gives a reference according to which it is made out that Śrī Śaṅkara lived in 400 A. D. and that he lived for 38 years[1].

iii. The late Hon. Justice K. T. Telang held[2] that Śrī Śaṅkara should have flourished between 550-590 A. D.; his reasons are

(*a*) mention of *Srughna* and *Pāṭaliputra* in the Bhāṣya on II-i-17. The city of Pāṭalitputra ceased to exist after 750 A. D.[3]:

(*b*) Pūrṇavarman, mentioned in the Bhāṣya II-i-17 is in all probability, a historical personage and Cunningham places him in 630 A. D.[4], though he should have actually flourished at the end of the 6th century:

(*c*) the work Koṅgudeśarājākkaḷ in the Mackenzie Collection mentions one Trivikramadeva Cakravartī as having been converted to Śaivism by Śrī Śaṅkara. Prof. Bhandarkar places him on independent grounds in 526 A. D.

(*d*) Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya on the Sāṅkhyakārikā was translated into Chinese during the period of the Ch' en dynasty which ruled between 557-583 A. D.[5]

iv. Dr. Burnell in the preface to his edition of the Sāmavidhānabrāhmaṇa places Śrī Śaṅkara between 652-680 A. D. mainly because he was a contemporary of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, who was in turn a contemporary of Dharmakīrti who lived between 629-658 A. D. in the reign of Srong-tsan-gam-po[6].

v. Dr. J. F. Fleet, on the strength of a statement in the Vaṁśāvaḷi[7] of Nepal[8] says that Śrī Śaṅkara visited that country during the last days of Vṛṣadeva or immediately after his death. This Vṛṣadeva was reigning in Nepal between 630-655 A. D.

vi. Mr. B. Suryanarayana Rao in his "History of Vijayanagar" traces the geneology of the heads of the Śṛṅgeri Mutt and arrives at the conclusion that Sureśvarācārya, the pupil of Śrī

1. *Vide* I. A. Vol. VII, p. 282; Vol. XIII, p. 95 ff.
2. „ I. A. Vol. XIII, p. 95 ff.
3. Report of Archaeological Survey Vol. VIII, p. xiii & 20 ff.
4. Archaeological Report 1879—1880.
5. *Vide* J. R. A. S. Vol. XII, p. 355, ff.
6. This information is from Tibetan Sources.
7. *Vide* I. A. Vol. XVI, p. 41—42.
8. Compare Wright's History of Nepal p. 118 ff; 123.

Śaṅkara passed away in 773 A. D. Consequently Śrī Śaṅkara belongs to the beginning of the 8th century.[1]

vii. Prof. D.R. Bhandarkar regards Balavarman mentioned in Bhāṣya on II-iv-1 and IV-iii-5 as a historical personage and contemporary of Śrī Śaṅkara. According to him, this Balavarman is probably identical with the Balavarman mentioned in the Kadab plates of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Govinda III who belongs to 767-785 A. D. So Śrī Śaṅkara should be assigned to the same period.[2]

viii. So early as 1877, Prof. Teile in his " Outlines of the History of Ancient Religions" placed Śrī Śaṅkara between 788-820 A. D.[3]

Prof. Pathak found in an anonymous work a verse which reads as follows :—

निधिनागेभवह्न्यब्दे विभवे शङ्करोदयः ।
कल्यब्दे चन्द्रनेत्राङ्कवह्न्यब्दे गुहाप्रवेशः [प्राविशद्गुहाम्] ॥
वैशाखे पूर्णिमायां तु शङ्करः शिवतामगात् ।

From this, he concludes that Śrī Śaṅkara was born in Kali 3889 (788 A. D.) and died in Kali 3921 (820 A. D.)[4]

ix. Mr. S. V. Venkatesvara Aiyar thinks that Śrī Śaṅkara is later than the Śaiva saints Tirujñānasambandha, Sundaramūrti, and Mathurakavi of 8th Cent. and earlier than Nāthamuni of the 10th century.[5] Later, in 1916 he placed the birth of Śrī Śaṅkara in 805 A. D. on the strength of the statement तुङ्गस्थे सूर्ये कुजे रविसुते च गुरौ च केन्द्रे found in the Śaṅkaravijaya attributed to Mādhavācārya; but at the same time he would not believe the remark made therein that he lived only for 32 years. The date of Śrī Śaṅkara according to him is 805-897 A. D.[6]

x. Mr. Balakrishna Pillai identifies the Manukulāditya referred to by Sarvajñātman, pupil of Sureśvara, as his patron, with the king of that name mentioned in the inscription of Bhāskara Ravi Varman of 978 A. D. and consequently says that

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1. *Vide* I. A. Vol. XLIII, p. 272.
2. *Vide* I. A. Vol. XLI, p. 200.
3. I. A. Vol. XI, p. 263 (Editor's note).
4. I. A. Vol. XI, p. 174-175.
5. I. A. Vol. XLIV, p. 164 ff.
6. J. R. A. S. 1916 pages 153 ff.

Śrī Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman and Manukulāditya should be referred to the beginning of the 10th Cent. A. D.[1]

I have thus briefly set forth the theories that have been put forward till now regarding Śrī Śaṅkara's date. My own conclusions differ from most of these. I shall state my position first and then answer the points raised in the theories of others.

Two incontrovertible dates *i. e.*, that of Bhartṛhari on the one hand and that of Vācaspati-miśra on the other, practically fix the upper and lower limits of Śrī Śaṅkara's life. Accepting the testimony of I-Tsing, the Chinese traveller, (there is no argument to discard it), Bhartṛhari should have lived between 600-650 A. D. for about the latter year he died. Vācaspati-miśra according to his own statement,

न्यायसूचीनिबन्धोऽयमकारि सुधियां मुदे ।
श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रेण वस्वङ्कवसुवत्सरे ॥

composed the Nyāyasūcīnibandhana in 898 saṁvat or 841 A. D. Later than Bhartṛhari and earlier than Vācaspati-miśra, Śrī Śaṅkara should have flourished, between 600-841 A. D.

Tradition holds that Śrī Śaṅkara had occasion to meet the great mīmāṁsaka teacher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa during the last hours of his life. At that time Śrī Śaṅkara had finished writing his Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras, so says the tradition. The same tradition also holds that Śrī Śaṅkara had an intellectual conflict with one of the pupils of Kumārila (*i. e.*,) Maṇḍana-miśra. Till now no evidence that can come into conflict with this chronological position of Kumārila, Maṇḍana and Śrī Śaṅkara has been brought forward by any scholar. Hence there is no room to disbelieve the authority of tradition in this respect. Now what is the date of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa? Bhavabhūti's date gives the clue to that of Kumārila. Bhavabhūti, otherwise known as Uṁveka, was one of the pupils of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and he was patronised by Yaśovarman of Kanouj about 720 A. D. The life-time of Bhavabhūti therefore must be approximately fixed between 650-720 A. D. Kumārila refers to Dharmakīrti in his Ślokavārtika and quotes from the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. Dharmakīrti was alive about 639 A. D. and Bhartṛhari died in 650 A. D. So the date of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa would fall approximately between 620 and 680 A. D.

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1. I. A. Vol. L, p. 136.

The date of Kumārila being thus settled, the date of Maṇḍana-miśra also becomes clear. He was, along with Prabhākara and Bhavabhūti, a pupil of Kumārila. He should, therefore, be assigned to the same period to which we would assign Kumārila. He would have been younger than Kumārila by probably a decade or two. His date will therefore fall between 650-700 A. D. There is a clear and persistent tradition that Śrī Śaṅkarācārya met Maṇḍana-miśra after he met Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, and by that time he had finished his Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras. Now Amalānanda in his Kalpataru declares that Maṇḍana-miśra had occasion to criticise a particular statement of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya made in his Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras. In commenting upon the passage of the Bhāmatī

स्थितप्रज्ञश्च न साधकः । तस्य उत्तरोत्तरध्यानोत्कर्षेण पूर्वप्रत्ययानव- [स्थितत्वात् ।

Amalānanda says :—

नियोगस्तथास्त्विति विधिः अनुयोग : कथमेतदिति चोद्यम् । भाष्ये स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणनिर्देशो जीवन्मुक्तिसाधक उक्तः । तत्र स्थितप्रज्ञः साधको न साक्षात्कारवान् इति मण्डनमिश्रैरुक्तं दूषणमुद्धरति—स्थितप्रज्ञश्चेति ॥

pp. 958-959 Nirṇayasāgara Edition.

If, thus, Maṇḍana-miśra, a pupil of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa presupposes Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, the only satisfactory chronological relation between these people would be that they should have been contemporaries. Śrī Śaṅkara did not quote from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa for he was not aware of his work till he saw him. Maṇḍana had some differences of opinion and consequently he stated them. Maṇḍana-miśra was a pupil of Kumārila and consequently freely quoted from his works. The Brahmasiddhi contains numerous quotations from the Ślokavārtika. Prabhākara was his co-pupil and Prof. Kuppuswami Sastriar has shown that Maṇḍana quotes from the Bṛhatī. I would, therefore, fix 655-687 A. D. as the date of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, of course assuming that he lived only for 32 years. The year 655 A. D. is subject to correction by a few years this way or that.

This is corroborated by other evidences also. Maṇḍana-miśra quotes in the Brahmasiddhi (on page 150) one of Gauḍapāda's Kārikās on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.[1]

1. This is taken from the Madras Edition of the Brahmasiddhi, to be issued shortly, edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, Curator, Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras.

कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।
प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु तुर्ये न सिध्यतः ॥

Gauḍapāda is the *prācārya* of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya.

There is one important fact which is worthy of consideration. Sureśvara, the author of the Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtika, wrote the work probably immediately after the death of his master, or during his last days. Vidyānanda, a Jain author quotes one of the verses of Sureśvara from the Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika in his Aṣṭāsāhasrī. What is the date of this Vidyānanda ? The lower limit to his date is furnished by Jinasena the author of the Bṛhaddharivaṁśapurāṇa. Jinasena wrote that work in Śaka 705 or 783 A. D.[1] as given by him at the end of that Purāṇa thus :—

शाकेष्वब्दशतेषु सप्तसु दिशं पञ्चोत्तरेषूत्तरां
पातीन्द्रायुधनाम्नि कृष्णनृपजे श्रीवल्लभे दक्षिणाम् ।
पूर्वं श्रीमदवन्तिभूभृति नृपे वत्साधिराजे परां
सौर्यानामधिमण्डलं जययुते वीरे वराहेऽवति ॥

........शान्तेः शान्तिगृहोचितः सुरचितो वंशो हरीणामयम् ॥

From this we understand that Jinasena composed his Harivaṁśa in 705 Śaka or 783 A. D. This Jinasena refers to a predecessor of his by name Vidyānanda—the author of the Aṣṭāsāhasri. This Vidyānanda must consequently be older than 783 A. D. We may fix his date in the first quarter of the 8th Cent. A. D. Now Vidyānanda quotes in his Aṣṭāsāhasrī a verse from Sureśvara's Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtika.[2] If an author living in the beginning of the 8th century quotes from a previous writer, one conclusion is certain that the writer from whose work

1. C. Mobel Duff in her "Chronology of India" records the fact that Jinasena wrote in 705 Śaka (783 A. D.)

2. The passage in the Aṣṭāsāhasrī runs as follows :—

तदुक्तं बृहदारण्यकवार्त्तिके—
आत्मापि सदिदं ब्रह्म मोहात्पारोक्ष्यदूषितम् ।
ब्रह्मापि स तथैवात्मा सद्वितीयतयेक्ष्यते ॥

History of Indian Logic Prof. S. C. Vidyabhushana, Page 187.

This verse occrus as No. 909 in the Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyasambandhavārtika. The second ardha has a slightly different reading there *i.e*, ब्रह्मापि संस्तथैवात्मा सद्वितीयतयेक्ष्यते.

the quotation is taken must be older than the 8th century. Now, therefore, Sureśvara cannot be regarded later than the first quarter of the 8th cent. A. D. ; and Sureśvara was one of the direct pupils of Śrī Śaṅkara. The traditional date of Śrī Śaṅkara (*i. e.*, 788-820 A. D.) has therefore to be discarded.

There are other considerations which compel us to discard this date. Padmapāda was one of Śrī Śaṅkara's pupils and Vācaspati-miśra who was living in 841 A. D. quotes from the work of Padmapāda. It would be difficult to maintain that he was quoting in 840 from a writer who was the pupil of a teacher living between 788-820 A. D. The following references may be noted :—

ये तु आकाशशब्दो ब्रह्मण्यपि मुख्य एव नभोवदित्याचक्षते तैः "अन्यायश्चानेकार्थत्वम्" इति च "अनन्यलब्धः शब्दार्थः" इति च मीमांसकानां मुद्राभेदः कृतः

Bhāmatī on I-iii-17.

पञ्चपाद्यां तु रूढिरुक्ता, तां दूषयति—ये त्विति ॥

Amalānanda's Kalpataru.

ii अत एव पुरुष इति पुरुषमनूद्य न वैश्वानरो विधीयते.

Bhāmatī I-ii-26.

पञ्चपादीकृतस्तु वाजसनेयिवाक्यस्यापि आत्मोपक्रमत्वलाभे किं शाखान्तरालोचनयेति पश्यन्तः पुरुषमनूद्य वैश्वानरत्वं विधेयमिति व्याचक्षते; तद्दूषयति—अत एवेति ।

Amalānanda's Kalpataru.

Now these two extracts show that Vācaspati-miśra had access to the Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda. If Śrī Śaṅkara had been living in 820 A. D., his pupil should certainly be later and it would be improbable to say that he was criticised in 841 A. D.

Such references and quotations are possible among contemporaries but they must have been known to each other very well; and the way in which Vācaspati-miśra refers to the author of the Pañcapādikā does not show such sort of relationship as would exist between contemporaries. This difficulty may be easily explained away if we push back the date of Śrī Śaṅkara by about a century or even more.

Bhāskara, the author of a Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras, written from the point of view of the *bhedābheda vāda*, criticises

Śrī Śaṅkara in a number of places. He is in turn criticised by Vācaspati-miśra who maintains the view of Śrī Śaṅkara against Bhāskara. This makes Bhāskara older than Vācaspati-miśra. Vācaspati-miśra criticises Bhāskara in many places and I would invite attention to the following extracts.

i यथाहुः—कार्यरूपेण नानात्वमभेदः कारणात्मना ।
हेमात्मना यथाभेदः कुण्डलाद्यात्मना भिदा ॥

Bhāmatī Page 118.

This verse is taken from Bhāskara's Bhāṣya and it occurs in page 18 of Bhāskarabhāṣya. (Chowkhamba edition).

ii न च प्राणमयादिषु विकारार्थत्वायागोत् स्वार्थिको मयडिति युक्तम्

Bhāmatī Page 178

भास्करोक्तमाशङ्क्याह—न चेति.

Amalānanda's Kalpataru.

iii ये तु प्रधानं पूर्वपक्षयित्वा अनेन सूत्रेण परमात्मैवाक्षरमिति सिद्धान्तयन्ति.

Bhāmatī page 284.

भास्करस्तु अस्थूलमनणु इत्यादेर्वर्णेष्वप्राप्तनिषेधत्वानुपपत्तेरधिकरण-मन्यथयामास । तदनूद्य दूषयति—ये त्वित्यादिना

Amalānanda's Kalpataru.

There are many more instances but they are not referred to for want of space. We find from these extracts that Vācaspati had to uphold Śrī Śaṅkara at every step against Bhāskara. There are reasons to think that Bhāskara had before him the Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda also. Now two writers (*i. e.*) Bhāskara and Padmapāda precede Vācaspati. Śrī Śaṅkara should have lived at least two generations before the time of Vācaspati-miśra. This will certainly disprove the present theory regarding the date of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya.

One of the traditions, among many, is the one which makes Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's pupil Hastāmalaka a son of Prabhākara-miśra. If this tradition were genuine, then it strengthens our position. Prabhākara and Śrī Śaṅkara should have been contemporaries. The chronology of the writers of the period between 600-800 A. D. may be tabulated as follows :—

Gauḍapāda (600-650)
|
Govindabhagavatpāda (620-680)
(pupil)
|
Śrī Śaṅkarācārya (655-687)
(pupil)

Padmapāda (675-720) (pupil) | Sureśvara (675-720) (pupil) | Toṭaka (pupil) | Hastāmalaka (pupil) (son)

Bhartṛhari (died in 651 A. D).

Kumārilabhaṭṭa (620-680 A. D).

Prabhākara (650-700) (pupil) | Maṇḍana (650-700) (pupil) | Bhavabhūti (655-720) (pupil)

Prabhākara: Hastāmalaka (pupil) (son) | Maṇḍana: Śālikanātha (pupil) | Bhavabhūti: Mahodadhi (pupil)

Bhāskara (750-800 A. D.)
Vācaspatimiśra (841 A. D.)

The chronological relation is almost correct though the actual number of years may vary in certain cases by a few years this side or that ; but it matters very little.

We may now dispose of the arguments of scholars who place him either before or after the period I have assigned (*i. e.*, 655-687 A. D.).

i. The theory that states that Śrī Śaṅkarācārya lived in the 5th century and attained *Brahmībhāva* in 476 B. C. does not deserve to be criticised. Historians, I am sure, will be amused to hear that even now some people are upholding such a view. They probably believe that the greatness of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya would be enhanced if he is put back by millenniums. We have only to pity them ; they are not aware of the fact that a thing is not great simply because it is old. I would only remind them of the oft-quoted verse of Kālidāsa पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वम्. The promulgators and the now living trustees of this important discovery may well keep it for themselves without trying to delude themselves with the belief that at least some swallow them. They are simpletons and let us have nothing to do with them.

ii. The second of the theories stated above is the one which places Śrī Śaṅkara in 400 A. D. and makes him live for 38 years. Now the tradition that is persistently and assiduously recorded by almost all Sanskrit writers is that Śrī Śaṅkarācārya lived for 32 years alone. This is, perhaps, the only work that gives him 6 years more to live ; and the work itself was compiled only very lately and consequently much faith cannot be placed on its authenticity.

iii. Justice Telang's argument for placing Śrī Śaṅkara between 550-590 A. D. are worthy of consideration. According to him and according to Mr. Cunningham also, Pāṭaliputra ceased to exist only after 750 A. D. The reference to Pāṭaliputra therefore need not compel us to place Śrī Śaṅkara before even 600 A. D. The date which I now assign to him certainly falls in a period when Pāṭaliputra was still an important city. The date assigned to Pūrṇavarman by Cunningham is 630 A. D. and this fits in very well with my date of Śrī Śaṅkara. The reasons for placing Pūrṇavarman in the last quarter of the 6th century are not really convincing. Mr. Taylor has pointed out in the Madras Journal of Literature and Science[1] that the reference to Śrī Śaṅkara in the Koṅgudēśarājākkaḷ in the Mackenzie collection is a mistake. Professor Belvalkar has shown[2] that the Chinese translation of the commentary on the Sāṅkhyakārikā should be

1. Vol. XIV, pages 14 ; 65.
2. Refer to the Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume.

that of Māṭhara and not that of Gauḍapāda as was supposed by other orientalists. So that argument cannot stand. It may be taken therefore that Mr. Telang took a view very similar to that of mine.

iv. Dr. Burnell's view is the same as that of mine and I may say that in a way it summarises my conclusions.

v. Dr. Fleet's arguments do not come into conflict either with Dr. Burnell's arguments or that of mine. They only add strength to the position taken up by me and Dr. Burnell.

vi. The genealogy of the Ācāryas preserved in one Mutt does not agree with that preserved in another and consequently we are at a loss to know as to the genuineness of the lists. The genealogy traced by Mr. Suryanarayana Rao cannot be implicitly relied upon unless there are corroborative evidences. We have to discard therefore that genealogy for our present purposes.

vii. Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar regards Balavarman as a historical person, probably without any strong reasons. Even granting that he was a historical personage, there is no guarantee that he was Śrī Śaṅkara's contemporary. The identification of this supposed historical Balavarman with the Balavarma mentioned in the Kadab Plates of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa King Govinda III who reigned between 767-785 A. D. is based on nothing but a simple identity of names. There is no other argument. There have been ever so many Balavarmans and Prof. Bhandarkar's arguments cannot stand.

viii. The work from which the verse निधिनागे etc. was taken to give the exact date of Śrī Śaṅkara is an anonymous work and much faith need dot be put in such a work. Even granting that it is very authentic, it probably records the date of a Śaṅkarācārya and not that of the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and other works.

ix. I have already pointed out the difficulties which prevent us from accepting 788-820 as the date of of Śrī Śaṅkara. It is hence unnecessary to answer the arguments of Mr. S. V. Venkatesvara Aiyar. In fact is its very difficult for him to maintain that Śrī Śaṅkara was later than Triujñānasambandha, Sundaramaūrti, Mathurakavi and others. And the dates of the Śaiva saints have not been settled beyond doubt.

x. Sarvajñātman's reference to Manukulāditya induces Mr. Balakrishna Pillai to place all these people (*i. e.*, Śrī Śaṅkara

Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman etc.) in the beginning of the 10th century. It seems to me that Sarvajñātman has been wrongly supposed to be the pupil of Sureśvara. Sarvajñātman at the end of his Saṅkṣepaśārīraka says :—

श्रीदेवेश्वरपादपङ्कजरजःसम्पर्कपूताशयः
सर्वज्ञात्मगिराङ्कितो मुनिवरः संक्षेपशारीरकम् ।
चक्रे सज्जनबुद्धिमण्डनमिदं राजन्यवंशे नृपे
श्रीमत्यक्षतशासने मनुकुलादित्ये भुवं शासति ॥

IV-62.

Sarvjñātman's teacher is here called *Deveśvara* and not *Sureśvara.* The colophon at the end of each of the adhyāyas of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka consistently says that Deveśvara is the teacher of Sarvajñātman. Consequently I think that Sarvajñātman is not a pupil of Sureśvara but a different person altogether. This Sarvajñātman may belong to 978 A. D. or thereabout and it does not affect our arguments.

Another important fact may be noted here. According to all the available commentaries on the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka, the auothor, Sarvajñātman had access to the Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktātman. The following reference is worthy of consideration :—

चिंतिभेदमभेदमेव वा द्वयरूपत्वमथो मृषात्मताम् ।
परिहृत्य तमो निवर्तनं प्रथयन्ते खलु मुक्तिकोविदाः ॥

Saṅkṣepaśārīraka IV-14.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in commenting upon the above verse says:—मुक्तिकोविदाः—इष्टसिद्धिकाराः

Rāmatīrtha's gloss runs thus :—

मुक्तिकोविदा इष्टसिद्धिकारादयः पण्डिता इत्यर्थः ।

Agnicitpuruṣottama explains. :—

मुक्तिकोविदा इष्टसिद्धिकारादयः ।

If we take it that the tradition recorded by the commentators is reliable, then Sarvajñātman has to be placed after the author of the Iṣṭasiddhi.

Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar drew my attention to the following passage in the Pramāṇamālā. (page 4. Chowkhamba edition.)

एतदेवोक्तं गुरुभिः—
नान्यत्र कारणात् कार्यं न चेत्तत्र क्व तद्भवेत् ।

This verse belongs to the Iṣṭasiddhi and from this we have to conclude that Ānandabodha, the author of the Pramāṇamālā was the pupil of Vimuktātman. These writers seem to have been contemporaries of Prakāśātman, the author of the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa. Sarvajñātman who refers to the Iṣṭasiddhi (according to the commentators) should be later than Vimuktātman. He was probably his younger contemporary and all these writers belong to the last quarter of the 10th century A. D.

Thus we see that after all no serious argument has been brought forward by anybody which may disprove the date which has been suggested in the preceding pages.

The date which I suggest gives rise to a number of important issues. Firstly, who is the Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya[1] presupposed by Śrī Śaṅkara at the end of the Samanvayādhikaraṇabhāṣya? What is his date?

Professor Kuppuswami Sastriar suggests three possibilities regarding the identification of Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya:

1. He might be identical with Kubja Pāṇḍya or Kūṉ Pāṇḍya;
2. He might be the same as Sambandha; or
3. He might be some unknown author who was living before Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa.

Now the date which I have suggested for Śrī Śaṅkara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa eliminates the first two of the possibilities noted above. The date of Kūṉ Pāṇḍya and Tirujñānasambandha falls between 640-700 and consequently they were younger contemporaries of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Kūmarila could not have quoted from the work of an younger contemporary. On the other hand there are sufficient reasons to think that this Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya is older than Śabarasvāmin and that his Vārtikas were based on some Vṛtti other than Śabarasvāmin's on the Pūrvamīmāṁsā and Uttaramīmāsṁā sūtras. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa refers to one such vārtika on a Vṛtti. He says :—

सूत्रेष्वेव हि तत्सर्वं यद्वृत्तौ यच्च वार्तिकं ।
सूत्रं योनिरिहार्थानां सर्वं सूत्रे प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥

इति ये वदन्ति तान्प्रत्युच्यते । न किंचित्साधनमप्रदर्शितिविषयं स्वार्थं साधयति । तत्र च पूर्ववदेव त्रेधा संशयमुपन्यस्तवान् । सूत्रकारेण

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1. For other particulars about Ācārya Śundara Pāṇḍya, refer to J. O. R. Vol. I, pages 1—10.

चेह हेतुमात्रमुपात्तम् । न चार्थप्रकरणादिभिरप्युदाहरणप्रतिज्ञासंशयहेतूनां अन्यतममुपलभ्यते । ....[इदं] पदं सूत्रकारेण नोपात्तम, इदं वृत्तिकारेण इत्येतत्प्रदर्शनार्थं एतद्वर्णयन्ति । तदिह भगवानुपवर्षः किल अग्निहोत्रे धेनुदोहाधिकारे श्रुतमिदं वाक्यमुदाहृतवान् 'वत्समालभेत' इति ।
Pages 606-607.

From this extract it is clear that the Vṛttikāra in this context is Upavarṣa and naturally the Vārtika referred to in the verse is a Vārtika based on the Vṛtti. Kumārila was aware of the Vārtika of Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya. Therefore it requires no great imagination to draw the conclusion that the same Vārtikakāra is referred to in this passage also. This tends towards the conclusion that the Vārtika of Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya is on the Vṛtti of Upavārṣa.

Śabarasvāmin quotes in his Bhāṣya (Page 37 Vol. II) a verse which runs thus :—

कुर्यात्, क्रियेत, कर्तव्यं, भवेत्, स्यादिति पञ्चकम्

with the prefatory note पदवाक्यार्थन्यायविदः । The same verse is quoted by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya with the note न्यायविदां स्मरणम. Amalānanda while commenting on the passage refers to this verse as a वार्तिक and he was familiar with Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya's Vārtika. The Vārtika in question *(i.e.)* कुर्यात etc. is probably taken from Sundara Pāṇḍya's work. If this is proved then there is no doubt that his is much earlier than even Śabarsavāmin. So much with regard to Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya.

The next predecessor that we have to notice here is Dramiḍācārya. It has been pointed out[1] by Prof. S. Kuppusvami Sastriar that the Dramiḍa presupposed by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya is the same as the Dramiḍacārya referred to in Viśiṣṭādvaita literature. He also suggests that Dramiḍācārya may be identified with Tirumaḻiśai āḻvār. Now this āḻvār is assigned by historians like the late Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Rao to the first quarter of the eighth century. The date that we have assigned for Śrī Śaṅkarācārya is 655-687 and consequently Dramiḍa's date would fall much earlier than 650 A. D. Is it not clear from this that Dramiḍa cannot be identified with one who was living much later

1. Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference

than 687 A. D.? Tirumaḻiśai cannot be Dramiḍācārya if we accept 655-687 A. D. as the date of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya.

We may pass on to Upavarṣa. It has been already pointed out by Mahāmahopādhyāya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar that Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa might have been identical. Probably they were ; but that is not our concern at present ; we have only to discuss the date of Upavarṣa.

Upavarṣa seems to have commented upon both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsā Sūtras. References to both the works are available. Now Vācaspati Miśra in commenting upon Śrī Śaṅkara's explanation of the word ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा observes as follows :—

षष्ठीसमासप्रदर्शनेन प्राचां वृत्तिकृतां 'ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति चतुर्थीसमासः परास्तो वेदितव्यः ।

It is agreed on all hands that the प्राचीनवृत्तिकार mentioned in the extract cited above is Upavarṣa. From this we understand that Upavarṣa advocated the *Caturthī Samāsa*. We have to look into the history of the *Caturthī Samāsa*. The Sūtra of Pāṇini on which this *samāsa* is based is चतुर्थी तदर्थार्थबलिहितसुखरक्षितैः। Kātyāyana supplemented the Sūtra by two vārtikas-(*i.e.*) तादर्थ्ये-समासे प्रकृतिविकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् , अश्वघासादयश्च, and in the case of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा it should be included under the group अश्वघासादि. Later on Patañjali declared अश्वघासादयस्तु षष्ठीसमासा एव. After this last statement of Patañjali there is no room to explain the compound in the way in which the *Prācīnas* have explained it. The only basis for such an explanation is the Sūtra as also Kātyāyana's Vārtika to some extent. Would it be far-fetched to suppose that if the Vṛttikāra had known the statement of Patañjali अश्वघासादयस्तु षष्ठीसमासाः he would not have gone against it for it was considered a sin to go against Patañjali. The Statement यथोत्तरं मुनीनां प्रामाण्यम् was so strictly followed. Arguing historically it cannot be far-fetched if it is surmised that the Vṛttikāra in question was living at a time when Patañjali had not written his Bhāṣya.

If this is agreed to, a corroborating statement may be found in the Bṛhatkathā which tells us that Upavarṣa and Varṣa were the elder contemporaries of Patañjali. This may place Upavarṣa in the 2nd century B. C.

Since writing the above article, I came across an interesting bit of information in a work called Śaṅkaravijayavilāsa attribu-

ted to one Cidvilāsa. The following passage from canto 25 of that work is worthy of considsration :—

काञ्चीं वरदराजस्य राजधानीमवाप सः ।
इयाज वेधा यत्रैव समुद्दिश्याम्बुजेक्षणम् ॥ ७ ॥
सोऽप्याविरासीत्सन्तुष्टो वपामेवोद्वहन्मुखे ।
पश्यत्सु सर्वदेवेषु यज्ञकुण्डहुताशनात् ॥ ८ ॥

तत्रत्यो राजसेनोऽपि राजा राजन्वतीं धराम् ।
कर्तुमेतन्निशम्याथ वृत्तं देशिकवाञ्छितम् ॥ १२ ॥
तत्पुत्रमित्रसेनानीसचिवस्सहबान्धवः ।
शङ्कराचार्यवर्यस्य जगाहे सविधं मुदा ॥ १३ ॥

श्रीमान् वरदराजोऽसौ वरदो जगतामपि ।
श्रीकान्तोऽपि कृतातङ्को ह्यनालयकृताश्रयः ॥ १९ ॥
सा सर्वमङ्गलात्रैव कुत्रापि च गृहान्तरे ।
तदर्थमत्रनिर्माप्य देवालयमनुत्तमम् ॥ २० ॥
परस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तेः कमाक्ष्याश्च महौजसः ।
प्रतिष्ठा करणीयेति तत्र कर्ता त्वमेव हि ॥ २१ ॥

....

यथोक्तं कारयामास पुरीं लक्षणलक्षिताम् ।
देवालयत्रयं तत्र पृथगेव विनिर्ममे ॥ २४ ॥
शिवकाञ्चीति तत्रैकामेकाम्रेशकृताश्रयाम् ।

....

नाम्ना तत्रैव कामाक्ष्याः पार्श्वे प्रासादमुन्नतम् ॥ २९ ।
विष्णुकाञ्चीति नाम्नान्यां तोरणादिपरिष्कृताम् ।
श्रीमद्वरदराजस्य सौधमन्यत्समुज्ज्वलम् ॥ ३० ॥

यत्वस्ति किंचिद्वैकल्यं क्षम्यतां किंकरस्य मे ।
इत्युक्त्वा पुरतः स्थित्वा राजसेनो महीपतिः ॥ ३३ ॥

We gather from these verses that at the time Śrī Śaṅkara visited the city of Kāñcī, there was a king by name Rājasena and through him Śrī Śaṅkarācārya built the temples which now adorn that famous city. The Rājasena referred to in the above passage may be identified with the Pallava King Rājasihma, alias Narasihmavarman II, the founder of the Kailāsanātha temple. The name Rājasena in the extract quoted above is very probably a mistake for Rājasihma. Rājasihma written illegibly in the Grantha and Malayālam characters could easily be read as Rājasena. The confusion seems to have arisen in that way. During the period prior to the 10th century A. D. there was no king in the history of Kāñci by name by Rājasena ruling there. If we can inentify Rājasena with any king, it could only be Rājasihma. The date of Narasihmavarman II falls in the the last quarter of 7th century and the beginning of the 8th century of the Christian Era.

One may raise a question as to the possibility of attributing the construction of these temples to the Pallava Rājasihma. So far as the Ekāmreśvara temple is concerned, we can very easily prove that a portion of the temple is even earlier than Rājasihma. Prof. Dubreui has shown in the pamphlet "The Conjeevaram Inscription of Mahendravarman" that even as early as the day's of Mahendravarman the Paurṇamī Maṇḍapa of the temple existed and that it was caused to be constructed by the curious-minded (विचित्रचित्त) Mahendravarman. Rājasihma probably made certain additions to the temple.

With regard to the other two temples we hope that later researches may bring to light some Pallava inscriptions which may throw light on the date of their construction.

We thus find that Śrī Śaṅkarācārya was a contemporary of Narasihmavarman whose period well nigh synchronises with the one I have suggested for Śrī Śaṅkara.

[NOTE.

The additional data set forth in this article compel a careful consideration of the whole question. While the evidence adduced by Mr. T. R. Chintamani in favour of his view that Śaṁkara should be assigned to the latter half of the seventh century A. D.

is very weighty, it cannot yet be regarded as conclusive. If, as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Agnicitpuruṣottama say in their commentary on I-8 of the Saṁkṣepaśārīraka, Sarvajñātmamuni was a direct disciple of Sureśvara; if, as Professor M. Hiriyanna suggested in a note in the Indian Antiquary Vol. LV, 1926, the king referred to in the penultimate verse of the Saṁkṣepaśārīraka could be identified with the founder of the Kollam era (824-25 A. D.): and if, as already pointed out by me, the author of the Iṣṭasiddhi who presupposes Śaṁkara, Maṇḍana and Sureśvara, should be the guru of Ānandabodha, who wrote a commentary on Prakāśātman's Śābdanirṇaya:—there still remains a tangle to be unravelled in the question of Śaṁkara's age.]

S. K. SASTRI.

PROBABLE IDENTIFICATION OF KING HĀRAVARṢA

BY

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The Gaekwad's Oriental Series of Baroda will publish shortly the *Rāmacarita* of Abhinanda which has been edited by the contributor of this paper. This is one of the finest examples of Indian classical poerty written in a charming, easy and natural style. The work introduces Rāma in a state of great mental anxiety waiting for the arrival of Sugrīva who was to be sent out in search of the residence of Rāvaṇa on the close of the rainy season. *Rāmacarita* is divided into forty cantos but the last four cannot be attributed definitely to Abhinanda. These four cantos have two definite recensions, one[1] attributing the authorship to Abhinanda and the other[2] to Bhīmakavi, a fairly unknown author. But this latter definitely says that Abhinanda left the work incomplete and it fell to his lot to complete the book by adding four more cantos. Most of the 36 cantos which are undoubtedly Abhinanda's own[3] contain besides the subject matter of the poem certain additional verses written obviously in praise of his patron king and describing the merits of his own composition.

The nature and the style of the verses are such as to preclude the possibility of their being regarded as interpolations or copyist's additions. On the contrary the style of the verses and the intimate connection between Abhinanda and his patron as expressed in them lead us to hold that they were composed by the author himself.

All manuscripts from the different parts of India contain the additional veres in question, with slight changes in their arrangement. In these verses, Abinanda mentions as his patron one

1. The Ms. of Madras Oriental Mss. Library.
2. The Ms. of Baroda Oriental Institute.
3. All other Mss. contain only 36 Cantos.

Hārvarṣa and Yuvarāja of the Pāla Dynasty and the object of this paper is to investigate into the question of the identity of the king and to consider the plausibility of identifying him with king Devapāla, son of Dharmapāla, of the Pāla Dynasty of Bengal.

Dr. Buhler, as early as 1873[1] attributed 2 works to Abhinanda namely the *Kādambarīkathāsāra* and the *Rāmacarita* in his article entitled "Abhinanda, the Gauḍa". After examining the historical information contained in these two works, he concluded that the authorship of these two works must be attributed to Abhinanda who is described in the *Kādambarīkathāsāra* as the son of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of *Nyāyamañjarī*. Jayantabhaṭṭa, it may remembered, is the great-grandson of Śaktisvāmin, who was a minister of Lalitāditya Muktāpīḍa of Kashmir[2]. With regard to Hāravarṣa, Dr. Buhler was of opinion that nothing definite could be said about him until further materials were available.

Later on, however, Dr. F. W. Thomas,[3] Dr. Aufrecht[4] and the editor of the *Kādambarīkathāsāra* in the Kāvyamālā Series, disagreed completely with the opinion of Dr. Buhler and held that the author of the *Rāmacarita* and the author of the *Kādambarīkathāsāra* must be different persons. The reason for holding this view was that, while the Abhinanda of the *Kādambarīkathāsāra* described himself as the son of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the Abhinanda of *Rāmacarita* called himself the son of Śatānanda. Śatānanda, we must remember, was well-known in the field of Alaṅkāra literature by his other name Rudraṭa and as the author of the *Kāvyālaṅkāra*. With regard to Hāravarṣa, however, nothing has been definitely settled, because the chronology and succession list of the Kings of the Pāla Dynasty are far from being of a definite character. But let us hope, with the *Rāmacarita* in hand, to tackle this interesting problem. Before, however, entering into the question more deeply let us quote a few stanzas from the *Rāmacarita* bearing on this point.

1. Indian Antiquary Vol. II, P. 102.
2. See the introductory Verses of the Kādambarīkathāsāra.
3. *Vide* Introduction of Kavīndravacanasamuccaya Page 20.
4. *Vide* C. C. Page 246.

1. एते निकामरसिकस्य जयन्ति पादाः श्रीहारवर्षयुवराजमहीतलेन्दोः ।
येर्द्वादशार्ककिरणोत्करदुर्निवारः सृष्टोऽभिनन्दकुमुदस्य महाविकासः ॥

I, VII

2. पालान्वयाम्बुजवनैकविरोचनाय तस्मै नमोऽस्तु युवराजनरेश्वराय ।
कोटिप्रदानघटितोज्ज्वलकीर्तिमूर्तिः येनामरत्वपदवीं गमितोऽभिनन्दः ॥

II, VIII, XIV, XXXV

3. नमः श्रीहारवर्षाय येन हालादनन्तरम् ।
स्वकोशः कविकोशानामाविर्भावाय संभृतः ॥ V, VIII, X, XII

4. श्यामः सितासितनिरायतपक्ष्मलाक्षः क्षामोदरः कठिनकान्तभुजान्तरालः ।
सर्वाङ्गपल्लवितयौवनलाञ्छनश्रीः श्रीहारवर्ष इव कुत्र पतिः पृथिव्याः ॥ VI

5. येनाद्य रामचरितं चारिताद्भुतेन स्वेनाधरीकृतमतीव महीतलेऽस्मिन् ।
तेनैव पालकुलचन्द्रमसा तदित्थमुत्थापितं जगति पश्यत चित्रमेतत् ॥ X

6. दीपः सतां स खलु पालकुलप्रदीपः श्रीहारवर्ष इति येन कविप्रियेण ।
सद्यः प्रसादभरदत्तमहाप्रतिष्ठे निष्ठापितः पिशुनवाक्प्रसरोऽभिनन्दे ॥ XI

7. सुदृढविपुलगात्रः शत्रुकीटान्तकारी सततमुपचितायां सन्निविष्टो दशायाम् ।
जगदमलमुदस्ताशेषदोषान्धकारं जनयति युवराजः पालवंशप्रदीपः ॥

XXVI

The verses quoted above clearly show that the patron of Abhinanda was Hāravarṣa also known as Yuvarāja who belonged to the Pāla Dynasty. It is not, however, difficult to imagine that this is the same as the famous Pāla Dynasty of Bengal history, even though the surname Pāla may be found occasionally in the names of kings of other dynasties, such as Mahendrapāla of the Gūrjara Pratīhāra Dynasty. According to V. A. Smith, however, the word "Pālānvaya" refers to th famous Pāla Dynasty of Bengal alone[1].

One may raise the question as to how the rulers of the Pāla Dynasty, with a definite partiality to the Buddhist creed, could patronise a Hindu poet like Abhinanda. The rulers of the Pāla Dynasty usually call themselves "Paramasaugata"[2] in their inscriptions and they are the accredited benefactors of purely Buddhist monasteries such as Nalānda, Vikramaśilā and Odanta-

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1. *Vide* Early History of India Page 413.
2. *Vide* E. I. Vol. IV, Page 249, and Indian Antiquary Vol. XXI, Page 258.

puri. It is, therefore, an anomaly to think of a Pāla King being the patron of a Hindu poet. The answer to this is not far to seek. The testimony of Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasād Śāstrī, the editor of the *Rāmacarita* of Sandhyākaranandin, is that the Pālas were tolerant to Hindu religion though they actually professed Buddhism.[1] The Grants made by Dharmapāla[2] to a Viṣṇu temple and Devapāla's Grant[3] to a Brahmin of the Āśvalāyana Śākhā and of the Aupamanyava gōtra, go to show that the Pālas were tolerant towards Hindu religion.

It is well-known that there are two lists of the Pāla kings; one comes from the Tibetan sources while the other is reconstructed with the help of inscriptional evidence. According to the Tibetan list the reign of Gopāla begins from 660 A. D. He is followed by 18 kings one after another and the last in that chain reigned in the year 1139 A. D.[4] The inscriptional evidence, on the other hand, does not agree with the Tibetan account with regard to the names of the kings or the duration of their reign.

Sir V. A. Smith, R. D. Banerji and M. H. D. Śāstrī are inclined to take the inscriptional evidence as more reliable than the information afforded by the Tibetan authorities. According to the Khalimpūr and the Monghyr Grants of Dharmapāla and Devapāla respectively, the first king of the Pāla Dynasty was Gopāla, the second was his son Dharmapāla while the third was Devapāla his grandson. Dharmapāla was a contemporary of King Indrāyudha who was ruling in Kanauj in 783 A. D.[5] Relying on this piece of evidence we can place the reign of Gopāla in the first half of the 8th century and that of Dharmapāla in the second half of the same century. The Pāla Dynasty was continued up to the end of the 12th century and thereafter was reduced to insignificance on the rise of the Sena kings and at the advent of the Muhammadans. The long chain of Pāla kings was noted for their fondness of literature and their patronage towards the great poets and philosophers of the time belonging to different religious sects. But amongst the known kings of the Pāla

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1. See Introduction to Rāmacarita of Sandhyākaranandin M.A.S.B.
2. *Vide* E. I. Vol. IV.
3. Indian Antiquary Vol. XXI, Page 258.
4. *Vide* M. M. S. C. Vidyabhushana's History of Indian Logic. P. 517.
5. *Vide* Page 50, Pālas of Bengal, M. A. S. B., Vol. V.

Dynasty no one bore the title Hāravarṣa, the parton of our poet Abhinanda, the author of the *Rāmacarita*.

The title Yuvarāja was, however, given to some of the Pāla Princes[1] but this appears to signify nothing more than a mere heir-apparent to the throne. But from what we can gather from the account of Abhinanda, Hāravarṣa the Yuvarāja seems to have been a ruling Prince and not a mere heir-apparent. This is also confirmed by the authority of Soddhala, author of the *Udayasundarīkathā*. In this work, published as No. XI of the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, it is mentioned that Yuvarāja, the patron of poet Abhinanda, was a ruling prince.

श्रीविक्रमो नृपतिरत्नपतिः सभानामासीत्स कोऽप्यसदृशः कविमित्रनामा ।
यो वार्थमात्रमुदितः कृतिनां गृहेषु दत्वा चकार करटीन्दुघटान्धकारम् ॥
हाले गते गुणिनि शोकभराद्बभूवुरुच्छिन्नवाङ्मयजडाः कृतिनस्तथामी ।
यत्तस्य नाम नृपतेरनिशं स्मरन्तो हेत्यक्षरं प्रथममेव परं विदन्ति ॥
श्रीहर्ष इत्यवनिवर्तिषु पार्थिवेषु नाम्नैव केवलमजायत वस्तुतस्तु ।
श्रीहर्ष एष निजसंसदि येन राज्ञा सम्पूजितः कनककोटिशतेन बाणः ॥
सृष्टं यदत्र युवराजनरेश्वरेण यद्दुष्करं किमपि येन गिरः श्रियश्च ।
प्रत्यायनं स्फुटमकारि निजे कवीन्द्रमेकासने समुपवेशयताभिनन्दम् ॥

Udayasundarīkathā Pp. 2-3.

Soddhala flourished in the court of the three Royal brothers Cittarāja, Nāgārjuna and Mumminirāja of Koṅkaṇa[2] and from the inscription dated 1026 A. D.[3] of Cittarāja we can assign him to the early part of the 11th century. That Hāravarṣa, the Yuvarāja, was a ruling prince, can also be ascertained from the following quotations taken at random from the *Rāmacarita* of Abhinanda.

नमो नृपतिचन्द्राय पृथ्वीपालाय येन सा ।
विकालमलिना दिक्षु दर्शिता कविपद्धतिः ॥ IV

एषोऽस्म्यहं निजवचस्सु चिरादिदानीं निस्साध्वसः कविसहस्रसमागमेऽपि ।
श्रीहारवर्षनरलोकपतेः पुरस्ताद्विस्तारिविष्णुवनमालिविचारितेषु ॥ X

1. *Vide* E.I. Vol. IV, Page 249 and Indian Antiquary Vol XXI, P. 258.

2. See the Introduction of the Udayasundarīkathā, G. O. S. XI.

3. *Vide* Indian Antiquary Part V, Page 277.

यया कयापि कलया यस्य तस्य सुभाषितैः ।
गृह्यते हारवर्षस्य मनोऽद्य नृपतेः परम् ॥ XIII

नाश्चर्यमावहति कस्य चराचरेऽस्मिन् श्रीहारवर्षनृपचन्द्रमसः प्रभावः ।
येनानिशं ललितकोमलकाव्यमूर्तेः सृष्टोऽभिनन्दकुमुदस्य महाविकासः ॥

XVII, XX

आचन्द्रसूर्यं निदधे जगत्सु व्यासस्य यद्वज्जनमेजयेन ।
एषोऽभिनन्दस्य महाप्रबन्धः क्षोणीभुजा भीमपराक्रमेण ॥ XVIII, XXI

हालेनोत्तमपूजया कविवृषा श्रीपालितो लालितः
ख्यातिं कामपि कालिदासकृतयो नीताः शकारातिना ।
श्रीहर्षो विततार गद्यकवये बाणाय वाणीफलं
सद्यः सत्क्रिययाभिनन्दमपि च श्रीहारवर्षोऽग्रहीत् ॥ XXXIII

शकभूपरिपोरनन्तरं कवयः कुत्र पवित्रसङ्कथाः ।
युवराज इवायमीक्षितो नृपतिः काव्यकलाकुतूहली ॥ XXII

From these citations it is easy to prove that Hāravarṣa, the Yuvarāja, was a ruling prince and patronised Abhinanda in the capacity of a sovereign. This Prince was powerful in battle-fields; he carried his victorious arms into the territories of his contemporaries and extirpated all his enemies; this is borne out by the following verses.

एते तवैकसुभगस्य जयन्ति पादाः श्रीहारवर्षयुवराज महीतलेन्दो ।
यान् सप्रतापभुवनेऽपि सदाभिसृत्य रात्रौ दिवा च रिपुराजरमा रमन्ते ॥

VII

सुदृढविपुलगात्रः शत्रुकीटान्तकारी
आचन्द्रसूर्यं........क्षोणीभुजा भीमपराक्रमेण ॥ XXVII

ते मेघमुक्तमपि न स्तुवते सुधांशुं तेषां मनो न रमते मकरध्वजेऽपि ।
सर्वारिवीरविजयप्रसृतप्रशस्तिः श्रीहारवर्षजगतीपतिरीक्षितो यैः ॥

XXVII

प्रतिनृपसुरमौलिरत्नराजीरुचिरुचिरप्रसवार्पिताङ्घ्रिपूजः ।
कृतसदनुतिर्महाकवीन्द्रैर्जयति चिरं युवराजमेदिनीन्द्रः ॥

XXIX, XXXIV

निर्मत्सर: कविरपि प्रभुरप्यवाम: कान्तोऽप्यरूढसुभगत्वमदप्रमील: ।
अत्युग्रशौर्यरभसोऽप्यकठोरवादी पृथ्वीपतिर्जयति विक्रमशीलजन्मा ॥
त्यागस्य पात्रमियमल्पतरा त्रिलोकी को विक्रमस्य कणिकामपि संसहेत ।
शास्त्राणि कानि सुबहून्यपि हारवर्षक्षोणीपतेरतिपटुप्रतिभागुणस्य ॥

XXXI

Now let us take up the question of the time of Abhinanda and Hāravarṣa. The testimony of Soddhala, as has been shown already, leads us to believe that Abhinanda and his patron king Yuvarāja were already famous in 1000 A. D. He actually compares Abhinanda with such famous authors as Bāṇa and Kālidāsa who preceded him.[1] On the other hand, we have to assign Hāravarṣa to a period after Dharmapāla, the second king of the Pāla Dynasty on the authority of the following citation from the *Rāmacarita* of Abhinanda.

श्रीधर्मपालकुलकैरवकाननेन्दू राजा विलासकृतिपङ्कजिनीविवस्वान् ।
सर्वाभिरामगुणपत्ररथव्रजैकनीडद्रुमो विजयते युवराजदेव: ॥ XXVII

As Dharmapāla ruled upto the first quarter of the 9th century, this fixes the earliest limit for the time of Hāravarṣa while the latest limit of his time is fixed by Soddhala, circa 1000 A. D. During this time, we find three or four names of kings in the Pāla Dynasty renowned for their valour and patronage of Sanskrit learning. These are 1. Devapāla, 2. Vigrahapāla, 3. Narāyaṇapāla and 4. Mahīpāla I. Two Yuvarājas also make their appearance during this period, namely Tribhuvanapāla, first son of Dharmapāla and Rājyapāla, son of Devapāla. These two latter were undoubtedly heirs-apparent but history does not tell us whether they ever got an opportunity to rule.

Next, let us examine the materials connected with the identity ot Abhinanda and attempt to fix his date with some degree of precision. As has already been pointed out, there is a general impression amongst scholars that the Abhinanda of the *Rāmacarita* is different from the Abhinanda of the *Kādambarīkathāsāra* on the ground that he is the son of Śatānanda while the other is the son of Jayantabhaṭṭa. That the author of the *Rāmacarila* was the son of Śatānanda is borne out by the following verse :—

1. See page 60 above.

तथा तूर्णं कवेः कस्य निर्गतं जीवतो यशः ।
हारवर्षप्रसादेन शातानन्देर्यथाधुना ॥ V, IX

As Jayantabhaṭṭa is generally assigned to the period between 825 and 850 A.D., his son Abhinanda and the Abhinanda of the *Rāmacarita* must be regarded as contemporaries, even though they may not be identical. It has already been pointed out that Abhinanda is referred to by Soddhala the author of the *Udayasundarīkathā* who flourished early in the 11th century. Bhojadeva in his *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* and the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* quotes extensively from the *Rāmacarita;* so also Mammaṭabhaṭṭa in his *Kāvyaprakāśa.* Several other writers on poetics such as Abhinavagupta and Kṣemendra of Kashmir refer to Abhinanda though it is rather difficult at this stage to say whether this Abhinanda is the same as the author of the *Rāmacarita.*

On the strength of these quotations one may be tempted to hold that Abhinanda was the Court-poet of Mahīpāla I who flourished between 978-1030 A. D. But this can be disproved by the fact that Soddhala in his Chronology of famous poets of ancient India beginning from Vālmīki down to his own time places Abhinanda before Rājaśekhara.* He says :—

आसीदसीमस्फुरितोरुधामा वाल्मीकिरग्रण्यतमो मुनीनाम् ।
वंशः कवीनामुदियाय तस्मान्मूर्ध्ना धृतो भूमिभृतां गणेन ॥
यस्मिन्नभूदग्रभव कवीनां व्यासो मुनिर्यस्य गुणैर्विजेतुः ।
कविर्गुणाढ्यः स च येन सृष्टा बृहत्कथा प्रीतिकरी जनानाम् ॥
स कश्चिदालेख्यकरः कवित्वे प्रसिद्धनामा भुवि भर्तृमेण्ठः ।
ख्यातः कृती सोऽपि च कालिदासः शुद्धा सुधास्वादयती च यस्य ॥
बाणः कवीनामिह चक्रवर्ती चकास्ति यस्योज्ज्वलवर्णशोभा ।
मान्यो जगत्यां भवभूतिरार्यः सारस्वते वर्त्मनि सार्थवाहः ॥
सामन्तजन्मापि कवीश्वराणां महत्तमो वाक्पतिराजसूरिः ।
वन्द्यः स विद्वानभिनन्दनामा विस्रम्भभपात्रं वचसाधिदेव्याः ॥
यायावरः प्राज्ञवरो गुणज्ञैराशंसितः सूरिसमाजवर्यैः ॥

* The author of the paper seeks to infer a chronological relation from the order in which certain poets are mentioned in these verses and argues that Abhinanda is older than Rājaśekhara. This inference is untenable since Kālidāsa in the extract comes after Bhartṛmeṇṭha. [Ed.]

Rājaśekhara was teacher of king Mahendrapāla of Kanauj and therefore must have flourished in the beginning of the 10th century.[1] If Abhinanda is regarded under the circumstances as a contemporary of Mahīpāla there will remain hardly any margin for his composition becoming famous so as to be classed with that of the Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Bāṇa and others.

According to Soddhala, therefore, Abhinanda must have flourished in the court of King Yuvarāja before the 10th century. In this way it is possible to shorten the later limit for the time of Abhinanda as 900 A. D. Between 8 .0 and 900 A. D. in the Pāla Dynasty o' Bengal, there were only two kings famous for their literary activities and renowned for their valour. These two are Dharmapāla and his son Devapāla the two most famous and powerful kings of the Pāla Dynasty. From the verses cited above, we find ample evidence of the high esteem in which King Dharmapāla was held in the eyes of Abhinanda. I will quote here some more verses from the *Rāmacarita* in which mention has been made of the father of his patron king Hāravarṣa.

किमिन्दुना चन्दनवारिणापि किमब्जकन्दैरभिनन्दवत्सलः ।
विचिन्त्यतामान्तरतापशान्तये स केवलं **विक्रमशीलनन्दनः** ॥

VII

निर्मत्सरः कविरपि प्रभुरप्यवामः पृथ्वीपतिर्जयति **विक्रमशीलजन्मा** ॥

XXIX

श्रीधर्मपालकुलकैरवकाननेन्दू राजा
वन्द्यः सुतः स खलु रामपराक्रमस्य येनैव रामचरितार्पितसम्मदेन ।
सद्यः प्रसादभरदत्तमहाप्रतिष्ठे निष्ठापितः पिशुनवाक्प्रसरोऽभिनन्दे ॥

VII

In these two stanzas, Hāravarṣa is described as the son of Vikramaśīla. Who this Vikramaśīla is, is again a difficult question. Or it may be a mere epithet. Be that as it may, the word Vikramaśīla very forcibly reminds us of the famous Vikramaśīla monastery of the Buddhists which was founded by Dharmapāla.[2] Is it then very improbable to identify

1. *Vide* Sir V. A. Smith Page 394.
2. See Sir V. A. Smith Page 414.

Vikramaśila with king Dharmapāla, the founder of the Vikramaśīla monastery ? On the contrary this seems to be quite likely as it is confirmed be the colophon of the *Sragdharā-stotraṭīkā*[1] which runs as follows:—

श्रीमद्विक्रमशीलदेवमहाविहारीयराजगुरुपण्डितभिक्षुश्रीजिनरक्षितकृता
बालार्कस्तुतिटीका समाप्ता ।

Dharmapāla had two sons Tribhuvanapāla and Devapāla. In the Khalimpur Grant, Tribhuvanapāla is mentioned as Yuva-rāja; but in the Monghyr Grant, Devapāla succeeds his father. In the second half of the 9th century, Devapāla attained great fame and popularity as a ruler.

Considering the mass of evidence given above, we have no other alternative than to identify Hāravarṣa or Yuvarāja the patron king of Abhinanda with Devapāla, son of Dharmapāla, otherwise known as Vikramaśila.

A confirmatory evidence in support of the proposed identification is afforded to us when we compare a statement in the Monghyr Grant of Devapāla with another made by Abhi-nanda in his *Rāmacarita*. In the Monghyr Grant[2], we find the following remarkable verse describing Devapāla—

य: पूर्वं बलिना कृत: कृतयुगे येनागमद्भार्गव-
स्त्रेतायां प्रहृत: प्रियप्रणयिना कर्णेन यो द्वापरे ।
विच्छिन्न: कलिना शकद्विषि गते कालेन लोकान्तरं
येन त्यागपथ: स एव हि पुनर्विस्पष्टमुन्मीलित: ॥

Here Devapāla is warmly praised for reviving the path of liber-ality which was opened up by Bali in Kṛtayuga and continued by Bhārgava in Tretā, Karṇa in Dvāpara and Śakadviṭ Vikra-māditya in the Kali age, but which was interrupted after the death of the last, mentioned king.

The same idea is expressed in the following few stanzas from the *Rāmacarita* describing Hāravarṣa's liberality—

न त्यागशक्तिमधिगच्छति कश्चिदर्थी
नास्त्येव विक्रमगुणस्य सम: सपत्न: ।

1. See M. M. S. C. Vidyabhushana's History of Indian Logic. Page 519.

2. *Vide* Indian Antiquary Vol. XXI, Page 258.

अर्था विशन्ति पथि यस्य धियश्च शास्त्र-
मेकः स विस्मयकरः परचक्रभीमः ॥ XXV

कवीनां किं दत्तैर्नृपपशुभिरन्यैरवसरे
परं पृथ्वीपालः क्षणमपि स **कर्णौ** वितरतु ।
अनात्तं तत्त्वज्ञैरपि सुविपुलार्थव्ययभिया
प्रतिष्ठां येनोच्चैर्जगति गमितं **रामचरितम्** ॥ III

तस्यैकस्य **निकामदानरभसप्रोल्लासिनः** शोभते
श्लाघ्ये वस्तुनि यत्र तत्र पृथिवीपालस्य कौतूहलम् ।
रुद्ध्वा सर्वदिशो मनोरथपथातीतर्द्धिभिः पुस्तकैः
सत्काव्याभिरतेन **रामचरितं** येन प्रतिष्ठापितम् ॥ XXVIII

त्यागस्य पात्रमियमल्पतरा त्रिलोकी
को विक्रमस्य कणिकामपि संसहेत । XXXI

दृप्तानां निधनानि यो वितनुते संख्येषु संख्यावतां
निस्संख्यानि धनानि योऽस्तु सुचिरं श्रीहारवर्षो नृपः ॥ XXIII

एकः स पालतिलकश्चिरमस्तु सम्राट्
कोटिव्ययो न गणितः प्रतिपाठकालम् ।
येनास्य रामचरितस्य समं सदस्यै-
रेकैकसूक्तिपरिभावनगद्गदेन ॥ XXIV

These verses are so remarkably similar that on the strength of this alone the identity of Devapāla with Hāravarṣa may be established.

The question may be raised as to how a king of the Pāla Dynasty, instead of bearing a name ending in Pāla, should prefer to be called Hāravarṣa, a name quite foreign to the Pāla tradition. The reason for this is not difficult to discover. It is well known that Dharmapāla married a Rāṣṭrakūṭa princess known by the name of Rannadevī.[1] Rāṣṭrakūṭa princes were very fond of adopting names ending in "Varṣa" and it is very probable that king Devapāla during his stay in his maternal uncle's household was known by the name of Hāravarṣa, while his elder brother Tribhuvanapāla was Yuvarāja in the court of his father Dharmapāla.

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1. Indian Antiquary Vol. XXI, Page 257.

ĀNANDARĀYAMAKHIN *VERSUS* APPĀDHVARIN

BY

V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, B. A. (Hons).

Superintendent, Sarasvati Mahal Palace Library, Tanjore.

Students of modern historico-literary research should not confound our authors, one with another, when ample material is available in their own works to distinguish them. One such confusion has somehow arisen between the two authors—Ānandarāyamakhin and Appādhvarin. Some believe that they are one and the same person. The learned introduction to the Vani Vilas edition of Dharmākūta of Tryambakarāyamakhin supports it. Others believe that Ānandarāyamakhin was the patron of Appādhvarin and as a token of his respect and gratitude, the latter wrote and presented some of his works to the learned public in the name of the former. Of these two views, the first is a mere conjecture and as such, has to be discarded. (See extracts below). The second is acceptable so far as it admits that they are two different authors of the same age; but the fact that of these two, one enjoyed high patronage at the hands of the other is questionable. If Ānandarāya were Appādhvarin's real patron, his name would have found a place in Appādhvarin's works. But nowhere in his works do we find references to Ānandarāya. Curiously, Ācāranavanīta, a great treatise on Dharmaśāstra which, as believed by some, Appādhvarin wrote and passed off in the name of Ānandarāya, mentions only king Shahji as his protector and life-giver. So the only conclusion possible is that Ānandarāyamakhin is a younger contemporary of Appādhvarin (as other evidences also show) and both of them have enjoyed the high patronage of the most benevolent king Shahji of Tanjore.

We shall now try to give a short sketch of these two authors and a list of their works.

Ānandarāyamakhin.

About the parentage of Ānandarāyamakhin, there is no difficulty. He is the son of Nṛsiṁharāyamakhin of Bhāradvāja family, who is the son of Gaṅgādharamakhin by Kṛṣṇāmbikā

and the grandson of Bābāji Yajvan,[1] as the following table will show :—

BĀBĀJI YAJVAN

|

Gaṅgādharamakhin = Kṛṣṇāmbikā
(Minister of Ekoji)

|

Nṛsiṁharāya-makhin—Minister of Ekoji. | Ānandarāya-makhin —Minister of Shahji and Serfoji I; author of Vidyāpariṇaya and Commentary on Āś-valāyana Gṛhya-Sūtras.	Tryambaka-rāyamakhin Minister of Shahji and Serfoji I—author of Dharmā-kūta, Strīdharma etc.	Bhagavantarāya-makhin—Minister of Serfoji I; author of Rāghavābhyudaya-nāṭaka; Mukunda-Vilāsa Kāvya, and Uttaracampū.

Gaṅgādharamakhin, his sons and his well-known grandson—Ānandarāyamakhin have had the fortune to serve as ministers under the Mahratha kings—Ekoji alias Venkoji and his three sons. Besides his manifold activities in the administration of the Mahratha royal court and battlefield as Dharmādhikārin and Dalavoy respectivety, Ānandrāyamakhin was a poet of a high order. His works so far as we are able to judge, are (1) Vidyāpariṇaya, published in Kāvyamālā Series—an allegorical drama on the model of Kṛṣṇamiśra's Prabodhacandrodaya, and (2) Āśvalāyanagṛhyasūtravyākhyā, (ms. available in Tanjore Palace Library) a good and readable commentary on the Ṛgvedic gṛhya-sūtras and to some extent, a good compendium of the duties of a Bahvṛca householder.

There is a strong belief prevalent among scholars that all the works known in the name of Ānandarāya are not his production. It is believed that one Vedakavi wrote Vidyāpariṇaya and Jīvānanda—another drama of the same type and attributed them to Ānandarāyamakhin. Similarly, Appādhvarin's Ācāranavanīta is also believed to have passed under the name of Ānandarāya. But the verses in the prologue to Vidyāpariṇaya

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1. See verses 15, 27 and 28 in the beginning of the Dharmākūta—Sri Vani Vilas edition and the prologue of Vidyāpariṇayam available in the Tanjore Palace Library.

(given below) expressly state that the author of the drama was Ānandarāyamakhin whose name as author and as minister of the Mahratha kings—Shahji and Serfoji was widely known.

सूत्रधारः—विद्वत्कविकल्पकतरुरानन्दरायमखी । यस्य किल

आनन्दरायमखिनो वाल्मीकेरिव योगिनः ।
इतरापेक्षणात्सारस्वतः सारस्वतोदयः ॥

अपि च,

नानापूर्वमहाक्रतुप्रगयनैर्ध्यात्मसम्मर्शनैः
कर्मब्रह्मपथप्रचारसविता षड्दर्शनीवल्लभः ॥
तातो यस्य किलैकराजवसुधाधौरन्धरी गीष्पतिः
क्षोणीपालकिरीटलालितपदः ख्यातो नृसिंहाध्वरी ॥
क्षुण्णा यद्यपि शास्त्रपद्धतिरसावन्यैः कवीन्द्रैरयं
त्वश्लीलं न तितिक्षते न सहते पात्रेषु चानौचितीम् ।
नेतुः शास्त्रमतां त्रिवर्गफलसम्पत्तिं विमुच्य त्वयो-
पन्यासं च जुगुप्सते तदयमारम्भोऽस्य संरम्भतः ॥

अद्वैतं वस्तु, शृङ्गारो रसः, अथ च निर्दोषितेति सर्वमत्यद्भुतं दृश्यते । अथ वा—

' सकलराज्यधुरन्धरस्य शरभमहाराजमन्त्रिशिखामणेरस्य जनकसनक....
धौरन्धरेयमिति मे महदाश्चर्यम् ।

आबाल्यादपि पोषितोऽजनि मया प्रेम्णा तथा लालितः
तेनासौ सरसामुपैतु कवितामानन्दरायाध्वरी ।
इत्येकक्षितिपालवंशजलधेर्दैव्या गिरा जातया
धीरश्रीशरभावनीन्द्रवपुषा नूनं प्रसादः कृतः ॥

(Prologue of Vidyāpariṇaya.)

The requisition note addresed to king Shahji in the work Ācāranavanīta by Appādhvarin is an eloquent proof of the fact that king Shahji—not Ānandarāya—was the patron of Appādhvarin. (See the extract given in the next section of this paper.)

Appādhvarin.

Appādhvarin belongs to Śrīvatsa family (gotra) and he is the son of one Cidambaramakhin, an inhabitant of Kīḻayūr (modern Kiḻḻiyūr) a village near Māyavaram in Tanjore District.

तातो यस्य चिदम्बरेश्वर इति प्रख्यातनामा मखी
यद्भात्रिन्दिवदत्तहव्यनिवहादानैकतृप्तास्सुराः ।
श्रीवत्सान्वयवारिधीन्दुरवसथः किलियूर्नामनि
श्रीमान्विश्रुतकीर्तिरार्द्रहृदये पुण्येऽग्रहारे सुधीः ॥

(Prologue of Madanabhūṣaṇabhāṇa, of which a ms. is available in the Tanjore Palace Library.)

श्रीमच्चिदम्बरमखीन्द्रसुतेन वत्स-
वंशाम्बुराशिविधुना विधिशास्त्रमार्गे ।
सञ्चारनिर्मलधिया सकलार्थबोध-
माचारसारनवनीतमिदं गृहीतम् ॥

(Ācāranavanīta—ms. available in Tanjore Palace Library.)

His Ācārya was one Udayamūrti and his Prācārya was one Piḻḻai Śāstrin of Ālattūr village near Māyavaram, as the following verses show :—

आलत्तूरधिवासस्य पिल्लैशास्त्रिबुधेशितुः ।
आचारनवनीताख्यं निबध्नाति कृपाबलात् ॥
वन्दे गुरूनुदयमूर्तिबुधाभिधानान्
यद्गोविजृम्भणमहो ! जगतस्तमोनुत् ।
तान्पिल्लै[ल्ल]शास्त्र्यभिधलोकगुरोः पुराण-
पुण्यानुभावकृतभूमितलावतारान् ॥

(Ācāranavanīta.)

That he was patronised by King Shahji is evident from the following verses found in his Ācāranavanīta.

श्रीशाहक्षितिपालनायकदयादत्तान्नभोगोल्लस-
द्बुद्ध्युत्कर्षविभावितश्रुतिबहुस्मृत्यर्थसारोदयः ।
सभ्यानां प्रमदाय सर्वविषयान्धर्मान्रहस्योत्तरान्
सङ्गृह्णामि मितैः पदैरधिवसन्मायूरमप्पाध्वरी ॥
एकक्ष्मापतिपूर्वपुण्यसुकृतोत्कर्षेण लब्धोदयः
दीपाम्बोदरगर्भवासमहिमप्रख्यातपुण्योदयः ।

श्रीशाहक्षितिराट् प्रशास्तु वसुधामाचन्द्रमप्पाध्वरी
यद्दत्तान्नबलेन धर्मविषयं शास्त्रं समग्रन्थयत् ॥

(Ācāranavanīta.)

Again, that Appādhvarin enjoyed royal patronage and help is evident from the following facts taken from the Ācāranavanīta (See extracts below).

When he had the honour of attending the great sacrifice performed by Tryambakarāyamakhin the minister of Shahji in Dhātṛ year (1696 A. D) in Svāmimalai near Kumbhakonam, his company was much appreciated by the Mahratha ruler and consequently, he was honourably delayed in Tanjore for three months to do Mahābhāratapārāyaṇa in the royal court; and when he was afterwards at his own request permitted to return to his place Māyavaram, he was asked by king Shahji to write a treatise on Dharmaśāstra. Consequently soon after his return to his residence, along with his son he took, up that great task and finished his monumental work on Dharmaśāstra—Ācāranavanīta of 15,000 granthas—which cost him hard mental labour for eight full years; and he made a final request to the royal patron to accept and popularise his work and to fulfil his desire to perform several vedic sacrifices.

धातृवर्षे यदा यज्ञसेवार्थमहमागतः ।
श्रीमहाराजराजस्य मन्त्रिणस्त्र्यम्बकप्रभोः ॥
महाराजस्तु मां प्रीत्या स्वसभायामवासयत् ।
भारतश्रवणार्थाय रात्रिन्दिवमुदारधीः ॥
यदा मासत्रयादूर्ध्वं प्राप्यानुज्ञां महीपतेः ।
गन्तुमिच्छामि च तदा धर्मशास्त्रनिबन्धने ॥
महाराजेन चाज्ञप्तो गौरीमायूरमागतः ।
तस्मिन्वर्षे वृश्चिकार्के धर्मशास्त्रसुधानिधेः ॥
एकेनैव मया पुत्रयुक्तेन शनकैः कृते ।
बुद्धिदण्डेन मथने रात्रिन्दिवमनेकधा ॥
अष्टभिर्लब्धवानस्मि वत्सरैस्तत्फलं महत् ।
आचारनवनीतं तन्मृदु सर्वमनोहरम् ॥

महाराजस्य दयया तत्सङ्ग्राह्यमभूद्भुवि ।
समाप्तः पञ्चदशभिः सहस्रैर्ग्रन्थसङ्ख्यया ॥
प्रचारोऽस्य महाराजाधीन एव हि सर्वथा ।
अहमप्पाध्वरीनाम्ना महाराजेन सादरम् ॥
दत्तां महीं समादाय तत्र कृष्यादिसम्भृतैः ।
धान्यैः परम्परासिद्धे ग्रामे कृष्या समार्जितैः ॥
कुर्वन्कुटुम्बभरणं पुत्रपौत्रैस्समावृतः ।
श्रेयः प्रार्थयमानस्सन्महाराजस्य सन्ततम् ॥
आयुश्शेषं सुखं वस्तुमिच्छाम्यग्निक्रि[त्र]यान्तिके ।
मनोरथो महानेष महाराजेन पूर्यताम् ॥

[Ācāranavanīta.]

Appādhvarin is widely known among scholars as the author of Ācāranavanīta, a big and good compendium of most of the important topics—specially funeral rites—related to Dharmaśāstra. The masterly exposition of the subject with all its complications, the vast number of quotations he has gathered from original smṛtis and digests—Nibandhanagranthas—on Dharmaśāstra including the most modern and up-to-date authority in South India—viz. the Smṛtimuktāphala of Vaidyanātha Dīkṣita, are sufficient proofs to the clear understanding and sound judgment of our author. His Madanabhūṣaṇabhāṇa and Gaurīmāyūramāhātmya Campū are the two literary productions that may stand on a par with the most famous works in that sphere of literature. In short, Appādhvarin is an author of a high order and his Ācāranavanīta and two other literary productions will make his name remembered by posterity.

Note.—This Appādhvarin should not be mistaken for one Appāsūri, who is known as the disciple of one Vaidyanātha Śāstrī, as evidenced from his work on grammar, Śabdaratnāvali, an incomplete copy of which is available in this library.

येषां प्रसादमात्रेण प्रज्ञा भवति निर्मला ।
तान्वैद्यनाथशास्त्र्यादीन्गुरूनन्वयमुपास्महे ॥
श्रीसादशा........प्रख्यातप्पेन सूरिवर्येण ।
नानावृत्तिषु सिद्धाः सङ्गृह्यन्तेऽत्र सारभूतार्थाः ॥

TIRUMAṄGAI ĀLVĀR AND CĀḶUKYA VIKRAMĀDITYA I.

BY

PANDIT M. RAGHAVA AYYANGAR,

Office of the Tamil Lexicon, Madras.

Tirumaṅgai Āḻvār mentions in several of his hymns a mighty king of the north being vanquished with the Pāṇḍya king by the warriors of Nāṅkūr.[1] Who that king is, is the subject of this article.

That Tirumaṅgaiyār lived after the Age of Śaṅgam is clear from his celebrating Kōc-c-ceṅkaṇāṉ, a king of Śaṅgam fame.[2] He mentions the shore temple of Śiva at Mahābalipuram built by Narasiṁha Varman II[3] (who lived towards the close of 7th century). He eulogises in his Paramēśvara Viṇṇakaram-Tirumoḻi, the temple consecrated by Pallava Malla (A. D. 717-779) who was known as Paramēśvara Varman before he came to the throne[4] and known after him as Paramēśvara Viṇṇakaram[5] and this hymn speaks of him and his triumphs even as they are known to us from inscriptions.[6]. The Āḻvār celebrates the prowess of Vairamēkaṉ in such a way that he could not have been other than his contemporary.[7] Hence, whoever this Vairamēkaṉ might have been, whether he was the Rāṣṭrakūṭa conqueror of Kāñcī in 754, or his daughter's son, Danti Varman, it is quite clear that the Āḻvār should have been his contemporary and lived in the 8th century. Further, the *Divyasūricaritam,* the most ancient and authoritative treatise on the lives of the Āḻvārs mentions that Periyāḻvār, Nammāḻvār, Tirumaṅgai Āḻvār and others were contemporaries and it has

1. *Periya Tirumoli*—4, 5, 6; 4, 1, 2; 4, 1, 5; 4, 6, 2; 4, 7, 1.
2. *Ibid.* 6, 6.
3. *Ibid.* 2, 6, 9.
4. S. I. I, iv. p. 11.
5. It is now known as Vaikuṇṭa perumāḷ kōvil in Conjeevaram.
6. *Periya Tirumoli* 2, 9.
7. *Ibid.* 2, 8, 10.

been proved in my *Āḻvārkaḷ-Kāla-nilai*, that they must have lived in the 8th century.

The Āḻvār born of the warrior class and having distinguished himself as a warrior of great valour, never failed to appreciate courage and prowess wherever he found them and immortalised the heroes in fitting terms. When he had an occasion to describe Kāñcī, he says that she (Conjeevaram) was steeped in the valour and fame of Vairamēkaṉ[1]. He speaks very highly of the warriors of Nāṅkai or Tirunāṅgūr in Cōḻa-nāḍu, for having so admirably routed a Pāṇḍya king and a mighty king of the North that they had to take to their heels[2]. But he has not mentioned the name of the king under whom the soldiers of Nāṅkai fought. This king should evidently have been one of the Pallavas who held the sovereignty from the 7th century in Cōḻa country with the help of Muttaraiyars[3]. The words 'maṉṉum' 'payil'[4] etc., that he uses here and also the fact that his native place was Tiruvāḷi-Tirunagari, a village near Tiru-nāṅkūr enable us to infer that he ought to have had a personal knowledge of the heroes of that great war. Who these heroes were, is worth investigating. In the first half of the eighth century when Tirumaṅgai Āḻvār lived, the kings that were most flourishing were the Pallavas. In this period, Kāñcī was invaded twice, once in 741 A.D. by Cāḷukya-Vikramāditya II[5] and again in 754 A. D. by the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Danti Durga in the time of Pallava Malla[6] and in both, the Pallava king was miserably defeated. Then we hear at the beginning of the ninth century that another

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1. "வயிரமேகன் தன்வலி தன்புகழ்சூழ்ந்த கச்சி" Periya-Tirumoli, 2, 8, 10.

2. "ஒண்டிறல் தென்னனோட வடவரசோட்டங்கண்ட, திண்டிறலாளர் நாங்கூர்" (*Ibid*. 4, 5, 6).

3. *Muttaraiyar* belonged to the Kaḷḷar caste and were such great warriors as to be eulogised by the poets. Tirumaṅgai mannan may be one of them. (vide *Āḻvārkaḷ-Kāla-nilai*, pp. 117-21).

4. "மாவருந் திண்படைமன்னை வென்றிகொள்வார் மன்னும் நாங்கை" (P. T. 4, 1, 2).

"நண்ணார்முனை வென்றிகொள்வார் மன்னும் நாங்கை" (*Ibid*. 4, 7, 1).

"மண்ணித் தென்கரைமேல் திண்டிறலார் பயில் நாங்கை" (*Ibid*. 4, 1, 5).

5. Ep. Ind. Vol. i, No. 29, p. 205.

Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Gōvinda III invaded Kāñcī, defeated Dantivarman, son of Pallava Malla and took Kāñcī by force. This gradually led to the decline of Pallava rule[1].

From the Aihole inscription we gather that Pulakēśin II defeated at about 610 A. D. Pallava Māhēndravarman. Again Pulakēśin invaded the south about 640 A. D. and fought many a battle at Maṇimaṅgalam and other places against Narasiṁhavarman I, son of Mahēndravarman. Narasiṁha had him defeated, pursued him as far as his capital, Vātāpi, and destroyed the city. Dr. V. A. Smith opines that Pulakēśin fell owing to this encounter. Pulakēśin's son Cāḷukya Vikramāditya, was an able soldier like his father. He wanted to take vengance on the Pallava monarch who was Paramēśvaravarman at this time. The Gadval, Kūram and Udayēndram plates say that Pallava Paramēśvara inflicted such a crushing defeat at Peruvaḷanallūr on Caḷukya Vikramāditya I about 676 A. D. who invaded the Cōḻa country and encamped at Uragapuram on the southern bank of the Cauvery, that he had to flee with rags on. It is reasonable then to infer that the Āḻvār's reference is only to the invasion of Cāḷukya Vikramāditya, and not of Pulakēśin; for it is more probable for the Āḻvār to have met the warriors who had fought in 676 A. D. than those who had fought in 640 A. D., since he should have lived at least up to 754 A. D. when he eulogised Vairamēkaṉ in his hymns; besides the scene of action during the invasion at 676 A. D. was only Cōḻanāḍu and not Toṇḍāināḍu, nor is found any mention, in the hymns, of the destruction of Vātāpi, the capital of Pulakēśin II.

Scholars vary, in their opinion, that Uragapuram mentioned above might have been Madura, Negapatam or Uṟaiyūr. But Dr. Dubreuil has conclusively proved that it could not have been other than Uṟaiyūr[2] since Peruvaḷanallūr is a village 10 miles northwest of it.[3] But he says that three kings, Mānavarman, the Singhalese king, Kō-c-caṭaiyaṉ, the Pāṇḍya king and Paramēś-

1. Ind. Ant. Vol. ix, p. 127.
2. The Pallavas. Eng. tr. p. 43.
3. Mahā-vidvān R. Raghava Ayyangar Avl.. kindly brought to my notice a passage "உரகபுரியாள் தலைவா தாலேலோ" from a poem called *Kulōttuṅga-cōḻaṉ Piḷḷai-t-tamil* by Oṭṭak-kūttar in the Tanjore Palace Library wherein *Uragapuri* is referred to as a Cōla capital at the time of Kulōttuṅga II. The Cōla capital referred to, could not have been anything other than Uraiyūr

varavarman, the Pallava king made an alliance among themselves to vanquish the invader Vikramāditya I.[1] But the Gadval plates refer only to Vikramāditya's recovering the tracts which the three unnamed kings deprived him of, in the opening years of his reign.

Even assuming that three kings opposed the invasion of Vikramāditya of whom one was the Pāṇḍya, he cannot possibly be Kō-c-caṭaiyaṉ as Dr. Dubreuil thinks. For, from the Āṉaimalai inscriptions and Vēḷvikuḍi plates we learn that Parāntaka Neṭuñcaṭaiyaṉ the grandson of Kō-c-caṭaiyaṉ ascended the throne about 767 A. D. Had Kō-c-caṭaiyaṉ lived during the invasion of Vikramāditya *i.e.*, about 675 A. D., a period of 92 years should be allotted to the reigns of Kō-c-caṭaiyaṉ and his son Māṟavarman which is too long. Hence there is great possibility for his father Arikēsari Māṟavarman to have lived at that time.

In this connection it may be pointed out that there is no support in the Veḷvikuḍi plates for the suggestion that Kō-c-caṭaiyaṉ vanquishing the Mahārathas in the city Maṅgaḷapuram has no reference to any war of the Pāṇḍya with Vikramāditya I, as Dubreuil thinks. It is well known from the commentary to Iṟaiyaṉār Akapporuḷ and the Vēlvikuḍi plates that above-said Arikēsari Māṟavarman was the victor over the Cēra in a number of battles and brought under his sway a part of Koṅgu-nāḍu If, during the time of this Pāṇḍya, Vikramāditya had passed through the Koṅgu-country and had camped at Uṟaiyūr, it is worth investigating whether he was there as the friend or foe of Pāṇḍya. The Gadval plates granted at the camp of Uṟaiyūr mention that Vikramāditya was camped there with the object of invading the Pallava domains, but does not mention that any battle had taken place there. There is thus no ground for the assumption that he camped at Uṟaiyūr after scoring a victory over the Pāṇḍya. The other theory that Vikramāditya passed through the Koṅgu-country and was encamped at Uṟaiyūr as the ally of the Pāṇḍya, considerably gains in strength. It is note-

1. He has perhaps based his argument on Kendur plates which were later than the Gadval and Kūram plates above referred to. Vikramāditya might have vanquished Pāṇḍya some time other than this since the above-plates do not clearly state that Pāṇḍya was one of the triad referred to. They merely enumerate the kings that [illegible]

worthy that there were reasons why the Pāṇḍya should range himself on the side opposite to that of the Pallava. The Pallavas had rudely shaken the balance of power, by their conquest of the Cōḻa country (even as early as the time of Siṁhaviṣṇu, 590 A.D.) and time and again they had attacked the frontiers of the Pāṇḍya country. So bitter was the feeling between these two powers that it gave rise to their hostility for generations. Hence the probability is that the Pāṇḍya took the opportunity of the invasion of a Northern Power to wreck his neighbour and enemy the Pallavas.[1]

The subjugation of the Koṅgu-country by the Pāṇḍya procured for him an inveterate enemy in the Cēra, who, on all subsequent occasions, ranged himself with the Pallava[2]. The Āḻvār himself hints that the Cēra was a vassal of the Pallava.[3]

From the above it may be clear, that if at all there were three kings that opposed the march of Vikramāditya, the probability is that they were the Pallava, the Cēra and the Singhalese king. That the Pāṇḍya was an ally of the invader is clear from the following lines of Tirumaṅgai Āḻvār. "ஒண்டிறல் தென்னனோட (வ்) வடவர சோட்டங் கண்ட திண்டிறலாளர் நாங்கூர்". "மாவருந்திண்படைமன்னை வென்றிகொள்வார் மன்னும் நாங்கை". "தெண்ணனமாற்றார் தம்மைத் தொலைத்தவர் நாங்கை". The first passage is to be interpreted thus :—The people of Nāṅkūr were so powerful as to see the flight of the Northern king with the mighty Pāṇḍya. It may also be interpreted thus.—The people of Nāṅkūr were so powerful as to see the flight of the Northern King after the mighty Pāṇḍya's flight. These passages also show how powerful the king of the North was, how soon he was vanquished by the warriors of Nāṅkūr, and how he was forced to retreat, all of which completely agree with the contents of the Kūram plates of Paramēśvaravarman I.

1. As there is distinct inscriptional reference that Pulakēśin II invaded the south against the Pallavas for the benefit of Cōla. Cēra and Pāṇḍyas, there is no doubt that the same motive must have actuated his son Cāḷukya Vikramāditya also: He must have been therefore friendly to the Pāṇḍyas. (E. I. vi. p. 1.)

2. "பல்லவனுங் கோளனும்...அணுகவந்து விட்டிருப்ப-இருவரை யும் இருபாலும் இடரெய்தப் படைவிடுத்து"—*Madras Museum Plates.*

3. "பல்லவர் வில்லவ ரென்றுலகிற் பலராய்ப் பலவேந்தர் வணங்குகழற் பல்லவன்" (P. T. 2, 9, 1.).

The Āḻvār who lived during the reign of Pallava Malla (717-779) should have had an opportunity to hear from the soldiers who took part in vanquishing the king of the North and who lived in Nāṅkūr, a village near his native place, all about the battle of Peruvaḷanallūr, and this king of the North could not have been any one other than Cāḷukya Vikramāditya I.

THE PRATIJÑĀCĀṆAKYA OF BHĪMA

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It is a well-known fact that the Mudrārākṣasa treats about the accession of Candragupta Maurya to the throne of Magadha, after defeating the Nandas and the "confederacy of the northern powers", with the help of Cāṇakya. This historical fact has been made the plot of the drama "Pratijñācāṇakya" or the "Pratibhācāṇakya" as it is otherwise called by Bhīma. Abhinavagupta refers to this drama in the Abhinavabhāratī twice. The following are the extracts :—

"भवतु तनयं लोके जातापशब्दपरंपरा
परिचयमयी वार्ता कीर्तिं निकृष्य निकर्तनी" इति

प्रतिज्ञाचाणक्ये महाकविना भीमेन राजापि विन्ध्यकेतुः भूयसा व्यवहृतः ।

Vol. ii, P. 343. A. Bhāratī.

प्रवेशका बाहुल्येन तावत्तापसवत्सराज**प्रतिभाचाणक्य**मुद्राराक्षसादिषु.

Vol. ii, P. 459. A. Bhāratī.

From the above two extracts we infer that Bhīma was a poet of a high order as is shown by the adjective "Mahākavi" and that he was the author of a drama with the twin-names of "Pratijñācāṇakya" and "Pratibhācāṇakya."[1]

This statement of Abhinava is confirmed by quotations in the latter day anthologies. Some of the verses ascribed to Bhīma in the anthologies like "श्रुत्वा कर्णज्वरम्", "कानि स्थानानि दग्धानि"

1. The main argument of the author of this paper in giving an alternative name for the drama Pratijñācāṇakya as Pratibhācāṇakya is based on the second reference given above (Abhinavabhāratī Vol. II, P. 459.). It may be noted that in all probability this is a scribal error, the confusion between *bhā* and *jñā* being quite common in many scripts. To base an argument on this point would appear to be far-fetched. [Ed.]

seem to have been taken from a drama and especially the verse "स्मेरास्सन्तु सभासदः" ascribed to Bhīma in the Sūktimuktāvalī certainly seems to be a verse in the Prastāvanā.

No writer before Abhinavagupta as far as I know has mentioned Bhīma or his dramas. There is no doubt as to the date of Abhinavagupta since he himself furnishes it in his "Bṛhatīvṛtti" on the Pratyabhijñāvimarśinī. The date of Abhinava's literary activity ranges from 990 to 1015 A. D. This then forms the lowest determinant of the date of the Pratijñācāṇakya. We shall, in the course of this article, fix the other determinant. That the Pratijñācāṇakya had the very same plot as the Mudrārākṣasa is clearly suggested by the title itself, and a study of the names given to these respective dramas furnishes us with some interesting information. The Mudrārākṣasa gives pronounced prominence to Rākṣasa and his ill-fated seal, while the Pratijñācāṇakya or the Pratibhācāṇakya gives prominence to Cāṇakya and his terrible pledge or to Cāṇakya and his scintillating genius. This makes us infer that perhaps Bhīma wrote his drama as a rival play to the Mudrārākṣasa. This perhaps legitimate, though speculative, inference is further strengthened by the similarity in the names of characters in the play. Like Malayaketu in the Mudrārākṣasa there is Vindhyaketu in the Pratijñācāṇakya. In this connection it is necessary to refer to the date of the Mudrārākṣasa. No scholar will agree to ascribe Viśākhadatta to a date earlier than 800 A. D. Since the Mudrārākṣasa seems to be the first play dramatising the ascendancy of Candragupta and since the Pratijñācāṇakya seems to be a rival play, it need hardly be said that the Mudrārākṣasa forms the upper limit of the Pratijñācāṇakya. Thus we may say that the drama in question was written between 800 and 1015 A. D.

Now, a further clue seemes to be found in one of the couplets of Rājaśekhara, praising poets or productions. One of such couplets praises a king of Kālañjara of the name of Bhīmaṭa.

कालञ्जरपतिश्चक्रे भीमटः पञ्चनाटकीम् ।
तेषु प्रबन्धराजत्वं प्राप स्वप्नदशाननम् ॥

43. Sūktimuktāvalī.

The above verse furnishes us with the information that Bhīmaṭa was the author of five dramas, and the Svapnadaśānana, was the best of them.

Kālajñara was a fortress, which was beautified later, as a chief town by the great builders, the Chandels. The history of the Chandels according to V. A. Smith began only early in the ninth century and Kālañjara fell into their hands only in the reign of Yaśovarman, the Chandel King in 916 A. D. This easily proves that Bhīmaṭa was the ruler of Kālañjara before the Chandels seized it. Thus the date of his rule should have been before 915 A. D. on the strength of these two reasons :—

(1) Rājaśekhara's reference.

(2) Fall of Kālañjara.

Now it is quite probable that the letters "—ṭa" may have elided, his name thus reducing itself to simple Bhīma. Since Rājaśekhara attributes five dramas to this king, since this really requires a high quality of creative genius, and since Abhinavagupta refers to a drama Pratijñācāṇakya, and speaks of its author Bhīma as a Mahākavi, it need not be thought far-fetched or laboured if we identify the two and include the Pratijñācāṇakya as one of the five dramas referred to before.

Chronologically there is nothing incongruous. The adjective "Mahākavi" does not militate against the royal status since we find Harṣa of Kanouj speaking of himself in the प्रस्तावना of his dramas as "श्रीहर्षो निपुणः कविः". This identity has made us go a step further in fixing the date of the play (*i. e.*) the play seems to have been written between 800 to 915 A. D.

Thus we may conclude that the author of the Pratijñācāṇakya was no other than the King of Kālañjara, that he was the author of five dramas of which we know only two namely the Svapnadaśānana, and the Pratijñācāṇakya, and that he flourished between 800 to A. D. and 915 A. D.


Definition of Poetry or Kavya

(THESIS APPROVED BY THE MADRAS UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ORIENTAL LEARNING)

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PUBLISHED IN

THE JOURNAL OF ORIENTAL RESEARCH

MADRAS.

1929

DEFINITION OF POETRY, OR KĀVYA[1]

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INTRODUCTION.

By way of seeking for a definition, an attempt is here made to point out what in the different phases of literary criticism was thought to be the essence of poetry. The thesis is divided into three chapters which relate to the English, Aristotleian and the Indian views on the characteristic principle of poetry. Since English criticism marks, logically, though not chronologically, the earliest stage of literary criticism, it is given the first place here. In my opinion at least, Aristotle has been grossly misunderstood throughout from his own age till now and it seems to me that we can hardly mention a treatise which has suffered at the hands of critics of various nations and countries as Aristotle's Poetics. The little acquaintance I have with the work of Aristotle (indeed in translation) assures me that he can be better understood by a scholar who is familiar with our (Indian) ancient poetical and philosophical works than anybody else. Butcher, truly a scholar of deep and admirable erudition, concentrated his attention upon the 'Imitation' and the 'Universal' of poetics; and thinking that all his predecessors were not able to penetrate into the true significance of the terms and that he alone has found it out, makes special mention of them in the introduction. I have to make the same remark with regard to his interpretation. Of course another scholar may come after me and repeat the same remark with regard to my interpretation also. But whether it may be correct or not, it is for the readers to judge. The critics including Butcher brush aside those passages of Aristotle that militate against their explanation, as casual and incidental remarks.

1. Thesis approved by the Madras University for the Degree of Master of Oriental Learning.

Professor Saintsbury ridicules Greek Philosophers that they tried to establish certain categories because of the existence of words signifying them. But the ridicule cast by the ignorant comes doubly to themselves. Current words cannot but have some significance as the moving body cannot but have a soul. Yet he ridicules because he may.

But the strong point in my views as to the "universal" and imitativeness of poetry spoken of in the Poetics is that the same line of argument is advanced by our old authors such as Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, and that we need hardly say as Butcher does (Intro. p. ix) "that in his Poetics there are oversights and omissions . . . .;" but all passages, if my interpretation of the above-mentioned terms are accepted, remain mutually concordant and are quite congruous with the Aristotelian principle of poetry.

In the third chapter I have tried to prove that Bhāmaha also accepts the svabhāvokti-alaṅkāra (his illustrative ślokā alone will suffice to convince one of this fact) and that Daṇḍin does not belong to the Rīti School of Vāmana, but to the same Alaṅkāra School of Bhāmaha. It is always more difficult to disprove than to form a conclusion. So until I see that sound scholars accept my view and explanation I cannot think that the case is finally proved.

It is often that I meet with a difficult passage in this or that work and I give my own explanation and I find afterwards that the same explanation is given by an old and accepted author. Instances were so numerous that I was forced to write once :

इत्थं परिष्कृताधियो महता श्रमेण
नैकप्रभेदनयशालिनि शास्त्रमार्गे ।

ब्रूमो यमर्थमवधार्य बहुत्र सोऽयं
संवादमृच्छति चिरन्तनसन्निबन्धैः ॥

It was not seldom that I had the same experience during the preparation of this thesis. One most striking instance is that portion of the first chapter which deals with the prose form of kāvya. It was more than a full year after writing this portion that I happened to see the introduction to the Pratimā Nāṭaka, by Mahāmahopādhyāya T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī of Trivandrum, where he writes about *gadya* (गद्य) in the same strain, not failing

to quote गद्यं कवीनां निकषं वदन्ति, which was already quoted by me. I thought it necessary to say this here so that what I have said in connection with गद्य may not be taken to be second-hand.

I studied or consulted almost every alaṅkāra book that my college library contains, besides many English critical essays, some belonging to the above library and others kindly lent to me by friends. I did not try to refer in the thesis to every book or essay that I read. Lest I should be thought of as digressing or speaking of far-fetced things I avoided many a point that came uppermost. One such point is the consideration of poetry as the criticism or interpretation of life. It seemed to me that this would result in much dilation and therefore I abstained from it. But some conflicting opinions about the Śānta-Rasa expressed in some works are dealt with in an appendix to this thesis.

The following works have been referred to in the thesis:—

Sanskrit.

1. Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra.
2. Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra.
3. Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa.
4. Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṅkārasaṅgraha.
5. Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra.
5. Rudraṭālaṅkāra.
7. Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka with Abhinavagupta's Locana.
8. Dhanañjaya's Daśarūpa with Dhanika's Avaloka.
9. Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāṁsā (Kāvya or K. M.)
10. Kuntala's Vakrokti-jīvita.
11. Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa.
12. Ruyyaka's Alaṅkārasarvasva, with Jayaratha's Vimarśinī.
13. Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra.
14. Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana, with Alaṅkāra-cūḍāmaṇi.
15. Vidyānātha's Pratāparudrīya.
16. Viśvanātha's Sāhityadarpaṇa.
17. Jagannātha's Rasagaṅgādhara, with Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's commentary thereon.

18. Dharmasūri's Sāhityaratnākara.
19. Vaidyanātha's Candrikā, commentary upon Appayya Dīkṣita's Kuvalāyananda.

English.

1. Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art. (1911) (Trans. Butcher). (Aris.)
2. Hazlitt's Lectures on the English Poets and Spirit of the Age. (Every Man's Library Edition).
3. English Critical Essays. (19th Century.) (The World's Classics). (E. C. E.)
4. English Literary Criticism. (C. E. Vaughan. (E. L. C.)
5. Mathew Arnold's Lectures on Literary criticism.
6. Life in Poetry and Law in Taste. (Courthope). (L. L.)
7. An Introduction to the Study of Literature. (Hudson). (I. S. L.)
8. Daśarūpa translated by Haas.
9. Bandārkar Commemmoration Volume. (B. C. V.)
10. Sanskrit Poetics Volume I. (S. K. De).

Besides the above books, reference is here made also to certain other works like the Raghuvaṁśa, the Kirātārjunīya, the Prabodhacandrodaya, the Saṅkalpa-sūryodaya, Goldsmith's Essays etc.

श्रीः

वेदापहारविक्रोशद्वेधःखेदविमर्दनम् ।
पण्णातीरपरिष्कारं पारिजातमुपास्महे ॥

CHAPTER I.

THE ENGLISH CRITICS.

I remember to have heard one among many of "grandmother stories" in which it was told that there was a beautiful princess who, having a mysterious power, used to appear, with all her graceful and bewitching splendours, before many a prince, and disappear from his sight as soon as he approached and began to talk to her amorously, leaving him melancholy for ever. Critics think that there seem to be many things which have just the same tantalising appearance as this deceitful princess and that, however, other things may be, it is certainly so with what we call poetry. There is scarcely a man in the world who, being at home in the language in which it is written is not charmed by a piece of poetic art. And yet if questioned as to what it is that makes a piece poetic, what it is that enables us to distinguish poetry from other kinds of literary compositions, very few answer satisfactorily; for, the very moment the question is asked, all the beauties of poetry vanish away, and they find themselves in the dark. Hudson applies to the case of poetry what St. Augustine is said to have remarked with reference to other matters :

> "If not asked I know ;
> If you ask me I know not."

Further Hudson says that the definitions given now and then by various authors and critics are not of any practical help; and quoting by way of illustration some twenty definitions, he remarks as follows :—

" How far they help us separately or in combination, to answer the question what is poetry, is a matter which each reader must decide for himself. Suggestive, one and all, they doubtless are. Yet when we look at them critically, and compare them with one another, certain disturbing facts about them become clear. They are almost distracting in their variety because the subject is approached from many different points of view. Some, strictly speaking, fail to define, because they ex-

press rather what is poetical in general wherever it may be found, than what is specifically poetry. Some, on the other hand, are too narrow and exclusive, because they recognise only the particular kind of poetry in which the writer happened to be personally interested. And all are necessarily so abstract in statement that, whatever may be their philosophic value, they leave us in a region very remote from that world of concrete reality in which we move when we are reading poetry itself." (P. 84—5.)

Thus far perhaps we can follow Hudson. But when he says :—

" It is fortunate for us, then, as students, not of aesthetic theory, but of poetry, that we need not concern ourselves greatly to begin with about formulas and definitions, and the controversies about the ideal aims of poetry which these will often be found to involve". (P. 85.)—we should necessarily part company with him. I cannot understand how it is possible for anybody to study a thing without knowing first what the object of his study is and what not; and such a knowledge requires a definition. That "a certain instinctive sense" of what constitutes poetry we all have, is not an excuse that can justify one that sets about laying down principles for a systematic study of poetry, in evading the difficulty that might attend one's attempt to get at a reasonable definition of it. Unless it is so, we can hardly account for the fact that critics often begin with a definition. You may be a student not of aesthetic theory, but of poetry. But you are a student of poetry in general. When you, thus being a student of poetry in general, think it necessary to consider some of its elements, its distinctness from science, its function, ultimate standard and varieties, and to dwell at some length upon the theories of metre, you should first attempt to define poetry. To enter into the study of poetry without having a definition of it is to get into our two-bullocked rural carts which have no foot-board. A reader who takes a particular piece with no other view than to please himself has no business to inquire what the definition of poetry is, just as one that enjoys the fragrance of a flower-garden has no business to inquire what are flowers. But if you feel that you begin within yourself to ask such a question, you may be sure that you are past the moments of the pleasurable feelings aroused by the beautiful thing; that you are no

longer in the state of a mere reader, but are stepping into the shoes of a critic. True enjoyment refuses to keep company with any other thought. The reader is interested in the particular and he is fascinated and absorbed in it. The critic is engaged in the general, and through it in the particular; and he examines it. The one is the lover of poetry and the other the philosopher. The one enjoys the fruit and the other describes what and how it is.

It would appear that we cannot get from the critics a satisfactory definition of poetry. Many a "definition" in Hudson's list however seems to suggest the idea that the critics that have given these various definitions have conceived the characteristic essence of poetry in the same way as our Ālaṅkārikas; but they hardly troubled themselves to think deeply. It lay in their minds always embryonically, or, in the phrase of Ānandavardhana, स्फुरितप्रसुप्तकल्प. The word and sense are the body of poetry, we know. What fit them for the name of poetry as distinguished from all other kinds of literature, are guṇas and alaṅkāras, qualities and embellishments. The pleasure which it affords is its life and soul. When we consider poetry in itself, without thinking of the genius that produced it, all the topics concerning it must necessarily come under one or another of these five headings. Guṇas, alaṅkāras—both embellishers, and the pleasure, the result of the embellishment, are correlated, and therefore when one is stated the other two are implied. Somewhat of a similar kind is the analysis of poetic essence, that lies in Goldsmith's mind when he says in one of his miscellaneous essays—"Poetry Distinguished From Other Writings"—

> "Were the histories of Polybius and Livy simply turned into verse, they would not become poems; because they would be destitute of those figures, embellishments, and flights of imagination, which display the poet's art and imagination."

I am inclined to think that Goldsmith means here a division of the factors of poetic essence into two kinds, figures and embellishments, which may be loosely called in Sanskrit, alaṅkāras and guṇas respectively. "The flights of imagination" refer, I think, to the development and the elevation of the subject through addition and omission. That he intends such a division of the outward life of poetry becomes more apparent when we find him saying in the same essay :—

"Tropes and figures are likewise liberally used in rhetoric. And besides the metaphors, similies and allusions of poetry there is an infinite variety of tropes, or turns of expression, occasionally disseminated through works of genius, which serve to animate the whole and distinguish the glowing effusions of real inspiration from the cold efforts of mere science."

In the latter passage the "metaphors and similies" stand for figures in general. What are the allusions of poetry? To me they seem to be the same as Ānandavardhana's vyañjanā-vyāpāra. In explaining the tropes, he continues :—

"These tropes consist of a certain happy choice and arrangement of words, by which ideas are artfully disclosed in a great variety of attitudes; of epithets and the compound epithets; of sounds collected in order to echo the sense conveyed; of apostrophes; and above all, the enchanting uses of the prosopopœia, which is a kind of magic, by which the poet gives life and motion to every inanimate part of nature."

We may note that a few of our guṇas are here recognisable. The "epithets" appear to be the same as constitute the second kind of Daṇḍin's *audārya*—

श्लाघ्यैर्विशेषणैर्युक्तमुदारं कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
यथा लीलाम्बुजक्रीडासरोहेमाङ्गदादयः ॥

and most probably the "compound epithets" form the *ojas* (ओजः). The prosopopœia is undoubtedly the *samādhi*-guṇa and strangely we see that, just as Daṇḍin highly commends this *samādhi*—

तदेतत् काव्यसर्वस्वं समाधिर्नाम यो गुणः ।
कविसार्थः समग्रोऽपि तमेनमनुगच्छति ॥

(That which is called the *samādhi*-guṇa is the "entire substance" of poetry); even so does Goldsmith say :—

"which is a kind of magic, by which the poet gives life and motion to every inanimate part of nature."

As regards the apostrophe, I think, either something of the nature of our *Ākṣepa* figure, or such a turn of expression as is peculiar to the language of a man in the condition of the vyabhi-

cāribhāva, called "unmāda"[1] (insanity), is meant by it. We know there are three vṛttis mentioned in Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṅkārasaṅgraha. Pratīhārendurāja's interpretation of vṛtti is रसाभिव्यक्त्यनुगुणवर्णव्यवहार. This may be explained as 'sounds collected in order to echo the sense conveyed.' Within the sense of these words of Goldsmith can be brought Ānandavardhana's suggestiveness, व्यञ्जना, and Kṣemendra's propriety औचित्य of sounds, and a guṇa called संमित, which may be the "absence of the blemish (असंमित,) which is defined by Vāgbhaṭa thus :—

"शब्दार्थौ यत्र न तुलाविधृताविव संमितौ ।
तदसंमितमित्याहुर्वाक्यं वाक्यविदो यथा ॥"

A little more advanced is Leigh Hunt's enquiry into "What is Poetry". He begins his 'answer' to this question with a definition which runs thus :—

> " Poetry . . . . is the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty and power, embodying and illustrating its conceptions by imagination and fancy, and modulating its language on the principle of variety in uniformity."
>
> (E. C. E. p. 300)

We see that the material and the end of poetry are not included in this definition. So he adds " Its means are whatever the Universe contains; and its ends, pleasure and exaltation. " In the above definition, many words do not constitute the definition proper. Many of them refer to some aspects of poetry which are common to other branches of fine art and other kinds of writings. Eliminating such elements in the definition, we have to take into consideration only two points. And in this essay, Leigh Hunt discusses prominently and at length only these two points :—"imagination" (fancy " which is a

1. Unmāda is defined by Dhanika thus :—

अप्रेक्षाकारितोन्मादः सन्निपातग्रहादिभिः

Obviously अप्रेक्षाकारिता in the printed books is a misreading for अप्रेक्ष्यकारिता. 'सन्निपातग्रहादिभिः' is translated by Haas into "by physical derangement, planetary influence and the like ;" but it really means by the dangerous illness called सन्निपातज्वर, (which causes delirium), being possessed by evil spirits and the like.

lighter play of imagination" being included in it) and the "language on the principle of variety in uniformity." He refers, however, before entering into a detailed discussion of imagination, to the relation of poetry to music and painting, and seems to hold it superior to these two arts. What, in our point of view, is the relation between poetry and music? What are their respective places? These are questions which I would answer by referring to the oft-quoted saying.

> सङ्गीतमपि साहित्यं सरस्वत्याः स्तनद्वयम्.
>
> Music and Poetry,
>
> Form the breasts of Sarasvatī.

As for painting, it seems that the ālaṅkārikas rank it far below the best kind of poetry. We know Ānandavardhana divides poetry into three kinds—superior, mediocre and inferior. The last kind is called citra (picture) because it is आलेख्यप्रख्य, painting-like. A few lines of Ānandavardhana are worthy of reference.

ततोऽन्यत् रसभावादितात्पर्यरहितं व्यङ्ग्यार्थविशेषप्रकाशनशक्तिशून्यं च काव्यं केवलवाच्यवाचकवैचित्र्यमात्राश्रयेणोपनिबद्धमालेख्यप्रख्यं यदा भासते तच्चित्रम्। न तन्मुख्यं काव्यम्। काव्यानुकारो ह्यसौ। (Dhvanyāloka, P. 220.) Leigh Hunt next points out the difference between the subject-matter of poetry and that of science, which difference has been given expression to, twelve centuries ago by Bhāmaha :—

> तत्र लोकाश्रयं काव्यमागमास्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ।
>
> To the world relates Poetry;
> The Śāstras show the Truth.

Incidentally Hunt happens to speak here of the "simplest truth" which is almost identical with our 'svabhāvokti'. That this "simplest truth" also requires imagination and feeling for its poetic representation is made clear by Hunt in another place in the essay :—

> "But in Poetry, feeling and imagination are necessary"
> to the perception and presentation even of matters of fact.
>
> (E. C. E. P. 319.)

These preliminary remarks over, he shows that there are seven kinds of imagination, of which the first four belong to plot-making and supply the material of poetry. In his explanation of the last three kinds, he mentions simile and

metaphor and vaguely indicates also one or two other figures and qualities of poetry. His instance of metaphor—Milton's "motes that people the sunbeams" is Daṇḍin's *samādhi*-guṇa and not metaphor in our sense. Besides the two figures, simile and metaphor, he speaks, under the fifth kind of imagination, of three kinds of epithets, all of which are none other than words used in उपचरितवृत्ति, and his words—" Sometimes in concentrating into a word the main history of a person or thing " contain the same idea as Bhāmaha's.

कथमेकपदेनैव व्यज्येरन्नस्य ते गुणाः ।
इति प्रयुञ्जते सन्तः केचिद्विस्तरभीरवः ॥

And when we consider what he says regarding the last three classes of imagination, it appears that he has in his mind something analogous to our उत्प्रेक्षा figure and a guṇa treated by Vidyānātha under the name of संक्षेप.

Coming to the next point—to the language on the principle of variety in uniformity—he writes :—

> " and he is the best whose verse exhibits the greatest amount of strength, sweetness, straight-forwardness, unsuperfluousness, variety and oneness;—"

From Leigh Hunt's explanation of the above it is clear that the strength and sweetness meant here are the same as Daṇḍin's *śleṣa* and *mādhurya* respectively. The most appropriate translation of Hunt's " strength " is to be found in Vidyānātha's *aurjitya*. Besides, Jagannātha's remarks in the Rasagaṅgādhara concerning the wrong setting of sounds in poetic diction —where a sound is immediately followed by the same sound, e. g. पल्लल or after a long vowel there occurs a संयुक्त—are brought to our mind when we go through Hunt's discussion of "strength ". I do not think that any one will ever fail to remember the contrast Daṇḍin makes in his Kāvyādarśa between *vaidarbha* and *gauḍa* styles, when he reads these words of Leigh Hunt about the abuse of strength:

" The abuse of strength is harshness and heaviness; the reverse of it is weakness." There is a noble sentiment—it appears both in Daniel's and Sir John Beaumont's works, but is most probably the latter's—which is a perfect outrage of strength in the sound of the words. " Only the finest and the ***constant'st***

hearts God sets to act *stout'st* and hardest parts." " By straightforwardness is meant," says Leigh Hunt, " the flow of words in their natural order, free alike from mere prose, and from those inversions to which poets recur in order to escape the charge of prose, but chiefly to accommodate the rhymes." This quality consists perhaps in the absence of the blemish अस्थानस्थपद, or reflects a certain aspect of the quality प्रसाद. To one who really knows the deplorably degraded condition of the style of the Sanskrit writers of to-day, it would seem that too much stress cannot be laid upon the necessity of this quality of straightforwardness. If a writer would invert words for the sake of metre—Ānandavardhana's अनुरोध or वृत्तानुरोध he may be excused, for there is at least that reason for his inversion. Thinking that the change of the natural order of words is a necessary requisite of poetic expression and that thereby they are following the Kādambarī style, many twist words, sometimes even awkwardly. Great poets never invert words in this way for the sake of metre. Kālidāsa excels other poets in this respect. In the verse

अथ प्रजानामधिपः प्रभाते जायाप्रतिग्राहितगन्धमाल्याम् ।
वनाय पीतप्रतिबद्धवत्सां **यशोधनो** **धेनुमृषेर्मुमोच** ॥

except the three boldly printed words, the rest are in their proper and natural places. Even for placing these three words where they are found, there is full reason; but I should confine myself to the subject on hand.

Rudraṭa's पुष्टार्थ or Bhāmaha's अर्थ्यं, or the reverse of Mammaṭa's अधिक blemish seems to be Liegh Hunt's unsuperfluousness. His " uniformity " refers to the keeping up of the adopted style—perhaps Bhoja's and Vidyānātha's रीतिमत् ,and his variety corresponds to the employment of different metres, or to Udbhaṭa's vṛttis. It is a well-known fact that our poets change metre in every canto according to its subject. In the Raghuvaṁśa, the *Vaṁśasthā* metre is employed in the third sarga where the birth of a son to Dilīpa is narrated; and in the eighth and fifth sargs of the Raghuvaṁśa and Kumārasambhava respectively, Kālidāsa adopts the *viyoginī* metre to suit the delineation of the sorrow of Aja and Rati. The most interesting and ingenious change of metre is made by Bhāravi in the middle of a sarga, which fully testifies to his possession of an extraordinary

poetic imagination. The 13th sarga of the Kirātārjunīya begins with the औपच्छन्दसिक metre and continues it for 34 ślokas, the last of which is

स समुद्धरता विचिन्त्य तेन स्वरुचिं कीर्तिमिवोत्तमां दधानः ।
अनुयुक्त इव स्ववार्तमुच्चैः परिरेभे नु भृशं विलोचनाभ्याम् ॥

He thought and took it up with care,
Which, as if with fame, shone with its full grace ;
And, as if inquiring how it did fare,
He, with his eyes, did it embrace.

When thus Arjuna,—who being utterly ignorant of the fact that Śiva had come there with his army, had not in the least anticipated to see somebody in the vicinity,—approached his victim with an intense feeling of pride about his arrow which felled his fearful enemy, and fondly looked at it, he suddenly caught sight of a fowler with a bow in his hand, standing before him in order to deliver the message of Śiva. Bhāravi wished to bring to the reader's mind the unexpected and surprising appearance of a fowler before Arjuna, in a short and effective way, and this he did by thus changing the metre. And the metre here employed is *rathoddhatā*, which, not only by its name, but by its very modulations, introduces *uddhata-kirāta* and his admonitions of Arjuna. The following is the first stanza in the metre :—

तत्र कार्मुकभृतं महाभुजः पश्यति स्म सहसा वनेचरम् ।
सन्निकाशयितुमग्रतः स्थितं शासनं कुसुमचापविद्विषः ॥

This much I have said not merely out of my curiosity in observing some parallelism between the Eastern and Western criticism; but with a view to make it clear that if one sets about to study poetry in itself in order to find out its distinguishing characteristics, the incipient stage of one's study and its result cannot but be verv similar to what we see in Goldsmith's and Leigh Hunt's writings referred to above and if using what they have said, other men of letters push on in the same direction, their development of criticism can hardly be otherwise than such as we see in our Alaṅkāra literature from Bhāmaha downwards. Unfortunately, however, almost all the critics seem to have been extremely *loath* to move in the direction shown by another. Each one tried to strike a new path, the result being that, however intelligent and keen-sighted the critics

might have been, the criticism remained always in infancy; so that when there arises a question—What is Poetry—as it is sure to arise whenever poetry happens to be spoken of, one becomes perplexed and has either to stammer in reply or to content oneself with leaving the question aside on the plea that one has nothing to do with such a question. To the same cause is to be assigned the fact that all the works of critics were merely "essays" never rising, nor ever ambitious to rise, to the level of science. The study of language so recently born as in the middle of the last century has grown up to be a science. A Max Muller took up its cause and designated his two volumes on language as 'The Science of Language' and successfully vindicated the claim the study of language for the title of science. We have not a Max Muller for poetry. Is poetry not a subject worthy of scientific treatment? Is it not in the fitness of the advanced stage of arts that we should have sciences of arts, especially a science of poetry, or let me call it, *poetology?* It seems to me that it is Aristotle himself who chiefly misled these critics. He treats of style and figure—which are the life-token of true poetry—not in Poetics, but in Rhetoric. This fact led to the idea that style and figures belonged to oratory, not to poetry.

When thus the direct and matter-of-fact consideration of poetic essence was thrown beyond the scope and realm of of the study of poetry, it is inevitable that critics should enter either into the poet's mind which gave birth to, or the life of the world which is represented by, poetry. And there they see nothing distinctly; all seem vague and nebulous; and yet, because great geniuses would not remain dumb on any point, they speak and write, which speaking and writing make us only understand that they are wandering philosophers, good dreamers and prose-poets of poetry.

If such a state of things is well understood, it would be apparent that Goldsmith and Leigh Hunt really deserve high commendation for having been able to shake off the traditional prejudice and to mark out the way to find out the distinguishing principle of poetry. That tropes (the elements of good style) and figures belong rather to poets than to orators is plainly said by Goldsmith :—

> "Tropes and figures are likewise liberally used in rhetoric; and some of the most celebrated orators have owned

themselves much indebted to the poets. Theophrastus expressly recommends the poets for this purpose. From their source the spirit and energy of the pathetic, the sublime and the beautiful are derived. But these figures must be sparingly used in rhetoric than in poetry, and even then mingled with argumentation, and a detail of facts altogether different from poetical narration."

But this is a whisper on the shore of the uproarious sea. Who would hear it? One thing, however, is clearly proved by the critics that imagination is—as Hemacandra and Jagannātha say—imagination being the प्रतिभा —the root of poetry; and the pleasure it affords is its flowers and fruit : that the language of poets has something in it which is wrought by imagination, beautifies the language and renders it pleasurable. So when poetry is sought to be defined with the help of these imagination, beauty and pleasure, as we see in—

"The expression of the imagination".

"The language of the imagination".

"The art of employing words in such a manner as to produce an illusion on the imagination".

"The rhythmic creation of beauty".

"The most delightful and perfect form of utterance that human words can reach".

"The art of uniting pleasure with truth by calling imagination to the help of reason".—

we may assume that the authors of these definitions are indirectly referring to the essence of poetry which resides in words and thoughts, and which owes itself to tropes and figures. I am inclined therefore to think that though the above and like definitions require a verbal change before they can be strictly called definitions, yet they are in substance the same as the definitions of our old Ālaṅkārikas of the Alaṅkāra School, which will be considered in the third chapter.

Of a quite different nature and value is John Stuart Mill's defiinition which is contained in his question "What is poetry but the thought and words in which emotion spontaneously embodies itself?" Perhaps we have here our *rasa* theory of poetry,

poorly expressed. In a more developed form we find the *rasa* principle in Wordsworth's observation which also refers to the question of origin and philosophy of poetry :

" . . . * Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings ". (E. C. E. Pp. 6 and 26).

(*To be continued.*)

* It seems to me that Hudson had better take this formula for Wordsworth's definition of poetry instead of "poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; " (in Rajaśekhara's words सा हि चतसृणामपि विद्यानां निष्यन्दः Kāvya. p. 4) and " it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science ", (E. C. E. p. 19).

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

THE MARATHA RAJAS OF TANJORE by K. R. Subramaniam, M.A., Lecturer in History, Maharaja's College, Vizianagaram.

It is no little credit to the author of this small but intersting volume, when he has so patriotically written a connected history of the reigns of The Maratha Rajahs of Tanjore. However much we may claim progressive ideas in the various fields of knowldge from ages past, it may not be quite uncharitable, if we have been criticised for a deplorable lack of the histroical sense. But in recent years much has been done by eminent scholars of our country towards making amends for what we have been so justly charged with. Hence, the author of this treatise being young deserves all the more our praise for having so ably collected information for a book of history of the Tanjore Kings.

The first few pages contain a few incidents of the early history of Tanjore under the Naick Kings before the advent of the Maratthas, under their leader Veṅkāji, the brother of the reputed empire-builder Śivāji. The reigns are narrated in their chronological order and end with that of Śivāji, the last of a line of prosperous but rarely intrepid kings. It is not a plethora of information encircling each of the reigns, that engages us here, but the exaustive data given of the cultural efflorescence of the period. The golden age of Sarabhoji, as it rightly can be deemed, speaks enormously of the intellectual progress and the great development in fine arts. The closing chapters on the administration and economic condition of the period go much to prove, how the institutions, though they may have fallen into disuse in morden times, could not have been anything less than conducive to the welfare of an economically contented people.

Really the book evokes in us a feeling of pride at our own glorious past. But heavier our hearts grow at the comparative decadence, in every way in the present, of the villages of Tanjore, many of which like the famous Tiruvisalore, contained men of honour and learning, whose effulgence never failed to attract

people from outside to such seats of scholarship and the Muses.

We have only feeling of extreme respect to the author for having so nobly endeavoured to write the history of his own country.

K. CHANDRASEKHARAN, M.A., B.L.

CALCUTTA ORIENTAL SERIES NO. 8. THE VAKROKTI-JIVITA, by Rājānaka Kuntaka with his own commentary, edited with critical notes, introduction and resume :—by Sushil Kumar De, M. A., D. Lit., Reader and Head of the department of Sanskrit and Bengali, and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Dacca.—Calcutta, 1928.

This is the second revised and enlarged edition of Kuntaka's Vakrōkti-Jīvita, which had long been supposed to be lost by most of the Sanskrit scholars, until I was able to discover it through a peripatetic party working under me and announced its discovery in 1920 in my report on the working of the peripatetic party of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library during the triennium 1916-17 to 1918-19. The first edition of this work was published by Dr. S. K. De, in 1923 on the basis of a transcript furnished by me and of another transcript prepared by Mr. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri (now of the University Oriental Institute, Madras) and lent to Mahāmahopādhyāya N. S. Anantakrishna Sastri of Calcutta. The second edition, now under review, was prepared by the same editor on the basis of the two transcripts above referred to and of a transcript of a manuscript of the same work existing in a Jaina Bhandar at Jesalmere. Though both these editions are inevitably incomplete, on account of the imperfect manuscript material on which they happen to rest, the second edition shows improvements in several directions and supplies several omissions. A fairly reliable text of the first two Unmeṣas is given in this edition, together with a part of the third Unmeṣa and a resume of the remaining part of the third Unmeṣa and the fourth Unmeṣa. What with the deficiencies in the manuscripts of the work and what with the inherent difficulties in Kuntaka's style and diction, which abound with specimens of *Vakrōkti* no less than Kuntaka's illustrative verses, the task of Dr. De, as the first editor of the Vakrōkti-jīvita, must have been of a very exacting kind. Numerous as are the errors which

happen to disfigure this publication and no less numerous as are the textual problems that are left unsolved, a special meed of praise is due to Dr. De for having made available in print, for the first time, the contents of the rare, valuable and difficult work —Vakrōkti-Jīvita, which is the oldest standard classic of the *vakrokti* school of Sanskrit Poetics.

In his learned introduction to this publication, Dr. De gives an exposition of the distinguishing features of the Vakrōkti school, discusses the place and importance of the Vakrōkti-Jīvita in the History of Sanskrit Poetics and indicates how Kuntaka's theory of poetry may well be described as a beautiful tree of curly foliage, which grew out of the germinal idea set forth by Bhāmaha in his well-known verse:

सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्नोऽस्यां कविना कार्यः कोऽलंकारोऽनया विना ॥

(ii—85.)

Those who have studied well the Dhvanyāloka and Lōcana are apt to feel disappointed in a very disagreeable way, on perusing pages xlii and xliii of the introduction. In bringing Ānandavardhana's *Dhvani* under *upacāra-vakratā*, Kunfaka certainly adopts *bhakti-vāda* in the sense that *bhakti* or *lakṣaṇā* or *guṇa-vṛtti* is sufficient to account for all cases of *dhvani* and that a distinct *vṛtti* known as *Vyañjanā* need not be recognised. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa, who would bring *dhvani* under *alaṅkāra*, are not *bhākta-vādins*. Evidently Dr. De is misled by the ambiguity of the term *bhākta* and confounds this word as sometimes used in the sense of 'an element of secondary importance', with the same word which is used by Ānandavardhana in the sense of 'something associated with the secondary significative power called *lakṣaṇā* or guṇa-vṛtti.' Again, Bhakti-vāda does not take several forms, as Dr. De seems to imagine. In the concluding kārikās of the first Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka and in the vṛtti and Lōcana relating thereto, bhākta-vāda is adversely reviewed through the well-known Śāstraic device of *vikalpyadūṣaṇa*. It is, indeed, amusing that Dr. De wholly misses the meaning of this portion of the Dhvanyāloka and Lōcana and inflicts upon his readers, not only in the first edition but also in the revised, edition under review, the painful task of attempting to construe the subjoined baffling clause appearing at pages xlii and xliii of the introduction:—

"* * * but which (bhakti-vāda) takes several forms, as Abhinavagupta points out, according as the tādātmya or tādrūpya, lakṣaṇa or upalakṣaṇa of the lakṣaṇā or indication is posited with reference to the function of Vyañjanā or suggestion!" Will Dr. De, who chastises Dr. Haricand Sastri somewhat unjustly, at these pages of his introduction, consider the extract quoted above with the same degree of severity ?

In what the editor calls the resume of the unedited portion of the text, he rightly states, with commendable modesty, that his emendations are capable of improvement. In some places, his emendations show that he misses the meaning. Attention may be drawn to one such striking example, just to show how wary those who use this publication should be. At page 193, the verse beginning with the word 'आपीडलोभात्' should be read thus :—

> "आपीडलोभादुपकर्णमेत्य प्रत्याहतोपांशुरुतैर्द्विरेफैः ।
> अभ्यास्यमानेव महीपतीनां संमोहमन्त्रं मकरध्वजेन" ॥

A beautiful Nāyikā, for whose hand several kings are vying with each other, is described in this verse. The bees attracted by the fragrant flowers decorating her ears come close to them and humming low, strike her ; and in this situation, she is described as being taught by Cupid, the *mantra* or spell by which all kings are captivated. Now Dr. De will certainly realise that his emendations consisting in changing 'प्रत्याहितो' into 'प्रत्याहितः', 'मन्त्रं' into 'मन्त्रः' and 'अभ्यास्यमानेव' into 'अमृष्यमाणेन' would only lead to the verse in the original being entirely dissociated from its sense. Whatever may be the defects of this publication, Dr. De has certainly placed all those interested in the study of advanced Sanskrit Poetics under a deep debt of gratitude, by the great pains which he has taken in publishing the available text of one of the most valuable and rarest works on Sanskrit Poetics—*viz.*, Vakrōkti-Jīvita.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

KAVYALAMKARA, by Śrī Bhāmaha with English translation and notes—by Mr. P. V. Naganatha Sastri, B.A., B.L., High Court Vakil, Tanjore—Price Rs. 3, Printed and published by the "Wallace Printing Press", Tanjore.

This is a welcome addition to the noteworthy publications relating to Sanskrit Poetics. The only edition of the text of Bhāmaha, available before the publication of this edition, was what one might find in the form of Appendix VIII to the Bombay Sanskrit Series edition of Pratāparudrayaśōbhūṣaṇa. Mr. P. V. Naganatha Sastri gives, in his edition, the text of Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra and an English translation, which is eminently readable and generally reliable, together with brief explanatory notes in English. The learned translator is happy in his rendering in several places and his judicious notes are such as bear ample testimony to his keen literary sense, sound Sanskrit scholarship and well-disciplined discretion—traits for which he has acquired a well-deserved reputation in the circle of cultured men to whom he is known. Bhāmaha's Kāvyalaṅkara bristles with textual problems, some of which Mr. P. V. Naganatha Sastri has solved, while many a problem still awaits further consideration and solution at the hands of other scholars. The printing is badly done and it is a pity that the learned editor could not decide to publish the results of his scholarly labours through some well-equipped Sanskrit Press. We offer our grateful thanks to Mr. P. V. Naganatha Sastriyar for the very valuable service he has rendered to the cause of higher literary criticism in Sanskrit, by bringing out this edition of one of the oldest works on Sanskrit Poetics.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

THE ṢAṢṬI-TANTRA AND VĀRṢA-GAṆYA.

BY

PROF. M. HIRIYANNA, M.A., L.T., MYSORE.

Although the term '*Ṣaṣṭi-tantra*' which occurs in the last stanza of the *Sāṅkhya-saptati* and elsewhere in Indian philosophical literature is well known, its exact significance is not clear. It is commonly taken as the name of an old treatise on the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, but doubts have been expressed as to whether it might not be merely a description of the doctrine itself because it recognises, according to one reckoning, sixty (*ṣaṣṭi*) principles. Among those that accept it as the designation of a work, there is difference of opinion again as to who its author was[1]. Some new light is thrown on these points by a book published in recent years, *viz.*, the *Jaya-maṅgalā*, a commentary on the *Sāṅkhya-saptati*[2]. The commentary is a brief one and is ascribed in the colophon to Śaṁkarācārya, but probably erroneously as Principal Gopināth Kavirāj who contributes an Introduction to the edition has tried to make out. Its date is not known, but it may not be without any claim for antiquity[3]. It contains about half-a-dozen references to the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* from which the following conclusions may be drawn—

(1) '*Ṣaṣṭi-tantra*' is the name of a work consisting of 60 sections, and the *Sāṅkhya-saptati* is a digest of it.

(2) Its author was Pañca-śikha.

1. For a discussion of the whole subject, see Keith: *The Sāṁkhya System* : Ch. V and the references therein cited.

2. No. 19 of the "Calcutta Oriental Series". Edited by Haradatta Śarma, M.A., 1926. The edition is based upon two Mss.--one belonging to the Govt. Oriental Library, Madras and the other, to the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.

3. For instance it refers the triple classification of inference into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* to the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* (page 7) whereas Vācaspati does not seem to have been aware of it as its source. See *Tattvakaumudī* on *Kārikā* 5.

(3) The doctrine also is called *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* for it postulates 60 principles.

The relevant passages are—

(*a*) तेषु च षष्टितन्त्रादिख्यातेष्विति । **विस्तर**त्वात् षष्टितन्त्रस्य संक्षिप्तरुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहार्थं सप्ततिकारम्भः । वक्ष्यति चैतदार्याभिस्संक्षिप्तमिति ॥ (page 1).

(*b*) एते षष्टि[:] पदार्थाः । तदर्थं शास्त्रं षष्टितन्त्रमुच्यते ॥ (page 56).

(*c*) तेनेति । पञ्चशिखेन मुनिना बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् । षष्टितन्त्राख्यं षष्टि**खण्डं** कृतमिति । तत्रैव षष्टिरर्था **व्याख्याताः** ॥ (page 68).

(*d*) ननु च षष्टितन्त्रमेवास्तु किं सप्तत्या ॥ (page 69).

(*e*) अत्र षष्टितन्त्रे बहवोऽर्थाः । तेऽत्र नोक्ता इत्याह सप्तत्यामित्यादि ॥ (p. 69).

Attention may in particular be drawn in the above to the words printed in bold type *viz.* विस्तर 'diffuseness of expression '[1], खण्ड 'section' or 'chapter', व्याख्यात 'expounded' and to the implication of extract (d) that the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* is a book like the *Sāṅkhyasaptati.*

Now there is no difficulty in accepting the first and the last of the three conclusions stated above, for they are not in conflict with anything that is definitely known about the Sāṅkhya-Yoga doctrine or its history. The same, however, cannot be said of the second conclusion for, as already observed, there is a difference of opinion in regard to it; and some have held that Vārṣagaṇya, and not Pañca-śikha, was the author of the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra.* The matter accordingly requires consideration. The reason for assigning the authorship of the work to Vārṣagaṇya is as follows:—In his *bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-sūtra* (IV 13), Vyāsa quotes a stanza as from "the *śāstra*" and Vācaspati in the *Tattva-vaiśāradī,* his gloss on it, explains it as taken from the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra.* This stanza is cited by Vācaspati himself in the *Bhamatī* (II-i-3), his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṁkara as one of Vārṣagaṇya. These statements, when taken together imply, it is said, that Vārṣagaṇya was the author of the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra.* In arriving at this conclusion, however, one important point seems to have been overlooked. There is a very material difference in the reading of the stanza as quoted in the two places. In the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya,* it runs as follows—

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1. See Pāṇini III-iii-33.

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

But in the *Bhāmatī* it is—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथप्राप्तं तन्मायैव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

That the difference is not due to a scribal error and is not a misprint is shown by the commentators explaining the stanza with *iva* in the one case[1] and *eva* in the other[2]. The difference in the context in which the stanza is quoted in the two works also makes this plain—

(1) As quoted in the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* i.e. with the reading *iva* :—The point under consideration here is, to put it generally, the distinction between the Prakṛti and its modes. The teaching is : Prakṛti is eternal but, in its unmanifest form, it never comes directly within our experience; its modes, on the other hand, which are directly experienced are not eternal. They are transient[3], the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* theory being that all things are constantly changing[4].

(2) As quoted in the *Bhāmatī* i.e. with the reading *eva* :—The matter under discussion here is whether the Yoga system is authoritative on the theoretical side of its teaching—especially in respect of Prakṛti being the independent cause of the physical universe—as it is on the practical side. The view of Vācaspati is that the system is concerned *solely* with a certain method of discipline for realising the ultimate Truth and that its theoretical teaching is not to be taken seriously[5]. It is in this connection that the stanza is quoted and it means according to him

1. 'मायेव न तु माया ।' *Tattva-vaiśāradī.*

2. 'मायैव मिथ्या ।'—*Kalpataru* p. 438 (Nirṇaya-sāgara Edn.)

3. Compare *Tattva-vaiśāradī*— 'सुतुच्छकं विनाशि । ...एवं विकाराः... प्रतिक्षणमन्यथाप्रकृतिर्नित्यतया मायाविधर्मिणी परमार्थेति ।'

4. Compare *Tattva-kaumudī* on *kārikā* 5 'प्रतिक्षणपरिणामिनस्सर्वे भावा ऋते चितिशक्तेः ।' Prakṛti also comes under this description, but it endures through change.

5. Not all the commentators understand Śaṁkara thus ; and Vācaspati may here be going beyond the *sūtra* as well as the *bhāṣya* on it. But that is a matter which is irrelevant for our present purpose.

that what is ultimately real is only the ground of the Guṇas or Prakṛti, *viz.*, Brahman and that all else, including Prakṛti, is phenomenal or illusory.

Since it is impossible to think that Vācaspati is here tampering with the text of the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* to suit his *advaitic* purpose, we must conclude that the difference in the reading is genuine, and that either Vārṣagaṇya or Pañca-śikha deliberately modified the other's *śloka* in order to draw pointed attention to an important doctrinal difference between their teaching. If so, the conclusion to be drawn from a comparison of the two quotations is that Vārṣa-gaṇya is *not* the author of the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* from which the stanza with the reading *iva* is taken. The evidence of the *Jaya-maṅgalā* in regard to Pañca-śikha's authorship of it may therefore be accepted; and like the other two conclusions, this one also really contradicts nothing that is so far known about the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. There is indeed one other statement, *viz.*, that in Bhāskara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras* (II-i-1)[1] which seems to make Kapila himself the author of this work; but it need not go against the evidence of the *Jaya-maṅgalā*; for we know from the last but one stanza of the *Sāṅkhya-saptati* that Pañca-śikha 'widely extended the doctrine' —तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्; and these words can, in that case, be taken to signify not a promulgation of the doctrine but an amplification of an earlier treatise on it also called by the name of *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra*. Such a conclusion is in agreement with the Chinese tradition which describes Pañca-śikha's book as consisting of 60,000 stanzas.

A question now arises as to what the character of the teaching of Vārṣagaṇya was. Vācaspati describes him as योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता which means that he was an exponent of Yoga—not however in the sense of an independent system of thought, as is clear from what has been stated; but in that of a system of discipline, calculated to help in the realisation of the Vedāntic Absolute. That is, Vārṣagaṇya was a Vedāntin—more particularly a *vivarta-vādin* or upholder of the Māyā doctrine. Such a view, however, cannot be accepted readily for there is early evidence to show that Vārṣagaṇya was in all probability a *pariṇāma-vādin*. In the *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu,

[1] 'कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतषष्टितन्त्राख्यस्मृतेः' (p. 87).

there is a long discussion between the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika; and at one stage of it, the Sautrāntika compares the *sarvāsti-vāda* of the Vaibhāṣika to the doctrine of Vārṣagaṇya. "In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya. According to them there is neither production of something new nor extinction of something existent: What exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent."[1] Now this is exactly what the Sāṅkhya is believed to teach. According to Vācaspati's *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* (IV-i-32), though both the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga alike advocate *pariṇāma*, the one is to be distinguished from the other just in this: According to the Sāṅkhya, the modes or differentiations are *always* there and what takes place in time and space is only their manifestation. It is not merely Prakṛti that is eternal; all its states are so. That is *satkārya-vāda* understood literally. According to the Yoga, on the other hand, the changing substance, *viz.*, Prakṛti is permanent but not its states which, as we know, is the view expressed in the *Yoga-bhāṣya* quotation already referred to. If Vārṣagaṇya held the *pariṇāma-view* in its extreme form, we see very good reason, by the way, for the emendation of the *śloka* in question. Now granting that Vārṣagaṇya was a *pariṇāma-vādin*, he might have been a Sāṅkhya believing in Prakṛti as the independent source of the physical universe. Or more probably, since Vācaspati insists that he was a Vedāntin and describes him as elaborating a method of discipline and not as propounding a system of philosophy, he was a *Brahma-pariṇāma-vādin* like Bhāskara, say, of a later age. In that case he would not hold Prakṛti to be ultimate.[2] Even so, we have to admit that Vācaspati in his *Bhāmatī* is interpreting a passage intended to teach *pariṇāma* in the sense of *vivarta*. But he is not alone in doing so and there are other instances of the kind in the history of Indian philosophy. Thus one and the same thinker, Brahma-nandin, who is also known as the Vākya-kāra, is cited in support of both the views—by Bhāskara in support of *pariṇāma* in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*

1. Stcherbatsky : *The Central Conception of Buddhism* : p. 89

2. Vārṣagaṇya would maintain that all things *are* at all times, so that the emphasis in मायेव in his *śloka* can refer not to the world as it is, but to the world as it is commonly conceived, i.e. as consisting of things that *originate* and *perish*. All things according to him subsist always; hence their existence in time and space is a myth.

(I-iv-25) and by Sarvajñātman in support of *vivarta* in his *Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka* (III-217,221). It is doubtful which of these views was acceptable to Brahma-nandin; but it is practically certain that Bhartṛ-prapañca was a *pariṇāma-vādin* and yet Sureśvara represents him as an advocate of the other view.[1] This uncertainty may in part be due, as suggested by Sureśvara in the passage just referred to, to the failure to preserve in its precise form the teaching of these ancient thinkers and the consequent break in tradition; but it is also due in part to the fact, noted by Sarvajñātman[2], that the advocates of *vivarta* usually make *pariṇāma-vāda* the stepping-stone to it. On account of this, their followers naturally come to look upon *vivarta* as the necessary implication of all *pariṇāma* views, and to regard the latter as affording merely a tentative solution of the well-known problem of the one and the many.

1. *Br.* : *up.* : *Vārtịka* p. 666 Śl. 1164-5. See also *Indian Antiquary*, 1924 : p. 84.

2. *Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka* : iii-220. Compare also Śaṁkara on *Ved* : *Sū* : II-i-14.

VAÑCIMĀNAKAR OR THE GREAT CITY CALLED VAÑCI

BY

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My friend, the late Mr. Devan Bahadur Pethachi Chettiar, by whose ultimately death, Southern India has lost its great patron of Tamil language and the most liberal-hearted of its sons, gave me two books called "Vañcimānakar" and "Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ" written by two of the most eminent Tamil scholars of the present day, namely Śrīmāns R. Raghava Iyengar and M. Raghava Iyengar respectively and asked me to review them. Owing to want of reference books and time, I could not complete my review within the time when my friend was sojourning at Ootacamund and therefore, with his permission I sent it to "Centamiḻ" the premier Tamil monthly and the organ of the fourth caṅkam published at Madura. It was published in that magazine, in No. 4 of Volume 21, February March, 1923.

2. For the reasons that the books reviewed by me were Tamil, the authorities quoted *pro* and *con* were Tamil and the subject was the capital of the ancient Cēra kingdom, one of the three great Tamil kingdoms which comprised the whole of Southern India, my review was written in the Tamil language. But scholars like Dewan Bahadur Bhavanandam Pillai and Mr. Krishnamachari of the Archaeological Department thought that if written in the English language it would reach a wider circle of readers and commanded me to render it in English. Hence my justification in rewriting my Tamil review in English. Here I have endeavoured to conform to the original as far as possible; and wherever I depart from it, it is solely with the object of making the subject more intelligible to the English reading public.

3. The capital of the ancient Cēra kingdom is admitted on all hands to have been "Vañci or Vañcimānakar". Which city of the present times was that Vañcimānakar is the theme of

the two aforesaid books which are reviewed here. Since there are more than two cities which can be rightly called Vañcimānakar of the ancients, it behoves us to restrict our subject to the elucidation of the question—which city was that Vañcimānakar which Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ the greatest monarch of the Cēra kingdom and Emperor of all India had as his capital at the end of the first and the beginning of the second century after Christ. The controversy as to Vañcimānakar does not seem to be new but it seems to have raged from the 13th century A. D. and scholars have not up to date agreed as to which it was. The learned authors of "Vañcimānakar and Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ" have declared as their opinion that it was Karūr, which is now the capital of a taluk in the Trichinopoly District; but which, by tradition, and character of the country and the people, naturally belongs and did belong till recently to the Coimbatore District. They have given ample reasons and quoted authorities for their position and indeed the two books which they have severally written are not only full of them but are a regular mine of scholarship and information of an exceedingly fascinating character. Mr. R. Rangachariar, M.A., L.T., in a learned article published in the "Hindu" of the 30th August, 1922, has agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the learned authors. But others such as Mr. K. V. Subramania Ayyar and the late Rao Bahadur P. I. Chinnasawmy Pillay of Palghat, are of opinion that Vañcimānakar was not Karūr but Koṭuṅkaḷūr, which is now anglicised into Cranganore situated about 25 miles north of Cochin, laved by the waves of the Arabian Sea on the west and the billows of the back water, whose entrance is at Karuvappadana, on the East. These gentlemen, it may be noted however, have given, so far as I am aware, no reasons and quoted no authorities for their opinions, while the authors of the two books under review have given reasons also for their position that Koṭuṅkaḷūr could not have been "Vañcimānakar". The renowned research scholar the late Mr. Kanakasabai Pillai of the Postal Dept. in his monumental work "The Tamils 1800 Years Ago" has expressed a third opinion that the ancient "Vañcimānakar was neither Karūr nor Koṭuṅkalūr, but Tirukarūr situated 28 miles north-east of Cochin and which is now in ruins. Mr. Kanakasabai Pillai also gives no reasons for his opinion, and by the way in which the expresses it, he seems to think it beyond all doubt.

4. Now, let me examine the grounds adduced by Śrīmāṉs R. Raghava Iyengar and M. Raghava Iyengar to prove that Karūr was Vañcimānakar. As far as I could gather from those two books the following six reasons seem to be the most important for their conclusions *viz.*—

I. In the Sthalapurāṇam or the ancient history of Karūr it is given that the site on which the town was built had been originally a forest of Vañcula or Vañci trees and hence it was called " Vañcuḷāraṇṇiyam ". If the word is taken to be "Vañcuḷā" (வஞ்சுளா) with ' ā ' as its terminal element then the meaning of "Vañculāraṇṇiyam" would be the forest which is full of very heavy milking cows ; and suitably to this significance is another name of the town *viz.*, Tiruvāṉilai or the village-common for the assemblage of cows ; and the God in the temple on that site is called " Paśupatīśvara " *i.e.*, the lord of cows.

II. *a.* " நெடுந் தேர்க்கோதை
திருமாவியனகர்க் கருவூர் முன்றுறைத்
தெண்ணீருயர்க் கரைக்குவைஇய
தண்ணான் பொருநை மணலினும்பலவே."

(அகநானூறு-93).

The valorous deeds of Kōtai (Cēra) of the tall chariot are as numerous as the sands in the dunes against the high banks of the river Taṇṇāṉporunai (Amarāvatī) which flows in front of the prosperous and wonderful city of Karūr.

b. " தண்பொருநைப் புனற்பாயும்
விண்பொரு புகழ்விறல் வஞ்சி." (புறநானூறு-11).

That powerful Vañci irrigated by the cool waters of Porunai and famed as far as the heavens.

c. தண்பொருநை சூழ்தரும் வஞ்சியர்கோமான். (சிலப்.-29).

The Lord of the people of Vañci which is surrounded by the cool Porunai.

d. " வஞ்சிப் புறமதிலலைக்குங்
கல்லென்பொருநை மணலினும்". (புற.-347).

(too numerous) as the sands in the bed of the roaring Porunai which leaves the outer walls of Vañci.

e. " இவன் யாரென்குவையாயினிவனே
புலிநிறக் கவசம் பூம்பொறி சிதைய
வெய்கணை கிழித்த பகட்டெழின் மார்பின்
மறலியன்ன களிற்று மிசையோனே

களிறே, முந்நீர்வழங்கும் நாவாய்போலவும்
பன்மீனாப் பட்டிங்கள் போலவும்
சுறவினத் தன்ன வாளோர் மொய்ப்ப
மரீஇயோ ரறியாது மைந்துபட் டன்றே
நோயில னாகிப்பெயர்க தில்லம்ம
பழன மஞ்ஞை யுகுத்த பீலி
கழனியுழவர் சூட்டொடு தொகுக்கும்
கொழுமீன் விளைந்த கள்ளின்
விழுநீர் வேலிநாடு கிழவோனே." (புறம்.-13).

"Oh, lord of all that beautiful country surrounded by falling waters, rich with money and fat fish from the rice fields where reapers bind sheaves intermixed with peacock feathers! If you ought to know who this fine warrior that sets his elephant like the death-dealing Yama is: it is he who slew the tiger with a single arrow, rending, at once, its beautifully coloured skin and vitals; and his elephant, becoming musty without the knowledge of his keepers, has run away unheeding the swords of the throng of warriors surrounding him, like the ship sailing through a sea of sharks and the moon the star-studded sky. May he depart in peace without danger!"

The foregoing quotations point to Karūr as "Vañcimānakar".

III. (*a*) The tutelary divinity of the town of Karūr bears the name of "Vañciyamman."

(*b*) The God Śiva of the temple north of Amarāvatī is called "Vañculēśvaraliṅkam".

IV. செங்குணக் கொழுகுங்க லுழிமலிர் நிறைக்
காவிரி யன்றியும் பூவிரி புனலொரு
மூன்றுடன் கூடிய கூட லனையை. (பதிற்.—50).

"You who are not only like the cool rippling Cauvery which bends its course straight to the east but also deep like the confluence of the flower-bedecked waters of your three rivers." The meaning of the above stanza, according to our authors, is that the three rivers—Cauvery, Amarāvatī and Kūḍavanār, according to an old commentary, mingle their waters; and it is from this confluence that the river Cauvery begins to flow eastward and therefore it is inferred that "Vañcimānakar is on the banks of the Amarāvatī.

V. ஆடக மாடத் தரி துயிலமர்ந் தோன் (சிலப்.—26).

" The God who sleeps the sleep of eternal wisdom in the gold-domed palace."

This, they declare, refers to the Raṅganātha's temple in the "Aracavaṉam" (the ficus grove in Karūr).

VI. The old Roman coins of the time of Augustus, Tiberius and Claudius were found in the vicinity of Karūr.

The above six, so far as I am able to gather, are the chief of the grounds adduced to establish that " Vañcimānakar " was no other than Karūr.

Now, let us see how far these grounds support their conclusions.

I. The learned authors say that the word "Vañcuḷāraṇṇiyam" means either the forest of Vañci trees or the forest where cows abound and therefore the city of Karūr has come to bear the name of " Vañcimānakar." They also say the city did not take that name from the " Vañci " creeper. But Cīttalaiccāttaṉār, the author of the great Epic " Maṇimēkalai " has referred to " Vañcimānakar " as

"பொற்கொடிப் பெயர்படூஉம் பொன்னகர் ".

(மணிமேகலை—20, 92)

" that wealthy city which bears the name of the golden creeper "

"பூங்கொடிப் பெயர்படூஉம் திருந்திய நன்னகர்

(மணிமே.—28, 101, 102).

" That well-built fine city bearing the name of the flowery creeper." which his commentators declare to mean that the city has taken its name from the creeper " Vañci." But our authors say that the real meaning of the above two passages is, the city which bears the name of the creeper and not which has taken its name from the creeper. I might agree with this meaning, but there occurs

உற்றவளாங் கோருயர் தவன்வடிவாய்ப்
பொற்கொடி வஞ்சியிற் பொருந்தியவண்ணமும்

(மணிமே.-பதி.—85, 86).

How she, after reaching it, assumed the garb of a ṛṣi and went to " Vañci " of the golden creeper. The meaning of this line that " Vañci " got its name from the creeper will not be wrong, for the second line has another reading *viz.*, " பொற்கொடி மூதூர் ". " The ancient city of the golden creeper "; the meaning of it would only be the city which obtained its

name from the creeper "Vañci" and not that its name was the same as that of the creeper.

There is also another line from which one could make out only that meaning *viz.*, that the city got its name from the creeper.

"பூங்கொடி வஞ்சிமாநகர் புகுவை." (மணிமேகலை—21, 91).

"You will get into Vañcimānakar of the flowery creeper." Besides the above, the great author of Maṇimēkalai when speaking of Vañcimānakar invariably connects it with the creeper Vañci but never for once, if he had meant it to be Karūr, has alluded to it as the Vañci of the Vañci trees, or, of cows, or, of pregnancy. The absence of any such allusion at all pointing to the origin of the name of the city and the omission of any such reference by Iḷaṅkōvaṭikaḷ the author of "Cilappatikāram" strengthen a little the view of those who say that "Vañcimānakar" was not Karūr.

II. The five quotations under this heading certainly refer to Karūr and not to any other place. Therefore, there are unmistakable examples pointing to the conclusion that the Vañci referred to in those stanzas means only Karūr.

III. The two examples given here could also apply to "Vañculāṭavī" as being the origin of the names "Vañciyammaṉ" and "Vañculēśvaraliṅkam" and from these to draw the conclusion that Vañcimānakar was Tiruvāṉilai-Karūr will be opposed to logic.

IV. The explanation that the three rivers mentioned in the stanza quoted here "மூன்றுடன் கூடிய கூடலனையை *i. e.*, like the confluence of your three rivers" *viz.*, Kāvērī, Amarāvatī and Kūṭavaṉāṟu, does not seem to be fitting. The authors have not given sufficient grounds for their opinion that the confluence referred to in this stanza points to that of the rivers Kāvērī and Amarāvatī. It is difficult to understand why our authors should have marched into the thorny path of imagining that the confluence spoken of by the author of the stanza refers to that of the said two rivers which is situated six miles away from Karūr, while there is in the country belonging to the Cēra Kings themselves the famous town of Bhavānī, where the sacred confluence of Kāvērī and Bhavānī takes place, according to Purāṇas and tradition, with the third river "Amṛtanadī" flowing underground. It is also not clear how they make out a connection between the

confluence of Amarāvatī with Kāvērī and Karūr and how it has become a sea also. In the quotation given by our learned authors from "Paramatabhaṅgam" of Vedānta Deśika *viz.*, "*மாதவனூர் வடகொங்கில் வானியாற்றின்*—Mādhava possessing the river Vāṉi in the north Koṅku country", the word "*வானி*" instead of meaning Amarāvatī distinctly shows that it is not Amarāvatī but Bhavānī, because the word "Vāṉi", although another name for Amarāvatī, cannot refer to it here, as it is not in the north Koṅku country; but the river Bhavānī being one of the large rivers belonging to the Cēras and flowing in the north Koṅku and bearing to this day the names of "Vāṉi" "Bāṉi" and "Āṉi" fits the meaning of the quotation better. Śrīmāṉ R. Raghava Iyengar finds the meaning of "*செங்குணக் கொழுகும் i.e.*, flowing due East" to be that the river Kāvērī flows due east only after it is joined by Amarāvatī. This does not seem to be near the geographical truth. Besides the fact that the stanza quoted does not refer to this confluence at all. There is the tradition that the sage Agastya, who was bringing Kāvērī in his kamaṇḍala from Coorg southwards to the Pāṇḍya country, sat on a rock to perform his ablutions and when he sat shutting his eyes in meditation with the kamaṇḍala before him, the God Gaṇapati at the earnest prayers of Indra and the then Cōḻa King Kavēra, assuming the form of a crow, sat on it and as if by accident upset it, so that the Kāvērī in it began to flow due east from that rock which lies on the opposite bank to Koṭumuṭi a town more than 20 miles to north-east of Karūr. This exists to this day under the name of Agastiyar Pāṟai. Although the meaning that Kāvērī flowing directs towards the sea, as found by Śrīmāṉ Iyengar, is taken to be correct, the confluence mentioned here is none but the confluence of Bhavānī and Kāvērī and there is no sort of connection between any confluence and Karūr.

V. "*ஆடக மாடத்தரிதுயி லமர்ந்தோன்*"

* * * *

The two learned authors are of opinion that the golden-domed temple mentioned in the above line is the Raṅganātha's temple situated in the ficus grove of Karūr and also it must have been within the city of Vañcimānakar or within the king's palace there, and could not be the famous temple at Trivandrum. Let us examine the correctness of this meaning. An incongruity is apparent on the face of it. The learned authors are of opinion that whether the golden-domed temple was Raṅganātha's temple

in Karūr or another within the palace itself, it must be very near to him. Those people who brought the sacred offerings to Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ would have done so with the knowledge of his having sent away his sword and umbrella on his state elephant, at the auspicious moment, the previous night, and of his starting that morning on his northern expedition and that they had been previously bidden to bring the offerings. If this had been true, that King Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, after worshipping God Śiva and placing the offerings of that shrine on his head and also worshipping the sacred fire of the brahmins, straightaway mounted his elephant without going to the golden-domed temple for worshipping the God Viṣṇu and receiving the offerings there, seems to be incongruous. The mere fact of his mounting his elephant without the least delay after worshipping God Śiva and the brahminical fire and just at that moment "some people's" coming with the offerings from the shrine of Viṣṇu show that he was not expecting them and that the shrine should have been far away and not anywhere in the vicinty. Therefore it is clear that Vañcimānakar might have been Koṭuṅkallūr or any other city and not Karūr. An ancient commentator on Cilappatikāram, known under the appellation of அரும்பதவுரையாசிரியர், has suspected that ஆடகமாடம் *i. c.*, the golden-domed temple, could be a town of the name of Ravipuram. Amongst the many patronyms of Karūr, Bhāskarapuram is one, and our authors hold that the ancient commentator meant Karūr by his mention of Ravipuram. Both the words mean the city of the sun (Bhāskara and Ravi). But Bhāskarapuram is one of the names of Karūr which is not in use; and to suggest that the ancient commentator simply translated Bhāskarapuram, a proper name, into Ravipuram is unnatural and unthinkable; and besides, when he said that it might be Ravipuram, would have been with the knowledge that it had a temple dedicated to God Viṣṇu, where He presided in a recumbent posture. That Sedakkudumbi is a citizen of Vañcimānakar, or is a great devotee of Viṣṇu is not disputed, but it does not follow that the ஆடகமாடம் the golden-domed temple should have been in Vañcimānakar. It is common knowledge that even to this day the officiating priests in the temples of Malayāḷam country, whether dedicated to Śiva or Viṣṇu, are called Śāntikars, and although they are Mangalore Brahmins, sometimes they used to live with their families in some convenient place in the Malayāḷam country,

from which place they used to go to different places for their duties, remaining there all alone for six months in the year and for the next half year returning to their families; and therefore the house of the Sedakkudumbi being in Vañcimānakar and their duty being somewhere else is not incompatible. It also sounds from the text that Sedakkudumbi should have been one of those people who brought offerings to the king while on the elephant. It is also understood from Kadiraiver Pillai Dictionary that Ravipuram is a town 10 miles to the Northwest of Cape Comorin. In it, there is a temple dedicated to Śrī Raṅganāthasvāmin where the sanctus sanctorum is called "ஆடகமாடம்"—"the golden-domed temple."

VI. The coins of the old Roman Emperors were found not only at Karūr but in several towns and more especially in towns on the west coast; and therefore that they were found at Karūr could furnish no valid reason for the conclusion that Karūr was the Vañcimānakar which was the capital of Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ. In my humble opinion I found that the foregoing six grounds which have been investigated are the most important of those adduced by Śrīmāṉs R. Raghava Iyengar and M. Raghava Iyengar.

We shall now proceed to investigate the reasons for the opinion that Koṭuṅkallūr was the famous Vañcimānakar. Cēkkiḻār, the author of Periyapurāṇam, was the first to have unmistakably declared that Koṭuṅkallūr was Vañcimānakar. It is known that the name of Koṭuṅkallūr never occurred in the Tamil literature anterior to it. The names, Koṭuṉkallūr and Tiruvañcaikkuḷam, do not appear in any of the works of the Caṅkam age or in the stray stanzas supposed to have been composed by any of the Caṅkam poets. There the capital city of Cēra kingdom is always given as "Vañci" or "Karūr." It is clear, from the five examples which begin with "நெருங்தேர்க்கோதை" (the valorous deeds of Kōtai) given above, that "Vañci" was Tiruvāṉilai-Karūr. But the utter absence of the name of Karūr in the great epics of Cilappatikāram and Maṇimēkalai composed in the time of Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ himself in which, on numerous occasions the name Vañcimānakar occurs, without in any way pointing to this Karūr, has given rise to the serious doubt that it could not have been Karūr. This, couplod with the work of Cēkkiḻār who is supposed to have lived in the 11th century A. D., in which Vañcimānakar is declared to be Koṭuṅkallūr, and the

opinions of the commentators of Cilappatikāram declaring that Tiruvāṉilai-Karūr was not the Vañci occurring in the text but that it is a town in the Malayāḷam country and the commentator of Maṇimēkalai for the "Vañci" in line 91 of canto 21 stating that "this is the capital of the Cēras and situate in the Malayāḷam country" have been the reasons for the investigation as to what was the capital of the Cēras in the time of Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ. Therefore, it behoves us to scrutinise Cilappatikāram and Maṇimēkalai for any internal evidence touching this matter without allowing ourselves to be guided by the opinions of the commentators of these epics. The ancients called Koṭuṅkallūr as Vañci and "Magodai". They have in no place called it as Karūr. It must not also be forgotten that they have also called Tiruvāṉilai-Karūr as "Vañci."

I. The learned among the ancients divided the Tamil country into three main divisions and named them "Kuṇanāṭu" குணநாடு (the Eastern country) Kuṭanāṭu (the western country) and "Teṉṉāṭu" (the Southern country) and their rulers as Kuṇanāṭṭukkāvalaṉ" (குணநாட்டுக்காவலன்) (the king of the eastern country) Kuṭanāṭṭukkāvalaṉ(the king of the western country) and Teṉṉāṭṭukkāvalaṉ (the king of the southern country) respectively. They have also stated that these divisions and the kingdoms had come into existence from the time of the creation, meaning thereby that they always existed from time immemorial. It was also widely known that the kings who ruled the western country were styled "Cēras" and "Ceralas" and their kingdom as Cēra country." The western boundary of the kingdom was the Western (Arabian) Sea. It is a well-known fact that the word Cēralaṉ, sanskritised into "Kērala", is more in vogue at the present time. It is also clear from numerous passages in the ancient literature that the Cēra King was called Kuṭanāṭṭukkāvalaṉ (protector of the western country) and "Malaṭaṉ" (the Lord of the mountains). Such being the undisputed facts, it stands to reason that the capital of that country and its kings must have been situated in that country and therefore the assertion that Tiruvāṉilai-Karūr which is situate in an Eastern district where there are no mountains and which is far away from mountains and the western sea, was the capital of the Cēra country does not appeal to the intelligent public. At the present time when the Cōḻas and Pāṇḍyas are no more, and when their existence is even doubted,

it is to be noted that the kingdoms of Cochin and Travancore are still ruled by the successors of the ancient Cēra Kings, and here and there, to this day, the smaller divisions of the country are ruled by the descendants of the ancient Kṣatriya families, shorn of all their former splendour except the appellation of kings used only by their immediate dependants. Such being the facts, to assert that the capital of the Cēras was Karūr, which is a city in the border land of the Cēra Kings and which required all the martial habits of the powerful Cēras to keep it from being wrested from their hands by the hostile and vigilant Cōḻas who sometimes actually wrested it, is an untenable proposition.

II. It must be understood that the names "Kuṭṭaṉ" and Kuṭṭuvaṉ" are peculiar to Malabar and are not commonly found in the Tamil countries. The meanings of the words are "little man" "child" and "son" and in this sense it is even to this day the patronym of fifty per cent of the population of Malabar. The meaning of the word "Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ" is *Red boy* and Kuṭṭanāṭu is "small country". Such names are not in vogue in and around Karūr or in any other Tamil speaking district. Therefore, it is a safe conclusion that the country where Cērāṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ was born and reigned should have been none other than the country which now goes by the name of Malayāḷam.

III. It is well known that Cilappatikāram in its Kātcikkātai (காட்சிக்காதை) describes how Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, sportfully inclined, with the object of seeing and enjoying mountain scenery, accompanied by Iḷaṅkōvaṭikaḷ, his brother, Vēṇmāḷ (வேண்மாள்) his consort and by his numerous army of the four divisions, set out like Indra, the monarch of the heavens with an army spreading over 140 miles, and encamped in the expansive sand bank of the River Periyār in the midst of mountains. If the "Vañcimuṟṟam" (வஞ்சிமுற்றம்), his palace in,"Vañci" which he left, were to have been at Karūr, it is inconceivable why he, who was going only for the purpose of mere sport, should not have chosen mountains comparatively near to it, having easier approaches and also belonging to him, such as Kollimalai and chosen the mountains very far away from his capital, having no direct road to them except through the countries belonging to other Sovereigns, to wit—the Pāṇḍya and encamp in the sand-dunes of Periyār near its source. The Cēra King, when he was thus encamping was regaling himself with the குன்றக்குரவைபோடு கொடிச்சியர் பாடலும் *i. e.*, the peculiar dances and songs of the mountain tribes, at the

same time listening to the noises of wild animals mingled with those of his large army and also receiving the presents such as elephant tusks and sweet voiced *hill-mynas* with which the mountain chieftains came to pay their homage to him. Such produce of the mountains, with such wealth and abundance, was not to be had in small mountain ranges such as Kollimalai but could only be found in the mountains to which he went. This also shows that Karūr could not have been the capital of his Kingdom. Further, when he returned to his capital in haste, although "Cilappatikāram" does not in so many words say that it took him only one day for the return journey it still has said enough for the conclusion that the road back to his palace was near and easy. Although it could be said that the presents which he received, the songs and noises which he heard, and the noble waterfalls which he feasted his eyes on, were available also in the Kollimalai, or other mountains, near by, that he should have chosen to go to Periyār for sport and actually returned so quickly to his capital makes it almost impossible to think that it could have been Karūr.

IV. Śrīmāṉ R. Raghava Iyengar is of opinion that from the lines beginning with " வெண்டலைப்புணரியின் விளிம்புசூழ் போந்" " Going on the shores of the white crested sea " it would be wrong to come to the conclusion that " Vañcimānakar " should have been near the western sea and adduces the following reasons :—(1) The author of Cilppatikāram did not say anything clearly in "வஞ்சியங்கானல் வெண்டலைப்புணரி" (going on the shores) of the white-crested sea belonging to Vañci." (2) It is said in the text that Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ went one way and his generals and army went another way.(3) Iḷaṅkōvaṭikaḷ has described with great wealth of detail their having reached the sea; and (4) It is only proper to construe that, according to the habit of Tamil Kings, Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ also started by first reaching the Eastern sea and went by its shore and returned by the West Coast. (1) & (2) It cannot be seen from the text that Iḷaṅkōvaṭikal has described at all the army's reaching the sea; nor could one understand the logic in the argument that if the army went by the western sea the author ought to have mentioned வஞ்சியங்கானல், *i. e.*, the sea-shore belonging to Vañci, and since it is not so mentioned the army did not go that way but went by the eastern sea. Śrīmāṉ Iyengar says that if "வெண்டலைப்புணரி " the white crested sea is taken to mean the western sea the text must be construed to mean that Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ went one way

and his army another way. The text does not countenance it, as it expressly says "உலகமன்னவ னொருங்குடன் சென்று" (the great Emperor of the World went along with his army).

(3) Śrīmān R. Raghava Iyengar asserts that it was the habit of Tamil Kings in contrast to the rest of the World—to start by going from right to left and supports it by a stanza from Kōvūr Kiḻār beginning "குணகடல் பின்னதாக *i. e.*, leaving the eastern sea behind." The meaning of the stanza does not seem to be such, nor could any such habit be inferred from it and even if, with difficulty, one were to construe it so, it does not make mention of any such habit. All that can be gathered from that stanza is that the Kings of the Cōḻa and Pāṇḍya country, when going to North India, chose the shores of the eastern sea. Of course they did so as it was an easier road for them to start by. It could never be made out that the Tamil Kings had established for themselves a custom or habit which is contrary to what is followed by the world throughout. Such an assertion would certainly be objected to by geographers by raising the question how, if Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ had started on his northern expedition from Karūr, he first reached the eastern sea and afterwards reached the slopes of the Nilgiri Hill for camping for the night as stated in the text. Therefore the inevitable conclusion which any impartial reader could arrive at would be that Śrīmāṉs Iyengars, for the purpose of establishing their prior conclusion that Karūr was Vañcimānakar, twist and distort the plain meaning of the author of the great Epic into incongruities and thereby land themselves in difficulties. Iḷaṅkōvaṭigaḷ has sung in clear sweet lines that Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ with his large army, first starting along the sea-coast diverged into climbing mountains and then descending to the plains went as far as the base of the hills called Nilgiris and there encamped for the night. It is therefore clear that Vañcimānakar, whether an inland or a sea-port town, must have been situate not far from the western sea. Here Nilgiri does not betoken the chain of mountains, going at the present time by that name, but clearly indicates that high inaccessible peak, called at the present day the Nilgiri Peak, which rises abruptly from the plains of Malayāḷam, and not far from whose base lie the towns of Nilāmbūr and Vaṇṭūr, and the road going northwards to Mysore, to this day, winds. Further, if a person wanted to go to north India from Karūr, the road chosen by

Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, as described in the text, *viz.*, by the Nilgiri Peak, is not the one which, if he were a sensible man, he would have chosen. It should also be noted that the opinion of Arumpatavuraiyāciriyar one of the commentators of Cilappatikāram, is in full accord with this view. Therefore the examples which Śrīmāṉs Iyengars have selected from Cilappatikāram for proving that Karūr was the ancient Vañcimānakar, instead of furnishing any ground for such a conclusion, furnish ample grounds for the conclusion that Karūr could never have been Vañcimānakar but that it should have been somewhere in the west and in the Malayāḷam country.

V. Now let us try to find out the true meaning of the passages— " உரவு நீர்வையை........

நெடு வேள்குன்றம் அடிவைத்தேறி "

Cila. 23, 185-190.

" The river Vaikai whose water augmented with those of other rivers; . . . laboriously and step by step ascending a hill dedicated to the God Muruka"—which have been pointed out as authority and construed by Śrīmāṉ Iyengars and others in different ways, suitably to their opinions.

Here it is the opinion of Śrīmāṉ Iyengars that the hill referred to in the passage was none other than the Paḻani Hill.

It seems necessary to understand clearly whether Kaṇṇaki when she set out on her lonely journey from Madura, started with the intention of going to Vañcimānakar or on the road to it. Supposing that she had the intention of going to Vañcimānakar, and that was Tiruvāṉilai-Karūr, then, there was a very good road in the plains from Madura to it without the slightest necessity for going on one of the banks of Vaikai or ascending or descending hills. If, on the other hand, Vañcimānakar were Koṭuṅkallūr or some other town, in the west, it is clear that the road taken by her was the proper way to it. It is not clear why she found any necessity for going either to Karūr or Koṭuṅkallūr. Cilappatikāram also does not say so. It is supposed that she wanted to go to Paḻani Hill ; but no necessity seems to have arisen for her doing so. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that when she set out she had no intention of going to any particular place. If the tutelary Goddesc of Madura were to have told her that she should go to Paḻani in order to join her husband, Citappatikāram would not have omitted such an important event. It only limits

the time for that occasion through the deity informing her that it would occur on the fourteenth day. Therefore, Kaṇṇaki, having sacrificed her husband, losing one of her breasts, setting fire to Madura and having seen the Pāṇḍya King and Queen dying before her own eyes, became so sad and dejected that she had no mind even to think of where she was going to and simply went whichever direction her feet took her, feeling " I am not alive either to sit or stand " (இருத்தலுமில்லேனிற்றலு மில்லேன்) " and the road which she happened to take was the road on one of the banks of the River Vaikai. That road led her into the mountains of the Pāṇḍya country and then into those of the Cēra country ; and she, finding a temple, dedicated to God Muruka on the top of one of the hills there, as is common everywhere, dragged herself up step by step with great difficulty and reaching a Vēṅkai tree in blossom stood panting and sighing in its shade. These events are most clearly portrayed in the text. If we were to suppose that the hill which was dedicated to God Muruka was Paḻani, it is nothing but natural to suppose that the great author would not have lost this splendid opportunity of describing so famous a temple, one of the military headquarters of the God, in befitting terms. The absence of any such description or even suggestion is one of the most potent objections against such a supposition. Besides this, the people who were to be found on Paḻani are the celestials, sages, Brahmins and the Bhaktas of Kumāraswāmin and not the rude uncivilized denizens of the forest, who it was that betook themselves to Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ in his camp and reported the occurrence, because he was their King and Sovereign. It is also to be noted that Paḻani Hill is in the Pāṇḍya country, as is well known from the history of Paḻani (பழனித்தல புராணம் : சோர சோன் சருக்கம்: 7-ம் பாட்டு)—7th stanza in the canto of Cēra King's episode, and also from the Madura Gazetteer of the present day; and the wild tribes, being subjects of the Pāṇḍya King, would not be expected to have gone to the Cēra King's camp, far out of the way, to report this strange occurrence in preference to their own sovereign. Śrīmāṉ R. Raghava Iyengar refers to the Madura Dt. Manual and Gazetteer and says that Periyār takes its rise in the Pāṇḍya country and mentions the chain of hills called Paḻani and Varicai mountains. These names are new and they did not come in to vogue in the age of the caṅkams. Therefore it is clear that the hill dedicated to God Muruka and over which Kaṇṇaki

dragged herself could never have been the famous shrine of Paḻani. On the other hand the learned commentator of Cilappatikāram pronounces it to be Tiruccenkōṭu, a hill on the mountains of Malayāḷam and not the isolated and far-famed sacred rock prominent for miles round in the plains of Salem. Here the ancient road to Vañcimānakar went only through the city of Madura as is laid down in Cilappatikāram itself. It is to be understood that the route taken by Tēvanti, who was Kaṇṇaki's friend, when set out for Vañcimānakar on learning from the Brahmin (Māṭalan) all that had befallen Kaṇṇaki and how a temple was built for her and how she was enshrined in it, in the city of Vañcimānagar, is the same as the one taken by Kaṇṇaki herself. Tēvanti and others set out from Pūmpukār, reached Madura and then going along one of the banks of the River Vaikai, ascending and descending hills, reached Vañcimānakar and Kaṇṇaki's temple. If Karūr should be Vañcimānakar, they need not have gone to Madura or along the Vaikai bank or up-hill or down-dale but could have gone to Uṟaiyūr and then straight to Karūr. Cilappatikāram furnishes another very interesting incident which proves the same thing. Parāśara, a brahmin belonging to Aḻavāy a town in the Cōḻa kingdom near Pukār, learning of the wonderful liberality of the Cēra king to the learned, set out for Vañcimānakar. He first went to Madura and took the road on the Vaikai bank and thence going over hill and dale and descending to the plains reached his destination. While returning, loaded with largesses, his episode at Tāṅkal, a town on the road, is well known to all those who have read Cilappatikāram. In the travels to Vañcimānakar by different people at different times, the same road as that which was taken by Kaṇṇaki, not omitting the important places which lie in its course is carefully described. Śrīmāṉ R. Raghava Iyengar, though agreeing that the Cēra monarch, whom Parāśara went to see, was reigning in the Malayāḷam country and the road he took to reach it was the one leading to his capital, still tries to avoid the conclusion naturally arising out of it, *viz.*, that Vañcimānakar was in the Malayāḷam country, by saying that Parāśara did not go there to see Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ but Āṭukōṭpāṭṭuc Cēralātaṉ ஆடுகோட்பாட்டுச் சேரலாதன், a half-brother of Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ and son of his father by his 2nd wife Patuman Tēvi, daughter of Vēḷavik-Komāṉ, whose capital was a town on the western sea coast by name " Naravu ". I also agree with him in thinking that Parāśara, the brahmin of Āḻavāy did

not go to see Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ. Still it is clear from the commentary of Arumpatavurai Āciriyar to canto XXIII, from the 316th stanza in Paḻamoḻi, and also from pages 11 and 12 of "Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ" of Śrīmāṉ M. Raghava Iyengar, that the king who enabled the scholar "Pālaikkōtamaṉār" பாலைக்கோதமனார் and his wife to bodily go to Heaven, by his munificence, was not Āṭukōṭpāṭṭuc Cēralātaṉ but Palyāṉaiccelkeḻu Kuṭṭuvaṉ பல்யானைச் செல்கெழுகுட்டுவன், the brother of Imaya Varampan *i.e.*, the father of Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ. This Palyāṉaiccelkeḻu Kuṭṭuvaṉ was no doubt Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ's paternal uncle and his predecessor on the throne and was also a contemporary of the Pāṇḍya King Neṭuñceḻiyaṉ who made a gift of Vayalūr to Vārtikan, the husband of Kārtika and who died, sitting on the throne itself, on Kaṇṇaki's proving before him his own injustice to her husband. This certainly will not make it inconsistent that Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ and Neṭuñceḻiyaṉ were also contemporaries. Even at this day, if one were to go to Koṭuṉkallūr from Madura, he has to take almost the same route and the road is a beautiful motor road throughout and after descending to the plains runs parellel to River Periyār.

VI. It is said in lines 67 to 77 of Canto XXVIII of Cilappatikāram that Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ after bringing stones from the Himalayas to his capital enjoyed his leisure by witnessing the dance and listening to the discourses of a renowned Cākkiyar belonging to the brahminical village of Paraiyūr. "Cākkiyar Kūttu சாக்கியார் கூத்து" as an institution and a pastime, was never known to have existed at or about Karūr, or for the matter of that, anywhere in the neighbouring Kingdoms of Cōḻas or Pāṇḍyas. But on the other hand, I am sure that no one could be so ignorant of the fact that it has been an institution of a public pastime, *sui generis* to Malayāḷam country even at the present day. Further, Paraiyūr is unquestionably the present "Parūr" a town in the Travancore Kingdom 25 miles from Cochin and 5 from Koṭuṅkallūr and since this town is clearly indicated in the text, it furnishes a very important ground for the conclusion that Vañcimānakar, which was the capital of Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, should have been a city in the Malayāḷam country, either Koṭuṅkallūr or some other, but never Tiruvāṉilai-Karūr.

VII. Śrīmāṉ M. Raghava Iyengar contends that a few words in Cilappatikāram, which he and other scholars have pronounced

to be peculiar to Malayāḷam, are nothing but pure Tamil words largely in use in ancient times but now out of vogue. I agree with him. But the conclusion which one can logically arrive at would be that the country in which Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ reigned, where his brother the most eminent scholar and poet learnt Tamil, and where his noble language was used in ordinary parlance, was the mountainous country now called Malayāḷam.

VIII. It is known from "Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ" written by Śrīmāṉ M. Raghava Iyengar that Imayavarampan Cēral Ātaṉ and Celvakkaṭuṅkōvaḷi Ātaṉ were both contemporaries and had married sisters. So it can be understood that their fathers Ūtiyañ Cēral and Āṇṭuvañ Cēral Irumpurai respectively, were contemporaries and of almost the same age. Puṟanāṉūṟu (புற நானூறு) says that the famous poem beginning with "If thou is oughtest to know who this is—இவன் யாரென்குவையாயின்" was addressed to Āṇṭuvañ Cēral Irumpurai by poet Eṇiccēri Muṭamōciyār எணிச்சேரி முடமோசியார். It is known that he was reigning at Karūr at that time. One of the sovereigns who reigned at Karūr before him bore the name "ōḷvāṭakōperuñ Cēral Irumpurai who went to reign at Karūr. கருவூரேறிய ஒள்வாட்கோப்பெருஞ் சேரலிரும்பொறை. From the epithet "who went to reign at Karūr" it is correct to infer that he should have gone there from some other place. His descendant, Āṇṭuvañ Cēral Irumpurai, was the great enemy of Muṭittalaikko Perunarkkiḷḷi" முடித்தலைக்கோப் பெருநற்கிள்ளி, the Cōḷa King from whose aggressions he required all his military genius for preserving the integrity of Karūr. From this what could be safely inferred is that Karūr being almost on the borders of the two kingdoms, there had been continuous war between their sovereigns to possess it and this necessitated the sending of a prince of the blood in lieu of Generals and statesmen, to rule from there as Viceroy and that a prince of the junior branch of the Cēras *viz.*, the Irumpurai who went to reign at Karūr was chosen and sent; and since that time Karūr became also a capital by courtesy, *i. e.*. Vañcimānakar. So this prince should have gone to Karūr during or before the reign of Ūtiyañ Cēral of the eldest branch. Therefore, the assertion that the Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, the grandson of Ūtiyañ Cēral and Peruñ Cēral Irumpurai the grandson of Āṇṭavuñ Cēral Irumpurai, both together reigned at Karūr, will be an absurdity. What could be properly deduced from the facts is that Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ the

scion of the oldest branch of the Cēras remained at their ancient capital of Vañcimānakar, which was in the Malayāḷam country and ruled his vast kingdom from there.

IX. If all the evidences pro and con were to be arranged, we find that the ancients have designated as Vañcimānakar, both the capitals of Cēra kings *viz.*, the western one in Malayāḷam, from where the emperor ruled and also by courtesy, Karūr, the eastern one, from where a prince of the younger branch of the Cēras governed as Viceroy; and that the origin of the name of Vañci was from the flower of the creeper of that name as we have noticed before. The country which was within the dominion of the Cēras, in those days, was several times larger in extent than the Pāṇḍya and Cōḻa countries. It is also known that when the Cēras went on a conquering expedition to the Himālayas they not only carved their own special sign of a bow on the mountains but also those of Cōḻas and Pāṇḍyas, *viz.*, a tiger and a fish for commemorating the conquest of the country by the Tamil sovereigns. From these it may be seen that the Cēras generally were very warlike and always undertook expeditions of conquest and aggrandisement; and consistently with their enterprise and the habit that was in vogue amongst the Tamils, they chose the "Vañci flower" as their emblem in token of their constant victorious expeditions and called their capital also Vañci. And, as if furnishing a further proof, poets of those days embellished the name of the capital as "Vāṭā Vañci" *i. e.*, the Vañci flower that never fades. There seem to be two objections to this conclusion; (1) Cēkkiḻār is the only poet and author who has called Koṭuṅkallūr "Vañci," whereas most of the poets of the third Caṅkam call Karūr Vañci. (2) When poets addressed their songs to the Emperor or princes of the senior and reigning branch, such as for instance Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, they made reference only to the sands of Amarāvatī and the battlements of Karūr. These two objections would induce one to arrive at the conclusion that Karūr was the capital of the Cēra empire and that it could not have been in Malayāḷam.

There are very good answers to those objections. "Olvatkopurum Cēral Irumpurai, who went to reign at Karūr", was earlier than both Anduvañ Cēral Irumpurai and Uṭiyār Cēral in point of time and was a contemporary of the poet Nari-Veruttalaiyār (நரிவெருத்தலையார்) who flourished before Cīttalai Cāttaṉār and Paraṇar. The prince went to Karūr in order to make it

safe from the aggrandisements of the Cōḻas, in which object he fully succeeded and highly embellished the city of Karūr and handed it down to Anduvañ Cēral Irumpurai and others, who also followed in the footsteps of that renowned warrior with such success that the city came to be considered the eastern capital of the Cēra Empire. Hence the poets who sang the praises of the princes, sung as well the praises of Karūr, their capital and Amarāvatī, the river that fertilized it and the country around.

(2) It is also well known that the emperors now and then visited Karūr and while there, their praises were sung by some of the poets who adorned court, making special references to the beauties of Karūr and Amarāvatī. This might have been so because those poets belonged to that country and perhaps never having visited Malayāḷam were more familiar with Karūr and Amarāvatī than Periyār and the country. Therefore we are driven to the irresistible conclusion that the cities, from which any Cēra prince ruled the territory given in his charge, were all called "Vañcimānakar" by courtesy, nay, by right, as the "Vañci" flower was the emblem of the Royal family

X. It is well known to scholars that that province of the Cēra empire, consisting of Karūr, Tiruchengode, Kollimalais, and certain other places, was called Koṅku nāṭu and its capital was Karūr; and that it obtained its name from Koṅkaṉ, a former king who ruled it. The minor branches of the Cēras had been given small territories in the Koṅkunāṭu to govern; and it is they that are referred to as Koṅkilaṅkōcar (கொங்கிளங் கோசர்), who also were present during the consecration ceremony of Kaṇṇaki's temple by their Emperor Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ. It is seen also that Irumpurais who were the scions of a main, but junior branch of Cēras, during their viceroyalty of Koṅkunāṭu, used to go to Head-quarters frequently and take orders from their Emperor and that whenever a great battle had to be fought the Emperor himself marched at the head of his large army and took the field and commanded it to victory. It was so, for instance, in the battle of Koṅkar Ceṅkaḷam with Paḻayaṉ Māṟaṉ—the powerful commander-in-chief of the Pāṇḍyas, who remained unsubdued even by the all-conquering new Mauriyas in their southern expedition. It was likewise so in the great battle of Nerivayil near Uṟaiyūr where Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ killed with his own hand, in one day, all the nine Cōḻa princes who rebelled

against their king Perunaṟkiḷḷi of the Rājasūya fame, இராசூயம் வேட்ட பெருநற்கிள்ளி who was his brother-in-law, and firmly established him on the throne of the Cōḻas by personally performing his coronation ceremony.

XI. The facts set out, in detail above, are so many grounds pointing to the conclusion that Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ's capital city was in the original home of his ancestors *viz.*, the Malayāḷam country. At one time, when they went on a conquering expedition they lighted on Karūr, wrested the country around it from the hands of the Cōḻas by a series of wars and after that founded a Viceroyalty there, which became firmly established for a long time. When by change of fortune, the Cēra emperors lost their power and became unableto effectually control their Viceroys at Karūr, Koṅkunāṭu gradually severed its moorings and became independent. This should have been either in the time of Cēramāṉ Perumāḷ or his immediate successors. It was also at that time that the Viceroy at Karūr began to lead expeditions against their own sovereigns in the Malayāḷam country with the object of wresting the throne from them and it was only after their final defeat that the Kollam Era was founded to commemorate this event; the final battle between the belligerents, which established the independence of the Cēra Kingdom on the one hand and secured the independence of Koṅkunāṭu on theother, was fought near Chittoor, a town on the borders of Koṅkunāṭu, now in the Cochin state about 10 miles from Palghat. This is shown by the great national festival of Koṅkuppaṭai which is being celebrated with great eclat at Chittoor even to this day. It is the common belief of folklore of Koṅkunāṭu that Kaṇṇaki having gone to Malayāḷam country became a Bhagavatī (Goddess). All these clearly point to the undoubted fact that the ancient capital of Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, his predecessors and successors should have been situated only in the Malayāḷam country and that on account of the warlike and conquering habits of the Cēras it was called 'Vañcimānakar,' the *great city of victory.* Still, the doubt whether it was Koṭuṅkallūr or Tirukkarūr or any other city has not been cleared. From the very good reasons given by Śrīmāṉs R. Raghava Iyengar and M. Raghava Iyengar it has not been possible to assert that Koṭuṅkallūr was the great Vañcimānakar. Those reasons are: while Iḷaṅkōvaṭigaḷ the author of Cilappatikāram describes Pukār as a sea-port town in glowing colours, Vañcimānakar has not been so described by

him or by Peruntalai Cāttaṉār, the author of the contemporaneous epic of Maṇimekalai, although both had abundant opportunities of describing it as such. Concluding that "Vañcimānakar" was in the Malayāḷam country and nowhere else, I may have to defer the consideration of the question as to which city it was, to a future occasion. The consideration of the age of Cēraṉ Ceṅkuṭṭuvaṉ, which is extremely pertinent and closely connected with this subject, has also to be deferred to that future occasion.

A PROLEGOMENON TO THE STUDY OF BURMESE ETYMOLOGY.

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Even from the title of this paper, it will be apparent that the Study of the Etymology of the Burmese language, is to be initiated in the near future and it has hardly been begun yet. The extant literature on the subject is altogether meagre; there is hardly a volume where the ancestry of Burmese words is sought. Less than half a dozen brief notices on the Burmese language lie embedded in defunct journals and the Burma Research Society's Journal, which suffers from the singular misfortune of never being read elsewhere. Even these few attempts at directing the thought of the cultured Burmans to the history of their own language, hardly indicate the lines along which such an interest in the language should develop. The Hon'ble Taw Sein Kho, and to a greater measure Dr. O. Blagden of the London School of Oriental Studies have offered to discover some obscure truths of Burmese Philology but the results of their investigations remain a far too technical success. The average Burmese graduate has hardly any notions on the subject. His vision is far too narrow even to imagine that in the language he has lisped from his infancy, have been blended influences, subtle as strong, from languages and peoples, with whom Burma has had most intimate connections for centuries. Perhaps, as long as the people of Burma lack a knowledge of the languages of the other Indian provinces, Burmese Etymology will have to remain in the hands of foreign Scholars, Indian or European.

In the study of Burmese Etymology, nothing will be so useful at the outset as to consider the history of Burma and draw up a list (1) of the countries with whom Burma had historic connections, (2) of the nations who migrated into Burma, and of other cultures and civilizations that have exercised an influence on the people of Burma. Such a preliminary consideration will

enable us to discard blind prejudices and investigate with an open mind into the history of Burmese words.

Of similar value, would also be a preliminary examination of the Linguistic Survey Reports on the Tibeto-Burman family of languages so that the historic connections as well as the racial affinities noticed will give us a clue as to the languages to which we should first turn our attention.

Such a preliminary study is sufficient to indicate to us that in the study of Burmese Etymology we should take into consideration the existence in the language of a native stock of words with which the nation had used her gift of speech from the earliest times. A proportion of these should be racially allied to the native words of other Mongolian races near by.

The Political history of Burma brings out the frequent relations that Burma had with China on the one side and on the other with the Cōḻa Kingdom in the South of India, in addition to occasional intercourse with Bengal and Siam. We should thus expect but little influence on the language from Siamese or Bengali. On the other hand, the Chinese invasions and the consequent migration of China-men into Burma have undoubtedly contributed a Chinese element to the making of Burmese. Of the Chinese words in the Burmese Language, a valuable study was made by Hon'ble Taw Sein Kho several years ago, although the truth appears to be, that owing to the inordinate difficulties inherent in the Chinese lanngage, the Chinese influence is but slight.

Too much, I am afraid has been made of late by English Scholars resident in Burma of the influence of English on the Burmese language. Such English words as are getting into Modern Burmese are mostly names of wholes or parts of English manufactured goods and will last as long as the goods in question are current in the land and probably not longer.

On the other hand, when we study the Religious History of Burma, the Indian influence appears predominant. Sanskrit words in their Pāli forms, abound in Burmese. Although originally these classical words should have been incorporated in the language to assist the philosophical thought of Buddhist Burma, the growing tradition in the land that the most elegant expression was possible only with the use of Pāli words, made it possible

that even those Pāli words. that have not a philosophical value, could come to live in the Burmese language.

It is at the same time important to bear in mind that in the conversion of Burma to Buddhism the work devolved mainly on South Indian Scholars and monks who were deputed for the purpose by the kings of South India, and patronised by their Viceroys or Princes ruling in Burma. Where the South Indian influence was confined to the invigoration of monastic life, it would be unwise to seek to trace in the language any linguistic influence. Thus though Sinhalese monks assisted materially in the Buddhist conversion of Burma, the Burmese language has hardly a single word of pure Sinhalese origin.

Far different is the Tamil influence in Burma. Historically, South India and Burma were connected by coastal trade as early as 450 A. D. The elephants of the forests of Burma and the Gold mines about Pegu and Thaton were attractions sufficient to invite emigrants from South Indian Cōḻa territories to the general exploitation of Burma's wealth. Thus the Lower Burma swamps were rapidly colonised and South Indian Tobacco Plantations were set up, and Industrial products were introduced by trade. For instance in the improvements of habitations etc., brass metal plates of South Indian manufacture were imported about the 10th Century. Again, from the earliest times Burma was clothed by South Indian cotton manufactures. Even when the British trade with Burma started in the 17th Century the East India Company traded only in goods manufactured in South India proper and not in English-made goods. South Indian Metallurgy likewise has contributed to the now neglected Science of Burmese metallurgy. The Tamil influence has been continuous throughout. Even after the advent of the British, the Tamil element preponderates in the various walks of life, the bulk of the cultivators, capitalists, labourers, sepoys, clerks and teachers being Tamil. Even the old Myo-thugyi system of Burmese administration appears to have been a direct descendant of the village administration prevalent in South India.

Judging from this allsided and ever continuous cultural influence of the Tamil race of South India on Burma, the linguistic contribution of Tamil to Burmese should be great indeed.

Luckily for Burmese etymology, the phonetic spelling craze here has hardly passed its infancy. The Phonetic Readers in

Burmese although authorised by the Text Book Committee, are steadily opposed by all Burmese scholars and used only by foreign students attempting to study Burmese. A voice of loud protest will have to be raised against the blind advocates of phonetic Burmese Spelling, for in words out of number the clear marks of birth and parentage which the Burmese words bear now upon their fronts, would then be obliterated and etymological enquiries would become well-nigh impossible. On the other hand, Burmese Orthography although termed to be illogical and unscientific is yet etymological and the ancestry of the words is visible in the written word. The Orthography perhaps is the only clue in the case of most words and it is imperative that etymological enquires should be promulgated on thorough lines before the phonetic craze has had time to play havoc with a national heritage.

The method to be adopted in Burmese etymology would have to be suited to the special features of the language but the ten cannas propounded by Skeat in his Science of Etymology have a value in correcting prejudices, and warning us to proceed with caution. Sentimental objections to etymological enquiry and false pride in the independence of the Burmese launguage should give place to a more sober satisfaction in finding amidst the numerous borrowed words, a native stock of words in the language.

The New Burmese Dictionary started by the Government of Burma should be of great assistance in furnishing us with the earliest forms of Burmese words as they are found in Early Burmese literature or in early stone inscriptions consulted in the preparation of the dictionary. These early forms of words would be regarded for our purposes as old Burmese words and would be most useful. Everywhere the Orthogrophy, the manner in which the written word is spelt, will be *the starting point.* The word should then be carefully transliterated, according to a uniform principle, in the Roman script. Side by side with this will be placed the transliteration in Roman script of supposed originals in Pāli, Chinese, Tamil, old Tamil etc., together with the originals in the script of the language within brackets.

On every word in the Burmese language, such an operation would have to be performed and the observation of the results of each experiment will have to be recorded in a note on each.

Such a note should include an observation on the *meaning* of the related words and the identity or the change noticed in the meaning. It should also include a remark on the *form* of the words, noticing the form or the change of letters or syllables in the words compared.

We should also ask ourselves what phonetic law was exemplified in each change, so that, at the end, we should be able not only to give the derivation of all Burmese words not belonging to the original native stock but at the same time be able to answer questions primarily of philological interest, and learn more of the History of Burmese Speech Sounds.

Perhaps it would be of interest to mention here my opinion (and the Archeological Superintendent, Burma Circle agrees with me) that the Pyus who inhabited Burma before the Burman were a South Indian Race.

MORE ABOUT THE AGE AND LIFE OF ŚRĪMAD APPAYYA DĪKṢITA.

BY

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In my last article in the July-October number of this journal for 1928, I briefly traced the history of research regarding the date of Appayya Dīkṣita during the past few decades and referred to the date of 1553 to 1626 as the one which scholars ultimately came to accept universally as settled once for all. I then proceeded to show that the fairly well ascertained historical dates of some of the political contemporaries of the Dīkṣita referred to by himself in his works as his patrons, tended to indicate unmistakably a far earlier date for him than 1553 to 1626 and I also propounded a new date for him, namely 1520 to 1593 on the basis of a quotation preserved to us in the चतुःश्लोकीव्याख्या of my great-grand-father.

I now propose to point out how, apart from its incompatibility, the accepted date of 1553 to 1626, is inherently vicious when the whole truth is said about it.

Very early in my investigations, when I came across the Aḍayapalam inscription and also made sure about the identification of the prince Cinna Timma, I was convinced of the utter impossibility of the current date for the Dīkṣita and set about to scrutinise it searchingly. My first quest was to satisfy myself if the horoscope given and the date described with a long flourish of details, by Śivānanda, would tally as astronomical verities. For this purpose in 1923 I sent the horoscope with all the details given by the biographer to the late Diwan Bahadur L.D. Swamikannu Pillai for a critical scrutiny and got his reply dated the 18th of August 1923, as follows :—" The details quoted by you were, I am afraid, forged by the biographer. They correspond generally to Monday, the 19th of September 1853 A. D. which was a Pramadīca, but Vikrama 1910, Śāka 1775, and Kali 4954. The deduction of 300 years from each of these years is manifest

.... In 1553 A. D.................. bahula 1st and nakṣatra uttara-bhādrapada concurred on Thursday.........22nd Kanyā............... The planetary positions on this day were very different from those in your horoscope."

This authoritative opinion of an expert in the field swamped away any tender feeling I might otherwise have entertained for the horoscope and the date, having regard to the venerable biographer who gives them.

In my first article on this topic which appeared in the Hindu Literary Supplement in June, 1928, I suggested a theory of origin for the spurious horoscope, and also hinted that it was supposed in some informed quarters to be a mere Naṣṭajātaka reconstruction. And now, thanks to the editor of the Jijñāsā, I am fortified in my conjecture beyond any possibility of doubt. In Volume I Part 2 of the journal (March 1927) the Editor incorporates a long foot-note as a preliminary to his article on Śrīkaṇṭhācārya and describes in it the circumstances under which Śivānanda made the epoch-making discovery of the date and horoscope of Appayya Dīkṣita. The Editor does not apparently dispute the date and states it as 1552 to 1624 A. D.

With his kind permission I quote here the foot-note almost in extenso.

"The exact date of the birth of Appayya Dīkṣita is thus given by Śeṣa Dīkṣita of my village, Kaḍayam, in the Tinnevelly District. He was a scion of the family of Dīkṣita and was known as Śivānandayati after he entered the fourth stage of life. He took great interest in unearthing many works of Dīkṣita...... and had written commentaries on some of Dīkṣita's works like the Ātmārpaṇa Stuti. He collected the various accounts either oral or written, of traditions in regard to the life and history of Dīkṣita and put them in a work known as Dīkṣitacarita of which four different versions exist all written by this same Śivānandayati at different times. The truth is that he recorded then and there the various and sometimes conflicting traditions current in his time and which he heard from various sources at different periods in his sojourn throughout South India. From the accounts he heard of Dīkṣita's birth-time some doubts arose in his mind as to the year in which he was born......... In order to determine the exact time he solicited the assistence of a famous

astrologer at the time familiarly known as Ūrkāḍ Jōsyar who was a native of the village of Ūrkāḍ...just 13 miles south-east of Kaḍayam. Applying the principle of Naṣṭajātaka calculation to the materials supplied by Śivānandayati, the famous astrologer was able to determine the exact date, time and year of Appayya Dīkṣita . . . . . That the Naṣṭajātaka of the astrologer . . . . reveals the peculiar Tinnevellian taste will be evident from noticing that an imaginary planet called māndi . . . . finds a place it in . . . . Appayya lived for 72 years. Śivānanda left this world at the age of 73 . . . . in 1898 A. D. . . . . after a typical sanyāsī life for 18 years."

The mystery of the horoscope is thus solved. The illusion which went on thickening by repetitions for half-a-century is once for all broken through. No more shall we think of the verse beginning with वीणातत्त्वज्ञसंख्या in connection with any discussion of the age of the Dīkṣita.

It cannot be supposed for a moment that Śivānanda had anything but the best of motives in incorporating the Naṣṭajātaka in his work. His absolute faith in astrology should have led him to believe that he was really in possession of the genuine horoscope of Appayya Dīkṣita. He was recording mere traditions but possibly believed in them with a pious faith. He should have felt that some information regarding the nativity of the subject was a substantial embellishment to a biography. Lacking a genuine one he procured a substitute and utilised the same for the purpose of giving his work a pompous opening. I have no doubt that Śivānanda sincerely believed that the great Subrahmaṇya Josyar of Ūrkāḍ had put the original itself into his hands. The cyclic year was patent on the face of the horoscope, as "Pramadīca"; for any one can ordinarily name the cyclic year of a horoscope from the positions of Jupiter and Saturn. It remained for Śivānanda to give the horoscope a suitable date in the Kali and other eras. He very likely with the help of the Ūrkāḍ Jōsyar himself calculated back computing by the number of generations he himself was removed from the Dīkṣita and easily discovered that a substraction of 300 years from each era was necessary. It may be asked whether the Naṣṭajātaka method itself may not have been so successful as to have ensured historical accuracy also. In the first place Mr. Swamikannu Pillai has said that it belongs to the 19th Century and cannot

belong to the 16th. Secondly, the question itself involves a confusion between what is good for astrology and what is good for Astronomy. The Naṣṭajātaka belongs to the category of Ārūṭams and its calculations are for the most part determined by the play of chance. The Naṣṭajātaka may be good enough for predictive purposes and may approximately hit off the operative Yogas of the original; as for instance, this supposed horoscope of the Dīkṣita gives us some transcendantal yogas for scholarship. But the Naṣṭajātaka has no claim for astronomical correlation.

Before proceeding to the many corroborative evidences to my theory of the age of Appayya Dīkṣita, I wish to dispose of two notions which conspiring with the horoscope have contributed to the preface-writers on Appayya Dīkṣita being misled. They are (1) an inference from a passage in Taylor's translation of Historical manuscripts Vol. II, p. 149, that in 1626 Appayya Dīkṣita arbitrated at Madura in a Śaiva-Vaiṣṇava dispute, and (2) a tradition that makes Jagannātha a contemporaneous opponent of the Dīkṣita and makes them meet each other at Benares.

The first notion felicitously slipped in as helping to mark the lower extremity of the Dīkṣita's life which began according to the horoscope with Pramadīca and which we definitely know to have run for 72 years and so should have ended in Akṣaya. A close scrutiny will show the record itself does not warrant the date of 1553 for the Dīkṣita's birth. By the 19th of September 1622 the Dīkṣita should have completed his 72nd year. As he died before he ran through his 73rd year his demise should have occurred before September 1626 at the latest. The manuscript says that the excavation of the Teppakkuḷam began in the 10th of Vaikāci in Akṣaya (*i. e.*, the end of May 1626) and proceeded fast. An image of Gaṇeśa was dug up and was enshrined in a temple built for the purpose. Then the manuscript continues :—"As they were placing the sculptured pillar of the Vasanta Maṇṭapam and were about to fix the one which bore the representation of Ekapādamūrti, they were opposed by the Vaiṣṇavas. Hence a dispute arose between them and the Śaivas which lasted for six months and was carried on in the presence of the sovereign. Two arbitrators were appointed, Appa Dīkṣitar on the part of the Śaivas and Ayyā Dīkṣitan Ayyan on

the part of the Vaiṣṇavas. These then consulted Sanskrit authorities and made the Śāstras agree; after which the pillar of Ekapādamūrti was fixed in its place."

It is not clear in which month the Śaiva-Vaiṣṇava disputes began. From the order of events narrated, it would appear that the disputes began sometime later than the end of May 1626. The disputes continued for six months and so should have lasted till about November or December 1626. The Śaiva arbitrator, therefore, went on arbitrating many months after the date when the Dīkṣita should have passed away.

It may be argued that we shall take the evidence of the manuscript independently, without relating it to the discredited horoscope. and assume a still later date than 1553 for the birth of the Dīkṣita with a view to cover Akṣaya within his age-limit. My answer is twofold. (1) The manuscript evidence is too flimsy to weigh against the historical and epigraphical evidences, which as I have already endeavoured to show, point out unmistakably to a far earlier date for the Dīkṣita. (2) The manuscript contains a patent mistake in that it makes Ayyā Dīkṣitan Ayyan arbitrate for the Vaiṣṇavas. Four pages lower down the same manuscript refers to Ayyā Dīkṣitar as having been entrusted with the organisation and conduct of the festivals of the Śrī Mīnākṣi Sundareśwara temple according to the ordinances of the ancient books. We know for certain that the latter reference is to Śrī Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, the poet, who was the minister of Tirumal Naik. Śrī Nīlakaṇṭha has always been known as Ayyā Dīkṣita and there can be no mistaking it. So in the former reference also Ayyā Dīkṣita should stand for Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita. The suffix of Ayyan itself clearly shows him to have been a Smārta brahmin. If we are so far correct we are faced with two improbabilities. Ayyā Dīkṣita would never have taken the side of the Vaiṣṇavas and secondly it would be absurd to suppose that he was engaging in a controversy against his grand-uncle, the great Appayya Dīkṣita.

On the other hand if we take the confusion to arise outof the scribe's mistake in transposing the names, we have little difficulty in the identification of personalities. Then it would read, Ayyā Dīkṣitar Ayyan for Śaivas and Appā Dīkṣitar for Vaiṣṇavas. In that age there lived a celebrated Vaiṣṇavite scholar named Appā Dīkṣitar who was the grand-father of

Veṅkaṭādhvarī and the nephew of Tātācārya, the Guru of the Karnāṭaka princes.

Veṅkaṭādhvarī lived in the middle and latter half of the 17th century, when the English had just come to Madras and the Mahattas were rising in power. He refers to his ancestry thus in his Viśvaguṇādarśa;

काञ्चीमण्डलमण्डनस्य मखिनः कर्णाटभूभृद्गुरो-
स्तातार्यस्य दिगन्तकान्तयशसो यं भागिनेयं विदुः ।
अस्तोकाध्वरकर्तुरप्पयगुरोरप्येष विद्वन्मणेः
पुत्रः श्रीरघुनाथदीक्षितकविः पूर्णो गुणैरेधते ॥
तत्सुतस्तर्कवेदान्ततन्त्रव्याकृतिचिन्तकः ।
व्यक्तं विश्वगुणादर्शं विधत्ते वेङ्कटाध्वरी ॥

The scribe's mistake in this case can be very naturally presumed as the words அப்பா and அய்யா very easily look like each other in Tamil script especially when written in a running hand. Scholars are familiar with more serious and unaccountable mistakes in such manuscripts and will therefore regard this one pointed out here with no feeling of surprise.

Having thus disposed of two of the confounding factors in the enquiry regarding the date of Appayya Dīkṣita—the forged horoscope and the scribe's mistake—I now take up the third—the contemporaneity of Jagannātha. This rests purely on tradition and is not therefore a serious matter to tussle with.

Jagannātha lived in the court of Shahjahan (1628—58) and outlived him. He says at the end of his Bhāminī Vilāsa

दिल्लीवल्लभपाणिपल्लवतले नीतं नवीनं वयः ।

He spent his youth in the Court of the Emperor of Delhi. In his आख्यायिका named आसफविलास he says that he got his title of पण्डितराज from Shahjahan. Dara, the first son of Shahjahan was also a patron of Jagannātha. The latter's जगदाभरण is in praise of Dara. Dara was a great patron of learning and enjoyed, as the crown prince, unlimited power and influence during the close of his father's reign. With the help of paṇḍits he had the Upaniṣads translated into the Persian. He himself was an author of many theological works. After Shahjahan's death, there was a political chaos and the succession was disputed with the result that Aurangazeb usurped the throne.

Jagannātha's career as a pet of the moghul Emperor's court therefore came to an end in about 1658 and thenceforth his life took a penitant philosophical turn as is evident from his works.

Thus Jagannātha flourished in the middle and latter half of the 17th century. His contemporaneity with the Dīkṣita is therefore out of the question.

There are other evidences also to show that Jagannātha should have been removed from the Dīkṣita by a few generations at least. Jagannātha's father was पेरुभट्ट. The latter studied the पूर्वमीमांसा under खण्डदेव. Khaṇḍadeva in his mīmāṁsā works (especially the कौस्तुभ) refers to Appayya Dīkṣita as a great authority in mīmāṁsā and styles the latter as मीमांसकमूर्धन्य. Khaṇḍadeva lived and wrote in Benares and during his age the Dīkṣita's works had spread to North India, and won for themselves great esteem. From Appayya Dīkṣita to Khaṇḍadeva, from Khaṇḍadeva to Perubhaṭṭa and from Perubhaṭṭa to Jagannātha four generations should have elapsed.

Again Jagannātha was a student of Śeṣa Vīreśvara, son of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa, who lived in the later half of the 16th Century under the patronage of Giridhari, son of Todarmal, the minister of Akbar. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, who lived and wrote during the closing decades of the 16th century, was a pupil of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa first and later of Appayya Dīkṣita. The Dīkṣita's fame had already spread far and wide and his works had become current in Northern India when Bhaṭṭoji thought fit to make a pilgrimage to the south and study Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā under him.

From Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa the contemporary of the Dīkṣita to Vīreśvara and from the latter to Jagannātha, there is again an indication of three generations.

It was Bhaṭṭa Śrī Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī, who gave the date of 1587 to 1660 for the Dīkṣita, that made capital out of the Jagannātha-Appayya Dīkṣita traditions. Later preface-writers have safely omitted to place any great reliance upon these traditions, though Mr. T. S. Kuppusvāmi Śāstri of Tanjore enumerates Jagannātha among the contemporaries of the Dīkṣita.

Sanskrit Scholars are not unaware of the unabashed egotism of Jagannātha. He is not only conceited but also offensive in his language. He seems to have cherished hatred for Bhaṭṭoji whom he calls a गुरुद्रोहिन्. The Guru referred to should have been Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa. There must have been some trouble about Bhaṭṭoji having first been a pupil of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa and then of Appayya Dīkṣita. Anyhow Jagannātha set himself as a scathing reviewer of the Dīkṣita, as a rhetorician. In his Rasagaṅgādhara, the Dīkṣita is often referred to with scant politeness. It is also likely that he had a great prejudice against Southerners.

That Jagannātha approached the personality of the Dīkṣita in a spirit of animosity is evident. Popular imagination took hold of this fact and wove a network of legends around it, even as it has done in the cases of Kālidāsa, Bāṇa, Bhavabhūti and a host of other poets all of whom are brought together in the exquisitely artistic spirit of Landor's Imaginary Conversations, though with but little historical warrant. The aesthetic truth of the legendary meeting of Jagannātha and the Dīkṣita, on the banks of the Ganges, is undeniable. Jagannātha was a protege of the Mohemmadan rulers and he had lapsed from सदाचार. Later in life he repented and sought purification of his soul. He wrote poetry overflowing with devotion and genuine contrition and invoked the holy waters of the Ganges to work up his redemption. All this is true. It is also perhaps true that the Dīkṣita travelled to Benares, though this fact was wrongly taken to be referred to in the verse of Nīlakaṇṭha—

गङ्गया यः पुरा स्नातो देवश्चन्द्रार्धशेखरः ।
गाङ्गेयेन पुनः सस्नौ सोऽवतीर्य यदात्मना[1] ॥

All these implications are artistically woven into a background of legend which has for long played around the verse of Jagannātha :

किं निश्शङ्कं शेषे शेषे वयसः समागते मृत्यौ ।
अथवा सुखं शयीथा निकटे जागर्ति जाह्नवी भवतः ॥

1. *Vide.* T. S. Kuppuswāmi Śāstri's preface to the Gaṅgāvataraṇa —Nirnaya Sagar Press. गाङ्गेय—Gold—The reference is to the Dīkṣita's Kanakābhiṣeka and not to a bath in the Ganges.

It is the crowning beauty of the legend regarding this verse that it purports to wind up the supposed Jagannātha—Dīkṣita controversy with a pathetic reconciliation; for it says that Jagannātha took the hint from the Dīkṣita and achieved his redemption by singing the praise of the Ganges in his Gaṅgā-laharī.

Legends like this are indeed pregnant with aesthetic lessons but in the role of a researcher one should be wary about taking them at their face-value.

The mists that had for long clouded the issue of the date of Appayya Dīkṣita having thus been cleared off, the proper avenue of research for the rediscovery of his age lies before us in clear daylight. I have already in my previous article identified the patron-princes of the Dīkṣita's youth, man-hood, and old age and stated my arguments in favour of the date 1520 to 1593 confining myself purely to a reference to the political history of the times. I now proceed to state the conclusive epigraphic evidence in favour of the above date.

The temple of Kālakaṇṭheśvara, at Aḍaiyapālam—the birth place and the ancestral abode of the Dīkṣita-contains an inscription on one of its walls. As it has very important bearings on the date and life of the Dīkṣita it needs no apology for my quoting it here in extenso.

No 395 of 1911. *Aḍaiyapālam.*

*विद्वद्गुरोर्विहितविश्वजिदध्वरस्य श्रीसर्वतोमुखमहाव्रतयाजिसूनोः ।
श्रीरङ्गराजमखिनः श्रितचन्द्रमौळिरस्त्यप्पै[1] दीक्षित इति प्रथितस्तनूजः ॥
येन श्रीचिन्नबोम्माक्षितिपबलभिदः कीर्तिरव्याहतासीत्
येन[2] श्रीकण्ठभाष्यं परमशिवमतस्थापनायोद्दधार ।
तेन श्रीरङ्गराजाध्वरिवरतनयेनाप्पयज्वाधिपेना-
कारि प्रौढोन्नताग्रं रजतगिरिनिभं कालकण्ठेशधाम ॥

* This is a true copy as the inscription as it reads. Its verse portion is in Grantha characters and its prose portion is in both Grantha and Tamil promiscuously employed.

1. Read अप्प— for अप्पै.
2. Read [illegible] for येन.

स्वस्ति श्री शकाब्दं 1504 க்குமேல் செல்லாநின்ற चित्रभानु வருஷம் स्वामि कालकण्ठेश्वरருட கோவிலிலே श्रीकण्ठभाष्यं ஐஞ்ஞூறு विद्वांसருக்கு படிப்பிக்க அதுக்கு शिवार्कमणिदीपिकैव्यास्यान மும் பண்ணி வேலூர் चिन्नबोम्म நாயக்கர் கய்யிலே कनकाभिषेकமும் பண்ணிவிச்சுக்கொண்டு அதுக்குப்பின் வேலூரிலே शिवार्कमणिदीपिकैயும் ஐஞ்ஞூறு विद्वांसருக்கு படிப்பிக்க चिन्नबोम्म नायக்கர் கய்யிலே स्वर्णங்களும் अग्रहारங்களும் படைப்பிச்சு [1]प्रतिविराज्यं பண்ணிவிச்சு न्यायरक्षामणि कल्पतरुपरिमल முதலான ஞூறு प्रबन्धं பண்ணின अप्पैदीक्षितருட कृति இந்த शिवालयं शुभमस्तु अप्प दीक्षितर् सदा सेवैं। नीलकण्ठदीक्षितर् सदा सेवैं । अरुणगिरि दीक्षितर सदा सेवैं । विश्वजिदप्पै दीक्षितर् सदा सेवैं । उमामहेश्वर दीक्षितर् सदा सेवै । यज्ञेश्वर दीक्षितर् सदा सेवै । मरुतालं लक्षन् शदा सेवै *

I will briefly notice the contents of this inscription. It records that the temple (dedicated to Kālakaṇṭheśvara) was constructed in 1582 A. D. by Appayya Dīkṣita and recounts that Appayya Dīkṣita was the son of the great guru, Raṅgarājamakhī, that through his association the fame of Cinna Bomma Naik of Vellore spręad far and wide, that he raised the Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya from obscurity and re-established the Śaiva cult, that he wrote his commentary Śivārkamaṇidīpikā on the Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya and taught the same to 500 learned men at Vellore having procured grants of gold and agrahāras for them from Cinna Bomma and that he was bathed in gold by Cinna Bomma on the completion of the above said celebrated commentary, that he raised Cinna Bomma to the dignity of a famous ruler of earth and that he wrote one hundred memorable works including Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi and Parimaḷa.

It is clear from this inscription that the life-work of Appayya Dīkṣita had already been achieved in 1582, and the greatest of his

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1. Read पृथिवी for प्रतिवि.

*N. B.—(i) The first verse can be found in many of the Works of Appayya Dīkṣita and is undoubtedly his own.

(ii) The second signatory is evidently the Dīkṣita's eldest son The fourth is probably his brother's second son the author of रुक्मिणी परिणय. The others must be his sons and grandsons.

(iii) The last is the Sculptor.

Śaivite and Advaitic treatises had been written and published. He had written his famous one hundred works, taught hundreds of disciples, revived the Śaiva cult and re-inforced Advaitism, achieved fame far and wide, lent light and glory to the ruler who patronised him—in fact had done, before 1582, all that we to-day understand to have been his life's great mission.

The Aḍaiyapālam inscription is one of the happiest finds of the Epigraphist. Its purport is clear and concise and its range of information fairly full. It should be noted that it refers to Cinna Bomma in terms of past. Inscriptions in the name of Cinna Bomma are found bearing various dates from 1549 to 1578. After 1578 there is a gap until we come to an inscription of 1601 in the name of Liṅgama Naik, son of Cinna Bomma. The Aḍaiyapālam inscription explains the gap; for it should be understood that Cinna Bomma died between 1578 and 1582 after a long and influencial reign of about thirty or thirty-five years. During most of these years Appayya Dīkṣita lived, wrote and taught under his devoted patronage. Very likely after the death of Cinna Bomma, the Dīkṣita retired to his village to live a secluded religious life, built a temple to his guardian deity and worshipped Him with his own hands.[1]

Prof. Heras, in referring to the inscription under discussion says :—" According to an inscription of Cinna Bomma Naik, of 1582, at Aḍaiyapālam" ; and then proceeds to say "that as the Vellore temple is known to have existed already, Appayya Dīkṣita perhaps only renovated and enlarged the existing temple." Evidently the Professor is mistaken ; for in the first place our inscription is not an inscription of Cinna Bomma and secondly it has nothing to do with the Vellore temple. The facts are patent on its face. Again he is wrong in thinking that the inscription evidences the fact that Cinna Bomma was living at that date. On the contrary the language is plain in its reference to Cinna Bomma in terms of past.

Having referred to the historical and epigraphical evidence, I now proceed to show how the ascertainable dates of the Dīkṣita's literary contemporaries amply corroborate my premises. Not a

1. It is said that even to day no hired Arcaka is allowed to worship the god, but only a resident scion of the Dīkṣita's family does it.

little is said in traditions regarding the sectarian controversies carried on against him by the leading Vaiṣṇavite and Madhva savants of the age, sometimes in a spirit of scholarly rivalry and at other times with gross vindictiveness. Many of the Dīkṣita's works unmistakably bring home to us that he lived in a hot age of sectarian philosophic controversy and that all his wonderful genius and energy were called upon to avert the grave crisis to which Advaita and Śaivaviśiṣṭādvaita were subjected through the uncommendable instrumentality of systematic proselytism carried through under state auspices. To give the reader an idea of the terrible tides which he had to stem during his life, which was all one of peril and sacrifice for the cause of his faith, I quote here a few of his verses spoken in the white-heat of righteous indignation.

विष्णुर्वा शङ्करो वा श्रुतिशिखरगिरामस्तु तात्पर्यभूमि-
नस्माकं तत्र वादः प्रसरति किमपि स्पष्टमद्वैतभाजाम् ।
किन्त्वीशद्वेषगाढानलकलितहृदां दुर्मतीनां दुरुक्ती-
र्भङ्क्तुं यत्नो ममायं न हि भवतु ततो विष्णुविद्वेषशङ्का ॥

सहस्रं वर्तन्तां पथि पथि परे साहसकृतः
प्रवर्तन्तां बाधां मयि विविधमभ्यारचयितुम् ।
न लक्षीकुर्वेऽहं नलिनजलिपिप्राप्तमपित-
न्मम स्वामी चामीकरशिखरिचापोऽस्ति पुरतः ॥

कण्ठे रुद्राक्षमालां भसितमतिसितं फालदेशे च पश्यन्
नश्यन्नेव क्रुधा यस्तदपहृतिमतिं सत्सु कुर्वीत गुर्वीम् ।
तन्फालात्तूर्णमायुर्लिखितमसुगणं चापि तत्कण्ठदेशात्
क्रुद्धास्ते ह्युद्धरेयुर्निजपदकमलाङ्गुष्ठलीलाविलासैः ॥

संकल्प्य स्थाणुशास्त्रप्रचरणविहतिः स्वेन कार्या भुवीति
श्मश्रूणि स्वैरमश्रूण्यपि दृशि महतां स्पर्धया वर्धयन्तम् ।
क्षुद्रं विद्रावयेयुर्झटिति वृषपतिक्रोधनिश्वासलेशा-
श्शास्त्रं शैलादिभृत्यास्तनुयुरखिलभूमण्डलव्याप्तमेतत् ॥

क्वचिदवयवे कांश्चिद्दग्धुं बलादनुचिन्यन्तन्
निरसनमितो देशात् कर्तुं महेश्वरमाश्रितान् ।
प्रमथपरिषत्क्रोधाद्दग्धाखिलावयवः स्वयं
निरसनमितो लोकादेव क्षणेन समश्नुताम् ॥

The last four verses are taken from his Nigrahāṣṭaka. Tradition declares that the person referred to therein as the Dīkṣita's persecutor was Tātācārya, the guru of the Karnāṭaka monarchs of Vijayanagar. Śivānanda's biography gives a string of incidents illustrating the development of the persecution. I am directly concerned now only with the identification of this Tātācārya who is said to have been an inveterate enemy of the Dīkṣita and Śaivism.

The Prapannāmṛtam is a work of one Anantācārya, purporting to record the history of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and the lives of the Ācāryas in South India. It says that Tātācārya of the family of Śrī Śaila Pūrṇa, son of Śrīnivāsa guru, became the preceptor of Rāma Rāya, the regent of Sadāśiva Rāya, who ruled, from 1542 to 1567 and that the latter took the guru to Candragiri with a view to spend some time there in intimate religious seclusion. At that time one Mahācārya alias Doḍḍācārya of Sholingar sought the assistance of Rāma Rāya for reinstating Govindarāja in Citrakūṭa (Cidambaram), for, the worship of Govindarāja in the temple of Cidambaram had been abolished since the time of the Cōḻa King Kulottuṅga II(कृमिकण्ठ). Rāma Rāya and Tātācārya fulfilled the request of Mahācārya after defeating the Śaivas of Cidambaram. In this context the narrative proceeds to say :—

> शैवशास्त्रविदां श्रेष्ठः श्रीमानप्पयदीक्षितः ।
> चित्रकूटे जितारातिरशोभत महायशाः ॥
> अद्वैतदीपिकाभिख्यं ग्रन्थमप्पयदीक्षितः ।
> चकार भगवद्द्वेषी शैवधर्मरतस्सदा ॥

And further on :—

> विधाय तातयाचार्यस्तत्पक्षमतभञ्जनम् ।
> श्रीरामानुजसिद्धान्तमव्याहतमपालयत् ॥
> महाचार्यो महातेजास्स कृत्वा चण्डमारुतम् ।
> अव्याहतं यतीन्द्रस्य तं सिद्धान्तमपालयत् ॥

These verses convey to us the information that both Mahācārya and Tātācārya wrote refutations in order to defend the creed of Rāmānuja from the attacks directed against it by Appayya Dīkṣita. It is, therefore clear, that in the days of

Rāma Rāya, Appayya Dīkṣita had already written his controversial works and was a power to reckon with, as an apostle of Advaitism. Rāma Rāya was in power since 1542 till his death in 1565. It must be remarked here that a work by the name of Advaita Dīpikā by Appayya Dīkṣita has not yet been identified but that one bearing the same name written by Nṛsiṁhāśramī a contemporary of the Dīkṣita, is alone, known.

This Tātācārya the guru of Rāma Rāya was not alive in the eighties of the century, for the ceremony of coronation of Veṅkaṭapati in 1585 was performed by the guru's son Lakṣmī Kumār Tātācārya who was a mere youth at that time.

It is, therefore, beyond doubt clear that Appayya Dīkṣita was already a celebrated scholar, teacher, writer and controversialist in the middle of the 16th century when Rāma Rāya was in charge of the Vijayanagar empire. The first among the verses quoted here from an unsympathetic record of a sectarian antagonist is especially noteworthy. The Dīkṣita was then living at Cidambaram having vanquished his foes and achieved unequalled fame. The Dīkṣita should have been at least middle-aged at the time of the establishment of Govinda Rāja by Rāma Rāya. The record of Anantācārya gives no room for the implication that the Dīkṣita was one among those Śaivas whose opposition was overcome before Govinda Rāja's reinstallation.

The Dīkṣita himself with his Advaitic impartiality seems to have hailed Govinda Rāja to his wonted honour and worship in the temple with a devotion which is not less intense than the one which he bore to God Naṭarāja. For he is said to have stood facing both the Godly presences simultaneously and addressed a century of verses to them jointly—verses which are alternately interspersed with epithets invoking both the deities. This stotra begins thus :—

मारमणमुमारमणं फणधरतल्पं फणाधराकल्पम् ।
मुरमथनं पुरमथनं वन्दे बाणारिमसमबाणारिम् ॥

It must be noted that the Prapannāmṛtam refers to the Dīkṣita at this period as an Advaitic writer and not as a sectarian Śaivate controversialist. The two Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas are said to have written their answers to the attacks of the Dīkṣita on the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. In my opinion, the controversy narrowed down to sectarianism, later on, when the

Vaiṣṇavaite Ācāryas having secured a firmer hold on the Vijayanagar monarchs, set upon coercive proselytism.

I now turn to the Madhva Ācārya who defended his philosophy against the criticisms of the Dīkṣita. It was Vijayīndra Bhikṣu an incumbent of the pontifical seat of the Sumatīndra mutt. Rāghavendravijaya is a work which describes the lives of the Ācāryas of the mutt. Regarding Vijayīndra the writer says—

विद्वद्वरोऽस्माद्विजयीन्द्रयोगी विद्यासु हृद्यास्वतुलप्रभावः ।
रत्नाभिषेकं किल रामराजात् प्राप्याप्रयत्नलक्ष्मीनकृताग्रहारान् ॥

Then the narrative goes on to describe how the successor of Vijayīndra was honoured by Veṅkaṭapati of Penukoṇḍa and Raghunātha of Tanjore. Vijayīndra was not therefore, living at the beginning of the 17th Century. He lived in the times of Rāma Rāya. He was a protege of Śevvappa of Tanjore also. In 1576 there was a grant to Vijayīndratīrtha obtained by Śevvappa from Śrī Raṅga I.

It is said that Vijayīndra engaged in several religious controversies with Appayya Dīkṣita and ardently defended his creed in a number of controversial writings. It is also said that he wrote 104 works in order to rival the Dīkṣita who had written 104 works. His Paratattvaprakāśa is said to be an answer to the Dīkṣita's Śivatattvaviveka. His Appayyakapola Capeṭika has indeed a very significant title. These facts clearly show that Vijayīndra should have been an younger contemporary of Appayya Dīkṣita.

The fore-going testimonies make it clear that Appayya Dīkṣita, Tātācārya the elder, and Vijayīndra Bhikṣu were contemporaries of each other and of Rāma Rāya the regent of the Tuḷuva Emperor, Sadāśiva Rāya (1542—1567).

The Tuḷuvas were ardent Vaiṣṇavas unlike the Emperors of the preceeding dynasties of Vijayanagar ; but they were very tolerant and generous in matters of faith. Rāma Rāya belonged to the Karnāṭaka line, also called the Āravīḍu dynasty. He married the daughter of Kṛṣṇadeva Rāya and came to wield much influence in the royal house-hold until at last owing to the minority of Sadāśiva, he became Regent of the Emperor and virtually the ruler. Rāma Rāya was a devoted pupil of the famous

Vaiṣṇavite teacher Tātācārya. He patronised Vijayīndra Bhikṣu and bathed the latter in a shower of precious stones. Under the aegis of his political prowess the Vaiṣṇavites reinstated Govinda Rāja in Chidambaram. He does not seem to have evinced the catholicity in religious sympathies which so well characterised the former emperors of Vijayanagar like Kṛṣṇadeva Rāya. While Appayya Dīkṣita's grand-father, Ācārya Dīkṣita was one of the celebrated ornaments of Kṛṣṇadeva Rāya's Court, we do not hear of the Dīkṣita himself as having at any time been the protege of Rāma Rāya. The reason is not far to seek. Rāma Rāya was completely under the influence of Tātācārya, the religious antagonist of the Dīkṣita. He allowed proselytism for spreading the Vaiṣṇavite creed. The Prapannāmṛta says that the younger Tātācārya having gained a firm hold over Veṅkaṭapati pushed through proselytism so vigorously that the whole world was converted to Vaiṣṇavism. I give the verses here :

लक्ष्मीकुमारतातार्यं महात्मानमशिश्रियत् ।
तद्राज्यं देशिकाधीनं विधाय गुरुभक्तिमान् ॥ etc.

and then,

आक्रान्तवेङ्कटपतिराय: श्रीतातदेशिक: ।
यतीन्द्राभिमुखं सम्यक् स चकाराखिलं जगत् ॥

I believe that this aggressive religious policy had its beginnings in the days of the elder Tātācārya himself. The question arises at this stage which of the two Tātācāryas is to be identified with the traditional persecutor of the Dīkṣita. It must be borne in mind that Veṅkaṭapati was himself a patron of the Dīkṣita.

The Dīkṣita refers to Veṅkaṭapati in these terms—

प्राप्त: पुण्यैरगण्यैरिव विबुधगणो वेङ्कटक्षोणिपालम् ॥

—Vidhi-Rasāyana

नियोगाद्वेङ्कटपतेर्निरुपाधिकृपानिधे: ॥

—Kuvalayānanda.

In the eighties of the 16th Century the Dīkṣita was very old and Lakṣmī Kumār was a mere youth. And as already shown, the Vaiṣṇavite record testifies to certain religious controversies between the elder Tātācārya and Appayya Dīkṣita. Taking

the bulk of these facts into consideration and the tradition that Tātācārya passed away as soon as he was anathematised by the Dīkṣita in the निग्रहाष्टक, I am inclined to think that the Dīkṣita had more to do with the elder than the younger Tātācārya. Appayya Dīkṣita both by his preachings and writings attempted to hold in check the aggression of Vaiṣṇavism to the detriment of Śaivism. It is not surprising therefore that we do not hear of the Dīkṣita being patronised by the central monarch of Vijayanagar while the Imperial vassals, like Chinna Thimma and Chinna Bomma alone patronised him and threw their sympathy and support on the side of his religious and literary activities. It was the religious policy of Rāma Rāya and his Aravidu successors guided and controlled by the elder Tātācārya until about 1580 A. D. that necessitated the great efforts of the Dīkṣita to protect the Śaivite persuation. The whole import of the Aḍaiyapalam inscription above given is significant of this necessity and shows how it was met with. The Dīkṣita revived the Śivādvaitamata of Śrīkaṇṭha by writing his शिवार्कमणिदीपिका and spreading it by teaching, at a stretch, five hundred learned men maintained by the munificence of Chinna Bomma. Thus we see that the Dīkṣita, viewed from one aspect, was a product of his age, as every great personality in History has always been.

Professor Heras, makes the following observations in this connection.

"This proselytism produced warm disputes at the Court itself of the sovereign among the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Scholars. One of these controversies took place between Tātācārya and the court poet Appayya Dīkṣita. This scholar was a very fervant Śaiva. He chanted four[1] verses in honour of Śiva wherever he went and by his zeal and preaching reconverted many Vaiṣṇavas to their former faith in Śiva. In the religious disputation with Tātācārya, Appayya Dīkṣita was victorious. Hence the royal guru cherished a mortal hatred against him, and even, they say actually plotted to put an end to his rivals' life."

The Professor derives his information from the Indian Antiquary Vol. XXVII, P. 326, and connects the incidents recounted with the Court of Veṅkaṭapati.

1, I think "four" must be read as "forth." [Y. M.]

As Prapannāmṛtam itself affirms, propaganda for Vaiṣṇavite conversion was made by Tātācārya the younger under the patronage of Veṅkaṭapati. Appayya Dīkṣita lived for more than seven years after the accession of Veṅkaṭapati and during those years certainly visited his court many times. So it is not impossible to believe the version relied on by the learned Professor. Very likely the scholarly controversies took place during the time of the elder Tātācārya and the mass conversion and reconversion with its attendant persecutions happened in the days of the younger Tātācārya who because of his youth perhaps took to missionary activities with extra enthusiasm. Though this latter view is not untenable, I am inclined to think that the weight of evidence is in favour of the former view expressed by me.

I now proceed to refer to the other contemporaries of the Dīkṣita whose chronology helps us to fix for him a date as early as 1520 to 1593. I have in my former article referred to an anecdote of a poet called Sārvabhauma visiting Appayya when the latter was barely twenty years old and when he himself was very far advanced in age. I have little hesitation in identifying this Sārvabhauma with the author of the works, भागवतच्चम्पू:, सालुवाभ्युदयं and अच्युतरायाभ्युदयं. His name was Rājanātha and his titles were numerous. He was commonly known by the title डिण्डिमसार्वभौमकविः । During the days of Prauḍha Deva Rāya of Vijayanagar, the great Agrahāra of Mūlanda was founded (in the latter half of the 15th century) by the poet Aruṇagiri who won for himself and his descendants the title of डिण्डिमसार्वभौमकविः in the court of the Sultan. (*Vide* 1918 Ind. Ant. P. 79) His son was Rājanātha, who was born very likely in the latter half of the 15th century. Rājanātha was the court poet of Sālva Narasiṁha (1486 to '92) and wrote the सालुवाभ्युदय in his court. He was the Court poet of Acyuta Rāya also, and wrote his Acyutarāyābhyudaya in the latter's court. Thus he had enjoyed more than sixty years of court life and was, indeed, very old when he met Appayya, the rising scholar and poet in 1540 or so. Research scholars have hesitatingly advanced the theory of the identity of the authors of both the Abhyudayas. I venture to say that their conjecture is fortified by the above described tradition which affirms that Rājanātha lived to a very old age.

The next important contemporary of Appayya Dīkṣita was Ratnakheṭa Dīkṣita. He was a protege of Śūrappa Naik of Gingi who ruled between the years 1553 and 1575 approximately. In the first half of the century he seems to have enjoyed the patronage of Chinna Vīrappa Naik of Vellore (the father of Chinna Bomma) and of Candra Śekhara Pāṇḍya of Madura. His reference to a चोळभूवल्लभ in his drama called भावनापुरुषोत्तम is perhaps to Śevappa of Tanjore. Ratnakheṭa growing jealous of the great reputation of the Dīkṣita vowed to vanquish the latter in debate, but failing to do so gave his daughter to the Dīkṣita in marriage under a divine direction. Rāja-Cūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita the son of Ratnakheṭa was a contemporary of Nīlakaṇṭha the grandson of the Dīkṣita's younger brother. Both Rāja-Cūḍāmaṇi and Nīlakaṇṭha flourished in Tanjore and Madura Courts respectively in the first half of the 17th Century.

The celebrated Govinda Dīkṣita was the next great contemporary of the Dīkṣita. Traditions are numerous which connect the two Dīkṣitas in some situation. Appayya is represented as a boy when he first met Govinda Dīkṣita while the latter was teaching his pupils (or performing a sacrifice according to another version). The verse :—

> नाहमधीती वेदे न च पठिती यत्रकुत्रचिच्छास्त्रे ।
> किं तु दरेन्दुवतंसिनि पुरहिंसिनि भूयसी भक्तिः ॥

is put in the mouth of Appayya and the verse :—

> अप्पदीक्षित किमित्यतिस्तुतिं वर्णयामि भवतो वदान्यताम् ।
> सोऽपि कल्पतरुरर्थलिप्सया त्वद्गिरामवसरं प्रतीक्षते ॥

is put in the mouth of Govinda Dīkṣita.

These traditions have no basis at all; for the latter verse is quoted in the name of Bālakavi (of mūlāndam) by Śrī Nīlakaṇṭha in his नलचरितनाटकप्रस्तावना I think that Govinda and Appayya were almost of the same age though the former lived longer.

Govinda lived in Vijayanagar as a youth in the days of Acyuta Deva Rāya. With Śevvappa he came to the Chola Kingdom to be the former's minister. Inscriptions of 1549 and 1577 mention him along with Śevvappa. An inscription of 1595-6 records a gift of money for the merit of the Dīkṣitan Ayyen

Professor Heras mistakes this to refer to Appayya Dīkṣita. In fact Dīkṣitan Ayyen is Govinda Dīkṣitar and cannot be any one else. In 1597 he crowned[1] Raghunātha as King of Tanjore. In 1605 at his instance the Tiruvādi Sthala purāṇa was translated from Sanskrit to Tamil. So Govinda Dīkṣita must have been the Minister of the Nāyaks of Tanjore from about 1545 to 1605. The latter date possibly represents his age limit. He ought to have lived for about 90 years if not more. The notion that Appayya Dīkṣita has commented on Govinda Dīkṣita's हरिवंशसार is not well founded, for whatever might be said about the identification of the commentator, that of the author has been repudiated by M. R. Ry. T. S. Kuppuswami Śāstri of Tanjore.

A cordial relation and a hearty co-operation ought to have existed between Govinda and Appayya Dīkṣitas; but tradition gives little information on this matter except the disproved ones above referred to. Professor Heras states that Appayya was a protege of Śevappa also. It is quite likely though I do not understand the source of his information. Sivānanda, indeed, refers to the long and strenuous devotion of the King of Tanjore to the Dīkṣita but he gives a wrong name.

Next, mention may be made of Nṛsiṁha Āśrami, sometimes called an ally of the Dīkṣita Nṛsiṁha Āśrami, the reputed author of भेदधिक्कार, अद्वैतदीपिका, विवरणभावप्रकाशिका, वेदान्तसारटीका and तत्त्वविवेक is said to have written his last mentioned work in 1547. He was perhaps an elder contemporary of the Dīkṣita.

Samara-puṅgava and his elder brother were the sister's sons of the Dīkṣita. The latter, was also a disciple of the Dīkṣita. Samara-puṅgava in his यात्राप्रबन्ध gives on account of his brother's life and his pilgrimages. He describes in glowing passages the fame and achievements of Appayya Dīkṣita and refers to the कनकाभिषेक. He gives his brother's horoscope which is as follows.

1. (Until Professor Heras authoritatively stated this, it was believed that the coronation took place in 1614).

	Candra.		
Ketu.			Guru.
Śani.			Budha Ravi Rāhu.
		Śukra Lagna.	Kuja.

I sent this horoscope to the late Diwan Bahadur L. D. Swamikannu Pillai. He fixed its date as 1551 A.D. 22nd August. Samara-puṅgava's brother was patronised by Saluva Makarāya of Karvetinagar whose inscriptional dates are found to fall within the first two decades of the 17th Century.

Thus, history, epigraphy, tradition and literature yeild unmistakable corroborations of the date 1520-'93 for Appayya Dīkṣita, propounded by me in my last article.

PROF-SRĪNIVĀSĀCHĀRI'S "RĀMĀNUJA'S IDEA OF THE FINITE SELF."

EXAMINATION OF CHAPTER I

BY

PROFESSOR K. SUNDARARAMA AIYAR AVL., M.A., KUMBAKONAM.

Professor Srīnivāsāchāri puts forward (in the *first* chapter of his work) a severe criticism of various points in what he considers to be the Advaita doctrine of Śaṅkara. He labours under serious misconceptions regarding that doctrine, and his criticisms are altogether unjustifiable and misleading. We shall consider them here one after another in order to place the truth in its proper light and remove prejudice and error to the extent we can.

1 It is stated (p. 3) that " Rāmānuja insists on the equal validity of all the Upaniṣadic texts and claims for his interpretation the authority of timeless tradition and logical satisfactoriness and verifies it by a quotation from Dramiḍācārya, etc. On the other hand, according to our author, the Advaitin " distinguishes between *primary texts* and *secondary texts, pradhāna* texts and *gauṇa* texts. Śaṅkara, for example, directs attention to the Mahāvākyas and derives his chief thoughts therefrom."

The above passage is so full of errors and misconceptions that we think that our author has undertaken his task of criticising Śaṅkara's views without taking adequate pains to know them as they exactly are. We can assent in reply that (1) Śaṅkara also " insists on the equal validity of all the Upaniṣadic texts," and (2) that he does not distinguish anywhere between what our author calls " primary texts and secondary texts." Śaṅkara himself never in his Bhāṣyas makes mention of the term " Mahāvākyas " as distinguished from what later philosophers of his school have called " *avāntara-vākyas.*" These latter have unquestionably proper grounds for making this distinction—grounds which can be traced to various Upaniṣads included in the accepted canon of later ages. For instance, Vidyāraṇya, in his well-known work, *Pañcadaśī (Prakaraṇa Five)*, quotes bodily from

the "Śuka-Rahasya-Upaniṣad" all the eight ślokas which explain the purport of the four accepted Mahāvākyas. The great modern Advaitic philosopher, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his "*Siddhānta-Bindu*" also makes the distinction between Mahāvākyas and others (*avāntara-vākyas*), and points out that, while the latter explains the purport borne by the "words" (*padas*), the aim of the former is to state the purport (*tātparya*) of the "sentences" in which the "words" occur. The "words" here referred to are such pairs of words as refer to Īśvara and Jīva,—*Brahma* and *Ātmā*,-*Tat* and *Tvam*, etc. Further, it must be understood that, even if Śaṅkara has not used the term '*Mahā-Vākya*' in his Bhāṣyas, he could not have been oblivious and indeed he is fully aware of the fact that sentences like "tat-tvam-asi', "*aham-brahma-asmi*", etc., are important in the Upaniṣads and that their importance is *fully* and *clearly* emphasised in the Chāndogya, Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka, and other Upaniṣads. In the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, "*tat-tvam-asi*" is repeated nine times in the instruction conveyed by the teacher to his pupil,—and such repetition (*abhyāsa*) is accepted as one of the six *tātparya-liṅgas*,—*i. e.*, indications of the true and ultimate import of the Upaniṣadic teaching and system. We turn to the *Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka* and find there the following :—" Whoever has the knowledge, I am Brahman (*aham-brahma-asmi*), he becomes all this (universe)." This shows that this Upaniṣad attaches supreme value to the knowledge conveyed by this sentence. It also explains why the *Śuka-Rahasya*-Upaniṣad (above referred to) and, following it, the great teachers, Vidyāraṇya-Swāmī and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and other later Advaitins have laid stress on what are called Mahāvākyas. It is also worth stating in this connection that the *Tejobindu-Upaniṣad* attaches such supreme importance to this particular *Mahā-vākya* as to dwell on its value and utility at immense length, and evidently this Upaniṣad is intended to convince all who read it that this Mahāvākya expresses the form in which we have the realisation of the supreme beatitude which is the goal of all life in the world of phenomena.

On the grounds above stated, we hold that Prof-Srīnivāsāchāriar is in error in saying that Śaṅkara (or any of his followers) do not admit the equal validity of all Vedānta-texts. The Advaitic school of Vedānta holds that *avāntara-vākyas* convey to us the *true import of the padas* (Brahman and Ātman, *Tat* and *Tvam*, *Iśvara* and *Jīva*, etc.,) while the *Mahā-vākyas* convey to us the

true *import of the "sentences"* (*vākyārtha*) in which any one of these pairs of words occurs so as to teach the supreme knowledge which is to lead to liberation from the transient joys (or sorrows) of the life of wandering through various stages of phenomenal existence. The making of such a distinction is fully supported by the authority of the Upaniṣads and by valid logic and is perfectly consistent with the upholding in full of the equal validity of all Vedānta texts. The two classes of texts have each its own function allotted to it, but *combine* to establish the Vedānta doctrine on the irrefragable basis of the experience which is the supreme Self and is the one Bliss of Existence Absolute and without a second.

2. Our author states as follows :—"The dualism that we find in the systems of Spinoza, Kant and Śaṅkara disappears in the synthesis of Rāmānuja. His governing idea is that there is no contradiction between the Absolute of Thought and the God of Religion."

Nothing can be a greater error than to suppose that the distinction (in Śaṅkara's doctrine) between Brahman and Īśvara implies "dualism" of any kind. Śaṅkara has specially referred to this objection in his Bhāṣya on Sūtra IV iii, 16 and stated, too, his reply therein. The passage is as follows :—"Are there two Brahmans higher and lower? Certainly there are two. For, we have the Praśna-upaniṣad passage, 'O Satyakāma, the syllable Om is the higher and also the lower Brahman. What, then, is the higher Brahman, what the lower ? We reply as follows. Where, denying all distinctions of name and form, etc., due to *avidyā* (nescience), Brahman is taught by such terms as *asthūla* (not coarse), that is the higher (Brahman) ; where, for the purpose of *upāsanā* (pious worship and meditation), the very same (Brahman) is taught as possessing name and form and other qualities by certain texts like 'he whose nature varies with the mind's power of thought (*manomaya*), whose body is breath (*prāṇa*), whose essential nature is the light etc., that is the lower Brahman.' But is there not room for the objection that this distinction of a higher and lower Brahman contradicts the texts asserting non-duality (*advitīya*)? No, we reply. For, the objection is answered by the *fact* that these texts refer to name and form which are phenomenal adjuncts due to *avidyā* (nescience)." Śaṅkara goes on to point out that, so long as *avidyā* is not discarded, pious worship of the personal God is maintained, and the fruit gained thereby remains included

within the limits of the *merely phenomenal* world due to such avidyā. Hence, Śaṅkara can nowhere be said to have admitted a *dualism* of any kind in the universally recognised sense of that term as referring to *two distinct (and pluralistic) realities of the same order.* The personal God who is the object of pious worship is relegated to, and stands related to the embodied individuals included within the limits of, the world of phenomena merely. If any one here objects, how are we to account for the Scriptural injunction (*vidhi*) regarding *draṣṭavya* (to be known), Śaṅkara gives the following reply (*vide* Bhāṣya on Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka, Vol. I, p. 154)—" The knowledge of the Brahman as One, need not be made an injunction, if there is no *adhyāropa* (superposition of a phenomenal object) on Brahman due to *avidyā* (nescience) We do not say that there is no such *adhyāropa* on Brahman of the attributes of what it is not. We only say that Brahman is not to be thought as the producer of *avidyā (avidyā-Kartṛ)* on account of the superposition of the attributes of what is not Brahman on our own Self (or Brahman)." That is, the *adhyāropa* (of what is not Brahman) which leads to the experiences of the phenomenal world is due to *avidyā* (nescience). Knowledge (of Brahaman) is prescribed in order to get rid of avidyā,—and, when we are rid of avidyā, Brahman shines in its *svarūpa* (or *characterising Content, i. e., dharma,* as Śaṅkara calls it in his *Bhāṣya* on III-iii-2 to which we shall have to refer in a later connection in a more pointed manner). This *Svarūpa* (or *Dharma*, or characterising content) signifies *Self-Effulgence* (*Svaprakāśatva* or *Sākṣitvam*), *Bliss* (*Ānanda*), *Knowledge* (*Cit-jñāna*), etc. There is really no differentiation possible between Brahman and its *Svarūpa* (characterising content). If we differentiate now (*i. e.*, when we have not yet attained to *Brahma-Sākṣātkāra*, Self-Realisation), it is simply due to our *avidyā* and only for the purpose of exposition or conception of what is yet not truly reached in its attributeless essence and its distinguishing (but characterless or featureless) content.

3. Prof. Srīnivāsāchāri says (p. 4) :—" To the advaitin, experience is rooted in inexplicable illusion (*anirvacanīya*) and contradiction (*Bādha*)."

The word *anirvacanīya* as applied to *primordial* matter (*mūla-prakṛti*) or *manifested* material objects of the phenomenal universe ought not to be translated as altogether " inexplicable." Śaṅkara, in Brahma Sūtra (II-i-14), explains it as " not to be

explained, as being either as an existing object (*tatva*) or as different from it (*anyatva*)"—*i. e.*, neither as a permanent reality (Brahman) nor as unreality (the horn of a hare). That is, it has only a *phenomenal* existence and so is transient and stultifiable when the realisation of Brahman is attained. Śaṅkara, in the same context gives a further explanation as follows:—" All Vedānta texts declare that, from the point of view of the highest (or noumenal) existence, the relation between the ruler and the ruled admitted in the practical life of the world does not exist. But from the point of view of the practical life of the world (*vyavahāra*), as also in the Śruti, such practical relationship between Īśvara (ruler of all) and others are spoken of." What *anirvacanīya* means must now be clear. But we shall add a further explanation. In the Vedānta, the conception of '*eternal*' (*anādi*) is to be distinguished from the *real* (*i. e.*, *nitya* or *permanent*). Prof. Pringle-Pattison says:—" The *eternal* and the *temporal* are essentially correlative conceptions so that it is only through the characteristic features of time—through some transformation of these features—that we can form an intelligible conception of the eternal." The conception of Īśvara (creator and ruler of the universe) is included among what are spoken of as *anādi* (beginningless), even as *prakṛiti*, *karma*, and some others are similarly included ; and hence it is brought under the category of *vyavahāra*, phenomenal existence. Brahman alone constitutes what he calls *Paramārtha*, the Absolute or Substance.

Further, Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri is mistaken in saying that, to the Advaitin, what is *anirvacanīya* (as explained above by us) is an " illusion." Śaṅkara, in his Bhāṣya on the Sūtra I-iv-3, says:— " The casual potentiality-*bīja-śakti*-of the world is of the nature of Avidyā (nescience)...... It is denoted by the term *avyakta* (unmanifested)......in some places, it is denoted by the term *ākāśa*......in some places, it is denoted by the term, *akṣara*...... in some places, it is spoken of as *māyā*." All these are, therefore, synonymous terms and indicate only the conception of primordial matter and its manifestation in the *phenomenal* world of material objects. No phenomenal existence—not even an *appearance* such as produced before us by the wand of a skilled magician—can be *known* as an "illusion" *while* it lasts as an experience, as an actual happening, in our waking and conscious life. We must also draw attention to Śaṅkara's clear statement (in his Bhāṣya on Sūtra-II-i, 14) that " the entire complex of

phenomenal existence is considered as real (*satya*) so long as the knowledge of Brahman as being the self of all has not arisen, even as the appearances in a dream are considered to be real until the sleeper awakes." Here, therefore, Śaṅkara distinctly says that phenomenal existence is "true" while it lasts,—*not* that our experience of it is an "illusion" or "rooted in contradiction (*bādha*)" while our experience of it lasts, as Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri assumes from his insufficient knowledge of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara holds that our "*svābhāvika-vyavahāra*" (the indepent existence of the world at large) and our "*svābhāvika-śarīrātmatvam*" (the independent existence of the embodied self) do not undergo stultification (*bādha*) till we reach the realisation (*sākṣātkāra*) of "the one Existence without a second."

Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri (pp. 3 & 4) states the conclusion which Rāmānuja reaches from "Śruti and logic" as follows: —"He (Rāmānuja) deduces his first principles of realism (*satkhyāti*) and Co-ordination (*sāmānādhi-karaṇya*) and establishes the truth of the *Jīva as a prakāra of Īśvara*." We shall here deal with the way in which Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri brings Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara into contrast as regards the question of external perception. The Professor, as we have already shown, is *entirely wrong* in thinking that Śaṅkara holds that in our perception of the external world we experience an "illusion." Śaṅkara's view is the very reverse of this view. For he says frequently, "*jñānam vastutantram, i.e.*, "our knowledge (in perception, external or internal) is determined by the object." Śaṅkara shares the view of a modern writer in regard to external objects in particular :—"These physical objects themselves somehow get within experience, *are directly apprehended.*" "The objectively-minded philosophers, suppose that the data of perception are the very physical existents which we all practically believe to be surrounding and threatening our bodies." Our author himself is aware that, in Rāmānuja's objectivism, "even dreams and illusions have perceptive reality." Our dreams and the "illusions" of our waking life are both alike in getting stultified later on; further, neither are futile while they are experienced,—and these are the reasons why we differentiate them from the other experiences of ours in the phenomenal world which continue ever so long and are felt to be true till we reach the realisation of the Brahman. But these circumstances should not induce in us the blindness which makes us to hold, as

our author does (p. 5), that a dream (or illusion) is "*as real as the perception of a pot*"—for the former—the dream—is stultified as soon as we return to the waking state, but the latter, *i. e.*, the perception of a pot is not stultified while we live and have our movement here. It is strange that Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri should propound such an astonishing paradox as is contained in the following :—"the cognition of silver in the shell, when the latter is mistaken for the former, arises from defective perception, owing to which the element of silver alone is seen and not that of the shell." Modern science has reached the conclusion that the mass of an electron (the ultimate constituent of matter) "Consists of nothing but electric changes and has no mass except that which results from those changes,'—thus reaching the Advaitin's conclusion of *māyā-śakti* (or energy) as the seed of the material world of phenomena. Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri himself says that the shell is "*mistaken*" for silver. How can silver be also said to be "*Cognised*" or "*seen*" actually when a "mistake" or error has been made by us. The author confounds—or rather fails to distinguish—between what the Vedāntins call "Bhrama" (false apprehension) and *Pramā* (true knowledge gained by right sources and methods of proof). In fact, he abolishes the distinction between truth and error, *i. e.*, erroneous judgment, erroneous belief, etc.[1]

We shall deal with what our author calls the principle of "Co-ordination" (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) when we deal with his Chapter II, where he deals with the crux of Rāmānuja's doctrine *viz.*, the relation known as *Prakāra-prakāri-sambandha*, existing between Jīva and Īśvara. But here we have to note that he speaks (p. 6) of the notion of Prakāra (mode) as "a *sui generis attribute* or *apṛthak-siddha viśeṣaṇa*." The two expressions are not synonymous, as the Professor thinks. *Sui generis* means "*a thing forming a class* by itself." *Apṛthak-siddha* means "existing in inseparable association." *Secondly*, the Professor's treatment of the term "*apṛthak-siddha viśeṣaṇa*" and its application to what he calls "a judgment, like, *this is that Devadatta*", is by no means satisfactory. For, in the *first* place, *Viśeṣaṇas* (attributes) are of *two* kinds—(a) *lakṣaṇas* (or dharmas) which are of the nature of what may be called 'characterising content

1. Professor Śrīnivāsāchāri evidently adopts Rāmānuja's अख्यातिसंवलितयथार्थख्यातिवाद. The learned critic of Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri misses this fact in this para. [S. K.]

or property'. *e. g.*, the *whiteness* of snow; (*b*) a mere relation of association which sometimes gets attached to an object and at other times stands not so attached, *e. g.*, the connection between a man and his clothing. In the *second* place, the Professor has entirely failed to understand the Advaitin's position in regard to the statement, "this is that Devadatta". Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri says that the Advaitin "establishes bare identity by the removal of contradiction between the subject and the predicate." This is quite wrong. The Advaitin speaks of the removal only of the predicates on account of their evident incompatibility with each other—the different time and space relations which belong to the *second* class of *Viśeṣaṇas* which we have just mentioned above. They do not "inhere" in the subject, as Prof. Śrīnivāsāchāri erroneously asserts, nor does Devadatta become the object of what the Professor calls "contentless cognition" or a "mere abstraction." Devadatta remains the same person, even though the times and places relating to him may differ, and though he gets detached from one relation of time and space and connected with another such. Nor can a difference in a mere time—space relation result in a "modification" of Devadatta which will leave him "contentless" or what our author calls "a bare identity," without any characterising attributes of personality.

Our author has got into this muddle in regard to the sentence, '*this is that Devadatta*', in order to make out that, in the corresponding sentence, *tat-tvam-asi*, of the Upaniṣad where *tat* refers to the personal god (Īśvara) and *tvam* signifies the finite self (*Jīva*) the removal of the attributes of each of them will land us in what he calls a "bare identity" or "Contentless cognition". In taking such a view, the Professor shows that he is entirely ignorant of the *Advaitic* interpretation of "*Tat-tvam-asi*," as referring to what the Upaniṣad calls "the one existence only without a second" (*ekam-eva-advitīyam*) without any reference to purely *personal* attributes such as 'Ommiscience,' etc., in the case of Īśvara and 'limited knowledge' etc., in the case of Jīva. Our author is wrong in supposing that the Brahman of Śaṅkara is "contentless", on account of its being '*nirguṇa*'. The passage in the Upaniṣad where 'nirguṇa' is mentioned is as follows : "sākṣī-cetā-kevalo—*nirguṇaśca.*" Brahman is all these in its essence (*svarūpa.*) The passage means "the Self-Effulgent, the knowing, the absolute, that which transcends the (three) guṇas". Further, the Professor should refer to the Sūtra III-iii-2—

" Ānanda (Bliss) and others belonging to the Principal Entity " (Absolute substance). Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on this Sūtra begins thus:—" In the Vedic passage referring to Brahma-svarūpa (or characterising and essential content of Brahman) are mentioned certain *dharmas of Brahman* such as Ānanda (bliss) in its essential form, it being one solid mass of knowledge (*vijñāna-ghanatva*), etc." This clearly shows that Śaṅkara's conception of "Brahma-svarūpa" is not one which involves what our Professor calls "a contentless cognition", "abstraction," "a bare identity." The Professor has discovered a mare's nest of his own or, like Don Quixote, is tilting with the creations of his fertile powers of fancy, poetic or philosophic. Further, he says in this same context,—" As a matter of fact every substance (*dravya*) is always modified by its essential attribute." Now *dravyas* (also called *arthas*) are either *phenomenal*, or *noumenal*. The former are *impermanent* (*aśāśvata*), as the Gītā, VIII, 15, calls them; the latter are *nitya*, permanent or changeless. Śaṅkara calls Brahman by the name *Paramārtha*, a term which he defines as follows:— "that substance which ever exists with one and the same (essential) characterestic nature" (The Viśiṣṭādvaitin himself also holds that all Jīvas have the same essential feature, *viz.*, *Jñānākāra with its capabilities*, untouched by material associations). We have seen just now that Śaṅkara's Brahman is conceived by him as possessing what he calls "*Brahma-dharmas*" (Sūtra III-iii-2) which, following Vyāsa, he enumerates as *Ānandarūpa*, etc. Hence, it is not at all to be treated as a "Contentless abstraction." Svāmī Brahmānanda, also in his great work, *Ratnāvaḷi*, (a commentary on Madhusūdana's commentary on Śaṅkara's Daśa-ślokī) teaches us as follows :— " All such sentences as teach *lakṣaṇas* (characterising content or attributes) only refer to the undifferenced Entity (*akhaṇḍa-vyakti*) which is only indicated by those attributes (lakṣaṇa-lakṣita), though adopting the device of conveying knowledge of a (seemingly) related (viśiṣṭa) quality". We would specially invite Professor Śrīnivāsāchāri's attention to Brahmānanda's use of the word, *akhaṇḍa-vyakti*, in referring to Brahman. It shows that, to the Advaitin down to the latest time near to us, Brahman is a *vyakti* (or Specific Entity)—Not an 'abstraction' or 'bare identity'—and that Śaṅkara himself speaks of Ānanda, etc., as "*Brahma-Dharmas*", and, in doing so, follows, too, in the wake of the Sūtrakāra Bādarāyaṇa.

[1]DEFINITION OF POETRY OR KĀVYA.

(*continued from page* 100 *of volume III, Part I, J. O. R., M.*)

BY

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This observation of Wordsworth as well as that of John Keble that poetry is "a vent for overcharged feeling" brings to our memory Ānandavardhana's śloka :

काव्यस्यात्मा स एवार्थस्तथा चादिकवेः पुरा ।
क्रौञ्चद्वन्द्ववियोगोत्थः शोकः श्लोकत्वमागतः ॥

and Abhinavagupta's comments upon it. It would be wrong, however, to think that these critics had ever conceived with any vividness the rasa or its relation to poetry. All we can safely say is that as Goldsmith and Leigh Hunt represent the old Alaṅkāra school, so William Wordsworth and John Keble represent the very incipient stage of the rasa school, though of course unconsciously. It should be noted here that Wordsworth when making the above observation is thinking only of the finished first-rate poets. An immature poet is never filled with such powerful feelings as would spontaneously overflow. He is more or less

हठादाकृष्टानां कतिपयपदानां रचयिता

(a maker of a few strained words).

A true poet, on the other hand, like an आरूढ or accomplished yogin, whenever he wishes, very easily forgets himself and his environments, and gets into, and identifies himself with, his object of contemplation, when it is utterly impossible for him to prevent from overflowing the feelings that are awakened within him. At that stage, words wait upon him like obedient servants, wishing, why, scrambling as it were, to be employed by him, and he sees that the embodiment of his feelings

1. Thesis approved by the Madras University for the Degree of Master of Oriental Learning.

is so rapid that his pen cannot keep pace with it and seems to be unusually and awfully slow. "But a perfect artist in the pure style," says Walter Bagehot (E. C. E. p. 457—1) "is as effortless and as natural in any style, perhaps is more so". This is true of all true poets. As he is master of his own style and feels little or no difficulty in expressing his poetic thoughts, Tennyson somewhat self-complacently likens his poetry to the singing of the linnet, which Professor Courthope, in whose mind the hardship of the enormous labour in preparing his lectures seems to be always present and who accordingly cannot think of poets but in their noviciate, has failed to appreciate and has done much injustice to true poets. He writes—

"I imagine that Tennyson, perhaps the most skilful poetic artist of the century, completely deceived himself when he declared that he sang "but as the linnet sings". The modern poet has to decide in the first place whether the ideas that present themselves to his imagination are genuine inspirations or only Idols of the Fancy ; then to discover the form best suited to embody his conception to estimate the value of different ideas relatively to the composition as a whole; to select some, to reject others, to arrange what remain; to find the right word for the expression of the thought and the right position of the word in the verse. All these perplexing conditions make the composition of poetry as different as possible from the song of a bird; Art as well as Nature has to be consulted; and if poetic conception is to issue in a permanent form of poetic expression, the poet must be a man not only of the highest invention but of the finest judgment" (L. L. p. 155).

Thus it is seen that though the critic's characterisation of poetry seems on the surface most ambiguous and heterogeneous, yet at the bottom of it, lies hidden the same principle as has guided our Ālaṅkārikas in their definitions of poetry. Nothing, therefore, requires to be said here beyond what we shall have to say with regard to our Ālaṅkārikas' definitions of poetry in the last chapter. So I may end this chapter: but before doing so I wish to briefly consider a topic which, while it has caused immense, unending controversy within the circle of Western critics, is conspicuous by its absence among Indian Ālaṅkārikas.

According to Johnson, it is said, poetry means metrical composition; and there are many others who define poetry in the

same way. As the English terms "poetry" and "poet" are always used in such a restricted sense as to carry with them the notion of metre, these definitions seem to hold good as far as the form of poetry is concerned. These words being stereotyped in their colloquial meaning, they were not applicable to prose writers and works, however, eloquent and embellished their language might be. Nor have the prose writers of poetic calibre, a name, either proper to them or common with 'poets', assigned to them in the English language. When, however, gradually, prose-writers rose to prominence, so as to secure for them an equal place with writers of poems, the monopoly of metre over the poetical field began to be questioned; and the question whether metre is a necessary and indispensably important requisite of poetical beauty is not finally settled, though many have fought for and against it.

Such a state of things we do not see in Sanskrit poetics. The Sanskrit word 'kavi', which naturally everybody uses in the sense of the English word 'poet', is general enough in its meaning to indicate at once both the writers of poem and of prose. If thus the word 'kavi' is a common name of both poets and prose-writers, it goes without saying that the word 'kāvya' derived from 'kavi' by adding the suffix 'ya', meaning work (कर्म)[1], is the common name of both metrical compositions and compositions without metre, provided they are not lacking in elegance, beauty, embellishments and other requisites of this branch of fine art. Bearing this in mind we can clearly see that there was no time in the Indian world of literature when so much importance was attached to metre as to think that without metre there could be no literary composition deserving the name of poetry, or kāvya.

Even the mantras of the world-old Vedas have two forms, metric and otherwise, the former of which furnishes to some mantras the name of Ṛk, and the latter to others the name of Yajus. And this variation of form in no way affects their importance in sanctity or anything else. Further, the two most famous poeticians of India, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, have divided kāvya into two kinds 'padya' and 'gadya' which mean poetry and prose. In the Mahābhārata and some purāṇas such as the Viṣṇu and the Bhāgavata, too, we find the prose form used for narrating a

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1. Abhinavagupta's derivation is otherwise—कवनीयं काव्यम् । (p. 7).

few episodes. All these facts go to show that in the opinion of the men of letters of India, the poetical language can be as good, melodious, beautiful and pleasurable, without metre, as with it. Of the same view Aristotle seems to be. He writes:

> "There is another art which imitates by means of language, and that either in prose or verse"

and I. 6

> "Fourth among the elements enumerated comes Diction, by which I mean, as has been already said, the expression of the meaning in words; and its essence is the same both in verse and prose." VI. 18.

Apart from these undiversified views of the ancient authors, I myself do not see any reasonableness in arguing for the necessity of metre in the productions of the poetical art. I do not deny, however, that among common folk, the word 'kavi' as well as 'kāvya' generally carries the idea of verse. And it is an undisputed fact that most kavis have a tendency to embody their thoughts in metrical language. If one requires proof for this assertion, I would refer of the limited number of prosaic and the superabundance of metrical works of our Indian authors. But this by no means affects my position. For, the cause of the abundance of metrical works and the paucity of prose works is to be found somewhere else and not in the necessity for metre. A beginner in the poetical field cannot but try first to compose verses. Ālaṅkārikas when pointing out ways to become kavis tell us that a would-be kavi should first attempt to acquire full mastery over words, by often making empty, meaningless verses. The idea is that without full power to wield language no one can become a kavi; and that power cannot be well attained otherwise than by constant and energetic effort in making metrical compositions.[1] And a man in his maiden attempt is at a loss to determine which words to use and which not, just as a rustic, who enters a shop in a big town for the first time, is at a loss to choose things as everything is new and strange to him. Therefore, as, in training horses, they are made to put their feet in measured paces, by imposing (with shackles) some restrictions

1. 'Besides these qualifications,' says Newman, (E. C. E. p. 251) 'poetical compositions require that command of language which is the mere effect of practice. The poet is a compositor; words are his types; he must have them within reach, and in unlimited abundance.'

their movements, so the man, desirous of poetic fame, is to use words so as to make measured lines; and by a continued and steady practice of using those words which fit the given metres and rejecting those which do not fit, he becomes rich in words and is able to use them freely. But at the same time he becomes much accustomed to the metrical composition, and usually inclined to write whatever he wishes to do, in verse, and seldom he tries to write prose. This is why we have not a considerable number of prose works while we have innumerable works of the other kind. And also this is the answer, but not 'that the laws of artistic expression oblige them to do so,' as Professor Courthope says (L. L. p. 71), to the question—"Why have poets always written in metre ?." The Professor unnecessarily fears that without metre there would be no distinguishing point between oratory and poetry. Refuting Shelley, he writes:

'Nor does it follow, because the truth and splendour of Plato's imagery are the most intense that it is possible to conceive, that he was therefore "essentially a poet"; the same might be said of the imagery of a great orator; yet oratory is not poetry. The end of Plato was to convince by dialectic, and though for this purpose he may have resorted to rhetorical and poetical methods of persuasion, that does not take him out of the class "philosopher" and transplant him into the class "poet." '

(L. L. p. 70-1.)

I think his own words 'The end of Plato was to convince...' contain the differentia. The orator as well as the scientific writer aims at conviction, while the poet aims at pleasure.

Besides 'oratory is not poetry'; not because the one does not and the other does require metres; but because the former is the art of speaking and the latter is the art of writing. With or without metre, writing is common to both poetry and scientific work. Figures and turns of speech, it may be granted, are common to both poetry and oratory. The aim, conviction, is common to both oratory and science. Poetry is, however, distinguished from oratory by its being indeed partly the art of writing, from science by figures and turns of speech, and from both by its immediate aim, pleasure.

And it will be seen in the next chapter that the universal, which is the object of poetic representation, as distinguished from [illegible]cular of History, is not the philosophic universal, the

creative force or law of the universe, but something of a totally different nature. This universal also makes a great difference between poetry and oratory. The role of the poet is to vividly delineate the human life in general and that of the orator to convince his hearers as to this or that particular truth or fact.

When I say that poetry partly consists in the art of writing, it is not meant that without the actual putting down of the words on paper or other like material, there can be no poetry. It does not require much labour to see that the exertion to compose a few words when one begins to write is greater and requires much more concentration of thought than the endeavour to speak a few words. This fact leads us further to see that there is a language which, though not actually written, yet for the sake of convenience may be called "written language", as distinguished from the "spoken language". Of these two languages the former is of the poet, the latter of the orator.

The poet writes, that is, he employs, the "written language." So he wishes to have no audience to hear him when he is at work with his art. And when he has finished his work, he places it before his hearers ; but at that time he is nothing more than his audience. Unlike him, the orator has nothing to do without some one to hear him. This is very plainly said by John Stuart Mill :

"Poetry and eloquence are both alike, the expression or utterance of feeling. But if we may be excused the antithesis, we should say that eloquence is heard, poetry is overheard. Eloquence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself, in moments of solitude, and embodying itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself out to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavouring to influence their belief or move them to passion or to action."

(E. C. E. p. 406).

But this ingenious and discerning critic shares the misfortune, with the poet Lord Tennyson, to be condemned downright by Professor Courthope who, we find, confuses the essence of poetical language and metre. He writes :

" John Stuart Mill attempts to draw a sharp distinction between the genius of the orator and that of the

he says, speaks to be heard, the other to be overheard. I venture to say that a more false description of the life and nature of poetry has never been given to the world. At no great epoch of poetical production was the art of the poet ever entirely separated from that of the orator. Did Homer, Pindar, the Greek tragedians and Aristophanes not speak to be heard? Were the Trouveres, the Troubadours, the Ballad Singers, the Elizabethan dramatists, the English satirists of the Restoration and the Revolution, not dependent on an audience?"

(L. L. p. 85).

I think I may venture to say that none confounds the art of writing poems so much with the art of speaking, as Professor Courthope does. True, Homer, Pindar and others spoke to be heard. But they spoke not to be heard, like orators when they spoke; but when they stopped speaking. By what is said thus far is only meant that kāvyas are as perfect with prosaic as with metric form and therefore both these forms have an equal value and place as the medium of expression in the art of kavis. But the matter does not stop here. There seem to be some who would go a step further on behalf of prosaic form. According to them prose language is more difficult to acquire than metrical language, and one cannot be a perfect kavi unless he is skilled in prose writing. Vāmana quotes a line—गद्यं कवीनां निकषं वदन्ति which means 'Prose is the touchstone of poets'. Besides we find a stanza in the beginning of the Vemabhūpāla-carita of Vāmana Bāṇa (ascribed to the 15th century) which may be rendered thus :—

Vāmana Bāṇa wipes out the infamy that all the kavis other than Bāṇa (of the Kādambarī fame) are blind in the ways of prose.

This well bears evidence to the fact that even the great po.ts of old, though adept in verse making, were and were thought to be unskilled in embodying their thoughts and feelings in the form of prose.

I cannot wholly accept therefore Hudson's views on this point. After quoting the following passage of Leigh Hunt—"Fitness or unfitness of song or metrical excitement, make all difference between a poetical and prosaic subject; and the reason why verse is necessary to the form of poetry is that the perfection of the poetical spirit demands it—that the circle of its enthusiasm, beauty and power is incomplete without it,"—

Hudson writes:

"This undoubtedly overstates the ease for form, since the writer appears to ignore the fact that the truest spirit of poetry has often been expressed, and very adequately expressed, without recourse to the medium of verse. The difference in question, as I understand it, is not necessarily between a "poetical" and a "prosaical" subject, but between the forms in which perhaps the same subject may be handled."

(I. S. L. p. 89).

But again he writes:

"A mere accessory in fact, it is not. It is rather the form which the poetic spirit seeks spontaneously to fashion for itself; and as such it "perfects" poetry by providing it with its most natural and adequate means of expression."

(*Ibid.* p. 93).

and again:

"We may conclude, therefore, that while verse is of course often used as the vehicle of purely prosaic thought, it ought not to be so used, and that conversely while an exalted mood of passion and imaginative ecstacy may often find utterance in prose, prose is not its most appropriate or even its most natural medium. The offices of prose and verse are, in fact, distinct; and their distinction is not fortuitous nor arbitrary, but vital."

(*Ibid* p. 95.)

If there is no difference between one subject and another as prosaic and poetical, equally there is no such difference between one thought and another. By a great poet any thought can be expressed through prose as well as through verse, without any danger to its spirit or beauty. If this is recognised, there is no meaning in saying that 'the offices of prose and verse are distinct,' and that 'it perfects poetry by providing it with its most natural and adequate means of expression.' If prose is not the natural means of expressing 'an elevated mood of passion and imaginative ecstacy,' no longer verse is such. Is it not indubitably true that the most elevated passion of an Englishman cannot find utterance in French nor that of a Frenchman in English? Only the former bursts forth in English and the latter in French. Which language of them, I should ask, is the natural means of expression of that elevated mood of passion? If both of them are, I fail to see why the same cannot be said of prose and verse. If on the other hand both of them are not, this too may equally apply to prose

and verse and nothing goes against the equality of the two forms of expression. When this is borne well in mind it will seem but reasonable to think that, that "Geothe meant to write in prose . . . . but his thoughts instinctively expressed themselves in verse." (I. S. L. p. 95 *n.*) shows that he had such a greater freedom and ease in verse than in prose, that its readiness for manipulation gave it the colour of being the natural means of expression of his poetic thoughts.

The point to be noted is that the common human ideas have not any particular language as the only proper and natural means of their expression, because we know, an English-born child if brought up in the midst of the French people is undoubtedly able to express whatever it thinks, in French, as freely and as clearly as a French child, and yet, from his ever growing familiarity with his mother-tongue which begins from his childhood, every man is likely to think that tongue is the natural channel of thoughts, which really it is not; in the same way poetical thoughts also have not for the reasons aforesaid, the one or the other of verse and prose as the natural medium of their utterance ; and yet one is apt to think one of the forms to be so, from one's close and constant contact with it and the freedom one has in its use. That metre is the part of the perfection of "poetry," I can, however, readily acquiesce in, for when put in a plainer language, it amounts to nothing more than 'metre is one of the component parts of the metrical composition'.

Now there is another point of view from which the relation between the metrical form and the poetical spirit is sought to be established as quite natural and vital and necessary. It is said that like music, metre or rhythm, either of which means a regular arrangement of measured groups of syllables, emotionalises the thoughts of hearers and thus enables them to fully enjoy the beauty of poetry ; and as such enjoyment cannot be had through the prosaic form, metre is truly part of poetic perfection. This way of argument also does not seem to have much weight in itself. Absence of metre in the Vāsavadattā or the Kādambarī does not in the least lessen our enjoyment of it. On the contrary there is an old saying about the Kādambarī, which in English means :

'Those who enjoy the rasa of the Kādambarī do not relish even food.'

That metre helps us in a way in enjoying a good piece is undeniable. But it does not follow therefrom that such enjoy-

ment is not possible without it. Also that the kind of pleasure derived from poetry in the metrical form is different from the kind of pleasure derived from pieces in the prosaic form, may be true. But it would be a gross mistake to conclude therefrom that one kind is superior to the other. This is, I think, too subtle a point to be explained even by psychologists. This is what is meant by Daṇḍin when he says :

इक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां माधुर्यस्यान्तरं महत् ।
तथापि न तदाख्यातुं सरस्वत्यापि शक्यते ॥ I-102

[Between the sweetness of the sugar-cane juice, that of milk, and that of jaggery, etc., there is great difference ; and yet that difference, it is quite impossible even for Sarasvatī to explain.]

In music too, it is performed sometimes with *tāḷa*, and sometimes the singer sings very sweetly without it, the mode of singing being called *ālāpa*.

It is not in the mere metre that the music of poetical expression consists in. It is quite of another kind and is present in the prose as well as in the verse of great poets. When we are speaking of prose as the creation of poets, it should be strictly understood that it has not such a wide application as to include in its sense the almanac prose, the newspaper prose, and daily business prose. Prose is of two kinds—kāvya or poetic prose and vārtā (वार्ता) or common-place prose. Melody, harmony and rhythm and everything that is required of true poetry may equally be found in poetic prose, and it is that that distinguishes it from the common-place prose and secures for it, it also being 'best words in right order', an equal place with the metrical creation of poets.

Now, therefore, I rewrite, in favour of prosaic form, what James Montgomery has said in favour of metrical form. 'Take the finest passages of the Kādambarī, and merely put them into metre with the least possible variation of the words themselves. The attempt would be like the gathering up of dewdrops which appear as jewels and pearls on the grass, but run into water in the hand; the essence and the element remain, but the grace, the sparkle and the form are gone.'

This topic cannot be better concluded than with a passage from John Stuart Mill, in which every word betokens the extraordinary critical acumen of the author :—

"It has often been asked, What is Poetry? And many and various are the answers which have been returned. The vulgarest of all—one with which no person possessed of the faculties to which poetry addresses itself, can ever have been satisfied—is that which confounds poetry with metrical composition : yet to this wretched mockery of a definition, many have been led back, by the failure of all their attempts to find any other that would distinguish what they have been accustomed to call poetry, from much which they have known only under other names."

(E. C. E. p. 398.)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BURMESE BUDDHISM—AN ORIGNINAL NOTE.

BY

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The deeper we study the religion of the people of Burma, the more we are struck with the peculiar individuality, and the astonishing coherence and self-consistency that mark the system of Buddhist beliefs in Burma. The philosophical system is more than a rational one, there is evidently a concern for, and an attainment of, proportion and symmetry of the various component factors. It is all the more remarkable when we notice the highly conservative attitude attending the religious character of the people. It will be no exaggeration to say that instead of the usual harsh outlines of rigid orthodoxy, we have a most artistic system cherished by the nation as a whole.

Every scholar of Buddhism has agreed that Burmese Buddhism owes a great deal of debt to the Hīnayāna school of Buddhist philosophy but an exact estimate has still to be made as to the extent of the obligation of Burmese Buddhism to the Hīnayāna and the nature of the original contribution that local scholars made to it. From the beginning of the fifth century to the close of the foreign Cōla suzereignty, the Pāli expositions of Abhidhamma of South Indian commentators like Dhammapāla, Buddhaghoṣa and Buddhadatta were doubtless studied and taught in the monasteries, and translation of the same into the vernacular was rapidly coming into vogue during the regime of Burmese kings. It is also significant that during both periods the works of Northern Buddhists, of the diverse Mahâyāna schools remained for the most part in comparative neglect and that the influence the Mahâyānist philosophy has exerted on the scholars of Burma has been next to nothing.

As we study Burmese Buddhism in its relations with the Hīnayāna Buddhism, while we are able to trace in the Southern Buddhist commentaries the lines of thought developed in the former, the development itself remains an unexplained problem.

The question arises : How did those several, divergent lines of thought present in the early Pāli commentarial literature come to be developed into a unified, self-consistent rational and artistic system? How were the discrepancies incidental to doctrines shaped by diverse hands at different periods in the history of the Hīnayāna schools ultimately harmonised into a single system which evidently looks like the result of a single mind ?

In the attempt to answer such questions a comparative study of each of the various schools of Hīnayāna thought with Burmese Buddhism leads us to observe the striking similarity in the fundamental conception in the amplified detail and in the general method of enquiry, that holds between the philosophy of Burmese Buddhism and that of the Satya Siddhi Śāstra composed originally in Pāli and running into 202 chapters. In this work by Harivarman, the disciple of Kumāralabdha, is inculcated in all its purity, a system most nearly akin to Burmese Buddhism. Making the Sarvaśūnyatāvāda the starting point of his philosophy, Harivarman expounds his views on every item of religious belief and ethical practice and his elaborate discussion of "Atthi Sammutika—Natthi Paramatthika" enables us to perceive how, at every stage of its development, Burmese Buddhism drew its inspiration from the work of one of its own scholars, and not from foreign exegetists like Buddhaghoṣa or Buddhadatta. Needless it is to say that this Harivarman was a local scholar and in all probability one of the Śālaṅkāyanas of Arimaddanapura.

While acknowledging the assistance received from without, the original element in Burmese Buddhism should be appreciated in fairness to the genius of Burma.

IS TAMIL SCRIPT PHONETIC OR NO?

BY

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A Script is said to be phonetic if each symbol denotes only one sound and each sound is represented by only one symbol. To determine whether Tamil script is phonetic or no, we will have to examine the number of sounds in Tamil language and that of the symbols that are used to denote them.

Tolkāppiyaṉār, the author of the earliest extant Tamil grammar mentions in the very first sūtra of his work that there are thirty primary sounds[1] and three secondary sounds. What these three secondary sounds are and how they are represented in script are mentioned in the second sūtra.[2] But some seem to doubt that the word *eḻuttu* in the first two sūtras refers to *symbol* since in modern times Tamil language, as pronounced in certain districts as Madura, Trichinopoly, Tanjore, possesses greater number of sounds than the symbols to represent them. But the fact that Tolkāppiyaṉār definitely refers to sound and not to symbol by that word is clear from the third sūtra[3] which says, ' Of them, a, i, u, e and o have only one *mātrā* in pronunciation and are named short *eḻuttu*. Similarly in the 9th sūtra[4]

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1. எழுத்தெனப்படுப
அகர முதல னகர விறுவாய் முப்பஃ தென்ப
சார்ந்துவரன் மரபின் மூன்றலங் கடையே.

2. அவைதாம்
குற்றிய லிகரங் குற்றிய லுகர
மாய்தமென்ற
முப்பாற் புள்ளியு மெழுத்தோ ரன்ன.

3. அவற்றுள்
அ இ உ
எ ஒ வென்னு மப்பா லைந்து
மோரள பிசைக்குங் குற்றெழுத் தென்ப.

4. னகார விறுவாய்ப்
பதினெண் ணெழுத்து மெய்யென மொழிப.

he names k to n̲ as mey and in the 11th[5] he says that their quantity is each half a mātrā. Can sounds have their quantity as one mātrā or a half or symbols? In the 19th[6], 20th[7], 21st[8] sūtras he says that k, c, ṭ, t, p and ṟ are valleḻuttu or voiceless consonants, ṅ, ñ, ṇ, n, m and n̲ as melleḻuttu or nasals and y, r, l, v, ḻ and ḷ as iṭaiyeḻuttu or semivowels. This classification can hold good only when *eḻuttu* means *sounds* and not symbols. Besides throughout the first chapter he makes mention of such words as uruvu[9] and iyaṟkai[10] whenever he refers to symbols.

In the second sūtra he says that *Kuṟṟiyalikaram* or shortened i, *Kuṟṟiyalukaram* or shortened u and *āytam* are provided with dots. Does this not show that even the secondary sounds had symbols to differentiate them from their corresponding primary sounds? The symbols for i and u were differentiated from those for *Kuṟṟiyalikaram* and *Kuṟṟiyalukaram* by a dot being put over them as i̇, and u̇. Similarly short e and short o were differentiated in symbol, from long ē and long ō by a dot being put over the symbols for ē and ō as எ and ஒ.[11]

5. மெய்யி னளபே யரையென மொழிப.
6. வல்லெழுத் தென்ப கசட தபற.
7. மெல்லெழுத் தென்ப ஙஞண நமன.
8. இடையெழுத் தென்ப யரல வழள.
9. (*a*) உட்பெறு புள்ளி யுருவா கும்மே. (தொல். எழுத். 14)

   (*b*) புள்ளி யில்லா வெல்லா மெய்யு
   முருவுரு வாகி யகரமோ டுயிர்த்தலு
   மேனை யுயிரோ டுருவுதிரிந் துயிர்த்தலு
   மாயீ ரியல வியிர்த்த லாறே. (தொல் எழுத். 17)

   (*c*) மெய்யுயிர் நீங்கிற் றன்னுரு வாகும். (தொல். புண. 37)
10. (*a*) மெய்யி னியற்கை புள்ளியொடு நிலையல். (தொல். எழுத். 15)

   (*b*) எகரத் தியற்கையு மற்றே (தொல். எழுத். 16)
11. எகர ஒகரத் தியற்கையு மற்றே (தொல். எழுத். 16)

N. B. The symbols for e and o at the time of Tolkāppiyanār were எ and ஒ and those for ē and ō were எ் and ஒ் while in modern times எ and ஒ have become the symbles for e and o and new symbols ஏ and ஓ have been introduced to represent ē and ō. This ought to have come when the scribes began to omit writing dots on palmyra leaves.

Hence it is clear that, at the time of Tolkāppiyaṉār Tamil script was completely phonetic.

But in modern times the sounds g, j, ḍ, d, b, ś, ṣ, s and h, are introduced in pronouncing Tamil words as தங்கை, தஞ்சை, பண்டம், வந்தான், பம்பரம், ஜாதி, பக்ஷம், மாஸம் and அஹஸ். But the last four words are pure Sanskritic words without being influenced by the rules of Tamil grammar. The same in pure Tamil would be சாதி, பட்சம், மாசம், அகச்சு. As regards the pronunciation of கை, சை, ட, தா and second ப, in the first five words, Dr. Caldwell and many others think that they are respectively gai, Jai, ḍa, dā and ba, they are made sonants by the influence of the preceding sonant nasal and it will be difficult to pronounce them otherwise. But the following examples from Sanskrit and English may convince the readers that it need not invariably be the rule :—Paṅka, pañca, ghaṇṭā, danta, pampā ; blanket, lunch, ant, pumping. Besides the following statement of Vendrys mentioned in the 60th page of his ' Language ' is worth noting ' Difficulty and ease of pronunciation are purely relative conceptions, doubtless quite definite to the speaker, but variable for each language. We cannot appreciate them without a thorough knowledge of the structure of the language. In fact articulatory habits are at the root of the difficulty so that a sound-group which one people find difficult to pronounce may be quite easy for a neighbouring people.' Hence the idea of Dr. Caldwell and others that each set of k and g, c and j, ṭ and ḍ, t and d, and p and b was represented by one symbol need not be true. The first sūtra of Tolkāppiyam which says that there were only thirty primary sounds and the nineteenth sūtra which says that க, ச, ட, த, ப, ற are voiceless consonants clearly prove that sounds g, J, ḍ, d, b were not originally in Tamil language. Besides such sounds as g, j, ḍ, d, b, ś, ṣ, s and h are not even now found in the Tamil language in all places where it is spoken. For instance in Jaffna, it is said that most of them are not found. They are found *in toto* only in such districts as Madura, Trichinopoly, Tanjore etc. In Tinnevelly some of them are not found. The word ' சட்டி ' is pronounced by Tinnevelly people only as *caṭṭi* and not as *śaṭṭi* as is pronounced by Tanjore people. The word ' அகம் ' is pronounced in Tanjore as *aham*, while in Madras it is pronounced as *agam*. Hence we may say that the Tamil script

is not phonetic in modern times with respect to *certain dialects*, if I may so call it.[1]

1. Since Tamil script was phonetic in earliest times and is phonetic with respect to certain dialects found in places where admixture of Sanskrit *tatsama* words is very little, I think that those who are responsible for deciding the transliteration adopted in the Tamil Lexicon, published by the University of Madras have to be congratulated for having chosen such symbols as would *correctly* represent the sounds of Tamil language as spoken in ancient times and as mostly spoken by those who are not influenced by the Sanskrit language, though they might have represented Kuṟṟiyalikaram and Kuṟṟiyalukaram by i and u and āytam by a symbol better than *k*, which gives the mistaken notion that it is a guttural sound, while in fact its organ of articulation is determined by the succeeding voiceless consonant. They have adopted symbols for j, ṣ, s and h in such Tamilised words as have been borrowed from other languages in recent times.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

LAGHU RAMACARITRAM by Y. Mahalinga Sastri.

The art of abridging a long story in an easy and telling manner is perhaps not commonly given to many who have the faculty to appreciate literature. And to have condensed an epic like the Rāmāyaṇa in a simple and narrative form without leaving out any of the soul-enthralling situations with which the grand tale is strewn all over, adds much to the credit of the author of this small book entitled Laghu Rāmacaritra.

It is needless to add that this tiny publication containing the story of Rāma in verses, flowing and unadorned, would allure young hearts. But even one who has tasted of the original, may derive ample satisfaction to find some of the fine verses of the Great poem chosen in order to enliven the readers. Indeed, this attempt to offer younger minds a foretaste of the beauties of the Rāmāyaṇa is praise-worthy.

Hence we have no little pleasure and pride in appreciating the work of the author in trying to acquaint little boys and girls with the chief incidents of the life of Śrī Rāmacandra, who is almost a household name with us for all that is good and great in man. We hope that authorities of schools and text-book committees will not be slow in prescribing such books for the better training of pupils in schools.

K. CHANDRASEKHARAN.

THE CONCEPTION OF BUDDHIST NIRVANA, by Th. Stcherbatsky, PH. D.—Professor in the University of Leningrad, Member of the Academy of Sciences of Ussr.—Publishing Office of the Academy of Sciences of the Ussr, Leningrad—1927.

[Reviewed by Mahāmahōpādhyāya, Vidyāvācaspati, S. Kuppuswami Sastri, M. A., I. E. S., Madras.]

This book contains the most illuminating contribution in English to the understanding of the exact significance of the Buddhist ideal of *Nirvāṇa*. Professor Stcherbatsky has attained a remarkable degree of success in his endeavour to disentangle the concepts of *Nirvāṇa* and *Śūnya* from the hazy and misleading

descriptions of their nature given by Indian authorities and several European writers and to show how these concepts are not wholly negative and nihilistic in their import and how *Śūnya* should be rendered intelligible by the English equivalent 'relative' and not by the wholly misleading term 'void'. Unprejudiced scholars would certainly like to congratulate Professor Steherbatsky on his able exposition of the central tenets of Buddhism and on his lucid account of the development of Buddhist thought. A special meed of praise is due to him for redeeming the 'genuine Buddhism of Buddha' from its unreliable accounts, such as we find in Dr. A. B. Keith's Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon and as misrepresent it to be 'nothing but obscure thaumaturgy, a product of a barbarous age, lacking both system and maturity, a fact historically reflected in the Negativism of Mahāyāna'. Sections XVIII, XIX and XX contain very suggestive correlations of Brahmanical and European parallels with Buddhist doctrines. A very useful and trustworthy English rendering of the text of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika-kārikās and Candrakīrti's commentary thereon—called 'Prasannapadā' is appended by the author to his scholarly dissertation on *Nirvāṇa*.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

BHAVABHUTI'S UTTARARAMACARITA with Ghanaśyāma's commentary in Sanskrit and English introduction, notes and translation—published by the Nirṇaya-sāgara Press, Bombay—Third edition: 1929—Rs. 3—8—0.

[Reviewed by Mahāmahōpādhyāya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri, M.A., I. E. S]

This edition of the Uttararāmacarita is of great value to students and teachers. It contains a scholarly and critical introduction by Professor Kane, in which all the available particulars about Bhavabhūti and Ghanaśyāma including those about the former that were brought to notice for the first time in some very recent contributions by me and other scholars, are ably summarised. Professor Kane, with his characteristic judgment, draws pointed attention to the best readings in the text where necessary and his English notes will prove to be very helpful to University students.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

THE WORDS ĀRYA AND DRĀVIḌA.

BY

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European scholars have a *penchant* for taking Indian words which possess a precise connotation attached to them and associating with those words absolutely new and sometimes hazy concepts. Thus the word *ārya* has a definite meaning in the Vedas. In more than seventy-five per cent. of the cases where the word is used in the mantras of the Ṛg Veda it occurs in hymns to Indra or Agni ; this constant association with Indra and Agni proves that in the Vedas the word *ārya* is used to denote a follower of the Indra-Agni cult. Thus the evidence of the Vedic mantras conclusively proves that the Ṛṣis regarded *ārya,* but as a cult-name. The great modern commentator on the Vedas, Śāyaṇācārya, has recorded in his Veda-Bhāṣya the age-long tradition with regard to the meaning of the Vedic words; selecting at random instances of his explanation of the word *ārya,* we find that he defines *āryāḥ* as *stotāraḥ,*[1] those who sing the mantras or hymns of praise, *āryāṇi* as *karmayuktāni*[2], practising fire rites, *āryāryāṇi* as *karmānuṣṭhātṛtvena śreṣṭhāni,*[3] most excellent through performing fire-rites. But yet European scholars have made Āryan the name of a race of men; this race ever since its invention more than a hundred years ago, has been begging for its 'original home' from the Pamirs to the Pyrenees and yet the wandering ghost has not been laid to rest. Anthropologists have no use for the concept of an Āryan race : Keane calls 'Āryan' a linguistic expression forced by the philologists into the domain of Ethnology, where it has no place and meaning" . . . . The "community or group of communities . . . . by whom the Āryan mother-tongue was evloved . . . .

1. Commentaries on R. V. i. 103, 3.
2. Commentaries on R. V. vi. 22, 10.
3. Commentaries on R. V. vi. 33, 3.

have themselves disappeared as a distinct race . . . . Of an Āryan race there can be no further question since the absorption of the original stock in a hundred other races in remote prehistoric times. . . . Dr. W. Z. Ripley remarks that instead of a single European type there is indubitable evidence of at least three distinct races . . . . (This) does away at one fell swoop with most of the current mouthings about Āryans and pre-Āryans ".[1]

Not only have the Āryas of India been made into a special race but their rivals and opponents, the Dasyus, have also been made into a separate race. The Ṛṣis who sang the Vedic mantras described the Dasyus as *apavrata*[2], of rites differing (from the Ārya ones), *anagnitra*[3], fireless, *abrahmā*[4], without prayers, also not having Brāhmaṇas as priests, *anṛcaḥ*[5] without *ṛk* mantras, *anindraḥ*[6], not worshipping Indra. These words summarize the cult-differences between the Ārya and the Dasyu; thus the Ārya poured all his oblations to the Gods into the burning tongue of Agni, specially lighted for the purpose, he accompanied the offering with *ṛk* or *yajus* mantras; in this worship he was assisted by Brāhmaṇa priests, and during the offering he invoked Indra chiefly and along with or after him, several other Gods and begged them to partake of the oblations, but the Dasyu offered his sacrificial food or portion direct to his God without the intervention of the fire-God, he did not mutter mantras during the process, he required no Brāhmaṇa priest to mediate between him and his God and he prayed to one God at a time. In this sense, all the Hindus of to-day, not excluding Brāhmaṇas, (except one in ten thousand or more) are Dasyus, because the Vedic fire-rites have been, in all but in name, ousted from Hindu homes. In ancient Āryāvarta, in ancient days, the Ārya rites were the successful rivals of the Dasyu rites. Notwithstanding this rivalry, which, combined with a desire for cattle and other forms of wealth, led sometimes to wars between the Āryas and the Dasyus, the ancient Āryas did not regard themselves as of a

1. Keane's Man Past and Present, pp. 445-447.
2. R. V. v. 42, 9.
3. R. V. v. 189, 3.
4. R. V. iv. 16, 9.
5. R. V. x, 105, 8.
6. R. V. vii, 18, 6; x. 27, 6.

different race from the Dasyus. The Dasyus no doubt hated the Ārya rites and destroyed them when they could. Hence Yāska explains *dasyu* as *upadāsayati karmāṇi*[1], who destroys (Ārya) rites and Sāyaṇa as *anuṣṭhātṛṇām upakṣapayitāraḥ śatravaḥ*[2] enemies who destroy the observers of the fire-rite. But throughout the long course of tradition, the Āryas and the Dasyus have been regarded as belonging to one race. Thus it is said in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa that Viśvāmitra, when he rescued his grand-nephew Śunaḥśepa from being immolated as a victim in a human sacrifice performed at the instance of Rohita, son of Hariścandra, the Ṛṣi adopted the released victim as his son and gave him the name of Devarāta. Fifty of Viśvāmitra's natural sons protested against Śunaḥśepa's elevation to the place of the eldest son of their father and Viśvāmitra cursed them saying *antān vaḥ prajā bhakṣīṣṭa*[3]. This is rendered by Keith, 'Your offspring shall inherit the ends (of the earth); but Sāyaṇa interprets '*antān bhakṣīṣṭa* as '*Caṇḍāḷādirūpān nīcajātiviśeṣān bhajatām*', 'they shall become Anāryas (Dasyus)'. Sāyaṇā's is much the better interpretation, for the Brāhmaṇa adds, '*ta ete āndhrāḥ puṇḍrāḥ śabarāḥ pulindā mūtibā ityudantyā bahavo Vaiśvāmitrā dasyūnām bhūyiṣṭhāḥ*'[4] these are the (people) Āndhras, Puṇḍras, Śabaras, Pulindas and Mūtibas, who live in large numbers beyond the borders; most of the Dasyus are the descendants of Viśvāmitra'.

Thus no difference of race is postulated as between the Āryas and the Dasyus. Indeed Indian opinion cannot be otherwise because as stated in very many Vedic texts, Manu was regarded as the progenitor of the Indian race; the phrase *Manuṣpitā* occurs ever so many times in the Vedic Mantras. Yāska explains *Manuṣpitā* as *Manuśca pitā mānavānām*,[5] Manu, the father of men. In the Manu smṛti and in the Mahābhārata, the Dasyu tribes of Puṇḍras, Oḍras, Drāviḍas etc. are said to be Kṣatriyas who had become Dasyus because they gave up the Ārya rites and lived away from Brāhmaṇas[6].

1. Niruk. vii. 23, 1.
2. Com. R. V. i, 51, 8.
3. Ait. Brah. vii, 18.
4. Ait. Brah. vii, 18.
5. Niruk. xii. 34.
6. Manu, x. 43, 44; Mahābhārata Anusāsana P, 2103 ff,

But yet European scholars have turned the Dasyus into the aborigenes of India and the Āryas into a foreign race which invaded India and established a new culture in that country. I am not here concerned with the theory of the Āryan invasion of India, which, I have always held, has no evidencc to support it.[1]

This theory was the result of a crude attempt, made nearly a hundred years ago, to account for the fact that Sanskrit is allied to the languages of Persia, Armenia, and the greater part of Europe. Linguists turned into amateur anthropologists and wove the dream of a civilized Āryan race pouring in many streams from the roof of the world to different parts of it. Anthropologists straightway condemned the theory as impossible, but linguists and writers of school books on Indian history have been repeating the theory with childish credulity and persistence; and Indians who take their modern knowledge from irresponsible text-book writers treat the foreign origin of the Āryas and their culture as gospel truth. On the contrary I hold that the Ṛṣis were Indians and not aliens, that the Ārya culture was entirely Indian in origin, and that there is no phrase, no remote allusion, in the vast body of the Vedic literature, which even by commentatorial torturing can be made to indicate the foreign origin of the splendid culture of the Vedic Age. I am here concerned but with the corrolary of that theory that the wars between the Āryas and the Dasyus were fights between invading foreigners and autochthones. The passages in the Vedic Mantras which refer to these wars show that they were wars of the followers of opposed cults and no more, for in all these passages, the authors of the mantras insist on the fact that the Dasyus practised other rites than their own.

While the extension of the meaning of the word Ārya to indicate a race with definite and unalterable anatomical and physiological characteristics, is illegitimate, there have been in India quite legitimate alterations of the meaning of the word, based on its original signification. Thus the Āryas were naturally proud of their culture and regarded themselves as superior to

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1. *Vide* my article on 'the myth of the Aryan invasion of India' Indian Ant. 913, on 'Did the Dravidians of India obtain their culture from Āryan immigrants': Anthropos. ix. 1, 2; also 'Life in Ancient India' pp. 8—16.

those who were not Āryas; hence Ārya came to mean 'noble' 'great'. Hence, Gautama, the Buddha, named the great truths that he taught to his disciples *āryasatyāni*. Again the Prākṛta form of the same word, *ajja* or *ayya* came to mean 'respected sir' and was borrowed by the speakers of Tamil and allied languages. The word 'ayya' was naturalized in Tamil and took the forms 'ayyaṉ' (singular) and 'ayyar' (plural honorific or actual) and the words came to be added to proper names to indicate that the owner of the name was a Brāhmaṇa, or otherwise entitled to respect. Of the two forms *ayyaṉ* and *ayyar*, the former alone seems to have been used along with the proper names of persons till very recent times. In Malabar, where old Tamil customs are preserved intact the suffix *ayyaṉ* is still affixed to proper names, whereas *ayyar* is almost universal in the Tamil country. While the suffix *ayyaṉ* was still current in the Tamil land, Tamil Śrīvaiṣṇavas who wielded much influence in the courts of the later Vijayanagara Mahārājas had the Telugu plural suffix *gāru* attached to their names and this is the origin of the name-suffix *ayyaṅgār*. The Telugu Śrīvaiṣṇavas have not been content with one plural suffix but have required three such, for they call themselves *ayyavārlugāru*.

Besides the Prākṛta *ayya*, the corresponding Saṁskṛta form *ārya*, was also borrowed by the Tamils, not as a name-suffix but as a class name for Brāhmaṇas in general. It is easy to understand the reason for this usage; for the first Āryas, whom the Tamils came in contact with were Ṛṣis; then those of the Southerners who learnt Saṁskṛt and adopted the Vedic culture became *ipso facto* Āryas, for ārya was a cult name and not a race-name. Such 'converts' as we would call them in modern phraseology, were also called *Brahma-rākṣasas*, i. e., Rākṣasas who had turned Brāhmaṇas. After the extinction of Rāvaṇa's power by Rāma, Brāhmaṇas migrated in larger numbers to South India. There was very little of Kṣatriya migration. The "three Tamil kings" were powerful enough to resist the incursions, if any, of Kṣatriya[1] kings from the North; and the Vaiśyas never thought of migration to the South. Hence *āriyar* meant

1. The only Āryan king who, so far we know, settled in the Tamil country was Pirahattan, to initiate whom in the specialities of Tamil literature, was written the Kuṟiñjippāṭṭu. Probably this person was an exile from a Northern court and he belonged to post-Christian times.

Brāhmaṇas in early Tamil literature and *āriyam*, the sacred language of the Brāhmaṇas,[1] *viz.* Saṁskṛt.

Another Indian word that has been tortured more than the word *ārya* is the word *drāviḍa.* This word is the result of the attempt of men of Āryan speech-habits to pronounce the word tamiḻ, the name given to themselves and their speech by the people who lived between the Vēṅgaḍam hill and the legendary Pahruḷi river in the Southernmost part of South India. The northerners who first learnt the word were probably traders with whom the ancient Tamils came into commercial contact. Now ḻ is a sound peculiar to Tamil and the nearest approach the northerners could make to it was ḷ or ḍ. Ḷ, ḻ and ḍ[2] are all retroflex or, as the French say, 'cacuminal' sounds, *i. e.*, sounds produced at the top of the throat. The Saṁskṛt grammarians call them by a similar name[3]. The place of origin of ḻ, ḷ and ḍ is thus the same; of these ḻ is a rolled sound, ḷ is a lateral fricative and ḍ a plosive. This gives the phonological explanation why people who cannot pronounce ḻ hit on ḷ or ḍ as the nearest approach to it. So the ancient speakers of Prākṛt changed ḻ in *Tamil* into ḷ or ḍ; they also voiced the initial dental stop and so the word became *damiḷ* or *damiḍ* in Northern lips. The change of *m* into *v* is a common phenomenon in Indian languages. According to Indian grammars *v* is a labio-dental fricative[4] and was perhaps so pronounced in ancient times; but in practice *v* is pro-

1, The phrase *āryavācaḥ* occurs in Aitareya Āraṇyaka ii. 2, 5.

2. Even within the Dravidian languages, Tamil ḻ becomes d in Telugu *e.g.*, *ēḻu* becomes *ēdu*, and ḻ in Kannada as *talai* becomes *taḷe*

3. Says Śaunaka in the Ṛg Veda Prātisākhya, *mūrdhanyau ṣakāra ṭakāra vargau*, the top sounds are the ṣa, ṭa series i. 9; Tolkāppiyam, Eḻuttatikāram iii, 13 says நுனி நா வணரி யண்ணம் வருட, ரகார ழகாரமா யிரண்டும் பிறக்கும், 'when the tip of the tongue goes up and touches the palate r and ḻ are born.'

4. பல்லித ழியைய வகாரம் பிறக்கும், 'the sound *v* is produced by the contact of the (upper) teeth and (lower) lip,' Tolkāppiyam, Eḻuttatikāram iii, 16. Saṁskṛt grammars say : *vakārasya dantoṣṭhau*, *v* is labio-dental. But Śaunaka's Prātisākhya of the Ṛg Veda says '*śeṣā oṣṭhyāḥ* i.e., the rest, *viz.*, u, ū, o, au, p, ph, b, bh, va, the *upadmānīya*, are labials. Op. cit. i. 9. Hence the pronunciation of *v* as a bilabial is not merely a modern development but existed in the days before Pāṇini.

nounced like the Spanish *v* as a bilabial. Hence *v* changes into *m* and *vice versa* in Indian dialects.[1]

There remains then the explanation of the intrusion of r in the first syllable. It is a well-known fact that when Prākṛt words become Saṁskṛt, the first syllable takes on an r and, when Saṁskṛt words became Prākṛt, an r of the first syllable drops out[2]. The following are examples selected at random :—*grāma, gāma; bhrātā, bāta; dhṛḍha, diḍha*; in certain dialects of Prākṛt, the r of Saṁskṛt reappears in the wrong place, such as, *karmam, kammam, kramam; dharma, dhamma, dhrama; drakṣyati, dakhati, drakhati*; in Telugu also a similar relation between the spoken language and the literary dialect exists; thus prāta, pāta, krotta, kotta, krinda, kinda etc. This tendency is so strong in all Indian languages that ignorant Tamils who wish to ape the heavily Samskrtised Tamil dialect of the Brāhmaṇas, change *deham* into *dreham*, imagining that thereby they turn the word into Saṁskṛt.

Thus it has been shown how *draviḍa* was evolved out of *tamiḻ*. But there are some lovers of Saṁskṛt who are wedded to the theory that the Tamil language is derived from the radically different Saṁskṛt tongue and who hold that the Saṁskṛt word *draviḍa* was corrupted into the *tamiḻ*. This theory assumes that the Tamils who inhabited South India at least from the beginning of the new Stone Age,[3] or as Tamil tradition has it, from the

1. A familiar instance is the change of *dēvuḍu* into *dēmuḍu* in spoken Telugu, and contrariwise, *mama* into *mā(v)a*. Prākṛt *bādāmi* corresponds to Tamil *vāḍāvi*, and Samskṛt *vātāpi*. Examples from literary Tamil furnished to me by Mr. S. Vaiyapuri Pillai, Editor, Tamil Lexicon are மிதவை, விதவை both meaning boiled rice, also rice boiled in milk, மிளை, விளை still further degenerated into இளை, meaning high ground, not supplied with water. The change of விழி in common speech into மிழி and later into முழி is another instance of the same phenomenon.

2. I do not here propose to discuss the question whether Prākṛt, the spoken language, was derived from Samskṛt, the literary language, as most Samskṛt scholars assume or whether from the Prākṛta, natural language, the Samskṛta, the reformed, refined language was born, as most students of the science of language hold, for the undoubted fact of the insertion of r in the one and the omission of it in the other, is enough for the present argument.

3. *Vide* my 'Stone Age in India' pp. 43—47.

beginning of this world-period,[1] had no name for themselves till Saṁskṛt speakers of a much later period endowed them with a name. This theory also involves the assumption that Saṁskṛt ḍ becomes ḻ in Tamil; this it does not ordinarily, because Tamils can pronounce ḍ without difficulty and hence it remains ḍ when it passes into Tamil, *e.g.*, Saṁskṛt *Hidimba* is *iḍumbaṉ*, not *iḻumbaṉ*. The theory is too far-fetched to deserve further discussion.

Now the meaning of this innocent word draviḍa has assumed certain metamorphoses in the hands of European scholars. At first it was made the general name of the agglutinative languages of the extreme south of India, which unlike those of ancient North India have preserved the individuality of their structure notwithstanding the pressure of Saṁskṛt for several milleniums. This new use of the word draviḍa was in imitation of the extension of the meaning of the word in the Indian expression, the pañcadraviḍa. The Brāhmaṇas of India are divided in comparatively recent Saṁskṛt usage into the five Draviḍas and the five Gauḍas The Draviḍa Brāhmaṇas are distinguished from the Gauḍas by the fact that the former do not eat meat but the latter do eat the meat of the five five-nailed animals. The former give the value ṣa to ष, and the latter, kha, (e, g., *upaniṣat*, *upanikhat*), the former pronounce ज as ja, the latter as ya, *e. g.*, *sūrya*, *sūrja*) etc., and by certain other differences of *ācāra*. The phrase *pañca draviḍa* is really a contraction of *draviḍādi pañca janāḥ*, the five tribes whose names begin with Draviḍas, for the list of these is Drāviḍas, Karnāṭas, Gujjarātas, Mahārāṣṭras and Tailaṅgas[2] and the list of Gauḍa Brāhmaṇas is Gauḍas, Sārasvatas, Kānyakubjas, Maithilikas and Utkalas[3]. Probably the phrase *pañca drāviḍāḥ* is a contraction of *draviḍa pañcakāḥ* and the *pañcagauḍāḥ* of the *Gauḍādi pañcakāḥ*. Hence the phrase *pañca drāviḍa* is an instance of a legitimate extension of the meaning of the word *drāviḍa*. In imitation of this, Caldwell

1. Parimēḻalakar, in his Commentaries on Kuṟaḷ, 955, says; ancient families means superiority from the time of creation, like the cēras, coḻas, pāṇḍyas.
தொன்றுதொட்டு வருதல் சேரசோழ பாண்டியரென்றாற் போலப் படைப்புக்காலம் தொடங்கி மேம்பட்டு வருதல்.

2. Śabdakalpadruma, II, p. 760.

3. Śabdakalpadruma, II, p. 370.

used the word Dravidian (English adjective from Drāviḍa) as the name of the new philological concept arrived at by him—that of the family of languages to which Tamil, Telugu, Kannaḍa Malayāḷam, Tulu, Kui and Khond belong. Hoernle imitating Caldwell gave the name Gaudian (English adjective of Gauḍa) to the family to which belong the modern dialects spoken in North India. This third meaning given to *Drāviḍa* is bad enough but perhaps excusable. But this continuous extension of meaning becomes intolerable when the anthropologist steps in, and with his old-fashioned ideas of the fixity of the physical characteristics of races discovered by the calculation of the ratios of various curved lines in the head, the measurement of sundry angles and the estimation of the colour of the skin, the eyes, and the hair, reaches the idea of a race that dwelt in India before the Aryans came and must needs call the race Dravidian. This is the fourth connotation of the word Dravidian. As if the confusion were not enough, the linguist who had already invented a Dasyu race, now equated Dasyu with Dravidian, and we now read in books on ancient Indian history of the Dravidian race on the banks of the Ganges.

DEFINITION OF POETRY OR KĀVYA*

BY

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(Continued from page 180 of Vol. III, Part II, J. O. R. M.)

CHAPTER II.

ARISTOTLE.

Now I turn to Aristotle. He says in his Poetics :—" Epic poetry, tragedy, comedy also and dithyrambic poetry, and the music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation." I. 2.

" There is another art which imitates by means of language alone and that either in prose or verse." I. 6.

". . . as if it were not the imitation that makes the poet. . . " I. 7.

". . . since he is a poet because he imitates. . . " IX. 9.
We may gather from these extracts that according to Aristotle poetry is to be defined as an art, the fundamental principle of which is imitation—that imitation being through the medium of language. Though all the other branches of Fine Art, namely, Music, Dancing, Painting and Sculpture, are also imitative, their medium of imitation is not language ; and though History employs language, it is not imitation. Poetry alone is both imitative and has language for its medium.

To an Indian Ālaṅkārika, I believe, this definition will cause not a little surprise. Poetry, imitative ! He, who is called a poet, is, we know, under various circumstances, which need not detain us here, inspired with some pleasant ideas which he expressses

*Thesis approved by the Madras University for the degree of Master of Oriental Learning.

in an elevated style of his language. What is there that makes his art imitative? It seems certain that had it not been for the old age in which Aristotle lived and for the high esteem he was held in, as a philosopher, no critic would have hesitated to pooh-pooh such a definition of poetry. That feature of a thing forms its definition which strikes us most when we perceive the thing and which at the same time forms its distinguishing characteristic. Not only we do not get an idea of its imitativenes, when we take up a piece of poetry, but we feel immense difficulty in connecting the idea of imitation with it. While it is true that great geniuses often conceive and express the same idea independently, it seems also equally true that they have sometimes views which would seem to one another extremely strange. Aristotle says many things in his Poetics which we find said in our Alaṅkāra Śāstra. The very manner in which his Poetics is written is Indian-like. But this definition of Poetry of his is such that an Ālaṅkārika would at once remark that it is subject to the defect of 'asambhava.'

In colloquial use the term imitation not only indicates the action of producing the likeness of something—which is part of its proper meaning ; but also gives an idea of want of originality on the part of the imitator. Critics tell us that though such is the case, the Aristotelian employment of the word is not intended to give any such degrading idea. But on the contrary it is to be taken in the sense of original creation. Thus, arguing step by step, Butcher says finally:

" Imitation, so understood, is a creative act. It is the expression of the concrete thing under an image which answers to its true idea. To sieze the universal and reproduce it in simple and sensuous form is not to reflect a reality already familiar through sense perceptions ; rather it is rivalry of nature, a completion of her unfulfilled purpose, a correction of her failures" (p. 254).

Now, as our objection to the definition is not grounded on the assumption that the term imitation implies want of originality, we may well leave off that consideration. In truth, imitation itself may become an art when it is one's professed occupation and is practised with much skill. A servile imitator is usually affecting to seem original and anxious not to be found out; and feels much shame when people come to know that he is copying another. This is what the disgraceful element of the popular sense of

imitation, consists in. It is not an easy thing to imitate another exactly. It requires as every art does, much labour and practice before it can reach its perfection. Nor, if perfect and dexterously performed, it is unproductive of pleasure. In imitation, too, there is much room for originality. We have our *Vikaṭakavis* who at times entertain even grave philosophers by imitating the twittering and chirping of the birds, the weeping of the child, the barking of the dog and various actions of men and other animate and inanimate things, the imitation often being so exact that if the man that imitates be not before our eyes, we would certainly mistake him for the very being or thing he imitates. It cannot be denied therefore the place and rank of an art. What is art but that faculty of man, which, cultivated by steady practice, makes for his enjoyment ? Nature produces, Philosophy contemplates, Science examines ; Art prepares, and again Nature, in human forms, enjoys. The very word 'Kavi', generally meaning poet, attached to 'Vikaṭa', humorous, proves that he occupies as an artist a position similar, though inferior, to that of a poet.

Now I say I object to the definition not because imitation implies want of originality, but because I fail to see any justification in calling the function of the poet, imitation. What does imitation mean ? To produce the likeness of something ? No. Let us suppose two men are doing the same thing without any knowledge of eath other. Will their productions be not alike ? Yet, can we say that the one is imitating the other? Does it then mean to reproduce something, that is, to produce something after an original already existing. 'Yes', almost all will readily reply. But take one who deliberately speaks or acts or dresses himself or puts on airs like another. There is certainly imitation. But see whether we are to speak of him as imitating the man himself, or his speech, action, dress, or countenance. Speakers speak, we know, in both ways. If thus to speak in both the ways is correct, then, we do not bring out all the sense of the word imitation, when we say that to imitate is to reproduce something. It is only one meaning of the word. In that sense the word may be only used when the object of imitation is the thing produced and not the producer. When *A* is imitating *B*, we do not and cannot mean that *A* is reproducing *B*. *A* is simply doing as *B* is doing and we mean only that. So the word has two meanings : to act intentionally as another acts, and to reproduce something, that is, to produce in-

tentionally a thing after an original. If all this is true, then, when allowance is made for poetry being an imitative art, the saying of Aristotle "Art imitates nature" may well apply to this branch of fine art, poetry; and the following words of Butcher have no meaning so far as poetry is concerned.

"Nor indeed could it possibly bear the sense that fine art is a copy or reproduction of natural objects. The use of the term "nature" would in itself put the matter beyond dispute. For nature in Aristotle is not the outward world of created things. It is the creative force, the productive principle of the Universe (p. 116).

"It has been already mentioned that to imitate nature in the popular acceptation of the phrase, is not for Aristotle the function of fine Art" (p. 122). Yes, let us take the word, 'Nature', in the very sense he ascribes to it. How does it then go against its application to a fine art. Nature produces these outward things or rather we may here say, men in action, and after her the poet produces his 'men in action' who are similar to those of nature. Have we not there an imitation? Nature is the creator of this Universe. Poet is the creator of a similar Universe, which is his own:

अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापतिः (Dhvanyāloka. p. 222.)

In the boundless world of poetry, the poet is the sole creator.

But to return to our present consideration. We have seen what imitation is. Now let us see whether the function of poets can be imitation. According to Aristotle the poet imitates, that is, reproduces, 'men in action' (II. 1).

In accordance with what has been said in explaining the word 'imitation' this may be more plainly put thus: Nature originally creates 'men in action'. Following her the poet creates his 'men in action' who are the likenesses of those of nature. Here one may, and reasonably, ask where do his men in action exist? In the common imitation we perceive the two quite distinctly—the original, and the thing similar to it produced by imitation. But in the so-called poetic imitation nothing but the literary composition is perceived corresponding to the 'men in action' of nature. The ready and natural answer one is apt to give to this question will be this. Since, in Arnold's words, 'the idea is the fact', 'the idea

is every thing in poetry', the 'men in action' of poetic creation are to be seen and do exist in the ideal, imaginary world. Now there arises a second question. Where is this imaginary world? In the mind of the poet or of the hearer? This we may answer thus. The former view is untenable. All the imaginary operation of the poet is cause to poetry not its creation. All its creation lies in the mind of the hearer. Poetry first sets in motion the imagination of the hearer and then, through the images it creates, appeals to his feelings. Thus we see that by saying 'the poet imitates men in action', Aristotle means that the poet creates men in action in the mind of the audience—'men' that are similar to those in the real outward world.

In the same way, the imitativeness in all the other fine arts is to be explained. That sculpture and painting raise in the mind of the spectators images of men in various situations is well known almost to everybody through personal experience. As regards music and dancing it may be doubted that they raise no images in our mind though they awaken certain feelings in our heart.

But Aristotle thinks they do. With reference to dancing he says :

". . . for even dancing imitates character, emotion, and action by rhythmical movement." I. 5.

What Aristotle means is, if I rightly understand him, that the feelings of our heart roused by dancing and music are not our own and original like those we experience during our failure and success in life. They originally belong to others. They are conveyed to our heart through the medium of movement and melody as they are conveyed through language and action in drama. Therefore, they are imitative. Since these feelings are those of human beings, they bring with them to us some idea of the images and mental conditions of the human beings to which they belong, though the idea may not be so clear as when it is carried by language and other medium. In this way, 'Dancing and Music imitate character, emotion, and action, or when shortly put, 'men in action.'

It is the objects of these fine arts, 'men in action', that make all the difference between these and the useful arts, such as cookery, architecture, etc., both kinds of which in general imitate nature. If cookery is an imitative art, I fail to see why architecture cannot be such a one though Butcher would say 'it would not have satisfied his idea of artistic imitation'. P. 149.

It is not however imitative of human life. Therefore it is that Aristotle did not reckon it among the fine arts. As regards the differentia in the fine arts themselves Aristotle says :—

"They differ, however, from one another in three respects, the medium, the objects, the manner or mode of imitation, being in each case distinct." (I. 3.)

It should be noted here that all these three do not differentiate fine arts from one another as one is apt to think from this passage. Aristotle takes the medium alone in explaining such a difference among the fine arts. The objects, which are 'men in action,' are, as I have already said, common to them all ; but as these 'men' may "be either of a higher or a lower type," they serve for sub-dividing each of the fine arts. The third point of difference, the manner or mode of imitation, is applied by Aristotle only to poetry. It differentiates one kind of poetry from another. To sum up for our purpose—according to Aristotle, all arts are modes of imitation ; all fine arts, imitative of 'men in action'; the art of poetry, imitative of 'men in action' having language for medium of expression.

Having in this way shown how in the Aristotelian view the art of poetry is imitative, I may now proceed to explain my contention against it. My opposition stands on two grounds. First, the function of a poet, is not at all imitation. Secondly, even if it be imitation it is not so characteristic as to form a definition of poetry. It is an indisputably true fact that the best or the only authority as to proper meanings of words is the long-continued use. An appeal to it convinces me that the re-production of a real thing in the ideal world can hardly come within the sense of imitation. Imitation implies the sameness, in a way, of the thing produced by imitation and the original ; and whatever may be said against this, and how much so ever dissimilarity may be allowed to exist between an imitation and its original, the ideality of one thing and the reality of the other are certainly qualities that at once make the application to them of the term imitation impossible. Everybody that has eyes is impressed by many outward things and when afterwards he remembers what he has seen, he is, we know, forming, in his mind, images of the things seen. But nobody can say that he is imitating the things he has seen. The reason is this. Imitation requires two separate things—the original and its copy ; and so long as we are moving in the imaginary world, we cannot get the second thing existing separately from

the original, *viz.*, the outward real thing. While I do not wish to go deep into philosophical and the psychological considerations, I should like to point out that by perception, remembering, thought, contemplation, imagination or invention, nothing is produced in our mind; nothing that can be compared with outward things. All these are so many activities of the mind; the mind brings us in a close relation with things either past, present or future, or real or unreal; things which do not abide in, have no contact whatever with, the mind. We may figuratively speak of a hundred things. But we should drop all figures when inquiring into the true nature of things. Now I say nothing is produced in our mind that is similar to outward things. All modes of knowledge are so many relations through which our soul is brought into contact with external things. We may perceive a fire or we may imagine a wild fire devouring the whole forest. The fire does not then with its physical form enter into our mind; nor another fire is produced there. Between the things we are conscious of and ourselves there is no direct connection but through the knowledge. We know things through the senses or otherwise. But the things remain where they are. When we speak of an imaginary world we mean nothing more than a kind of mental operation by which various natural things adjusted according to our will seem to us; and in which the mind is as clear of the things that appear as our eyes are of things we perceive. To be short, poetry produces in the mind of the hearer no such new things as can be said to be the imitations of the outward things; and therefore poetry cannot be imitative.

In another way too may be proved the unimitativeness of poetry. Here language comes for my support. 'Imitation' may be interpreted much more properly as 'doing the same' than as 'reproducing a thing'. Thus we see speech is imitated by speech; action by action, dress by dress, countenance by countenance and so on. But when one, instead of doing the same thing as another does, says in his language that another is doing such and such things, all sense of imitation is gone. Now what is he function of the poet but to relate what his hero, real or imaginary, did or suffered? The poet does not do or act as his hero did or acted. By his imaginative faculty he brings before his mind's eye the life of his hero which may be wholly real, or partly real and partly worked out by imagination. Then he sees with his inner eye, the combined work of his imaginative, inventive, and thinking powers,

he being at that stage nothing more than a spectator of a stage play, and expresses what he sees there in a language that befits it for the name of poetry. There he stops. Nothing more is required of him as a poet. To express by language is not to imitate.

Now for the second, I say, even supposing that poetising is imitation, the latter cannot form the artistically essential principle of poetry. In the way in which I have explained the Aristotelian imitativeness of poetry, almost all speeches and writings may be, and rightly, called imitation. For they too excite our imagination, and through it, bring in, in our mind, images of persons whom they concern. Now the difficulty is that the distinction of poetry from historical and other treatises disappears; all being modes of imitation.

Here Aristotle would say:

"The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history; for Poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages. The particular is—for example—what Alcibiades did or suffered." (IX. 2, 3, 4.)

Yes, let us accept for the time the 'true difference' between History and Poetry. Is my contention affected thereby in the least? No, not at all. On the contrary this passage of Poetics gives us to understand that Aristotle himself thought that imitation by itself is not such a characteristic principle of poetry as to make the latter in any way different from history. Is it not plain then, that to say, as Aristotle does, that imitation makes the poet is as absurd as to say that writing about something makes the poet?

It might be thought here that though imitation is not such a characteristically special feature of poetical art as to differentiate it from history, yet the definition of poetry given above may hold good if only imitation be qualified by the phrase 'of the Universal'; poetry is the imitation 'of the universal element in human life'. History imitates the particular, not the universal. But let us first understand what this universal means. Sir Philip Sydney has raised a question implying the undistinguishableness of poetry and history, both being imitative; and thus answers with reference to Aristotle's passage above quoted.

"Truly Aristotle himself in his discourse of poesy, plainly
"determineth this question, saying that poetry is *philosophoteron*
"and *spoudaioteron*, that is to say, it is more philosophical, and more
"studiously serious than history. His reason is, because poesy
"dealeth with *Katholou*, that is to say, with the universal consider-
"ations; and the history with *Kathekaston*, the particular; now
"saith he, the universal weighs what is fit to be said or done,
"either in likelihood or necessity (which the poesy considereth in
"his imposed names), and the particular only marks, whether
"Alcibiades did or suffered this or that. Thus far Aristotle;
"which reason of his (as all his) is most full of reason. For in-
"deed, if the question were whether it were better to have a parti-
"cular act truly or falsely set down, there is no doubt which is to
"be chosen, no more than whether you had rather have Vespasian's
"picture right as he was, or at the painter's pleasure nothing resem-
"bling. But if the question be for your own use and learning,
"whether it be better to have it set down as it should be or as it
"was; then certainly is more doctrinable the feigned Cyrus of
"Xenophon than the true Cyrus in Justin; and the feigned Aeneas
"in Virgil than the Aeneas in Dares Phrygius." E.L.C., p. 18, 19.
What in this passage Sir Philip Sydney means will become more
apparent when we look into another passage of his which though
much longer than this one, I may be excused for quoting.

"Now to that which commonly is attributed to the praise of
"histories in respect of the notable learning is gotten by marking
"the success, as though therein a man should see virtue exalted
"and vice punished; truly that commendation is peculiar to
"poetry, and far off from history. For indeed poetry ever set-
"teth virtue so out in her best colours, making fortune her well-
"waiting handmaid that one must needs be enamoured of her.
"Well may you see Ulysses in a storm and in other hard plights;
"but they are but exercises of patience and magnanimity,
"to make them shine the more in the near following pros-
"perity. And of the contrary part, if evil men come to the stage,
"they ever go out (as the tragedy writer answered to one that
"misliked the show of such persons) so manacled, as they little
"animate folks to follow them. But the historian, being captived
"to the truth of a foolish world, is many times a terror from well-
"doing, and an encouragement to unbridled wickedness.

"For see we not valiant Militiades rot in his fetters? The
"just Phocion, and the accomplished Socrates, put to death like

"traitors? The cruel Severus live prosperously. The excellent "Severus miserably murdered? Sulla and Marius dying in their "beds? Pompey and Cicero slain then, when they would have "thought exile, a happiness.

"See we not virtuous Cato driven to kill himself? and rebel "Caesar so advanced, that his name yet after 1600 years, lasteth in "the highest honour? And mark but even Caesar's own words of "the fore-named Sulla (who in that only did honestly, to put down "his dishonest tyranny) *literas nescivit*, as if want of learning caus-"ed him to do well. He meant it not by poetry, which not con-"tent with the earthly plagues deviseth new punishments in hell "for tyrants: nor yet by philosophy, which teacheth *Occidendos* "*Esse*: but no doubt by skill in history: for that indeed can afford "your Cypselus Periander, Phalaris, Dionysius, and I know not "how many more of the same kennel, that speed well enough in "the abominable unjustice or usurpation. I conclude therefore "that he excelleth history, not only in furnishing the mind with "knowledge, but in setting it forward, to that which deserveth to "be called and accounted good: which setting forward, and mov-"ing to well doing, indeed setteth the laurel crown upon the poet "as victorious, not only of the historian, but over the philosopher: "howsoever in teaching it may be questionable.

"For, suppose it be granted (that which I suppose with great "reason may be denied) that the philosopher, in respect of his "methodical proceeding, doth teach more perfectly than the poet; "yet do I think that no man is so much *Philophilosophos*[1] as to "compare the philosopher, in moving, with the poet.

"And that moving is of a higher degree than teaching, it may "by this appear: that it is well-nigh the cause and the effect of "teaching. For who will be taught, if he be not moved with desire "to be taught? and what so much good doth that teaching bring "forth (I speak still of moral doctrine) as that it moveth one to "do that which it doth teach? For as Aristotle saith, it is not "*Gnosis* but *Praxis*[2] must be the fruit. And how *Praxis* cannot "be, without being moved to practice, it is no hard matter to con-"sider." (p. 21 and 22). E. L. C.

Now it is clear that in the view of Sir Philip Sydney the universal is 'what should or what should not be' according to

1. 'in love with philosophy.'
2. 'not knowledge but action.'

moral philosophy. He would exemplify it thus: that 'the just Phocion and the accomplished Socrates should have been honoured' is the universal; but the historical fact that instead of being honoured, they were 'put to death like traitors' is the particular. Though we do not share the opinion that didacticism is opposed to the spirit of Poetry, we may accept the gist of Sydney's argument. But the question to be considered is whether Aristotle's words, "by the universal I mean how a person of certain type will on occasion speak or act according to the law of probability or necessity";—can bear this meaning of Sydney's. I think they cannot. But I do not wish to go any further in explaining why they cannot, than quoting a few lines from Butcher. He writes in his 'Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art':—

"Returning now to the discussion about poetry and history we shall better understand Aristotle's general conclusion which is contained in the words so well known and so often misunderstood. 'Poetry is a more philosophical and a higher thing than History'—where the *spoudaisteron* denotes 'higher in the scale', not 'more serious', for the words apply even to comedy, nor, again, 'more moral', which is quite alien to the context."

Now if we ask Butcher, 'If the moral precept is not meant here as Sydney thinks what then is your meaning of the universal?' his answer is, "a purified form of reality disengaged from accident and freed from condition which thwart its developments." For a clearer understanding of this, the following lines of his may be read :—"The real and the ideal from this point of view are not opposites, as they are sometimes conceived to be. The ideal is the real but rid of contradictions, unfolding itself according to the laws of its own being apart from alien influences and the disturbances of chances" (pp. 150-1).
And,

"Poetry, we say—following Aristotle—is an expression of the universal element in human life; or, in equivalent modern phrase it idealises life. Now the word 'idealise' has two senses, which have given rise to some confusion. Writers on æsthetics generally mean by it the representation of an object in its permanent and essential aspects, in a form that answers to its true idea; disengaged from the passing accidents that cling to individuality, and from disturbing influences that obscure the type.

What is local or transient is either omitted or reduced to subordinate rank; the particular is enlarged till it broadens out into the human and the universal. In this sense the ideal is the universal of the Poetics." (P. 368.)

This meaning given by Butcher too seems to me unsatisfactory. Thinking that "Aristotle's Poetics cannot be read apart from his other writings and that no author is more liable to be misunderstood if studied piecemeal",[1] and noticing an observation of Goethe that "it needs some insight into Aristotle's general philosophy to understand what he says about the drama, since otherwise he confuses our ideas" Butcher overworks with the universal of Poetics. 'Universal' is a term that transports the hearer at once into the region of philosophy and it was, methinks, only with a view to prevent such misunderstanding, that Aristotle went on to explain what he here meant by the word. Strangely, however, Butcher, the most thorough master of Poetics, has failed to grasp the somewhat hidden purport of these explanatory words of Aristotle and taken the term in the usual philosophical sense. Moreover the 'particular' which is mentioned here as an antethesis to the 'universal' seems to confirm the sense of the word. Now Aristotle's words are, as already quoted more than once—'by the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act according to the law of probability or necessity.' From these words the poetical universal is to be determined. So far as my study of Poetics goes, nowhere else can I find something said to warrant the above-mentioned meaning given by Butcher. When unstrained, these words would seem to mean exactly what Coleridge says with reference to this passage of Aristotle:

"I adopt, he says, with full faith the theory of Aristotle that poetry as poetry is essentially ideal, that it avoids and excludes all accident; that its apparent individualities of rank, character, or occupation, must be the representative of a class ; and that the persons of poetry must be clothed with generic attributes, with the common attributes of the class; not such as one gifted individual might possibly possess, but such as from his situation it is most probable that he would possess."[2]

Having in view what Aristotle says elsewhere—'for tragedy is an imitation, not of man, but of an action and of life' (VI. 9.),

1. Aris., p. 114.

2. Quoted by Butcher, Aris., p. 195.

'what he imitates are actions '(IX. 9),—we have to interpret the passage in question as meaning that the universal (which it is the aim of poetry to express) is qualified speech or action; and the qualification is suggested by 'a person of certain type,' which naturally seems to be 'typical' (that is, common to all the individuals that are of the same type) which excludes individualistic. Then do the utterances of Coleridge—"that its apparent individualities of rank, character, or occupation, must be the representative of a class" not seem to be in full accordance with Aristotle's explanation ot the universal? Butcher, while leaving us in utter darkness as to why the universal should be taken in the sense he assigns, criticises Coleridge's interpretation thus:—

"Some of these explanatory words themselves are, it must be owned, misleading. Such phrases as 'representative of a class', 'generic attributes,' 'class characteristics which constitute the instructiveness of a character,' seem to imply a false view of the universal of poetry, as though the 'individuality' were something outside the universal and of no poetic account; yet, he says, 'the individual form' is ' uppermost. ' One might think that the 'universal' was a single abstract truth instead of being all the truths that meet in the individual. The expression, however, 'such (attributes) as from his situation it is most probable that he would possess is true and Aristotelian. But how can these attributes be called attributes of a class?" (P. 196.)

Butcher here seems to me somewhat wanting in cogency. Not onty there is nothing said in Poetics in favour of Butcher's sense of the universal, but there is much to show that it is quite against Aristotle's intention After explaining the universal in his own way, Butcher writes (pp. 154) (as is already said) :— " To seize the universal and to reproduce it in simple and sensuous form is not to reflect a reality already familiar through sense perception." If I rightly understand, this means that the universal which is the object of poetical imitation is a thing that men in general cannot perceive but through poetry. If so, the universal, though very clearly represented by the art, can hardly please an audience who, according to Butcher, are not already familiar with it. For, does Aristotle not say " for if you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other cause "? (IV. 5.)

Though thus Coleridge's interpretation of the word seems more plausible than Butcher's, even that I cannot persuade myself to accept. What are the accidents, one is apt to ask, that should be avoided and excluded by poetry and why should they be avoided and excluded by it ? As regards the first question, while Butcher would satisfy himself by saying this much—

"At what precise point imperfections are to be regarded as accidental, abnormal, irregular; as presenting so marked a deviation from the type as to be unworthy of lasting embodiment in art—is a problem whose answer will vary at different stages of history, and will admit of different applications according to the particular art that is in question (p. 372)", Coleridge expresses his view in these words—

"Such as one gifted individual might possibly possess." As for the second, both of them think that the accident, if not eliminated, will obscure the universal as in our actual life and render the imitation inartistic and ineffective. All these are—I cannot help saying, following the dictates of my own reason—vain but inevitable wanderings of the critic's mind, which is given up to undue philosophising about poetry. I do not think that there is anything in this immense universe like accidental and hence unfit to be an object of the art of poetry. Anything and everything can be so beautifully delineated as to raise pleasurable feelings in our heart, if only the poet should be of a sufficiently superior rank. The very thing, which we discard and do not take care even to see because of its meanness, uselessness, and other such causes, will appear as pleasing as that which is great and majestic, when embellished and represented by poetical talent. "Poetry", says Shelley, "turns all things to loveliness. It exalts the beauty of that which is most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed ; it marries exultation and horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change ; it subdues to union under its light yoke all irreconcilable things." (E. L. C. p. 195.) This all-embracingness of poetry is already expressed by our famous dramaturgist (of the tenth century) in the end of his Daśarūpa :

रम्यं जुगुप्सितमुदारमथापि नीचं
उग्रं प्रसादि गहनं विकृतं च वस्तु ।
यद्वाप्यवस्तु कविभावकभाव्यमानं
तन्नास्ति यन्न रसभावमुपैति लोके ।

Nothing is there, in the world, whether it be delightful or detestable, high or low, gross or elegant, occult or deformed, entity or non-entity, which, when touched by the imagination of poet and men of taste, does not become rasa.[1]

[I should like to point out here in passing that विकृतम् is a misreading of विवृतम्, salient, not obscure, the opposite of गहनम् occult.]

It is very interesting to note that William Hazlitt, as if echoing Dhanañjaya's, has uttered the following words :—

" Poetry is only the highest eloquence of passion, the most vivid form of expression that can be given to our conception of anything, whether pleasurable or painful, mean or dignified, delightful or distressing." (H. L. p. 7.)

It should not be here lost sight of that Dhanañjaya ascends a degree higher than Hazlitt in adding that even a non-entity can be a fit subject for poetry (यद्वाप्यवस्तु). To restrict the range of poetry is to deny the possibilities of the inventive and imaginative power of transcendently high order of poets. It is not the office of the poet to seize the recondite and represent it clearly for us. It is rather the office of the philosopher. Most of what poets have hitherto represented is already known to men through other sources. This consideration leads me to conclude that it is a rule which governs poetry that the object of the art should be such as men generally are familiar with. John Keble, in his invective against Dr. Johnson, writes :

" He argues the point, first from the nature of poetry, and afterwards from that of devotion. 'The essence of poetry is invention; such invention as, by producing something unexpected, surprises, and delights. The topics of devotion are few.' It is to be hoped that many men's experience will refute the latter part of this statement. How can the topics of devotion be few, when we are taught to make every part of life, every scene in nature, an occasion—in other words a topic—of devotion? It might as well be said that connubial love is an unfiit subject for poetry, as being incapable of novelty, because, after all, it is only ringing the changes upon one simple affection which every one understands. The novelty

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1 This is one of the many ślokas which are very incorrectly translated by George C. O. Haas; a list of which I have published in this Journal. (*Vide* J. O. R. M.—Vol. II part II—p. 142.)

there, consists not in the original topic, but in continually bringing ordinary things, by happy strokes of natural ingenuity, into new associations with the ruling passion." (E. C. E. p. 204.)

If poets sometimes give expression to a truth that has an air of philosophy, it is not because they, as poets, should find and express it; but because they wish to show the vastness and depth of their knowledge and think, and think rightly, that the expression of such a philosophical truth in a pleasant and attractive way would add to the grandeur of their works. Surely, poets themselves, if asked, cannot say that they, at a certain stage of their art, have to discriminate in their objects of representation certain elements as transient and accidental and therefore unworthy of their treatment, as opposed to the elements, permanent and inherent, which are in the sense of the critics the 'universal', the object of poetry. It is not because of their unfitness for poetical treatment, but because they are, though undoubtedly gems of poetry, yet of such a different hue and colour as render them incongruous with the other gems which the poet is going to string together in order to make a particular kind of poetical garland, that he ignores some aspects of the object of his representation, such aspects being reserved for treatment in another kind of poetry. As these critics have not distinctly illustrated the universal and accidental of things, I need go no further in disproving their views. Anyhow, it seems to me certain that Aristotle's use in Poetics of the word 'universal' could hardly be in the sense of generic attributes or purified individuality.

Now since I could not accept any of the meanings given by the critics, the difficult task is left to me of finding out the proper meaning of the 'universal' in Poetics. In illustrating the 'universal' of poetry, Aristotle says:

> " In comedy this is already apparent; for here the poet first constructs the plot on the lines of probabilities and then inserts characteristic names." (IX. 5.)

Here lies hidden a truth of no inconsiderable value, which it is almost impossible to fully grasp for those who have not a fair acquaintance with the philosophy of words and sentences, as vehicles of ideas. Śabara, the famous author of the Mīmāṁsā Bhāṣya says (I-i-24) that the *universal* ist he sense of the word, the *particular* is the sense of the sentence. The word 'goes', taken alone, gives the idea of the action of going. But

add a subject to it, as in 'a man goes' the meaning of the verb becomes restricted. And it will be still more restricted if a proper noun be used to denote the subject, as in 'Rama goes'. Now the sense conveyed by 'goes' alone, unconnected with any other concept, is *universal* and becomes *particular* when it is related to Rama. Thus we see that the general idea of an action becomes particularised by its relation with a particular man; and the particularity of a man, it is well known to us, cannot be better brought home to our mind than through his proper name. So each and every action of man, viewed apart in itself, without any thought of its relation to its agent, is, in Śabara's sense—and I think I am quite right when I say in Aristotle's sense as well—'universal.' All that a poet should do to get at this 'universal' is to ignore the proper name of the man to whom the action he is going to poetise, belongs. This is what Aristotle means, when he says 'for here the poet first constructs his plot on the lines of probabilities'. Though, in this way, in order to shape the form of the universal, which it is the aim of poetry to represent, proper names are to be deleted, they cannot be altogether done away with. How is it possible to represent different characters without a name given to each, so as to distinguish them from one another? Only for the sake of convenience, and not at all for any purpose connected with the essential requirements of poetry, names are attached to characters. Aristotle also thinks in this way when he adds 'and then inserts characteristic names'.

When thus proper names are inserted, it is inevitable that the 'universal,' which alone, being represented through the medium of poetry, is the source of pleasure, somewhat loses its own form and assumes the appearance of the 'particular.' But the unimportance of the 'particular' in poetical creations may be proved in this way. Let us take a piece of poetry and change the name of every character in it. Can it affect in the least the charm of the piece? No, certainly not. When this is borne in mind we can well understand the full import of the words of Aristotle:—
"Still there are even some tragedies in which there are only one or two well-known names, the rest being fictitious. In others, none are well known, as in Agathon's Anthens, where incidents and names alike are fictitious, and yet they give none the less pleasure. We must not, therefore, with all costs keep to the received legends, which are the usual subjects of tragedy. Indeed, it would be absurd to attempt; for even subjects that

are known are known only to a few and yet give pleasure to all." [IX. 7, 8.]

The audience, Aristotle thinks, need not have personal knowledge of the persons suggested by the characteristic names for the enjoyment of a stage play. But they (this view of Aristotle is expressed in a passage already quoted) should be familiar with of the action, the 'universal' of the play. Without it they cannot enjoy it. How striking is the correspondence between these words of Aristotle and the following line of Dhanañjaya:

त एव च परित्यक्तविशेषा रसहेतवः IV. 39.

The same conditions of life (as referred to in the previous śloka, and not 'the heroines' as intrepreted by Haas) being stripped of the particulars, form the contributory factors of rasa. Dhanika's explanation here runs thus: There, the words, Sītā, etc., leaving off the particulars such as the daughter of king Janaka, etc., denote women in general. What harm is there?

When it is established that the particular is in no way the essential part of poetry, and the universal only is the object of poetic representation, it goes without saying that poets are at full liberty to make their men and things all fictitious. But this licence for fiction cannot be extended beyond the names and the particulars suggested by them. Poets ought not to represent actions which are not generally known as probable. An action which is unnatural to human beings should not be delineated on the excuse of poetical fiction. For, being against the law of nature, it overpowers the mind at once and breaks off suddenly the smooth and continuous flow of pleasurable feelings awakened by poetic representation, thus jeopardising the very life of poetry. So Aristotle would say in his explanation of the 'universal' that the action should be according to the law of probability. As regards the law of necessity, I am one with Butcher in saying that it refers 'rather to the internal structure of a poem'.

Among the Indian Ālaṅkārikas too, there were some who held, like modern critics of the west, the view that the 'universal' of poetry is the concrete truth of the outward phenomena of nature. Ānandavardhana, in the fourth Uddyota of his Dhvanyāloka (p. 242 f.) criticises this view and rejects it, saying that if it is the aim of poetry to represent such 'universal' there can hardly be more than one poet in the

world, that 'universal' having been represented by the first poet. This reason of Ānandavardhana serves, apart from the words of Aristotle himself, to prove that the interpretation of the poetic 'universal' given by modern critics could not be accepted.

Having thus expounded the true significance of the 'universal', we may now take up the definition given above of poetry and consider whether it can serve to differentiate poetry from history. 'Poetry, we know,' says Aristotle, 'tends to express the *universal*, history the *particular*'. I think the 'particular' is almost fully explained when we explained the 'universal.' An action taken as pertaining to an individual is the 'particular'; 'the particular' is what Alcibiades did or suffered.' In poetry the action alone is the object of representation. As the action cannot be related without an agent, poetry makes use of the 'particular' through the name given to the agent. That 'particular' may be this or that, nay, even such as has never existed, only imaginary; but in history the 'particular' is everything. It is the soul of it. We cannot change the name of the historical person, while we can readily do in the case of the hero of a piece of poetry. If it is changed, it is no longer history. Imagination has no business with it. It must stick to the naked truth. Thus, it may be said, the difference between history and poetry is very clear—the former representing the 'universal' and the latter the 'particular.'

But this also seems to me untenable. It is quite impossible to represent the 'particular' without representing at the same time the 'universal.' Is it not an irrefragable truth of philosophy that the 'particular' can never exist separately from the 'universal'? Unless it embraces each and every particular, the 'universal' cannot be universal. The very sense of the 'universal' well considered convinces us of this fact. That being so, it needs little effort to show that, whenever the 'particular' is brought to view, the 'universal' cannot but come into view through it.

As in poetry, so in history, you may have the action universalised by getting rid of the idea of its relation to its particular personal agent. Since, thus, history too represents the 'universal,' the definition remains subject to the same fault with the 'universal' put into it, as without it.

To this objection, an answer may be attempted here. The poet first collects such incidents of human life as are suitable to the kind of poetry which he intends to produce, and then so

arranges them that every subsequent incident stands to a preceding one in the cause-and-effect relation and thus all of them make up one whole which is called "plot". "It clearly follows", says Aristotle (IX. 9.) "that the poet or maker should be the maker of plots rather than of verses." The historian has not any such task. He has not to trouble himself about selecting some incidents and rejecting others, after considering their probability, about the proper and orderly arrangement of them, about trying to find out suitable language for effectively expressing them. Only he records all the doings and sufferings of a man that come within his knowledge in the order in which he thinks they had happened. So the 'universal' of poetry is more philosophical and a far higher thing than the object of history.

But we think that this differentiation of poetry from history is not satisfactory. There may be a piece of history, as stated by Aristotle himself (IX. 9.), the incidents of which are in full conformity with poetic requirements. Let us suppose that it is represented both by a historian and a poet. Can there be any difference between their productions so far as their object of representation is concerned? We cannot say that one represents the 'particular' and the other the 'universal.' Neither can it be reasonably said that, though both relate both, yet one tends to express the 'particular,' and the other the 'universal.' One's tendency cannot make any change in the real nature of things. One may produce a certain thing for a particular purpose. But it may as well serve another purpose. So, it is, surely and necessarily, something else than the object of representation, that we should consider in order to frame a satisfactory definition of poetry.

Thus we have seen that three principles, according to Courthope, underlie Aristotle's Poetics, namely—

(1) that the function of poetry, as of all Fine Arts, is imitation, not instruction;

(2) that the object of imitation in poetry is the 'universal' not the 'particular'; and

(3) that the test of the justice of poetic imitation is the permanent pleasure produced in society by the work, not merely the pleasure felt by the artist in creating it; and that the first two of these are of no use for the purpose of defining poetry. As

regards the third, I think it is only that principle that can enable us to frame a definition and I propose to consider it in the next chapter, wherein it will be clear that it is a principle in which Aristotle and our Indian Ālaṅkārikas seem to agree entirely. Meanwhile, I should say a few words as to why Aristotle so much extols the imitativeness of poetry, if it is not such an essential feature as would help in defining it—about a view which is held till now by all critics of all nations, and adopted by John Dryden in his " Preface to the Fables" in these words—

> " The design, the disposition, the manners, and the thoughts are all before it ; where any of those are wanting or imperfect in the imitation of human life ; *which is in the very definition of a poem.*" (E. L. C. p. 65-6.)

Courthope and Butcher think that even before it was used by Aristotle, the word "imitation " was already current in popular usage in connection with poetical creations, and Aristotle accepted but interpreted it "anew." In the foregoing pages, I have said enough to show why the interpretation given by modern critics for the Aristotelian use of the term " imitation" is not acceptable. Whether the word was in popular usage long before Aristotle or not, it is unnecessary for us to enquire. As Saintsbury says, the word is, in the sense in which it is used in Poetics, very awkward. Nevertheless, the word is not without some highly commendable significance of its own. By giving so much importance to the imitativeness of poetry, Aristotle means to tell us that he would insist upon the fact that though poetical works need not be true in the historical sense of the word, yet they should be very true when representing " men in action, " the 'universal.' The more exact the representation, the more perfect and beautiful the piece of poetry is. This is a secret of not a little importance. This was fully understood by almost all the ancient poets. So it is that the pleasure derived from their works is universal and permanent. Failing to grasp this fundamental truth and principle of poetic art, and carried away by an irrepressible desire to excel all other poets and by the erroneous notion that the life-giving, beautifying, originality of poetry consists in a new way of delineation, untrodden by anybody else, later poets in Sanskrit Literature began to hyperbolise to an unlimited extent, with the result that their poems are not much less difficult than the works on various śāstras. Śrī Harṣa's Naiṣadhacarita is a good example of this

kind of poetry. He himself says in the concluding verse of the 8th Sarga—

:\.......कविकुलादृष्टाध्वपान्थे महा—

काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते..............

The folowing is one of his verses I think, which induced him to boast of his poem, in the above strain, as "one that travels through the path, never seen by the world of poets":

वैदर्भीकेलिशैले मरकतशिखरादुत्थितैरंशुदर्भैः
ब्रह्माण्डाघातभग्नस्यदजमदतया ह्रीधृतावाङ्मुखत्वैः ।
कस्या नोत्तानगाया दिवि सुरसुरभेरास्यदेशं गताग्रैः
यद्गोग्रासप्रदानव्रतसुकृतमविश्रान्तमुज्जृम्भते स्म ॥

Naiṣadha. II. 105.

Aristotle would not allow such pieces to have the name of poetry. In the sense in which he uses the word, this verse is not *imitative.* We cannot see in the outward world the work of nature, the like of which is here represented. Consider side by side with the above verse of Śrī Harṣa, this half of Kālidāsa—

शृङ्गेण च स्पर्शनिमीलिताक्षीं मृगीमकण्डूयत कृष्णसारः ।

which is found in the third Sarga of the Kumāra-Sambhava. There is not any high feat of imagination in this half. Yet it belongs to the first order of poetry. The reason is obvious. In the Aristotelion sense, it is fully imitative. The office of poets, as that of garland-makers, is rather to arrange than to create. From my own experience, I have to conclude that immature poets cannot get at this truth. The following is a verse of my own (in my Rāmavarmodaya written about thirteen years ago, that is, in my twenty first year).

उत्थाय मेघाः सविधे समुद्रात्
यन्नारिकेलद्रुमकोटिघुष्टाः ।
निःशेषनिर्यातनवाम्बुपूरा
नैवाभिवर्षन्ति परत्र किञ्चित् ।

Against the cocoanut trees of which (country, Kerala), clouds, rising up from the sea at hand, dash, and, having poured out all the water, rain nowhere else even to the smallest extent.

If I should be now asked to write a poem according to my poor ability, I do not think I can allow myself to write in such a

strain. Though possessed of extraordinary abilities and power of imagination, Śrī Harṣa and other poets of the later centuries were, since artificiality then reigned supreme, blind to the fact that it is a faithfully exact and simple, yet grand, description of the creations of nature, such as we find throughout the Rāmāyaṇa and the works of Kālidāsa, that gives long life to poetry. Probably Daṇḍī expresses the same idea on this point as Aristotle, when he writes in his Kāvyādarśa.

लोकातीत इवात्यर्थमध्यारोप्य विवक्षितः ।
योऽर्थस्तेनातितुष्यन्ति विदग्धा नेतरे जनाः ॥

By the idea being expressed in a highly fantastical way, as though it is something ultramundane, cultivated minds are pleased, (विदग्धाः, an ironical term meaning gauḍas[1]) not others. (1. 88.) The following extracts also deserve consideration here, as being not only in full accordance with, but also explanatory to, Aristotle's view concerning the imitativeness of poetry; and they substantiate my interpretation of his theory :

"Oh nature and Jane Austen, which of you has copied from the other."

(quoted by Courthope, Page, 292.)

"To hold mirror up to nature."

Shakespeare.

आदिराजयशोबिम्बमादर्शं प्राप्य वाङ्मयम्. Daṇḍin I. 5.

"The image of the glory of ancient kings, through finding in speech a mirror,..............." B. C. V. P.

Now it remains for me to show what Aristotle means, when he says " he is a poet because he imitates " (quoted in the beginning). If all that has been said thus far by me is borne in mind, it would seem reasonable that the term imitation, as used by Aristotle, means not merely narration (which is common to history) but delightful and faithful representation, and we have no objection whatever to accept that such a representation by means of language " makes the poet".

It is already explained that the objects of poetic representation need not be necessarily real in the usual sense of the word. In the multifarious phases of human life, it is quite possible that the " action " of some men may be such that a keen-sighted

१. विदग्धा इति गौडानाक्षिपति । Hṛdayaṅgama.

poet finds in it a ready-made plot, and begins to treat it poetically. In this case we have not the least doubt as to the reality of the object of his representation. But when such a ready-made plot is not available, the poet himself creates one, picking up some incidents here and others there, and arranging them all in a suitable order. Since such a series of incidents taken as a whole has not actually happened, it is undoubtedly unreal. It is, however, poetically true. Even where the action is real, its reality is of no account in poetry. Poetic truth consists in the fact that the incidents and their sequence as represented in poetry are not against the laws of nature. All that is possible is poetically true. For "possible" implies that a similar thing has already happened: unless it is so, what is to be represented cannot be taken as possible. Aristotle says :—

> "But tragedians still keep to real names, the reason being that what is possible is credible ; what has not happened we do not at once feel sure to be possible ; but what has happened is manifestly possible ; otherwise it would not have happened."

"Possible" according to Aristotle, means "what may happen." From the above extract from his Poetics, it is clear that "what may happen" includes the real past action, that also being possible. Whatever is accepted as possible is to be taken, therefore, as a thing of nature ; and wherever a thing or action that is possible is beautifully represented, we have an Aristotelian imitation there. So we cannot help saying that Hudson is somewhat rash when he adds in a footnote :

> "...... are to Aristotelean antithetical conception of it as in its essence one of the imitative arts. The Greek philosopher's theory really breaks down in his own hands, since, as he himself admits, the poet's business (he is thinking of the narrative poet[1]) is to relate, not what actually happens, but what may happen."

Again, according to the rationalistic view, there are no gods and demi-gods; and yet poets represent them, their excuse being, in Aristotle's view, that they are "thought to be." The idea is that the poet has no business to enquire whether the Gods really exist or not. Men generally think that there are such superhuman beings and that the poet has the original for his imitation. For

1 We do not know why.

it is not the human form alone, but men with their physical, mental, intellectual and imaginary operations, that nature creates. So what is thought to be is also a creation of nature or it may be taken for granted that it is possible. Hence it is an object of poetic representation, or imitation.

And again, though men, as a rule, are spiritually, and morally, to be short, in every way, imperfect, yet each man has his own ideal with respect to virtues, life, Government, and such other things. Religion and philosophy, while edifying people, mostly help them in forming such ideals. Sometimes poets begin to illustrate the religious and philosophical precepts, as Sir Philips Sidney says, in their beautiful and more convincing and attractive way, representing the ideal virtues as possessed by some extraordinary personalities. For the nations which are full of theological notions and historical legends and myths, it is not too much to conceive a man in ideal perfection. So, when a poet pictures some human personalities in somewhat superhuman forms, it should not be thought that it is all his own making and nothing of the kind could have been conceived by others.

The poet vividly represents what is vaguely conceived by the common folk. Unless it is so, the representation can be by no means pleasing. For, if what is represented be his own creation, quite unknown to us, " we cannot be sure that it is not an image of a monster". Therefore the better men, or, as Aristotles puts it, men, that are represented as they ought to be, are, like Gods, poetically true; and this representation may very well be called imitation in the Aristotelian sense. I would say this much in order to show that little value need be attached to Butcher's statement:

> "A crucial instance of the inadequacy of the literal English equivalent 'imitation' to express the Aristotelian idea is afforded by a passage in Ch. XXV. The artist may 'imitate things as they ought to be."

If representation by language can be called *imitation* there is nothing here to render the term inadequate for conveying the sense in which it is used in Poetics.

Having said all that is necessary for our present enquiry, we should take leave of Aristotle here, though reluctantly.

THE PRESENT KALIYUGA

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Every Hindu has to begin every act with a declaration of his determination to do it which is called *Saṅkalpa.* The *Saṅkalpa* declares the date on which he is so doing. It specifies the year beginning from a certain point of time which may be called the Āryan era. According to that era, fifty years of Brahma's life has passed and the first day of the second fifty years is passing.

We have reasons to believe that the first fifty years of Brahma's life were counted at 24,000 years for every day. Even at that rate the era has counted $24{,}000 \times 360 \times 50$ years or 432 million years. The day of Brahma is the period when the first point of Aries begins from the same Rāśi again and is above 25,000 years correctly. So above 450 million years have passed since the beginning of the Āryan era.

A day or night of Brahma was divided into four yugas--Kṛta, Treta, Dvāpara and Kali. They consisted of 4,800, 3,600, 2,400 and 1,200 years with Sandhya and Sandhyaṁśa at the beginning and close of each yuga. The yugas were originally an astronomical period merely. They afterwards were given a different meaning which made the yugas 360 times longer. Dharma was said to be walking on four legs, on three legs, on two legs and on a single leg in these four yugas and so the Hindus were not willing to say that *kṛta* had begun when peace and order were obviously not prevalent.

When did such an interpretation come in and when was a different calculation introduced?—is the question which we are now going to answer.

The present calculation of the kaliyuga gives it 43,200 years or 360 times 1,200 years. An attempt was also made to multiply 1,200 by 1,000. The Purāṇas were intended to narrate Āryan

history and they give a clue to the change that was effected originally.

The present Kaliyuga was intended to begin from the Mahābhārata war and the Mahāprasthāna of Yudhiṣṭhira. The *kali* then was 1,200 years long and the next *kṛta* was proposed to be begun after a period of 1,200 years. The date also for the beginning of *kṛta* was fixed and the manner in which that peaceful *kṛta* was to be ushered in.

Three Books make mention of this event (1) The Mahābhārata, Vana Parva, Ch. 190 *v.* 91, (2) Viṣṇu Purāṇa, aṁśa IV, ady. 24, *v.* 102, (3) Śrī Bhāgavata, sk. XII, ady. 2, *v.* 23. The verse is the same, though there is a slight difference in the reading.

यदा चन्द्रश्च सूर्यश्च तथा तिष्ये बृहस्पतिः ।
एकराशौ समेष्यन्ति तदा भवति वैकृतम् ॥ Viṣṇu Purāṇam.

The Mahābhārata reads तिष्यबृहस्पती प्रवर्त्स्यति तदा instead of the above reading. The Bhāgavata reads तत् instead of वै.

The four kinds of months, lunar, Sāvana, Solar and Stellar, coincide at the end of every five years. The seven grahas excluding Rāhu and Ketu coincide at the end of every sixty years. The Sun and the other planets begin from the same Rāśi after a period of 2,400 years owing to the precession of the equinox.

Row Bahadur C. V. Vaidya quoted the verse from the Mahābhārata in his 'Epic India' but confessed his inability to interpret it. We put forward our explanation before the first Oriental Conference at Poona and published it in the Kumbakonam College Magazine also. We are now fortified in our position by the three old commentators of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and the Śrī Bhāgavata having accepted our interpretation as the hereditary one.

The conjunction of the Sun and the Moon occurs on every new moon day. The new moon day occurs in Puṣya in every Āṣāḍha month. The planet Bṛhaspati goes to Puṣya in Āṣāḍha every twelve years. But the *yuga* begins with all planets together and in the same Rāśi at the equinox. The equinox occurred in Āṣāḍha or Kaṭaka about 1,500 + (3 × 2,160) or 6,500 + 1,500 years ago or 8,000 years ago. The equinox occurred in Meṣa or Caitra 1,500 years ago and the equinox recedes in 2,160 years one Rāśi. Therefore *kṛta* was expected to begin 8,000 years ago and the

kali before that *kṛta* must have begun 8,000+1,200 years ago. Viṣṇucitta's commentary on Viṣṇupurāṇa—

चन्द्रादिग्रहणं सर्वग्रहोपलक्षणार्थं—सर्वग्रहयोगे हि युगम् ।

The Kali was expected to be a period of strife and confusion and a *śūdra* was seen driving a cow and its calf through the streets before Yudhiṣṭhira decided to set out on his Prasthāna. Similarly people expected that kṛta would be a period of quiet and order. Some how their ideas were not fulfilled. The confusion after the Bhārata war did not subside and they thought that the people were not orderly either. So they were not prepared to say that *kṛta* had come.

The present kali is said to be 5,000 and odd years old. The period between the date fixed for the beginning of *kṛta* and the beginning of this present *kali* included the reigns of Balarāma and Śrī Kṛṣṇa. They were reputed to be Avatārs of Viṣṇu. Therefore the people said that *kali* had not begun during their time. It was only after the passing of Śrī Kṛṣṇa that the people began to say that *kali* had begun. The present *kali* dates from the passing of Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

यस्मिन् कृष्णो दिवं यातः तस्मिन्नेव तदाहनि ।
प्रतिपन्नं कलियुगमिति प्राहुः पुराविदः ॥

Śrī Bāghavata, xii 2. 32. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 4. 24. 113.

So long as Śrī Kṛṣṇa was reigning, kali did not dare to intrude. Therefore the period from the passing of Yudhiṣṭhira to the passing of Śrī Kṛṣṇa was considered as a part of the Dvāpara yuga. That is a period of 9,200—5,000 or 4,000 years. Therefore Śrī Kṛṣṇa lived 4,000 years after Yudhiṣṭhra.

Even at the time of Śrī Kṛṣṇa's demise the *kali* that came in was said to be 1,200 years long. When Yudhiṣṭhira passed. away, the avatār that was expected to introduce the Kṛtayuga was Kalki and not Kṛṣṇa. The Kṣatriya and Vaiśya kings being now exhausted, the Kṛtayuga is now to be inagurated by the God incarnating in a Brāhmin family. He acquires facility in the use of weapons, becomes the emperor, kills all Mlecchas and establishes order again. Mahābh. Ch. 190 *v.* 91½-99. In the second stage as *kali* or *kalaha* did not end in 1,000 years, it was thought this was not the mere end of a day or night of Brahmā, but that it found Brahmā sleeping. Owing to Brahmā not being awake and active, things were in a state of perfect disorder and

decomposition called *Naimittika Pralaya,* which was to end in another *caturyuga* or night of Brahmā and was to be followed by fresh creation. ch. 189, *v*.41, 48-9. Mārkaṇḍeya wandered through the wide waters which filled the whole world and found a child sleeping on a banyan tree. That child was the god Nārāyaṇa whose transition state (आभ्यन्तरशरीरं) Mārkaṇḍeya was permitted to see. The child opened its mouth and Mārkaṇḍeya went into his stomach. The third period of confusion deepening and prolonging itself brings Balarāma and Śrī kṛṣṇa on the stage. As these were represented to have lived in the Dvāpara yuga, there was no need to interfere with Mārkaṇḍeya's account of the end of *kali* as narrated to Yudhiṣṭhira. Kṛṣṇa is identified with the child on the banyan tree and the Pāṇḍavas appeal to him for protection. Ch. 188; *v*. 18; Ch. 189, *v*. 52-9. But the date fixed for the beginning of *kṛta* became useless and altogether unnecessary, though it was allowed to continue as part of the text.

After Kṛṣṇa's demise, the kali was expected to end in 1,200 years. There was another method of calculating time. The Saptarṣis moved over one nakṣatra along the ecliptic in one hundred years. They were at the birth of Parīkṣit which is the same as the demise of Śrī kṛṣṇa in Māgha. In 1,000 years or so they would move over 10 stars and stop at Pūrvāṣāḍha. Then the Āryans wanted to say that the the *kali* would end and *kṛta* begin.

तेन सप्तर्षयो युक्ताः तिष्ठन्त्यब्दशतं नृणाम् ।
ते तु पारीक्षिते काले मखास्वासन् द्विजोत्तम ॥
तदा प्रवृत्तश्च कलिः द्वादशाब्दशतात्मकः ।
प्रयास्यन्ति यदा चैते पूर्वाषाढां महर्षयः ॥

Correspondingly the Maghada line of kings ruled for 1,000 years after the birth of Parīkṣit. The 5 Pradyota kings ruled for 138 years afterwards. Thus 1,138 years passed after the passing of Śrī kṛṣṇa. The next were the Śiśunābha line of kings with Mahānandi as their last. The *kṛta* ought to have been calculated after 1,200 years. The Āryans did not dare to call it Kṛtayuga after that period. Some how they evaded. From Śiśunābha to Mahānandi a period of 362 years passed. Then Mahāpadma Nanda ruled. He exterminated the kṣatriyas, like another Paraśu Rāma. He was a son of Mahānandi by his concubine.

Till that time the Āryans entertained some hope of *kṛta* coming in. They gave it up at the time of Nanda. Śrī Bhāgavata says:—

आरभ्य भवतो जन्म यावन्नन्दाभिषेचनम् ।
एतद्वर्षसहस्रं तु शतपञ्चदशोत्तरम् ॥ S. K. XII. ii. 25.

The commentator says on 1,150 years that it was said of some other thing which he was not able to specify. कयापि विवक्षयाऽवान्तरसंख्येयम्'। He knows that the correct period is 1,498 or 1,500 years. We say that the text meant to speak of the beginning of *kṛta.*

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa reads—

यावत्परीक्षितो जन्म यावन्नन्दाभिषेचनम् ।
एतद्वर्षसहस्रं तु ज्ञेयं पञ्चाशदुत्तरम् ॥ 11. V. P. IV 24. 104.

It talks of 1,050 years only though everybody knows that it must be 1,500 years. Therefore Śrīdhara says of 1,050 years, शुद्धक्षत्रवंशोपेतं ज्ञेयम्—न तु कालमात्रसंख्येयम्। But Viṣṇucitta who suspects nothing would read it पञ्चशतोत्तरं and so end all cotroversy.

That the authors of Śrī Bhāgavata and Viṣṇu Purāṇa wanted to speak of *kṛta* is brought out by another verse.

यदा मघाभ्यो यास्यन्ति पूर्वाषाढां महर्षयः ।
तदा नन्दात्प्रभृत्येष कलिर्वृद्धिं गमिष्यति ॥ Bhag. XII-2-31.
प्रयास्यन्ति यदा चैते पूर्वाषाढां महर्षयः ।
तदा नन्दात्प्रभृत्येव गतिवृद्धिं गमिष्यति ॥ V. P. IV 24. 112-7.

They ended by saying that *kali* grows stronger after 1,500 years. They effected this by multiplying 1,200 by 360. There was an attempt to multiply by 1,000. They said that 1,200 years were the years of Devas.

शतानि तानि दिव्यानां सप्त पञ्च च संख्यया ।
निश्शेषेण गते तस्मिन् भविष्यति पुनः कृतम् ॥ V. P. *v*. 115.

From the 1,050th year to the 1,500th year after Śrī Kṛṣṇa, people were in doubt whether *kṛta* would begin then, after 1,200 years called Kaliyuga. After Nanda, the doubt was set at rest. There was a saying that the Kṣatriya race came to an end after Nanda. नन्दान्तं क्षत्रियकुलम्। Now every body is agreed that *kṛta* is to come in after 4,32,000 years of *kali.*

1,050 years after Kṛṣṇa is about 3,900 years from to day or about 2,000 B. C. Mahāpadma Nanda came 450 years later or about 1,500 B.C. Kauṭilya lived about 1,450 B.C. and he betrayed the last of the Nandas and set up Candragupta Maurya as king. It was probably Kauṭilya that settled the age of *kali*.

The reason for continuing *kali* is obvious. *Kali* ceased to be thought of merely as an astronomical period. The reason is suggested in Śrī Bhāgavata.

तदाविशत्कलिर्लोकं पापे यद्रमते जनः । *v*. 28.

[कृतं] भविष्यति यदा नृणां मन आत्मप्रकाशकम् ॥ *v*. 33.

If the nature of the people is to determine the name of the period, then nothing can be fixed. What shall we do at the end of this 4,32,000 years of *kali* if the people continue to be bad? No *kṛta* can ever come in.

Really after Yudhiṣṭhira 9,000 and odd years have passed, 4,800 years will make a Kṛtayuga and 3,600 years will make a Tretā. Therefore more than 600 years have passed in Dvāpara yuga. This is the correct account according to the ancient Āryan reckoning.

PAṆḌITA GHANAŚYĀMA—A POET-MINISTER OF KING TUKKOJI (TULAJA I) OF TANJORE (1729-1735).

BY

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Ghanaśyāma is a prolific writer. His name is for the first time known to the Sanskrit-reading public through the 'Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts in South India' by Dr. E. Hultzsch, Ph. D., who, in spite of his many-sided activities, has carefully given in No. III of his Reports the names of all the works of Ghanaśyāma and many useful extracts from his work. These extracts furnish accurate information regarding the date and the literary history of this learned poet. Except Ghanaśyāma's commentary on Uttararāmacaritanāṭaka, most of his works are not yet published ; and almost all the Oriental Journals of to day are silent about them. My humble attempt in this paper is only to give a short sketch of his life and literary career, so far as I am able to gather from Dr. Hultzsch's Reports and from the Jambunātha Bhaṭṭa Laṇḍagai Collection of Manuscripts in the Tanjore Palace library.

Here I am tempted to observe that many of Ghanaśyāma's work, more than 100 in number, have perished by this time and some at least would not have come to the possession of the public but for the careful collection and safe preservation by the great Mahrathi Sanskrit scholar—Jambunātha Bhaṭṭa Lāṇḍagai of Tanjore, in whose name and memory many rare Manuscripts, including some of Ghanaśyāma's Sanskrit works[1], are now preserved in this Library.

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[1] The following eighteen works of Ghanaśyāma are preserved in this Library :

1. चम्पूरामायणम्—युद्धकाण्डः ॥
2. शाकुन्तलसञ्जीवनी ॥

Ghanaśyāma was the favourite minister of king Tukkoji I of Tanjore (between 1729-35) the third son of king Ekoji *alias* Veṅkoji, and the brother of the famous kings Sahaji and Serfoji I. The following extracts give a good summary of his personal history and his literary and other accomplishments :

1. यस्येशोऽप्रभवः पिता किल महादेवः स काशीप्रसूः
साधुः श्रेयसि सुन्दरी प्रियतमा शाकम्भरी च स्वसा ।
सप्ताष्टोक्तिलिपिप्रभुर्गुणनिधिश्चौण्डाजिबालाजिनः
पौत्रो यो द्वयवादितूलपवनो द्वाविंशवर्षान्वितः ॥

[Prologue of Navagraha Caritanāṭaka].

2. आत्मा यः शिवयोश्चिदम्बरमहायोगीन्द्रशाकम्भरी-
भ्राता स्त्रीद्वयसुन्दरीकमलजः काशीमहादेवजः ॥
मन्त्री चोलमहीपतेस्त्र्यधिकपञ्चाशत्प्रबन्धीकरः
वाग्देवी धुरि वावदीति स घनश्यामः कवीनां कविः ॥

[Verse 5. Bhāratacampūsañjvīanī].

3. प्रबोधचन्द्रोदयव्याख्या ॥
4. आनन्दसुन्दरीसट्टकम् ॥
5. मदनसञ्जीवनभाणः ॥
6. दशकुमारचरितसञ्जीवनम् ॥
7. कुमारविजयनाटकम् ॥
8. भोजचम्पूव्याख्या ॥
9. प्राकृतभाषामञ्जरी ॥
10. उत्तररामचरितव्याख्या ॥
11. चन्द्रालोकव्याख्या (very much worm-eaten).
12. विद्धसालभञ्जिकाव्याख्या–(प्राणप्रतिष्ठा)
13. प्रचण्डराहूदयदीपिका (A fragment only).
14. संस्कृतभाषामञ्जरी ॥
15 षण्मणिमण्डनकाव्यम् ॥
16. नवग्रहचरितनाटकम् ॥
17. प्राकृतसंस्कृतकाव्यम् ॥
18 प्रहसनम् ॥

3. आत्मा यः शिवयोश्चिदम्बरमहायोगीन्द्रशाकम्भरी-
भ्राता स्त्रीद्वयसुन्दरीकमलजः काशीमहादेवजः ।
एकग्रन्थकरस्य हन्त! भणितिं मिश्रस्य स व्याकरो-
दार्योक्तीरवतंसयन्भुवि घनश्यामः कवीनां कविः ॥

[verse 14. Prabodhacandrodayasañjīvanī].

4 इति महाराजपदमहनीय तुक्कोजिराजमहामात्येन मौनभार्गवकुलाकूपार-चन्द्रचौण्डोबालाजिपौत्रेण, कौण्डिन्यगोत्रपारावारनिस्तुलकौस्तुभतिम्माजिबाला-जिदौहित्रेण, काशीमहादेवतनूजेन, शाकम्भरीपरमहंसचिदम्बरब्रह्मानुजेन, परदुष्करनवरसमणिपेटकचतुरचतुःषष्टिप्रबन्धीदशभाषाकाव्याष्टपदीपद्यवर्णविलसद-न्यूनाक्षरमालिकार्यास्तवनकवनधौरन्धरीपारीणेन, गीतगाथासहस्रचतुष्टयचटुल-दिव्यदेवीताटङ्कलिपिकल्पकेन, दुर्जनातिनिन्द्येन, सज्जनाभिनन्द्येन, सुन्दरीकमला-जानिना, भगवत्पादप्रतिष्ठापिताद्वैतसुधासमुद्राटनमहापीठेन, महाराष्ट्रमह-त्तरपटलकोटीरहीरेण वश्यवचः—सर्वज्ञ—सरस्वतीनामत्रयमण्डितेन, घन-श्यामपण्डितेन, शिवसाक्षिकसप्ताष्टवारपुरःप्रदेशप्रत्यक्षविभूतिरुद्राक्षधरप्रबोध-टीकोक्तकथनोत्तरक्षणदृश्यकृष्णमिश्रविज्ञापनाबलात्कारतश्चन्द्रोदयगौरीव्रतनिशी-थारब्धपरिपूरितप्रबोधचन्द्रोदयसञ्जीवनाख्यटिप्पणे, प्रथमोऽङ्कः ॥

[Colophon of the First Act in Prabodhacandrodaya-sañjīvanī.]

His paternal grandfather was Cauṇḍāji Bālāji who was described as the moon that rose up from the ocean of *Mauna Bhārgava* family. His maternal grandfather was Timmāji Bālāji who was praised by our author as 'the unrivalled kaustubha jewel of the great ocean of *Kauṇḍinya* family'. His father was Mahādeva and mother was Kāśī. He had one sister named Śākambhari and had an elder brother, named Cidambarayati in his fourth Āśrama. He paid a glowing tribute to his benevolent brother who settled at Devīpāṣāṇam or Navapāṣāṇam in the front-view of the temple of Goodess Mahiṣāsuramardinī near Rameśvaram, as evidenced by the following verse found in his Prabodhacandrodayasañjivanī.

वन्दे ब्रह्मपरं चिदम्बरगुरुं पूर्वाश्रमे मेऽग्रजं
यस्यारामसरोऽग्रहारयुगधिष्ठानं सुसत्रं मटि ।
श्रीरामेश्वरमार्गधाम्नि महिषाभिख्यासुरघ्न्याः पुरो
देवीपट्टणतीर्थभाजि नवपाषाणस्थले शोभते ॥

He had two wives, Sundarī and Kamalajā or Kamalā, who, as literary ladies, played a prominent part in his literary career. He himself referred to them in one of the Maṅgalaślokas on the goddess *vāk,* in his famous commentary on the Viddhasālabhañjikā—

केयं दीप्तिरयैष कः परिमलः किं शिञ्जितं का मृदु
ब्रूतेऽसाविति सुन्दरीकमलयोः प्रश्नस्य या भाजनम् ।
दीप्रा कापि तडिल्लतेव पुरतोऽप्यह्नाय दृश्या च या
ब्रह्माणं जहती विभाति मयि सा वाग्देवता पातु वः ॥

His two wives successfully imitated his Viddhasālabhañjikā-Vyākhyā, known as Prāṇapratiṣṭhā, and jointly wrote another commentary on the same drama, in which, after the usual prayer, a list is given of Ghanaśyāma's Sanskrit works, more than sixty-four in number :—

गणेशचरितं (1) भाणः (2) षडाननचरित्रकम् (3) ।
युद्धकाण्डः (4) सटीकश्च (5) नवग्रहचरित्रकम् (6) ॥
सट्टकं (7) ससटीकञ्च (8) वेङ्कटेशचरित्रकम् (9) ।
संस्कृता (10) प्राकृता (11) भाषामञ्जरी, कलिदूषणम् (12) ॥
सव्याख्यानं (13) डमरुकं (14) काव्ये प्राकृतसंस्कृते (15) ।
प्रसङ्गलीलार्णव (16) वत् काव्यं षण्मणिमण्डनम् (17) ॥
एषां व्याख्याः (18, 19, 20, 21,) कुमारविजयं (22) डिमः (23) ।
व्यायोगा (24)—न्यापदेशानां (25) सहस्रं राजरञ्जनम् (26) ॥
जातिसंतर्जनं (27) वर्णमाला (28) शाब्दिकमोदनम् (29) ।
त्रिमठीनाटका (30)—न्यम्बाविजय (31) द्वैतभञ्जनम् (32) ॥
दोषाकरः (33) कुकविसंतापनं (34) च गुणाकरः (35) ।
सालभञ्ज्या भुवि प्राणप्रतिष्ठाऽन्यैः सुदुष्करा (36) ॥
समप्राकृतकाव्यार्थबन्धः (37) श्लेषार्थचित्तभाक् ।
अबोधाकरवद्भागवतचम्पूश्च (38) टीकया (39) ॥
नलचम्पू (40) हरिश्चन्द्रचम्पू (41) र्थत्रयात्मकः ।
भगवत्पादचरित (42) धातुकोशो (43) रसार्णवः (44) ॥
अद्वैतबोधोऽ (45) ‘नुभवचिन्तामण्याख्यनाटिका (46) ।
शाकुन्तलस्यो (47) त्तररामचरित्रस्य (48) च टिप्पणम् ॥

प्रबोधचन्द्रोदय (49) वद्रोज (50) भारतचम्पु (51) वत् ।
कादम्बरी (52) विक्रमोर्वशीययो (53) वेंणीसंहृते: (54) ॥
प्राकृतायाः सप्तशत्याः (55) कविराक्षसपद्धते: (56) ।
स्वपूरितमहावीर (57) चण्डकौशिकयो (58) रपि ॥
व्याख्या वासवदत्तायाः (59) स्थलमाहात्म्यपञ्चकम् (64) ।
नानाभाषास्वष्टपदीपदादीनां तु नो मितिः ॥

[Sundarīkamalīyam—Commentary on Viddhasālabhañjikā]

They (Sundarī and Kamalā) justified the propriety of their writing a commentary on the same drama which was already commented upon by their learned husband, in the following terms—

कृता व्युत्पन्नसिंहेभ्यो नाथपादैरविस्तरा ।
प्राणप्रतिष्ठा या तस्या मूलस्याप्यर्थदैव या ॥
सुन्दरीकमलाभ्यां सा व्युत्पन्नानां सुबोधने ।
इयं प्रणीयते टीका चमत्कारतरङ्गिणी ॥

[Sundarīkamalīya, availabhe in this Library].

"Their work is intended only for ordinary people of average learning, while their Lord's work—Prāṇapratiṣṭhā, which makes the text full of meaning, is intended only for sarvants of a high order—व्युत्पन्नसिंहाः. Still they were afraid that their work would be an object of ridicule when it might fall into others' hands :—

व्याख्यैषा.....................................हासायैव भविष्यति ॥

Ghanaśyāma had two sons *Candraśekhara* and *Govardhana.* The former was known from his work—a commentary on his father's *Ḍamaruka* as these verses show:—

घनश्यामस्य सुमहाकविशब्दजुषः कृतेः ।
कुर्वे डमरुकस्याहं टिप्पणं चन्द्रशेखरः ॥
जामातृशोधमत्राकुर्वद्भिर्धातुविस्तराद्यखिलम् ।
डमरुकचित्रावल्यां ज्ञेयं मत्तातपादरचितायाम् ॥

[Hultzst's Reports III. Page 66].

The latter *Govardhana,* a blind boy from his early days, was known as the author of a commentary on Ghaṭakarpara's work, where he highly eulogised his father in the following terms :—

1. निजजनकघनश्यामं शेषवचःप्रियमशेषशास्त्रज्ञम् ।
वन्दे यद्दत्तागमदृशा सुखसहं ममान्ध्यदुःखमभूत् ॥
2. मूढोऽपि गोवर्धननामधेयः पितृप्रसादादनवद्यविद्यः ।
सद्यः कविः सत्वरया तनोति सङ्क्षिप्तटीकां घटकर्परस्य ॥

Ghanaśyāma refers to one learned author *Śivarāmakṛṣṇa*, with great respect.

ग्रन्थो मे मित इह विस्तरे वृथा स्या-
द्रायत्र्यष्टकपठने बुधोऽलसो यत् ।
यल्लेखेष्वपि शिवरामकृष्णनाम्नां
यश्चायं वटुगणपाठने घनेच्छः ॥

[Uttararāmacaritasañjīvanī].

That Ghanaśyāma produced sixty four works in Sanskrit, twenty in Prākṛt and twenty-five in Vernaculars is evident from the verse in his commentary on the *Nīlakaṇṭhacampū* :—

"संस्कृते या चतुःषष्टिसङ्ख्या, विंशतिसङ्ख्यका ।
प्राकृते या च भाषासु पञ्चविंशतिसङ्ख्यका ॥

That a prolific writer like Ghanaśyāma, who was patronised by King Tukkoji, and whose beautiful poetry was also well appreciated by the royal patron, had to suffer much in his later days is a pity indeed. He had to concentrate his mind upon God after the death of his royal patron and this is expressed in a pathetic way in the following verse.

आयुः किं शरदां सहस्रमथ किं दैवेन यद्दीयते
तन्नालं जठरस्य हन्त गिरिजाकान्तं शिवं चिन्तय ।
मत्काव्याणुविलङ्घनैकविमुखे तुक्कोजिराजे गतेऽ-
प्याश्चण्डालमनः! किमिच्छसि पुनर्भाग्यं न लज्जा तव ॥

[Nīlakaṇṭhacampūsañjīvanī]

Ghanaśyāma's troubles in his later days may be accounted for easily. He was a great devotee of the Goddess Vāk—Sarasvatī—and his ardent devotion so completely blinded him as to believe that he was an incarnation of *Sarasvatī* herself. In this respect, he imitated Rājaśekhara who belived that he (Rājaśekhara) was the third incarnation of the great *Ādikavi Vālmīki* after Bhavabhūti and Bhartṛmeṇtha (the author fo Hayagrīvavadha). This blind belief had somehow a telling

effect upon him and on his works. He began to consider himself a matchless man of letters and a noisy note of vanity pervaded all his productions. In one of the introductory verses in his commentary on Bhāratacampū he set aside all the commentators except the learned Appaya Dīkṣita and the revered Mallinātha, as worthless on the ground that they all alike, like the fluttered runaways from the battle-field, observed a vow of silence in interpreting a difficult passage, while they made great noise in commenting on easy passages in the text:—

सन्त्यन्याप्ययदीक्षितं बुधवरं श्रीमल्लिथार्यम-
प्यन्यस्मै सकलाय सन्तु नतयो व्याख्याकरौघाय नः ।
काठिन्ये सति मौनवेगचकितः सौलभ्यकोलाहली
यो वैराटिरिवाचकास्ति समराद्धावन् प्रवीरो गृहे ॥

That his antipathy to the author of Saṅkalpasūryodaya was very great is evident from his express statement:—

प्रबोधचन्द्रोदयसेर्ष्यजातसङ्कल्पसूर्योदयशोणदृष्टेः ।
प्रचण्डराहूदयकर्तुरेष बाभात्यहो! श्मश्रुणि यस्य हस्तः ॥

It is mere childishness that he (Ghanaśyāma) finished his moustache against Vedanta Deśika as if to meet him in an open contest. His vanity and over-confidence reached a ludicrous climax in his endeavour to pull down even the great Kālidāsa—'दशाकृतिर्हा कालिदासोऽस्ति चेत्'. These statements did provoke the indignation of the learned public against our author and his intolerable conceipt made for his fall in his later days.

In these circumstances, it becomes intelligible why *Vāñcheśvarasudhī,* ' otherwise known as *Kuṭṭikavi,* the famous author of the Mahiṣaśataka, and probably an elder contemporary of Ghanaśyāma himself in the Court of Tukkoji (Tulaja I), is said to have satirised Ghanaśyāma and such others as *vṛṣalas* who had free access to the then royal court of Tanjore, in the following verse in the Mahiṣaśataka :—

'नानाजिप्रभुशाहजीन्द्रशरभेन्द्रानन्दरायादयो
विद्वांसः प्रभवो गताः श्रितसुधीसन्दोहजीवातवः ।
विद्यायां विषबुद्धयो हि वृषलाः सभ्यास्त्विदानीन्तनाः
किं कुर्वेऽम्ब कृषे व्रजामि शरणं त्वामेव विश्वावनीम् ॥

Virūpākṣa the author of the Śāradaśarvarī, a commentary on the *candrāloka* refers to Ghanaśyāma in the following extract :—

'कुर्वन्ती स्वच्छमन्तर्जडमपि च घनाम्भोदवार्तां हरन्ती
चन्द्रालोकप्रबोधिन्यखिलकुवलयानन्दसन्धानशीला ।
सङ्कल्पात्सत्कलाभृत्कृतपदशिरसः श्रीविरूपाक्षनाम्नः
प्रादुर्भूतप्रकाशा जगति विजयतां शारदी शर्वरी या ॥

(शारदशर्वरी—a ms. available in this library).

But all these did not put him out of spirit. He was fully confident in himself and in his matchless workmanship. His appeals and exhortations to the world at large resembled those of the great poet-critic Bhavabhūti who said in his Mālatīmādhava :—

ये नाम केचिदिह नः प्रथयन्त्यवज्ञां
जानन्ति ते किमपि तान् प्रति नैष यत्नः ।
उत्पत्स्यतेऽस्ति मम कोऽपि समानधर्मा
कालो ह्ययं निरवधिर्विपुला च पृथ्वी ॥

(Mālatīmādhava Act I.)

मद्ग्रन्थानवलोक्य सर्वमपि तच्छब्दार्थजालं मन-
स्याधाय प्रतिसंस्कृतैः कृतिलवं ये ये गुरुद्रोहिणः ।
कुर्वन्ति स्म करान्निजं प्रहरणं तेषां हृदि स्थापय-
त्यज्ञानां किल सम्पदां झटिति या सा शूलिनी पातु वः ॥

श्रुत्वा द्वित्रबुधाः कृताः प्रमुदिता नो वात्र किं तावता
जम्बूद्वीपमिदं कियत्कृतिगुणग्राहा रसज्ञाः कति ।
वाग्देवी कवयाम्यहं मम चतुःषष्टिप्रबन्धीसुधा-
कूपारा भुवि निर्विषैर्वघटजापेया विराजन्त्यमी ॥

निन्द्यो निन्दतु दुर्जनो दशकृतिर्ह्रा कालिदासोऽस्ति चे-
न्नैष ज्ञास्यसि(ति) चातुरीं मम चतुःषष्टिप्रबन्धीकवेः ।
आस्तां ग्राम्यकिटिश्चतुर्दिशजगद्ग्रासस्य लिङ्गात्मनो
जानात्यादिवराह एव न पदोर्भावं भवानीपतेः ॥

(Verses 5, 7 & 8. Prabodhacandrodayavyākhyā Act I).

Ghanaśyāma's great renown as a poet is shown by the following extract found in the prologue to the Navagrahacaritanāṭaka :—

विश्वावसुः—(आकाशे)

यदन्यकविदुर्लभं यदपि संविधानोद्भवं
कुतूहलकरं जगत्यनुभवैकवेद्यं च यत् ।
तदस्मदतिविस्मयावहमनेकवस्तूज्ज्वलं
नवं किमपि चिन्त्यतामिति नवग्रहाणां मनः ॥

शास्त्रे भागवते पुराणपटले रामायणे भारते
सर्वैश्चर्वितचर्वणं कृतमहो किञ्चित्कवीनां गणैः ।
एवं सत्यधुना नवं किमपि हा वर्तेत किं वा यतो
भूयादन्वहमेव तत्रभवतां भूयान्प्रसादो मयि ॥

(नान्द्यन्ते)

सूचकः—(ससम्भ्रममाकाशे लक्ष्यं बध्वा) भो भोः छान्दसचमत्कारिन् ! किं ब्रवीषि ।

नमामि वरभाग्याय ग्रस्तदुःखापदं हरम् ।
चरणध्वस्तदारिद्र्यं रिपुघ्नं तण्डुसेवितम् ॥

एतत्पद्यविद्यमानसप्तपदीपूर्वपूर्वाक्षरसम्मेलनघटितं यद्भवेत्तत्किमप्यभिनयेति ।

(प्रविश्य)

कालयुक्तिः—प्रिये ! **नवग्रहचरितम**भिनेतव्यमिति व्यादिष्टोऽस्मि तत्रभवद्भिः ।

सूचकः— (स्वगतं) ननु सुप्रसिद्धमिदम् । (प्रकाशं) प्रिये ! **सर्वज्ञ-कविना** ? । यस्येशोऽप्रभवः.......द्वाविंशवर्षान्वितः ।

(आकाशे) न हि तेन कृतम् । अपि तु **घनश्यामेन** ।

प्रहसनडमरुकनाटकसट्टककाव्यद्विमञ्जरीभाणान् ।
देवीताटङ्कलिपिं कृतवान् यश्चान्य(?) मिष्टशतचम्पूम् ॥

सूचकः—श्रुत्वा हृष्यति । (नेपथ्ये) न खलु घनश्यामेन कृतम्; किं तु **कण्ठीरवेण** । यः किल याचते नित्यम् ।

दत्वा ग्रामान्द्विजेभ्यः कृतबुधमखसात्कृत्य दन्तावलन्द्रान्
कृत्वा श्रीपौण्डरीकं रचितवनसरःसत्रदेवालयादिः ।

नीत्वा ख्यातिं प्रबन्धान् प्रथितरणयशा न्यस्य राज्येषु पुत्रान्
अन्ते संन्यस्य शम्भो त्वयि हृदिव वपुर्गाङ्गनीरेऽर्पयामि ॥ इति ॥

(प्रविश्य पटाक्षेपेण)

सिद्धार्थः—आर्य! चौण्डाजिकविर्नेदमाहितमिति नः श्रुतम्।

कालयुक्तिः—(स्वगतम्) किं णुखु भिण्णभिण्णो पवादो। (किन्तु खलु भिन्नभिन्नोऽपवादः) (प्रकाशं) अज्जउत्त! विससण कइणाकअंति किवअन्ती पवहइ।

सूचकः—(साश्चर्यं स्वगतं) अहो कौतुकपरम्परा! प्रिये! शृणुमस्तावत्।

सर्वज्ञ(कवि)चौण्डाजिकविकण्ठीरवा अपि।
घनश्यामस्य जगति प्रथन्ते नामकीर्तयः ॥

In one quarter he was well-known as Sarvajñakavi, in another as Ghanaśyāma, yet in another as Kavi-kaṇṭhīrava and again in another as Cauṇḍājikavi. He was also surnamed Vaśyavacas and 'Sarasvati'—वश्यवच(स्सर्वज्ञ)सरस्वतीनाम(त्रय)मण्डितेन—in the colophon of the first act of his Prabodhacandrodayavyākhyā. He himself made a pun upon his own favourite name 'Ghanaśyāma' by which he was known to posterity, in the following verse in his Uttararāmacaritasañjīvana :—

तनुरुचि यो न श्यामः कविः कवीनां स यदि घनश्यामः।
कवने कमनश्यामः किमसूयाभिर्मुधैव नश्यामः ॥

" If he (the poet) is Ghanaśyāma, he is not black in colour but he is a poet of poets because he is himself a श्याम (a cuckoo) which sings beautiful poetry. Why kill ourselves thereby in vain with jealousy ?"

Ghanaśyāma was a good poet even in his twelfth year when he wrote his Rāmāyaṇayuddhakāṇḍa-campū, as may be seen from the following verse in his Yuddhakāṇḍa :—

यस्येशोऽग्रभवः.........................
...........शाकम्भरी च स्वसा।
तेन द्वादशवत्सरेण कविना चौण्डाजिपन्तेन च
श्रीमानारचितश्चिराय जयतु श्रीयुद्धकाण्डो मुदा ॥

In his Kumāravijayanāṭaka, he openly expressed his superiority to Rājaśekhara—a poet-critic of the 10th century—in the following terms :—

'राजशेखरश्च प्रगल्भते। ....स खलु संस्कृतप्राकृतमात्रकविः। अयं तु सर्वभाषाकविः' इति ॥

Again in his Viddhasālabhañjikāvyākhyā known as Prāṇapratiṣṭhā, he ridiculed Rājaśekhara as a very mean author ; but as a literary man, he felt he ought to safely preserve at least one of Rājaśekhara's dramas—Viddhasālabhañjikā—by writing a good commentary upon it, just as people, through pity, look after the welfare of a helpless orphan :—

पञ्चाशीत्यधिकान्यदुष्करमहाग्रन्थाः पदोस्रारुणा-
त्रिग्रन्थीकरराजशेखरकृतिव्याख्यासु लज्जामहे ।
मादृक्षा भुवि केऽनुभाविन इति स्निग्धा वयं लौल्यतः
पाल्योऽस्तस्य शिशुः स्थितैरिति नयादत्रानुकम्पामहे ॥

His poetry (style) is in keeping with his theme.

(1) Vīrabhadra speaks of his separation from his beloved Sati; the pathos is touching.

जानाम्येव समग्रमप्यविरलं तत्त्वार्थसारं तथा
जाने लब्धुमपि व्यथाप्रतिकृतिं सत्त्वप्रकारोन्नतिम् ।
जानाम्येव जनाय तत्कथयितुं विज्ञानमुच्चावचं
जाने नैकमहं बतानुभवितुं जायावियोगं पुनः ॥

वेदा एव कुतो यजध्वमिति हा वाक्यार्थमाबिभ्रते
कृत्वा भक्तिममीषु दक्षहतकोऽप्यारब्धसत्रं कुतः ।
बाला सापि कुतः पितुर्मखमदं मुग्धा जगामाग्रहात् ;
(विचिन्त्य) ज्ञातं मद्विपदे तदेतदखिलं सम्पन्नमेवङ्गुणम् ॥

[Kumāravijayanāṭaka Act II, *v.* 7 & 8]

(2) Vīrabhadra enters the stage as the personation of Raudra-Rasa :

(ततः प्रविशति बद्धकच्छो रक्तरक्ताङ्गः श्मश्रुसमुल्लासकरः खड्गपाणि-वीरभद्रः । विकटं परिम्क्रय दन्तान्कटकटाकृत्य सरोषम्)

दोष्णा गां शकलीकरोमि नखरैश्चूर्णीकरोम्यम्बरं
दुर्दान्तं कबलीकरोमि (सह)साचामामि सप्तार्णवीम् ।
ऊर्ध्वं नागजगन्नयाम्यहमधः स्वर्गं करोम्यश्रमः
श्रीमद्भीमपदाब्जरेणुकरुणालेशाणुमात्रा यदि ॥

[Kumāravijayanāṭaka Act I, *v.* 14.]

Here we hear an echo of the *raudra* sentiment expressed by Bhīmasena in the Veṇīsaṁhāra in the following terms :—

मथ्नामि कौरवशतं समरे न कोपात्
दुश्शासनस्य रुधिरं न पिबाम्युरस्तः ।
सञ्चूर्णयामि गदया न सुयोधनोरू
सन्धिं करोतु भवतां नृपतिः पणेन ॥

Our author was well conversant with all the canons of Sanskrit Literary criticism and he described his own poetry thus :—

श्रुतिसुखवचनामुदारवृत्तां
ललितपदां सुखदां रसोर्मिलां च ।
रुचिररुचिमुदीतशोभशय्यां
कविगीतां कवितां विचिन्तयामि ॥

He was a prodigy and was a tireless writer. Many commentaries that he wrote were productions of one day or one night or even a part of it *e.g.*, (1) शिवरात्रिचतुर्थयामारब्धपरिपूरितायां........ प्राणप्रतिष्ठायां प्रथमोऽङ्कः ॥ (2) भीष्मैकादशीनिशीथजागरण एवारब्धपरिपूरिते शाकुन्तल-सञ्जीवनाख्यटिप्पणे ॥ etc.

In his Uttararāmacaritasañjīvanī, Ghanaśyāma gave his horoscope which might enable the students of Indian Astrology to ascertain the intellectual and other attainments of our author :—

"लग्ने कीटे झषेष्वासनदलनिलयौ भूजकेतूजनूर्ह-
येंशे काव्योऽथ नक्रे क्रियघटकटकांशेषु सौम्येन चन्द्रः ॥
सौरिर्मेषे तुलांशे वृषमिथुनदले सैंहिकेयोऽथ जीवः
कौलीरे सिंहभागे ह्यळिधनुनवमांशे यदीयोऽवतारः ॥"

	श	रा	
	राशि-		गु
बु च	चक्रम्		
शु	कु के सू ल		

श्री
घनश्यामजातकम्

कु			रा
बु	अंशक-		च
सू	चक्रम्		श गु
के		शु	

One particularly notable feature in the horoscope is the occupation of the ninth house by the most powerful planet—

Guru, who was mainly responsible for the high prosperity and renown that our poet enjoyed in his lifetime.

In conclusion, it may be said to the credit of our author Ghanaśyāma that his poetry is simple, that his knowledge is cyclopaedic and his vocabulary is vast. He is one of the many later poets in whose hands the old Vaidarbhī style of classical poetry was revived in the South. Though at times, given to verbal puns and alliterations, he writes a very clear and pointed language. His independence in thought and in language and his unique position in the royal court of Tanjore as an able poet-minister, made him all-powerful in this temporal world; and for his renunciation of all worldly pleasures, his desire to do public good and his complete reliance upon God—for all these virtues he deserves to be remembered by posterity for all time to come.

DRAVIDIC NOTES.

BY

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I. THE FRONT FRICATIVES AND AFFRICATES OF DRAVIDIAN.

A. *General.*—The (Sibilant) fricative *s* and post-dental and palatal fricatives and affricates abound in Dravidian:—

		Initial.	Medial.
Tamil	...	*śēru* (to join)	*kaśappu* (bitterness) *paccai* (greenness)
Telugu	...	*tsūḍu* (to see) cey (hand)—	*kū(t)su* (sit) *osāgu* (to give)
Kannaḍa	...	*cem* (red)	*hesaru* (name)
Malayāḷam	..	*cāl* (channel)	*veśappu* (hunger)
Tuḷu	...	*caḍu* (belly), *śēru* (to join)	rare[1]
Kui	...	*sā* (to die), *sude* (river)	*nespa* (to fill)
Kurukh	...	*cā* (to stink), *sel* (to push)	*asar* (to fear)
Gōṇḍi	...	*coḍ* (to drop), *sī* (to give)	*gars* (to play)
Brāhūi	...	*cā* (to understand) *sal* (to stand)	*bis* (to bake)

An examination of the above would show that the affricate *c* is rare in medial positions (except in Tamil and Mal. where it appears only in a doubled state *cc.*[2]) Tamil-Mal. does not tolerate *s* initially or medially.

Initially *c* is frequent in Malayāḷam, Kurukh, Tuḷu, Brāhūi, while Kannaḍa shows it occasionally.

Ś initially occurs only in Tamil, and here probably it represents only an older *c* (as the symbol in the native script shows),

1. Medial *ś* has in numerous cases turned into *dj* or *d* in Tuḷu.

2. For the reduplication *Vide* my paper on "Inter-vocal Plosives and Accentual Influence" in *Indian Antiquary*, June, 1929.

especially as Malayāḷam, (an off-shoot of ancient Tamil) preserves the value of *c* in initial positions.

Ś medially is the normal sound of the single medial front fricative in Tamil and Malayāḷam, while Kannaḍa, Telugu and the Central and North Dravidian dialects show the dental sibilant *s*.

Telugu preserves both *s* (*ts*) and *c* initially, according as the following vowel is dorsal or front in character.

Tuḷu[1] shows freely *c* and *s* initially, while occasional variants with initial *ś* are also found.

I propose to discuss in this paper the relationship of these sounds and their possible derivation. Before doing so, let me record here an observation (based upon the examination of different families of languages), recently[2] made by *Pater* Schmidt, that it is probable that fricatives are, in the history of phonetic development, secondarily derived from the plosives.

One of the objects of this paper is to examine how far *Pater* Schmidt's conclusion may be justified in its application to Dravidian.

Preliminarily it may be noted that initial *c*, *ś* and *s* on the one hand, and medial *ś*, *s* on the other, found in the different dialects, are in many cases related amongst themselves in each of the respective groups. This is proved by correspondences like the following :—

	Tam.	Kui.	Gōṇḍi.	Kurukh.	Mal.
(to go, enter, etc.)	*śel*	*sal*	*sal*	*sel*	*cel*
(to die)	*śā*	*sā*	*sāi*	*khe*	*cā*
(√ *may*, to be changed)	*maśal*	*māsa*	*mas*	*massā* (axe)	*maśakka*

1, For explanations of the alternance of initial *t*, *s* and *h* in Tuḷu, see my paper on "The Secondary Velar Aspirate in Dravidian."

2. Page 286 of *Die Sprachfamilien and Sprachenkreise der Erdc*, where *Pater* Schmidt compares the phonetic incidence of the fricative in various groups of languages and says : ' Zusammenfassend lasst sich eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit behaupten, dass die altesten Kulturkreise keine Reibelaute gekannt haben "; and since the oldest culture —spheres, are equated more or less with Language—Spheres, the secondary character of the fricative is indicated.

That in a large number of cases the sounds in each group are related, will be further clear from the following discussion.

B. The question of medial fricatives and affricates may be taken up at first, as it is easier of solution and classification than the problem of the corresponding initial sounds.

All medial fricatives are derivative in Dravidian:—

(*a*) They may have developed originally from a front glide *y e.g.* Tamil *paśumei* (greenness <*pay*); Kann. *basir* (belly —cf. Tam. *bayir*); Kui. *kasa* (to heat) <*kāy*; Gōṇḍi *mās* (to burn) <*vay*; Kurukh *pac* (to be hungry) <*bay;* Br. *bis* (to bake) <*biy*, etc.

(*b*) They are the palatalised resultants of original *t* under the influence of front vowels:—The *cc* of Tamil in the past tense affixes *e.g. kācc-*, etc.; the past affix *s* of Brāhūi (<original *t*); Kui causative *tiss* (to feed) where *ss* <old causal affix-*t;* Gōṇḍi Past bases like *guhc* (having seized) where c <past affix *t*, etc.

(*c*) An older *k* may also have been similarly turned into fricative in instances like following:—Tel. pr. affix *tsu* which is from original *k; arki* (nice) and *ariśi* (rice); etc.

(*d*) In the Central Dravidian dialects Kui and Gōṇḍi, *s* in some cases may be traced to the aspirate *h* :—Kui *rispa* (to settle down) where *s* <older *h;* Gōṇḍi *s* in the causative affix *st*, alternating with *ht*, *e.g. kist* from *kiht*, the causal of *ki* (to do).

This is certainly modelled on the Indo-Aryan alternance of *h* and *s*, as in *niḥ* + *kāma* = *niṣkāma.* h > s, is normally a change not native in Dravidian.

The medial fricatives in Dravidian are, therefore, all derivative.

C. So far as the initial sounds are concerned, the question of origin should be approached through the examination of forms that are cognate in meaning.

	Tam.	Tel.	Kann.	Kui.	Gōṇḍi.	Kurukh.	Brāhūi.	Tuḷu.
(to die)	*śā*	*sā*	*sā*	*sō*	*sā*	*khē*	*kā*	*ā*
(to go, enter etc.,)	*śel*	*cel*	*sel, sal*	*sal*	*sōṛ*	*sel, kā*	*kā*	*sal*
(hill)	*koṇḍa*	*koṇḍa*	*kundu*	*sōru*				
	śuruṅgu	*tsur*	*kurugu*	*krōk*	*sūrv*	cf. *kuk*(boy)	*kur*	*surgu*
(to join)	*cūḍu, kūḍu*	*kūḍu*	*cūḍu*	cf. *kuṭ*	cf. *kuṭ*	*kuḍ*	*kuṭṭ* (to pound)	sūḍi (sheaf.)
(to hang)	*toṅgu*	*toṅgu*	*toṅgu*	...	*tōkar* (tail)	*toṅg*	*ṭang*	*soṅju*
(to sleep)	*tūṅgu*	*tūṅgu*	*tūṅgu*	*sunja*	...	...	*tugh* (sleep)	*sūnju*
(to spit)	*tuppu*	*tupu*	*tupu*	*supu*	...	*tup*	...	*supu*
	tī	*tsūḍ*	*cūḍ*, (heat), *tōr*	*tōj* (to appear)	*tāv-* (to see)	*suṇḍyas* (distoller)	*tor*(to show)	*tu, su, hu*
(√ *tag* to be fit, etc.	*taṭṭai* (flatness)	*tsaṭṭc.*	*caṭṭe, taṭṭe, saṭṭe*	*tan*	*tagg* (to wear fit)	*tān*	*dagh*	*saṭṭe* (flatness)

It will be observed that the above-mentioned forms are *closely* related in form and meaning. In the first five the initial fricative (or affricate, as the case may be, of some dialects), corresponds to the back plosive *k* of others; while in the next five instances the correspondence is between *t* and the fricative.

This opens up a problem worth pursuing, *viz.*, whether and how far the fricatives[1] in initial positions in Dravidian are traceable to *k* and *t*.

The problem can be conclusively proved only if

(*a*) it could be shown that *s* may not have changed to *k* and *t* in Dravidian ;

(*b*) the reasons inducing the change: *k* > fricative, and *t* > fricative are indicated ; and

(*c*) a sufficiently large number of instances of the change are given.

I. We shall start with the question of the relationship of initial *k* and initial fricative.

(i) Nowhere in Dravidian have we instances of an *original* fricative having changed into *k* under ordinary circumstances.

(ii) Initial *k*- under the influence of a front vowel freely changes into the fricative.

	Kannaḍa	Tam.	Brāhūi	Kurukh
(Small)	*Kinna*	*śinna*	*cunak*[2]	*sanni*
(red)	*kem*, *cem*	*śuvappu*	*khem*	*kem*
(fire)	*cicc*	*kāy*		*cicc*

etc. etc.

(iii) Initial *k*- followed by a dorsal vowel does not usually change into a fricative. No instances are available of the groups

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1. The initial fricatives of a number of words in the central Dravidian dialects are traceable to the front on-glide *y* appearing before initial vowels of older bases (*See* I.H.Q., March and June, 1929).

2. The dorsal vowel *-u-* in the Brāhūi word represents older *i*- which, it may be noted here, is in many cases represented by *a*- or *u*- in Brāhūi. The alternance of *-i*- and *-u*- is common in the modern colloquial parlance of the South also : cf. *mū*-and *mī* (above), *tuṟa*, *tiṟa* (to open) etc.

Ko- or *Ku*[1] having changed in any of the dialects into the fricative.

The few cases of forms with *k* followed by the symbol *a*, that do show this change, have to be explained on the principle that Dravidian *a* is sometimes front in character [=a] and that it changes often into less open vowels. It is, therefore, likely that these cases should be traced to the palatalising influence of the *front* character of the immediately following vowel. This view becomes all the stronger when we note that some of the Dravidian dialects in such instances do show front vowels like *e* or *i* *e.g.*,

Brāhūi, *ka* (to die); Kurukh, *khe*, Central *sai;* Southern *śa*, *śā*, *sā* etc.

The conculsion, therefore, so far as initial *k* is concerned is that

(*a*) there are instances in Dravidian of the change : *k*> fricative under the palatalising influence of front vowels, and

(*b*) that when *k* is followed by a dorsal vowel it does not change at all.

11. Now, we come to the question of *t* and the fricative. This question has three aspects :—

(*a*) Whether *t* or the fricative is the original ;

(*b*) If the dental plosive is not original in some cases, whether and how far we can postulate a change like *k*>*s*>*t* ;

(*c*) if *t* is found to be original and the fricative to be secondary, what exactly the course of change from *t* to the fricative was.

(*a*) There is reason to think that initial *t* should have been original in a large number of cases, if we judge from the greater or lesser correspondence of forms in the various dialects *e.g.*,

Southern Dr. (Tamil, Tel., Kann.) etc.,	*Central Dr.* (Kui, Gōṇḍi)	*Northern Dr.* (Kurukh, Br.,) Malto
(to be fit) *tag* ; *tāṉ* (self)	*tan* (self)	*tāṉ*
(to eat) *tiṉ*	*tind*	Kurukh, *tin*

1. It should be remembered that instances like *kurugu*, *śuruṅgu*, should be explained, on the principle stated *supra* in the footnote, of the alternance of *-i-* and *-u-*, as due to the palatalising of *-i-* or some near front vowel. This fact is proved by the existence of cognate forms with the front vowel *-i-*, like *śir*, *siruṅgu* etc.

(to open) *tiṟa, tuṟa* Gōṇḍi, *tul* (to open) Kurukh, *tisig, ture* etc.,

(scorpin) *tēḷ* Gōṇḍi, *tiṛil* (centipede) Br., *tēlh* (Scorpion).

In this connection we may note that the change of *c, ś, s* to *t* is admittedly common in the *colloquial* dialects of the South and particularly in Tuḷu. In adaptations of Sanskrit words with initial sibilants, *t* is substituted for the sibilant *e.g.*,

Tam.:—*tamayam* for *samayam* ; *taṅgati* for *saṅgati*, etc., etc.

Tuḷu :—*tañci* for *sañci*; *tañja* for *sandhyā*; while these are Sanskrit borrowings, the following appear to be *native* instances: *tane* (of cattle to be pregnant) < *śane* < *kane* < *Kāy; tār* (to jump, cf. Tam. *śāṭu* < √ *kā*) etc., etc.

This fact complicates the problem of the origin of *t* and the fricative of numerous native forms. How are we to determine which is original and which is secondary? The only safe course would be to examine if in a *SUFFICIENTLY* large number of dialects, and particularly alike in South, Central and Northern Dravidian, the *cognate* forms show *t* instead of the fricative, in which case a presumption arises as to its *original* character.

Let us take a few instances :—

(i) A large number of cognate forms from the base *tu, tī*, (light, etc.) appear with both initial *t* and the fricative in all Dravidian dialects. (*Vide* my paper on " The Linguistic History of certain Dravidian Words" in Vol. XX of the *Calcutta University Journal of Letters*).

Hence we are not unjustified in thinking (so far as our present knowledge warrants) that *t* is original in this instance.

(ii) *ta-g* (to fit, to be closely pressed, etc.) is a base with initial *t* which has numerous cognate forms in Sn., Central and Nn. Dravidian :—

Sn. :—*tag* (to become fit), *taṭṭi* (that which has become fit flattened), *tāṉ* (self), *taṭṭuga* (spoon), *taggu* (to be humble), *tāṅg* (to assist) etc.

Central :—*tagg* (to be worn light), tāṉ (self), *taṅgi* (sister), *tañji* (father), *tah* (to chip off) etc.

Nn. :—*dagh* (to measure), *tāṉ* (self), *taṅkār* (to become oneself), *tambas* (father) etc.

Initial *t*- therefore should be considered to be original in this instance also.

Similar explanations could be given for a number of other instances also.

(*b*) The next question for consideration is whether in any instances the change : *k* $>$ *fricative* $>$ *t* could be postulated. Here, of course, only if the secondary character of *t* is proved at first, can any plausibility arise as regards the postulate. The few native instances given above illustrative of the change of *s* $>$ *t* in Tuḷu, fall under this class.

I give below a few other instances which raise the problem:—

Kurukh.	*Brāhūi.*	*Central Dr.*	*Sn. Dr.*
(to turn) *kirr*	*kur*	*sur*, *tir*	*sur*, *tir*
(to beat) *khall*	*kell*	Kui., *sah* (to beat)	tal
(to move) *ka*	*ka*	*tar*, *sal*	*tar*, *sel*, *sār*, etc.
(to be full) *tumbu*	*kubēn* (heavy)	*kūp* (to fill)	*kumi*, *tuppu*, etc.

The above are some instances of the possible correspondence *k*: *fricative*: *t*. They are very few; but few as they are, they do raise a problem which we cannot satisfactorily solve in the present state of our knowledge; the materials available are much too inadequate to enable us to come to any definite conclusion.

(*c*) Despite the question raised by the facts adduced in (*b*) above, one thing is clear :—initial *t*- should have been original[1] in a number of instances commonly found in Nn., Sn. and Centr. Dr. alike, and many of these original forms have also derivatives with initial fricatives.

What we have now to see is the course of change along which, in these cases, the original *t* may have changed into a fricative:

1. Nothing can be more misleading than to think that because there are instances of the change of *s* $>$ *t* in the South, and a few cases of the possible change (*k* $>$ fricative $>$ *t*)—the initial fricative is original in Dravidian and that *all* cases of initial *t* are derived from the fricative. The determining factors are the following :—(*a*) the existence of *t*- in cognate forms of *numerous* dialects; and (*b*) the undoubted original character of *t*- in a large number of other forms which do not have alternative fricatives initially.

(i) Under the influence of a front vowel, palatalisation of *t* to *c* or *ś* (and then a change back to *s* in some dialects) is possible :—

Cf. Tamil *tikku*, *śikku* (to be crowded, etc.), Tuḷu *cippale* (clamp), *cīntu* (to burn, from *tī*), etc. Kui *sik* (to be scorched from *tī*), Brāhūi *cāē* (to understand—cf. Southern *teriy*), Kurukh *cind* (ashes, from *tī*), etc., etc.

(ii) So far as cases, where initial *t* with a following dorsal vowel has changed into a fricative, are concerned, there are three possibilities:—

(*a*) The original vowel may in some cases have been front in character—cf. the alternance of *-u-* and *-i-* above referred to in Dravidian; and note also the front value of Dr. *a* in certain positions.

(*b*) The change of *t* to a palatal fricative need not necessarily in all cases have been due to the influence of any palatal vowel; for the dental *t* may, by a slight rise in the point of articulaticn of the tongue, change with a slight leap to *ś*. In this respect, *t* > *ś* stands on a different footing from *k* > *ś*, owing to the greater proximity of the points of production for *t* and ś.

(*c*) The change may have been in many cases a direct fricatisation of *t* > *s*, and then *s* may have changed into *ś* and thence to *c* [cś.].

What exactly the process was in all those instances of original initial *t*—explained above as having subsequently changed into the fricatives,—we are not in a position to say definitively. The preference shown by Tamil, Kurukh and Malayāḷam for fricatives or affricates (as the case may be) with raised point of articulation, on the one hand,——and the common occurrence of initial dental *s* for *t* in Tuḷu and the Central Dravidian dialects, on the other, are noteworthy.

Conclusion.

(*a*) Certain instances of initial Dravidian fricatives are traceable to the palatalisation of an original *k*.

(*b*) Som: Initial fricatives are also traceable to original *t*, either through the process of fricatisation or palatalisation.

(*c*) Medical friçatives are undoubtedly secondary.

(*d*) All things considered, therefore, it appears as if the initial front sibilants and fricatives (dental, post-dental and palatal, and initial affricates are not original in Dravidian but derivative.

II. ONE AND THREE IN DRAVIDIAN.

		ONE	THREE
Tamil	...	*oru, ondru, ottrai*	*mū(v), mūndru, mūnu*
Telugu	...	*oka (ṭi)*	*mūḍu*
Kannaḍa	...	*ondu*	*mūḍu, mūndu*
Malayāḷam	...	*onnu*	*mūnu*
Tuḷu	...	*oñji*	*mūji*
Kui	...	*ro*	*mū, mūndi*
Gōṇḍi	...	*uṇḍi*	*mūndu*
Kurukh	...	*ort, oṇṭa*	*nubb, mund*
Brāhūi	...	*asi, asiṭ*	*musi, musiṭ*
Malto	...	*ort, oṇḍ*	*tīn* (Indo-Aryan.)

The history of the forms for *"one"* and *"three"* in Dravidian sheds interesting light on the origin and character of the alveolar plosive *t* and of the spontaneous nasals appearing in Dravidian before sonant plosives.

(1) Tamil shows the most conservative form for "one", in that *or* is constituted of the base *o* (one) and - *r*(from *ir*) the ancient Dravidian verb-forming and noun-forming affix (appearing in *tur*, to appear; *kūr* to sit; *kuḷir*, cold; *veḷir*, whiteness etc.)

ondru (one), the substantival form, is derived from *or* itself, the *ndr* group arising from stressed *r* which incorporates the alveolar *t* as *tr*, *t* subsequently having become sonatised into -d along with the production of the spontaneous nasal *n*.

This change is more or less analogous to the change of *kumbu* (heap) from *kuv* (to heap), *pāmbu* (that which rushes, snake) from *pāyvu*, *īṅgu* (to move) from *ī-gu*, etc., etc. The plosive *t* in the constitution of stressed *r* was recognised, and the spontaneous nasal cropped up on the principle of accommodative ease which also led to the sonatisation of *t* into d.

An alternative explanation that might 'be suggested is that *ondru* arose from *or* + *t*, this *t* being traceable to the neuter demonstrative which is employed for the formation of neuter nouns. The following facts, however, militate against this possibility:—

(*a*) The change of *ondru* to *oñji*, of *mūndru* to *mūji*, and of *āru* to *āji* in Tuḷu is a uniform law in Tuḷu operating in all cases of *ṟ*: *maje* (to forget-*maṟa*), *kaje* (blot-*kaṟa*), etc., etc.

(*b*) The change of *ṟ* to *ttr* in Tamil adjectival or transitival combinations cannot be explained otherwise than on the principle that stressed *ṟ* incorporates the alveolar plosive *t*.

(*c*) The argument that, as *iraḍu* (two) and *ay-du* (five) show probably the affix -t-, the same affix may presumably have existed in *ondru* and *mūndru*, is answerable by the instance of *āṟu* (six) which shows admittedly no affix but yet changes into *āju* in Tuḷu and *sājgi* in Kui. A stage like *ādru* could be postulated for *āṟu* also though there are no separate forms for the *ordinal* and the *cardinal* here.

In Tamil *ottrai*, the voiceless character of the plosive was retained in a long form, and the spontaneous nasal was avoided as in many instances of other plosives in similar circumstances.

(2) Tamil *mūndru* similarly arises from mūr (which was extant in Old and Middle Kann). The colloquial *mūnu* is from *mūndru*, with the dropping of-*d* and-*r*.

(3) Kannaḍa *ondu* and *mundu* go back to *ondru* and *mūndru* respectively. The alveolar changes into the dental almost regularly in similar circumstances in Kannaḍa *e.g.*, *pandri*, *pandi* (pig), *Kandru*, *Kandu* (calf), etc. Along with the change of the character of the plosive, the nasal also changes from an alveolar into a dental.

Kannaḍa *mūr* shows the old base.

(4) Telugu alone, of all the Dravidian dialects, fails to show the ancient formative affix *r* and its development in the form for ONE. *oka* is probably from the radical *o* + k (from *kei*, to do). cf. Tamil *o-kku* in which an older *r* may possibly have existed ; similarly Tel. *oka* may probably be *or* + *ka* or it may be *o* + *ka*.

Tel. *mūḍu* (three) shows ḍ which represents the alveolar d. The alveolar changes in Telugu into the cerebral almost regularly *e. g.*, the oblique endings of the so-called "irregular" nouns of Telugu.

(5) The Tuḷu forms are the results of a regular and uniform change in Tuḷu :—

(one) *oñji* < *ondri* < odr < *otr* < *or*

(three) *mūji* < *mūdr* < *mūtr* < *mūr*.

The equation : old Dr. *ṟ* = Tuḷu j (through *tr*. or d*r*) is almost a law.

(6) Kui *ro* (one) < (*o*) *ro* < *oru* < *or*

For stress-displacement in Kui, compare a number of words beginning with *r* in Kui = *ris* (to burn < *eri*), *ri* (to set down < *iri*).

The substantival *roṇḍe* (one) shows the stress-displacement and the change of *nd* into *ṇḍ*, the following *r* having dropped off.

Kui adjectival *mun* retains the nasal of *ndr*, d*r* having dropped out.

The substantival *mūñji*<*mūn*d*ru*<*mūr*. cf. for the change of *r* to *j*, Kui *pajji* (pig) etc.

(7) Kurukh *ort* is metathetical for *otr* (<*otr*<or).

onta may be compared to Kannaḍa *ondu*

nubb (three) shows *n* far *m* and *bb* for the old dorsal off-glide v.

The other form *mund* is comparable to Kann. *mund.*

(8) Gōṇḍi *uṇḍi* (one) shows the cerebralisation of *n*d in older *ndr*. Cerebralisation is frequent in Gōṇḍi, as in Telugu.

*mūn*d*u* shows *nd* instead of *ndr*. For the neuter enunciative vowel-*i*, cf. Gōṇḍi *yēni* (elephant) *neli* (field), *puri* (insect).

(9) Brāhūi *asi* (one) and *musi* (three) are adjectival and *asi-ṭ* and *musi-ṭ* are substantival.

Two explanations are possible for these forms :—

(i) *asiṭ*<*ayit*<*ayitr*<o(y)ir <*o*+*ir*— and a similar change for *musiṭ*. O appears as *a* in Br. as illustrated by *maṇḍ* (lame—cf. Southern *moṇḍi*), *paṭṭak* (short of stature—cf. Kannaḍa *puṭṭu*), *khall* (to beat), etc. For the change of -*y*- to -*s*-, cf. *Brāhūī pas-un*, *bas-ing*, etc.

According to this explanation,-*s*- is from the hiatus-filling glide *y*, and *ṭ* is the cerebralised form of alveolar *t*.

In this view, *asi* and *mūsi* would only be differentiated variants of *asiṭ* and *musiṭ*.

(ii) *asi* and *mūsi* may be considered as original in Br., and *ṭ* only an affix conferring the substantival meaning ; if so, the derivation of *asi* and *mūsi* would be similar to that of Tuḷu *oñji* and *mūji*, with this difference that while Tuḷu retains the original *o* and develops *j* (with the spontaneous nasal in the form for *one*), Brāhūi shows *a*- and -s-.

In this view, *ṭ* may also be regarded as an analogic intrusion from *iraṭ* (two).

The fact that none of the Dr. dialects shows a hiatus-filling glide *y* between *o* and the affix (*i*)*r* in the forms for *ONE*, would point to the latter explanation of the Br. forms as being more probable than the former.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

I

A NOTE ON

THE CŌLAVAṀŚĀVALICARITRAM

BY

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Students of South Indian History will be particularly interested to hear that there exists in the Tanjore Palace Library, a rare manuscript known as "The Bṛhadīśvara Māhātmya" or "The Cōḻa Vaṁśāvalicaritram". This work is described as an extract from the "Bhaviṣyottara Purāṇām". The name "Bṛhadīśvara Māhātmya" is evidently because of the most important topic discussed within. The origin, construction and development of the Bṛhadīśvara temple known as "The big temple Tanjore" is described in detail. In and around this main topic, the history of the Cōḻa kings of Tanjore numbering sixteen in all and covering a period of nearly 112 centuries is narrated with a great wealth of detail, drawing particular attention to the chief events in each king's reign. The work is in 30 chapters.

Chapters I and II narrate the conversation between Pārvatī and Īśvara regarding the resuscitations of the famous shrines and places of pilgrimage in the beginning of each Yuga after they had been destroyed in the Praḷaya preceding.

In Chapter III are given the territorial divisions of Southern India, the resuming of the reigns of the kings that held sway over them, and in particular the history of Cōḻa kings, characterising them as great devotees of Śiva fired with a consuming love to practice all the meritorious deeds that are characteristic of a true devotee of Śiva.

Chapter IV deals in general with various kinds of charitable works carried out by the Cōḻa kings.

In Chapter V, we have the beginning of the history of the Cōḻa kings. Kulōttuṅga of the Solar race is referred to as the first of the line. The Lord (Īśvasa) tests the devotion of Kulōttuṅga and his wife Kōmaḷa by appearing before them as a mendicant at midnight in need of alms. Pleased with the devotion shown by the couple, the Lord blesses them and assures them that till the 16th of their race, he and his successors would hold undisputed sway over the southern regions.

Chapter VI and VII deal in detail with the reign of Kulōttuṅga Cōḻa which is stated to have extended to 90 years. Kulōttuṅga Cōḻa is succeeded by his son Dēva Cōḻa.

In Chapter VIII, we are informed that Dēva Cōḻa married Soundarya Vallī of the family of Kāmika and restored several temples during his reign of 60 years. He was succeeded by his son Śaśiśekhara Cōḻa who, with his concert Campakavallī continued the good works of his father during his reign of 70 years, the most important of them being the construction of a Grand Anicut above Śrīraṅgam.

In Chapter IX, we find that Śaśiśekhara Cōḻa was succeeded by Śivaliṅga who, with his wife Padmavallī held his court probably near Tiruvālūr paying his daily homage to the Lord Thyāgarāja there. We are also informed that his son Vīra Cōḻa killed by accident a calf caught in his chariot wheels. It is stated that the mother-cow's groans attracted the attention of the king who, when informed that it was his own son who had killed the calf, immediately ordered that the real ends of justice should be met and therefore, the same chariot must be made to pass over his son's body in the presence of the aggrieved cow. The act was actually done and both the calf and the young prince lay dead, when a divine voice was heard to acclaime the greatness of the king in dealing out impartial justice, in appreciation of which the Gods themselves were pleased to revive the dead calf and the young prince. Śivaliṅga's rule seems to have extended to 6 years at the end of which he was succeeded by his son Vīra Cōḻa, who regined over the Cōḻa Country with his wife Hemavallī for as along a period as 87 years.

Chapter X begins with the story of the accession to the throne of Karikāla, the son of Vīracōḻa., It was in Karikāla's court that the great Śaivite Philosopher Haradatta of Kañjaṉūr held the honoured post of the king's preceptor. It is stated that

the king was suddenly attacked with black leprosy. Smarting under it, the king sent for his chief preceptor Haradatta and asked him to advise him.

In Chapter XI, he is reported to have performed a big sacrifice for 40 days at the end of which the Lord Agnīśvara, the titular diety of Kañjaṉūr appeared to him in a dream and informed him that the king's malady could be got rid of, if the king undertook a pilgrimage to the river Narmadā to bring a big *liṅga* of Śiva and build a temple and consecrate the image duly and fittingly in Tanjore.

Chapter XII heals with the narration of the dream by Haradatta to the king at Tanjore.

Chapter XIII deals with the preparations for the pilgrimage including the entrusting of the construction of the *gopura* to the famous sculptor Soma Varmā already well known to all by his exquisite work in the *gopura* of the Ekāmranātha temple at Conjeevaram.

Chapter XIV narrates the bringing of the image from the river Narmadā.

Chapter XV deals with the story of the actual construction of the big tower. Even at the end of 12 years the foundation had not been completed. We are informed that Soma Varmā's own son who had come to visit his father after the latter's absence of 12 years found fault with the proportion of the base for the tower and advised the king to remodel it suitably. The father was convinced of his miscalculation. The father and son set to work together and constructed the tower.

Chapter XVI deals with the Kumbhābhiṣeka. The sacred *liṅga* was named Bṛhadīśvara and the goddess was named Bṛhannāyakī. The Kumbhābhiṣeka was celebrated on a grand scale.

We are informed in Chapter XVII that during the celebration of the Caitrotsavam on the 12th day, the king Karikāla bathed in the sacred tank Śivagaṅgā adjoining the temple and found himself cured of all signs of his black leprosy as soon as he emerged from the sacred waters. The king was immensely pleased as also his ministers, courtiers and the public. After a successful reign of 90 years, the king was succeed by his son Bhīma Cōḻa.

Chapter XVIII deals with the rule of Bhīma Cōḻa who, with his queen Vidyullatā, the daughter of a Keraḷa prince, carried on

the administration for a period of 77 years continuing the acts of charity so dear to the Cōḻa rulers. He was in turn succeeded by his son Rāja Rājendra Cōḻa who married Kamalinī, the daughter of Kulaśekhara Pāṇḍya.

Chapter XIX deals with the reign of Rāja Rājendra Cōḻa extending over 78 years. He was succeeded by his son Vīramārtāṇḍa.

Chapter XX deals with the reign of Vīramārtāṇḍa, who with his queen Māṇikkavallikā, daughter of a Cēra prince held sway for 66 years. To Vīramārtāṇḍa is given the credit of reconstructing the Koṅkaṇeśa temple in Tanjore.

Chapter XXI deals with the story of the Koṅkaṇeśa temple.

In chapter XXII, we are informed, that Kīrti Cōḻa succeeded his father Vīramārtāṇḍa. Kīrti Cōḻa married Kamalinī, the daughter of Sūryaśekhara Pāṇḍya. Among his works of public benefaction, particular mention is made of the laying out of the river Kīrtimatī. Kīrti Cōḻa reigned for 49 years and was succeeded by his son Jaya Cōḻa.

In chapter XXIII we are informed that Jaya Cōḻa married Kāñcana Mālā, daughter of a Keraḷa prince and reigned for 60 years, revelling in acts of piety and public charity. We are also told that Jaya Cōḻa carried out vast improvements to the Bṛhadīśvara temple.

Chapter XXIV informs us that Jaya Cōḻa was succeeded by his son Kanaka Cōḻa. Kanaka Cōḻa married Campakāṅgī of the Vikrama race and reigned for 70 years.

In chapter XXV, we are informed that Kanaka Cōḻa was succeeded by his son Sundara Cōḻa. Sundara Cōḻa with his queen Citravallī, the daughter of a Cēra prince reigned for 60 years. Sundara Cōḻa had a daughter named Utpalavatī who was given in marriage to a Pāṇḍya prince. Various tests of Sundara Cōḻa's devotion to the Lord are narrated in detail. Thc story of how Sundara Cōḻa committed the heinous crime of murdering a brahmin unconsciously is also told.

In Chapter XXVI, the king's sufferings, mental and otherwise due to his heinous crime are narrated in detail.

Chapter XXVII deals with the details regarding the processes through which the king Sundara Cōḻa got rid of all the effects of his crime by worshipping the Lord Śiva in Madhyārjuna or the modern Tiruvadamarudūr.

Chapter XXVIII narrates the story of Kālakāla, the son of Sundara Cōḻa. Kālakāla married Guṇavatī, the daughter of a Kerala prince and ruled for 70 years. The restoration of the temple of Tālavaneśvara during Kālakāla's time is narrated.

Chaptes XXIX tells us the story of Kalyāṇa Cōḻa, son of Kālakāla. Kalyāṇa Cōḻa married Kalyāṇī, the daughter of a Pāṇḍya prince and ruled the Cōḻa country for 67 years. Kalyāṇa Cōḻa carried out great works of reconstruction. Particular mention is made of his significant contribution to the reconstruction of the Śrī Naṭarāja temple at Chidambaram. Kalyāṇa Cōḻa was succeeded by his son Bhadra Cōḻa who along with his queen Subhadrā reigned over Cōḻa country for 70 years. Towards the close of this chapter, we have a resuming of fhe reigns of all the sixteen Cōḻa kings with specific mention of their particularly brilliant acts of charity or devotion.

Chapter XXX gives a concise description of the several places of pilgrimage dear and wholy to the followers of Śiva.

Thus, this important manuscript deals with the reigns of the sixteen Cōḻa kings giving continued genealogy spread over a period of approximately 113 centuries. This is of course a purāṇic account. How far this is supported by the existing historical data is a matter for further investigation. In and through the purāṇic account, there lie embedded valuable tit-bits of historical information.

Any critical student of South Indian History will usually inform us that the great temple of Bṛhadīśvara was built in the beginning of the 11th century A.D., during the time of Rāja Rājendra Cōḻa. But the manuscript before us informs us definitely that it was built really during the time of Karikala Cōḻa, the grand-father of Rājarājendra Cōḻa. We are further informed that it was Jaya Cōḻa, the great-grand-son ot Rāja-Rājendra Cōḻa who carried out extensive improvements to the Bṛhadīśvara temple.

My interest in narrating in detail the above story as found in the Manuscript before us is mainly to call the attention of the South Indian History to the existence of this manuscript, to enable them to shed more light upon the forgotten pages of the History of Tanjore.

II

A NOTE ON VAITAṆḌIKA AND AVYAPADEŚYA.

BY

R. NAGARAJASARMA, ESQ., M.A., L.T.

In the course of his review of my polemical pamphlet entitled "Romance in Indian Philosophy" appearing on pages 279 and 280 of the Journal of Oriental Research for July-October, 1928, and in the course of his contribution on "Recent work in Indian Thought—By Indian writers," published in the "NEW ERA" for December, 1928, Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Prof. S. Kuppuswamy Sastriar characterises me to be a "rising *vaitaṇḍika,*" and observes that Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's critic, *i.e.*, my humble self "nods in his remarks about the professor's rendering of the term "*avyapadeśya.*" In the course of this note, I beg leave to maintain that I have not nodded at all.

i

It has been suggested to me curiously enough, that the term "vaitaṇḍika" contains a sinister or a dubious compliment and its use is tantamount to damning me with faint praise! A friend of mine went to the extent of pointing out a passage in the "Saṅkalpa-sūryodaya," to the effect that "vaitaṇḍika" is a person to be hanged, drawn, and quartered "*vaitaṇḍika-vetaṇḍaḥ-nirasanīyaḥ.*" When the term was applied to me by a correspondent in the columns of the "Hindu," who endeavoured in vain to defend Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of the term "*Pratītya-samutpāda*" against my criticisms, I explained that the term "vaitaṇḍika" could be rightly applied to one who, while hiding from his opponents his own metaphysical theories, just finds fault with the latter's arguments, and as I made my position quite clear at that time, the correspondent was mistaken in applying it to me.

Prof. Sastriar now remarks that I successfully play the role of a rising vaitaṇḍika in my pamphlet. I take it as a compliment. I am aware that a popular usage has converted the term into a sinister appellation. Nobody need take any cognisance of that. In support of my contention that Prof. S. Radha-

krishnan is not acquainated with the original sanskrit texts, I have mentioned instances. I am not bound to develop my own philosophical doctrines in a pamphlet which is admittedly and avowedly polemical. When and if I feel any inward dynamic urge to undertake any constructive work, I shall certainly accomplish one, but failure to feel any such or respond to any such urge is hardly the justification why I should not find fault with the constructive work done by others.

Discussing the value and validity of vitaṇḍā, the author of " nyāyavārtika " writes : " *eke-tāvad-varṇayanti-niṣprayojana-dūṣaṇamātratvāt—... Pakṣam-yo-na-sthāpayati-sa-vaitaṇḍika-ucyate...etc.*" (P. 16, Vindhyeswariprasad Edition of Vārtika.) I am sure Prof. Kuppuswamy Sastriar has deliberately used the term vaitaṇḍika in the śāstraic connotation, and that is certainly complimentary to me. Vācaspatimiśra follows suit. " *Tasmāt-vitaṇḍāpi-prayojanavatī.* " (P. 35 Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, Benares Edition.) Madhva in his work " Kathālakṣaṇa " has explained that vitaṇḍā is a perfectly legitimate and logical weapon of polemics or controversy. There is an important recognition of the maxim that pearls should not be cast before swine. Vitaṇḍāvāda is the only go. As a character in Tempest says that the effect of having learnt language is to abuse the teacher himself, one might not be inclined to place one's philosophical doctrines before the public or before one's opponents lest the latter should scoff at them. So, a party to the controversy or metaphysical debate is at perfect liberty to confine himself to a purely destructive criticism or annihilation of the arguments of his opponent. Such a controversy loses nothing by being styled *vitaṇḍāvāda.*

I can mention another point. In the innermost orthodox circles of paṇḍits, a Mādhva is considered to be a vaitaṇḍika both by Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins. He repays the compliment with compound interest. To a Viśiṣṭādvaitī, Dvaitī and an Advaitī are vaitaṇḍikas. To a Dvaitī both the Advaitī and Viśiṣṭādvaitī are vaitaṇḍikas. When passions are stirred up, language is freely used. The Saṅkalpasūryodaya has some opponents in view when the term vaitaṇḍikavetaṇḍa is used! He who runs may read.

ii

Prof. S. Radhakrishnan renders the term "avyapadeśyam " into " inexpressible". With great respect to Prof. S. Kuppuswamy Sastriar, I think it necessary to point out that the translation is indefensible. Prof. Sastriar remarks (1) that it would be

easy to maintain from the point of view of the Tātparyacaryā, that Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's rendering of the term is not wrong, and (2) that it would not be less easy to maintain that I am needlessly creating a mist over one of the alternative interpretations of that term given by Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya. Let me deal with the two contentions of Mr. Sastriar seriatim.

What does the Tātparyacaryā establish ? "*Tatra-nāmarahitam-avikalpakam-nāsti- iti- ye - vipratipadyante- tanmatamapacikīrṣurupanyasyati-bhāṣyakāraḥ etc.*" (P. 82, Et. seq. Benares Edition. Tātparyaṭīka.) There is an extreme view which seeks to hold that there is no form of perception, no form of awareness, no form of knowledge, without reference to a Śabda, a linguistic symbol. This view is to be refuted. Bhāṣyakāra wanted to secure the refutation. Tātparyacaryā mentions that the Bhāṣyakāra so wanted. For pucca, first-rate, sense-perception what is required is Indriyārtha-sannikarṣa, *i.e.*, appropriate contact between sense-organ and object by means of the adequate stimulus as the modern psychologist would put it. Regressively go back to the first perception of the newborn babe to which the world is a big, booming, and buzzing confusion, which is also to be included in the definition as any other form of perception. In what sense is perception inexpressible ? I quite appreciate the anxiety of the Bhāṣyakāra and Tātparyacaryā to establish the existence of Avikalpaka or the Nirvikalpaka, but in that type of nebulous perception, the noteworthy feature is that though there is the required contact with the object and the sense-organ, linguistic symbols do not function in any manner to describe or characterise the said contact. There may be overt description or may not. I shall put the matter in other terms. The modern psychologist asks " Is imageless thinking possible ? " Very often we employ the verbal image. We do not stop even to conjure up the images in normal cases. They rapidly succeed one another in us. Names, linguistic symbols are of a later origin. Reference to them should not be incorporated in the definition of sense-perception. That is the central doctrine.

What sense does it make when it is stated that sense-perception is " inexpressible"? Prof. S. Radhakrishnan is complimented by Mr. Sastriar on his expository brilliance. Suppose a western psychologist or a logician reads the account of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan that perception is " inexpressible ". What will he understand ? Why inexpressible ? Has the perceptual

cosmos been struck beautifully or pathetically dumb? Does it get vocal at all ? If so when and under what circumstances ? Analyse adult perception. Analyse the hypothetical first perception of the new-born babe. Contact between the sense-organ and some stimulii like sound, light, etc., there is. The contact guarantees perception. But later in life, either for purposes of communication or some other social exigency, form, quality, time, space, *qua* clothed in verbal linguistic symbols enter as factors in perception. The Sūtrakāra, the Bhāṣyakāra and the Tātparyacaryā are one in their anxiety to exclude reference to linguistic symbols from the definition of Pratyakṣa.

Jayanta examines a number of alternatives that are sought to be excluded from the definition by the term avyapadeśya into the details of which I do not propose to and need not in fact enter at all to show the untenability of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation. He points out that Vācaspatimiśra's interpretation is not accepted by some.

In the light of the Tātparyaṭīkā, I beg to submit it is impossible to defend Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation. The inexpressibility of sense-perception is a misnomer. The rendering is wrong, lock, stock and barrel.

Prof. Sastriar complains that I needlessly create a mist over one of the alternative interpretations of that term Avyapadeśya by Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya. In the present context, there is no alternative interpretation. If it is elsewhere, it is *nihil ad rem* to the present context. He concludes "*Tasmāt aśābdamarthajñānam indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam.*" (P. 14. Calcutta Edition.) He is not offering any alternative interpretation at the given context "*śābdam prasajjyeta.*" He raised the query and answered "*aśābdam.*" The perceptual awareness though linked at definite stages with names, and linguistic symbols, these latter do not cause or produce the former. The latter at definite stages of adult linguistic growth do give rise to perceptions which have to be ruled out from the definition essayed by the Sūtrakāra. On page 87 of the Nyāyamañjarī, Jayanta after having discussed a number of alternative interpretations of the term avyapadeśya, and after having indicated or identified what concepts were exactly intended to be excluded from the definition by the insertion of the term avyapadeśya, from time to time, mentions that after all some would like to go back to a view championed by *jaran-naiyāyikas*, old decrepit, senile logicians, and reading between

the lines of the text, I am sure that the Sūtrakāra and Bhāṣyakāra were anxious to secure the exclusion of any reference to any linguistic system or linguistic symbols from the definition of sense-perception, the differentia of which is just what is caused by contact of object with sense-organs (of course Avyabhicārī).

Let me illustrate. Suppose a child a few months old is confronted with Bernard Shaw's beard. The form, the shape, the waviness of the beard will all be *perceived* by the child but there would be no realisation of the object *qua* Shaw's beard which is the result of training in linguistic symbols and imagery as the outcome of social existence. Contact of object with sense-organs is just what is necessary to constitute perception (of course Avyabhicārī).

It is possible to bring up a child on a lonely island and make it the monarch of all it surveys. No one speaks to it. Its physical and physiological wants are satisfied. It is bound to perceive the colour of an evening sky and hear the noise of birds. Sensations from external reality it would have, but, the form, colour, touch, smell, *et hoc* would not be designated with linguistic symbols. The reference to the latter should be excluded from the definition of perception.

Prof. S. Radhakrishnan writes "Vātsyāyana holds that an object may be perceived with or without the apprehension of its name." One asks, in utter despair, what if? Vātsyāyana's meaning on the other hand is, as I have explained, that, in fixing down the definition of sense-perception, and marking in clear relief the boundaries of connotation, you should restrict yourself to contact of the sense-organ with external reality, through the instrumentality of a specialised sensory structure and the adequate stimulus. For the life of me, I can never understand how anybody could come forward to defend Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of avyapadeśya into "inexpressible".

I plead not guilty to the charge of having created any mist! Creation of mist in the tropical tracts in which we live is by no means easy, or practical politics. If according to Prof. S. Kuppuswamy Sastriar's own showing, there is an alternative interpretation of the term given by Vātsyāyana, I should be exonerated from the charge of having created a mist with a view to obscuring a legitimate and logical interpretational issue. At any rate, I am

entitled to inquire why Vātsyāyana embarks on alternative interpretations. Are all the alternatives equally valid? If so, what may be the motive of multiplying them? Or is Vātsyāyana dissatisfied with one alternative and has suggested another?

Look at the question from any point of view or angle of vision you please; I find it impossible to admit that I have nodded in my remarks about the utter untenability of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of the term avyapadeśya as "inexpressible." Why on earth inexpressible? Is it inexpressible by the child that has a perception? Or is it by the adult? In my illustration, the adult who takes the child to Shaw knows, and he expresses that the child perceives the beard and terrified, bursts forth into a cry. The child itself when it masters the linguistic technique would "express" its perceptions in language. The inexpressibility of perception is thus a pseudo concept. It cannot stand a moment's scrutiny.

iii

Let me now conclude the note.

(1) Vitaṇḍā is a necessary form of debate, dialectic, or disputation. Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā are necessary even as Vāda. Otherwise the Sūtrakāra would not have mentioned them at all. Vitaṇḍāvāda comes in handy especially when one of the parties to the controversy, *i.e.*, vaitaṇḍika is not willing to reveal his own constructive theories. He may not choose to reveal them for a number of reasons. No agency can compel him to reveal them. If vitaṇḍā is necessary vaitaṇḍika has his place in the sun! He cannot be banned or exterminated summarily by anybody's fiat. A barbed fence is necessary to protect truth. Jalpa and vitaṇḍā might be regarded such a fence (literally fence of thorny branches) (Nyāyasūtra IV-ii-50). I am at perfect liberty to take and I do take the term vaitaṇḍika applied to me as an ungrudging compliment paid to me by an eminent authority of the type of Prof. Sastriar.

(2) Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of the term avyapadeśya as "inexpressible" is indefensible. Reference to linguistic system, linguistic symbols, technical terms, even designations like form, weight, pressure etc. should be excluded from a definition of Pratyakṣa—sense-awareness. The most appropriate definition is *Indriyārtha-Sannikarṣotpannam-Jñānam-avyapadeśyam* etc. Knowledge due to contact of object with sense-organ (*i.e.*, know-

ledge of object as it is, and *not* as it appears to be) is Pratyakṣa, sense-perception. If after a perusal of this note, Prof. Sastriar still thinks I have nodded, I am ready to take consolation in the eternal reminder "Homer nods!" By the way, may I point out that Vācaspatimiśra himself reveals a tendency to nod? On page 82 he does not include the term avyapadeśya as part of definition, and yet on the next page, he writes: "*Lakṣaṇagatena . . . . avyapadeśyapadena sūcitam.*"*

*While I readily appreciate the correctness of Mr. Sarma's interpretation of the word *Vaitaṇḍika* I cannot help differing from Mr. Sarma in the interpretation of the term *avyapadeśya.* Nor can I help thinking that Mr. Sarma still persists in nodding, while Vācaspatimisra nowhere nods. [S. K. Sastri].

III

RĀMĀBHYUDAYA.

BY

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That the plays which have dramatized the story of the Rāmāyaṇa outnumber those that have not is a proposition, I think, to which every one may subscribe. This dictum is applicable not only to the world of current dramas but also to such forgotten dramas as linger in our memory through references or extracts in such comprehensive treatises as the Abhinavabhāratī, the Śṛngāraprakāśa etc.

The Rāmābhyudaya is one of the many " Rāma-plays " that exist only through references. That Yaśovarman, the patron of Bhavabhūti, was the author of this drama is plainly expressed by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka, namely the Locana.

सन्ति सिद्धरसप्रख्याः ये च रामायणादयः ।
कथाश्रया न तैर्योज्या स्वेच्छा रसविरोधिनी ॥

Locana—

कथानामाश्रयाः इतिहासाः । तैः इतिहासार्थैः सह स्वेच्छा न योज्या । कथंचिद्वा यदि योज्यते तत् तत्प्रसिद्धिविरुद्धा न योज्या । यथा रामस्य धीरललितत्वयोजनेन नाटिकानायकत्वं कुर्यादिति तु अत्यन्तासमञ्जसम् । यदुक्तं "कथामार्गे न चाक्रमः" इति रामाभ्युदये यशोवर्मणा "स्यितमिति(?) (स्थितिमति) यथा शय्याम् " ॥

(Dhvanyāloka—Locana, page 148.)

This extract is significant. Ānandavardhana observes that alteration in or deviation from, works like the Rāmāyaṇa is permissible only when it is in consonance with its predominant Rasa. As Abhinavagupta observes, Rāma, a Dhīrodātta, (धीरोदात्त) if pictured as a Dhīralalita (धीरललित), will certainly be

against the tone of the Rāmāyaṇa. In support of his statement Ānandavardhana quotes a metrical bit. "काव्यमार्गे न चा(ति)क्रमः" which Abhinavagupta not only identifies as that of Yaśovarman from his Rāmābhyudaya but also furnishes us with another foot of the verse, namely," "स्थितमिति (स्थितिमति) यथाशय्याम्". This verse of Yaśovarman which tells us that no unjustifiable deviation has been made from the story of the Rāmāyaṇa should certainly, as one can easily infer, be found in the prastāvanā of the Rāmābhyudaya.

The date of Yaśovarman has been already fixed by scholars at 713 A. D. Now we may reconstruct the plot of the drama from the following extracts :—

Rāmābhyudaya.

रामाभ्युदयादौ सीताप्रत्यानयनादेरिव । न हि तत्र अश्वमेधयागादेर्नायकोचितस्य कविविवक्षितत्वमस्ति ।

(vol. II, page 491, A. Bhāratī.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये तृतीयेऽङ्के सीतां प्रति सुग्रीवस्य सन्देशोक्तिः—

बहुनात्र किमुक्तेन पारेऽपि जलधेः स्थिताम् ।
अचिरादेव देवि त्वामाहरिष्यति राघवः ॥

(vol. II, page 504, A. B. Bhāratī.) (vol. II, page 485, Ś. Prakāśa.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये भयात्मोपक्षेपः

(vol. II, page 531, A. Bhāratī.)

यथा मायाशिरोनिक्षिप्ते रामाभ्युदये सचित्रं नेपथ्यम् ॥

(vol. III, page 13, A Bhāratī.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये द्वितीयेऽङ्के

रावणः—प्रायः श्रुतमेव भ····यथा कलत्रसा····जापसस्तदपहार एव····निरूप्यताम् । न च कलत्रापहरणादृते पुरुषस्यापरं परिभवस्थानमस्ति । तत्र च मारीचेन क्रियमाणं साहाय्यकमिच्छामि ॥

मारीचः—स्वामिन् ! जीवतो रामस्य परिभव इत्य···· न खलु तापस इत्यवज्ञातुमर्हति देवः । अन्यदेव किमपि वस्त्वन्तरं तत् ॥

रावणः—(सक्रोधम्) आः किन्नाम वस्त्वन्तरम् ! तन्मूढयुक्तैव क्षत्रबन्धोः परिभवमजीयत(?) कर्तुमिच्छन् मायासाहाय्यके निपुणतरइति येनासमर्थः ।

यश्चान्यत्तत्र वज्रप्रहतिमसृणितस्फारकेयूरभाजः
सज्जात्रैलोक्यलक्ष्मीहठहरणसहा बाहवो रावणस्य ॥

(vol. II, page 472, Ś. Prakāśa.)

यथा च रामाभ्युदये सीतायाः परित्यागेन अवमाननात् छलनम् ॥

(page 29, Daśarūpaka.)

नाम कोऽयं नाटकस्य गर्भितार्थप्रकाशनम्—यथा—रामाभ्युदयादिः ।

(P. 6-142, Sāhityadarpaṇa.)

अभिधेयगतं यत्तत्काव्यनाम्ना प्रकाशनम् ।
तन्नाम नाटकाद्यन्तं गर्भगाढोपसूचनम् ॥
यथा हि रामाभ्युदयं नाम नाटकमित्यतः ।

(page 210, Bhāvaprakāśa.)

बीजवन्तो मुखाद्यर्थाः परमेव प्रयोजने ।
लभन्ते यत्र संबन्धं तन्निर्वहणमुच्यते ॥
यथा हि रामाभ्युदये सुग्रीवश्च विभीषणः ।
कपयो राक्षसाश्चैवाभिषेकाभ्युदयं ययुः ॥

(page 221, Bhāvaprakāśa.)

षडङ्कं दृश्यते तत्र रामाभ्युदयनाटकम्

(page 247, Bhāvaprakāśa.)

मूर्खजनसन्निकर्षे हितमपि प्रभाषते यत्र विद्वान् ।
न च गृह्यतेऽन्यवचनं विज्ञेयोऽसत्प्रलापोऽसौ ॥
यथा हि रामाभ्युदये सीतापहरणोद्यतः ।
मारीचेन सहायेन निषिद्धो रावणः क्रुधा ॥

(page 242, Bhāvaprakāśa.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये

तापसः— (आकाशे) भाव···· रामभद्रस्तिष्ठति । किं ब्रवीषि ? तेऽस्या एव—पथिकजनमनोहरिण्याः पुष्करिण्याः परिसरे सीतया लक्ष्मणेन च सह न्यग्रोधच्छायायां सुखोपविष्टस्तिष्ठतीति ॥

(page 325, Kāvyānuśāsana).

तथा रामाभ्युदये प्रथमेऽङ्के वटोः कुचाभिनयमेव "प्रधानं वक्षस्य" इति सर्वत्र संबध्यते ॥

(vol. II, page 299, A. Bhāratī,)

As in the Kṛtyārāvaṇa, we can easily infer the story in the opening act of this drama. We find that the plot of the second act consists in the abduction of Sītā and the schemes of Rāvaṇa. Hence the opening act, probably like the Kṛtyārāvaṇa, began with the history of the exiled Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā.

The plot of the play seems to be this. Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā lead a happy life in the forest. Rāvaṇa wants to carry away Sītā at the instigation of the disfigured Śūrpaṇakhā. He consults his friends and ministers.

Rāvaṇa starts the discussion by saying that since the abduction of one's wife means a consequential ignominy and shame for the husband, no other plan will be more retaliative than the abduction of Sītā. To accomplish his task, Rāvaṇa seeks the aid and alliance of Mārīca, thinking that he will readily respond to the royal request. His ardent expectation meets with a keen disappointment. Mārīca gives a dignified reply. He asks Rāvaṇa to be considerate when speaking of Rāma. He plainly and provokingly tells Rāvaṇa that to bring about ignominy on Rāma is an impossible. To hear plain truth especially when it exposes one's defect is always uncomfortable and Rāvaṇa after hearing this defence of Rāma lashes himself to fury, extols his own strength and thunders forth abuses on Mārīca. Mārīca finally yields with reluctance and Rāvaṇa achieves his desire by carrying off Sītā. This seems to be the plot of the second act.

In the third act Rāma and Sugrīva meet and pledge themselves to be friends for life. Sugrīva sends his monkeys in search of Sītā with a solacing message. In due course of time war happens and Rāvaṇa resorts to black magic. He creates by magic a living image of Sītā and kills it in the very presence of Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa. Even necromancy fails to bring about Rāvaṇa's success. Rāma, and through him righteousness, wins.

After returning to Ayodhyā, Rāma spends a life of unalloyed happiness but the slander of the public questioning the chastity of his wife makes him banish Sītā to the forest. Poor pregnant Sītā gives birth to twin sons in the hermitage of Vālmīki.

Rāma finds that life without Sītā is but an arid desert and hence under the pretext of an Aśvamedha sacrifice, as Abhinavagupta pointedly observes, tries to bring back Sītā. In this he succeeds and both are united. The monkeys and the rākṣasas headed by Sugrīva and Vibhīṣaṇa attend the coronation ceremony.

This then is the plot of the drama. The dramatist has deviated from the Rāmāyaṇa in that he has made the Aśvamedha sacrifice a device to bring about the union of Rāma and Sītā.

The term 'Rāmābhyudaya' is significant since it suggests the coronation of Rāma. It comprises six acts and the author

has admirably succeeded in presenting such a long story in such a short compass. The Rāmābhyudaya seems to be a high class drama since even Kuntaka praises it.

All the anthologies quote from Yaśovarman's Rāmābhyudaya. The verses so quoted number nearly ten and a reading of these verses make our hearts throb, nerves tingle and pulses beat. They are so realistic in their tender pathos, so natural in their plain appeal that they thrill our hearts, kindle our emotions, raise pleasure from the bosom of pain and sweep us on with force to the source and soul of eternal delectation, namely Rasa.

IV.

GHAṆṬAKA.

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Ghaṇṭaka is a poet mentioned by Abhinavagupta in the Abhi navabhāratī. The following is the reference :—

श्रीशङ्कुकस्तु अयुक्तमेतदित्यभिधाय अष्टधेति व्याचष्टे । तथा च देवी कन्या च ख्याता अख्याता भेदेन चतुर्धा । कन्या तु अन्तःपुरसङ्गीतकभेदेन द्विधेति । घण्टकादयस्त्वाहुः नायको नृपतिरित्येतावन्मात्रम् । नाटकादावुपजीवितं न तु प्रख्यातत्वमपि । तद्भेदद्वयादन्ये षोडश भेदा इति ॥

(vol. II, page 468, A. Bhāratī.)

It may be guessed that Ghaṇṭaka was an ālaṅkārika and differed from his predecessors. He might have set forth his views in some treatise. In the anthologies we find the following verse ascribed to him :—

धनुर्माला मौर्वी क्वणदलिकुलं लक्ष्यमबला
मनोभेद्यं शब्दप्रभृतय इमे पञ्च विशिखाः ।
इयान् जेतुं यस्य त्रिभुवनमदेहस्य विभवः
स कामः कामान् वो दिशतु दयितापाङ्गवसतिः ॥

(verse 82, Subhāṣitāvali.)

This verse seems to be an invocatory stanza. Ghaṇṭaka might have tried his skill also in the realm of poetic creation.

The date of Ghaṇṭaka can be easily fixed. The extract from the Abhinavabhāratī plainly tells us that Ghaṇṭaka differs from Śaṅkuka's opinion as regards the number of Nāyikās (नायिकाः). Naturally he should have been posterior to Śaṅkuka and since Abhinavagupta refers to Ghaṇṭaka's views he should be prior to Abhinava. Thus the date of Ghaṇṭaka falls between the dates of Śaṅkuka and Abhinavagupta. He should therefore have flourished between 840 and 1020 A. D.

In III and IV above, the references to the Abhinanabhāratī Śṛṅgāraprakāśa and Bhāvaprakāśa are all to the manuscripts of these works in the Govt. Ort. Mss. Library, Madras.

EDITORIAL.

In inviting the attention of the public to the newly started Department of Islamic studies in the Viśvabhāratī University under the able guidance of Dr. Julius Germanus, Professor of Islamic Studies at the Oriental Institute of the Royal Hungarian University, Budapest, who has been recently elected to the Nizam Islamic chair for Islamic studies, we are glad to observe that this department will stimulate interest in Islamic learning which has long been undeservedly neglected and will serve the cause of Islam in the best way possible. Apart from its literary value, the general benefit derived from such educational propaganda can in no way be exaggerated. The syllabus drawn up by the learned Professor as given below is comprehensive and affords ample scope to tackle the problem of Islamic studies in a satisfactory way. We hope that the good example set forth by the Viśvabhāratī University will be promptly followed by other academical institutions in India.

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LOCATION. Śāntiniketan is situated at a distance of 99 miles from Calcutta and 1½ miles from Bolpur, a railway station on the East Indian Railway.

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The Karma-Sachiva, Visva-Bharati,
210, *Cornwallis Street,*
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THE CHANGE IN THE FORM OF TAMIL WORDS THROUGH METANALYSIS AND CONFUSION OF SCRIPT.

BY

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It may be of interest to schclars to note how some Tamil words have undergone change in their form through Metanalysis and Confusion of script.

1. Metanalysis.[1]

Ku in place of *u* and *vice-versa.*

(*a*)	Urutiram (Skt. rudhira)	Kuruti (Paripāṭal)
	Ucci	Kucci (Kamparāmāyaṇam)
	Uruttal (Skt. rūpa)	Kuruttal (Vināyakapurāṇam)
(*b*)	Kuḻarutal	Uḻarutal (Tāyumāṉavar)
	Kulukkutal	Ulukkutal
	Kulaital	Ulaital (Pattu-p-pāṭṭu)

Ū in place of *kū.*

Kūtal (cold wind)	ūtal

I in place of *ci* and *vice-versa.*

(*a*)	Cippi	Ippi (Maṇimēkalai)
(*b*)	Ilirttal	Cilirttal (Kamparāmāyaṇam)

2. Confusion of script.[2]

Confusion between a consonant and a vowel consonant and vice-versa.

Correct form	Changed form
For Kavvutal (கவ்வுதல்)	Kavavutal (கவவுதல்)

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1. By Metanalysis is meant the analysis of words or word groups done in a way quite different from that done in a former age. This is possibly due to, as Otto Jespersen says, the ignorance of the person who uses it, of the real form of the word (*i. e.*) where it begins and where it ends.

2. It must be noted that the dots above க, ச etc. as க், ச் to distinguish pure consonants from vowel-consonants (உயிர்மெய்) and above எ and ஒ which originally represented the sounds ē and ō, as எ and ஒ to represent e and o were not used in palm leaf manuscripts ; there was no difference between the lengthening mark in கா, சா etc. ா or (r).

Correct form	Changed form
Kan̲an̲akam (கனனகம்) ...	Kan̲n̲akam (கன்னகம்)
(Skt. *Khananakha*)	
Kan̲an̲am (கனனம்)	Kan̲n̲am (கன்னம்)
(Skt. *Khanana*)	

Confusion of ா *as in* கா, சா *etc., and* ர் or ர *and* vice-versa.

Correct form	Changed form
(*a*) Kavācci (கவாச்சி)	Kavarcci (கவர்ச்சி)
(Skt. *Gavākṣi*)	
Cāṭu (சாடு).	Caraṭu (சரடு)
(Tel. *Tcāṭu*)	
Aṇṭāṇṭam (அண்டாண்டம்)	Aṇṭaraṇṭam (அண்டரண்டம்)
(Skt. *Aṇḍāṇḍa*)	
(*b*) Ayar (அயர்)	Ayā (அயா)
Paravutal (பரவுதல்)	Pāvutal (பாவுதல்)
Caravaṇam (சரவணம்)	Cāvaṇam (சாவணம்)
(Skt. *Ṡaravaṇa*)	
Caraṇam (சரணம்)	Cāṇ (சாண்)
(Skt. *Caraṇa*)	
Carakam (சரகம்)	Cākam (சாகம்)
(Skt. *Saraghā*)	
Karaṇṭakam (கரண்டகம்)	Kāṇṭakam (காண்டகம்)
(Skt. *Karaṇḍaka*)	
Kācaram (காசரம்)	Kācā (காசா)
(Skt. *Kāsara*)	
Karaṇṭai (கரண்டை)	Kāṇṭai (காண்டை)
(Skt. *Karaṇḍā*)	
Maram (மரம்)	Mā (மா)
Var (வர்) the root in the form varukiṟān̲ etc.	Vā (வா)[1]

1. At present vā is said to be the root meaning to come. Its forms in the present, past and future tenses are respectively varukiṟān̲, vantān̲ and varuvān̲. How ' r ' is inserted in varukiṟān̲ and varuvān̲ is not explained. Dr. Caldwell says that vā aud var are ' alternative roots ' or different forms of the same root. But it seems to me that the root was originally var. Vantān̲ might originally have been changed form of varntān̲ where r was dropped. The corresponding root in Telugu is rā. It is generally seen that the initial syllable of the Tamil words are dropped in the cognate words in Telugu. Cf. Tamil avan̲ Tel. vāḍu. Besides there is a root *val* in Sanskrit which has the same meaning. Hence it is worth investigating whether var or val was one of the roots common to the parent Indo-Germanic, and the parent Dravidian language.

Confusion between ca (ச) *and* ka (க) *and* vice-versa.

	Correct form	Changed form
(*a*)	Cañcayam (சஞ்சயம்) (Skt. *Saṁśaya*)	Caṅkayam (சங்கயம்)
	Cāṭakam (சாடகம்) (Skt. *Śāṭaka*)	Kāṭakam (காடகம்) Kāḻakam (காழகம்)
	Ticai (திசை) (Skt. *Diśā*)	Tikai (திகை)
	Cīram (சீரம்) (Skt. *Cīra*)	Kīlam (கீலம்)
	Cācaṉam (சாசனம்) (Skt. *Śāsana*)	Kācaṉam (காசனம்)
	Cālūram (சாலூரம்) (Skt. *Śālūra*)	Kālūram (காலூரம்)
	Camari (சமரி) (Skt. *Camarī*)	Kavari (கவரி)
	Ucīram (உசீரம்) (Skt. *Uśīra*)	Ukiram (உகிரம்)
	Kōcayam (கோசயம்) (Skt. *Gōśaya*)	Kōkayam (கோகயம்)
(*b*)	Kuṭikai (குடிகை) (Skt. *Kuṭikā*)	Kuṭicai (குடிசை)

Confusion between cu (சு) *and* ku (கு) *and* vise-versa.

(*a*)	Cukkilam (சுக்கிலம்) (Skt. *Śukla*)	Kukkilam (குக்கிலம்)
(*b*)	Kuruḷutal (குருளுதல்)	Curuḷutal (சுருளுதல்)

Confusion between a (அ) *and* ca (ச).

Amparam (அம்பரம்) (Skt. *Ambara*)	Camparam (சம்பரம்)
Aḷḷal (அள்ளல்)	Caḷḷal (சள்ளல்)

Confusion between ma (ம) *and* ya (ய).

Cētiyam (சேதியம்) (Skt. *Caitya*)	Cētimam (சேதிமம்)

Confusion between ṉa (ன) *and* ḷa (ள) *and* vice-versa.

(*a*)	Uvaṉittal (உவனித்தல்)	Uvaḷittal (உவளித்தல்)
	Kaṉam (கனம்) (Skt. *Ghana*)	Kaḷam (களம்)
(*b*)	Īḷam (ஈளம்) (meaning spurge)	Īṉam (ஈனம்)


Probable confusion between n̲a (ன) and ை the symbol denoting ai in மை (mai) etc.

Correct form	Changed form
Ūn̲am (ஊனம்) (Skt. *ūna*)	Ūmai (ஊமை)


The above examples were found out by my colleagues and myself in the Tamil Lexion Office, in the preparation of the Tamil Lexion published by the University of Madras.

Correction.

In Part ii of Vol. III at page 168, last line and at page 169, line 25 read III-iii-12 for III-iii-2.



THE BOY COWHERD



THE BOY COWHERD

अग्रे दीर्घतरोऽयमर्जुनतरुस्तस्याग्रतो वर्तनी
सा घोषं समुपैति तत्परिसरे देशे कलिन्दात्मजा ।
तस्यास्तीरतमालकाननतले चक्रं गवां चारयन्
गोपः क्रीडति दर्शयिष्यति सखे पन्थानमव्याहतम् ॥

Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛtam.

THE WORKS OF PRABHĀKARA.

BY

T. R. CHINTAMANI, M. A.,

Superintendent, Sarasvatīmahal Palace Library, Tanjore.

In a paper contributed to the Madras session of the Oriental Conference, Mahāmahopādhyāya, Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, Avl., makes the following remarks :—

" In the Madras manuscript of the Sarvadarśanakaumudī, by Mādhava Sarasvatī, referred to above, it is stated that Prabhākara wrote two commentaries on the Śābara Bhāṣya (*i.e.*) Vivaraṇa and Nibandhana. The following extract gives this information and some interesting particulars about the Prābhākara literature—

प्राभाकरप्रस्थानं तु—भाष्यस्य प्रभाकरकृतं व्याख्यानद्वयम् । एकं विवरणं षट्सहस्ररूपम् । अपरो निबन्धनसंज्ञः द्वादशसहस्रम् । विवरणस्य ऋजुविमला, निबन्धनस्य दीपशिखा, टीकाद्वयं शालिकनाथकृतं प्रकरणं शालिकनाम । नयविवेको भवनाथकृतं प्रकरणं द्वादशसहस्रम् । तट्टीका वरदराजकृता अष्टाचत्वारिंशत्साहस्री ॥

P. 122 of the manuscript of Sarvadarśanakaumudī.

From the foregoing extract it is clear that Prabhākara's Bṛhatī should be identified with the Vivaraṇa; and the Nibandhana which Dr. Jha identifies with the Bṛhatī (*see* lines 18 and 19 at page 9 of Dr. Jha's book—Prābhākara School), turns out to be different from the Bṛhatī, for the commentary on the Vivaraṇa, called Ṛjuvimalā by Śālikanātha deals with the Bṛhatī and not with the Nibandhana. The colophon इति प्रभाकरमिश्रकृतौ मीमांसाभाष्यविवरणे reported by Dr. Jha as found at the end of the second pāda of the second Adhyāya in the Bṛhatī manuscript belonging to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, supports the identification of the Bṛhatī with the Vivaraṇa."[1]

1. Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Page 477 and ff.

He then proceeds to show, on the strength of certain internal evidences, that the Bṛhatī is only another name for the Vivaraṇa and not the Nibandhana.

Now, from the extract given above from the Sarvadarśana-kaumudī, one fact is clear that Prabhākara wrote two commentaries on the Bhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin. This fact is recorded by other writers also. The following references are worthy of note :—

1. Rāmānujācārya, in his Tantrarahasya, printed in the Gaekwad Oriental Series remarks at the outset.

आलोच्य शब्दबलमर्थबलं श्रुतीनां
टीकाद्वयं व्यरचयद्बृहतीं च लघ्वीम् ।
भाष्यं गभीरमधिकृत्य मिताक्षरं यः
सोऽयं प्रभाकरगुरुर्जयति त्रिलोक्याम् ॥
बृहतीं तथैव लघ्वीं टीकामधिकृत्य शालिकनाथः ।
ऋजुविमलां दीपशिखां विशदार्थामकृत पञ्चिकां क्रमशः ॥ P. 3.

2. Varadarāja in his Nayavivekadīpikā says at the beginning of the 2nd Adhyāya—

टीकाकारो हि प्रथमं विवरणटीकां कृत्वा पश्चान्निबन्धनटीकां कृतवानिति किंवदन्ती ।..निबन्धनमतस्याद्यापि शिष्यप्रशिष्यपरंपरया वर्तमानत्वात् निबन्धन इति वर्तमाननिर्देशः ॥

Adyar Manuscript. Vol. II, p. 3.

3. Appayya Dīkṣita in his Parimaḷa remarks in the 3rd pāda of the 3rd Adhyāya—

गुरुणा हि निबन्धनटीकायामङ्गसौत्रामणिबृहस्पतिसवयोः कर्मान्तरत्वं प्रसाधितवतापि विवरणटीकायामकर्मान्तरत्वं व्यवहृतम् ॥

P. 789, Nirṇayasāgar Edn.

These extracts go to prove definitely that Prabhākara wrote two commentaries on the Śābara Bhāṣya. Varadarāja gives us an additional information that Prabhākara wrote the Vivaraṇa first and then the Nibandhana. Rāmānuja records the same tradition in his commentary on the Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārtha-sārathi Miśra. He says :—

विवरणं नाम प्रथमं गुरुणा प्रणीता लघ्वी टीका इति तत्संप्रदायः ।
निबन्धनं नाम पश्चाद्गुरुणैव प्रणीता बृहती टीका ॥

Adyar Manuscript. P. 633.

Thus we see that the Vivaraṇa was written first and that the Nibandhana next. Now what could have been the reason which compelled Prabhākara to write two commentaries ? The following explanation is offered in certain quarters : Prabhākara wrote the Vivaraṇa and his teacher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa chanced to look into it. The doctrines propounded therein were antagonistic to his and consequently he criticised them in a work of his (Kumārila's). Prabhākara had to defend his position and in refutation he wrote the Nibandhana. This explanation may be taken for what it is worth, but cannot be brushed aside as baseless. Śālikanātha, in many places in his Ṛjuvimalā points out how the Bṛhatī (Nibandhana) is intended to refute the statements made in the Vārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Let us now turn to the identification of the work of Prabhākara that is now available. The available work is called the Bṛhatī and a commentary on it by Śālikanātha, named Ṛjuvimalā is also available. Writing about 20 years ago Dr. Jha was not then aware of the 2 works of Prabhākara. He was aware of the references to Prabhākara as Nibandhanakāra and when a work of Prabhākara was discovered, he at once named it Nibandhana. It was Mahāmahopādhyāya, Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar who first drew the attention of scholars to the two works of Prabhākara. And on the strength of certain evidences which he was able to collect, he viewed the question from a different point of view and came to the conclusion that the available work called Bṛhatī could not be identified with the Nibandhana but only with the Vivaraṇa. I had occasion to view the question fully during the course of my official work as librarian of the Adyar Library and I shall summarise the results of my enquiry briefly.

Mādhava Sarasvatī states in the Sarvadarśana Kaumudī that the Vivaraṇa consists of (about) 6,000 granthas (every grantha consists of 32 syllables) and the Nibandhana of 12,000 granthas. These figures cannot be accurate to the letter but are only approximate. Now the Bṛhatī is available up to the end of the sixth Adhyāya and it consists of nearly 8,000 granthas. There are six more Adhyāyas and that portion is yet to be discovered. It is obvious, therefore, that this cannot be the Vivaraṇa, which is

the smaller of the two works. The portion of the commentary for the 6 Adhyāyas exceeds 6,000 granthas which is the extent of the entire Vivaraṇa. Now this point raised a doubt in the statements of Mādhava Sarasvatī. The Ṛjuvimalā, which is now available, is a commentary on the Bṛhatī and Mādhava Sarasvatī says that it is a commentary on the Vivaraṇa. Professor Kuppuswami Sastriar thought probably that Mādhava Sarasvatī was wrong in his calculations. To me it seems that he was wrong, not in his calculations, but only in making the Ṛjuvimalā a commentary on the Vivaraṇa. The following are my reasons:—

(i) Appayya Dīkṣita refers to the Ṛjuvimalā as Nibandhana-pañcikā. He says :—

उक्तं हि निबन्धनपञ्चिकायामृजुविमलायां अनन्वितावस्था हि संबन्ध-ग्रहणोपायतां गच्छन्ती वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तौ निमित्तम् ॥

Parimaḷa, P. 139, Nirnaya Sagara Edition.

Pañcikā is the general name of the works of Śālikanātha (for example, Vivaraṇa-pañcikā, Nibandhana-pañcikā, Prakaraṇa-pañcikā etc.). It is evident from the extract that Appayya Dīkṣita regarded the Ṛjuvimalā as a commentary on the Nibandhana.

(ii) Rāmānuja in his Nāyakaratna remarks :—

निबन्धनं नाम पश्चाद्गुरुणैव प्रणीता बृहती टीका ॥

(quoted ante.)

This extract explicitly records the fact that the Bṛhatī is otherwise called Nibandhana.

(iii) Varadarāja's remarks, in his commentary on the Nayaviveka given under, elucidate the point clearly.

a. विवरणे त्विति । तत्र हि पूर्वपक्षे प्रयोगविधिमन्त्रार्थवादात्मकत्रिविध-वेदस्य स्मार्तान्वयमुखप्रामाण्यमुच्यते । न केवलं बृहत्यामिव मन्त्रमुखमित्यधिक-मित्यर्थः ॥ Nayavivekadīpikā Adyar Ms. Vol. I, p. 175.

b. लघ्व्यां तु संगतिपूर्वपक्षौ प्रकारान्तरेण इत्याह—विवरणे त्विति ॥

Vol. I, p. 256.

c. नन्वत्र विवरणटीकायदं प्रासङ्गिकमिदमुदाहरणमित्युक्तम् । तदयुक्तम् ; निबन्धनवत् साक्षात्संगतेरध्यायें संभवात् इत्याशङ्क्य यथादीपशिखाटीकार्थं अवान्तरसंगत्यभिप्रायमाह—विवरणे त्विति ॥ Vol. I, p. 491.

d. नन्वत्राधिकरणपञ्चकमेकीकृत्य पठतो निबन्धनकारस्य कोऽभिप्राय इत्याह—अधिकरणेति । अस्फुटभेदत्वादित्यर्थः । कथं तर्हि पृथगधिकरणत्व-मित्यत्राह—त्रयमिति । अन्यमन्यं परिहारमुपदर्शयितुं पृथगधिकरणं भाष्ये निरसनं कर्तुं विधाभेदाद्भिन्नमित्यर्थः । लघ्व्यां तु वस्तुबलादधिकरणं भेदेन ॥

Vol. I, p. 527.

e. विवरणे तु शेषकार्याणां द्रव्याप्रयोगत्वे चतुर्थ उक्ते कथमत्रोपांशु-याज्यस्य जौहविकस्य शेषकार्यैः शेषप्रयुक्तिशङ्का इत्याशङ्क्य चतुर्थोक्ता प्रयोजकवत्त्वस्य अन्यथागतिरुक्ता । तामाह—लघ्व्यामिति ॥

Vol. III, p. 602-B.

f. नन्वेवं विवरणमते भाष्यस्थविशिष्टविध्युक्तेः का गतिरित्याशङ्कामनूद्य यद्विशिष्टं भक्षणं तत्स्वरूपविधिः तत्र लीनः क्रमः शब्दावगत इति क्रमापेक्षिणा विधिना स्वीकृत इति विधिस्वीकाराभिप्राया विध्युक्तिरित्याह—लघ्व्यामिति ॥

Vol. III, p. 634.

g. विवरणे तु भक्षान्तरविध्यर्थं विधेयान्तराभावः प्रपञ्चित इत्याह—लघ्व्यामिति ॥

Vol, III, p. 637.

h. ननु निबन्धनमते न्यायादेव सिद्धे प्रधानमात्रान्वये वाक्यस्य का गतिरित्यत्राह—बृहत्यामिति ॥

Vol. IV, p. 215.

In these extracts 'a' differentiates the Vivaraṇa from the Bṛhatī; 'b,' 'e,' 'f' and 'g,' identifies the Vivaraṇa with the Laghvī; 'c.' tries to point out that there is no inconsistency between the Vivaraṇa and the Dīpaśikhā; 'd.' differentiates the Nibandhana and the Laghvī; 'h.' regards the Nibandhana to be identical with the Bṛhatī. These extracts are enough to show that the Nibandhana is the same as the Bṛhatī and that the Vivaraṇa should be distinguished from the Bṛhatī.

(iv) At the beginning of the second Adhyāya Bhavanātha says in his Nayaviveka :—

प्रथमेऽध्याये प्रमाणलक्षणं वृत्तमिति भाष्यम् । तदेव निबन्धने व्याख्या-तम् "यथाप्रमाणं शब्दस्तथोक्तमित्यर्थः" इति । तद्विवृतमृजुविमलायां 'येन प्रकारेण न[णान]पेक्षत्वाख्येन शब्दः प्रमाणमिति लक्ष्यते, तदनपेक्षत्वं प्रमाण-लक्षणमुक्तम्' इति ॥

Nayaviveka. Adyar Ms. Vol. I, p. 232.

Now the corresponding passage in the Bṛhatī reads thus:—

प्रथमेऽध्याये प्रमाणलक्षणं वृत्तमिति । यथाप्रमाणं शब्दस्तथोक्तमित्यर्थः ॥

Bṛhatī. Vol. II, pp. 438—439.

It is clear that Bhavanātha quotes from the Bṛhatī, through its other name Nibandhana.

(v) The opening verses of the Ṛjuvimalā lend support to the view that it is a commentary on the Nibandhana. The verse itself runs thus :—

सृष्टांविद्यानिशाध्वंसिंनिबन्धमयवासरम् ।
उज्जासितजगज्जाड्यं नमस्यामः प्रभाकरम् ॥

(vi) The following passage occurring at the beginning of the 9th Adhyāya of Ṛjuvimalā finds support for the view, propounded herein, in the Vivaraṇa.

अतश्च 'व्रीहीनवहन्ति' इत्यनयैव चोदनया नीवाराणामपि कार्यत्वमवगम्यते । तदिदं कार्यनिरूपणज्ञानमुपजायत इति कार्यजं शाब्दम् । तेन "नाप्रमाणत्वं नाशाब्दत्वं नोपदेशत्वम्" इति स्वयमेव भगवता विवरणकारेणोदितमित्यनवद्यम् । श्लोकमप्युदाहरन्ति —

"प्राकृतस्थानपतितपदार्थान्तरकार्यतः ।
ऊहः प्रयोगो विकृत ऊह्यमानतयोदितः" ॥ इति ॥

Pp. 5-6.

Unless it be different from the work on which the commentary is written, the whole argument comes to nothing. It is clear therefore that the work Ṛjuvimalā is not a commentary on the Vivaraṇa.

(vii) Later writers on Mīmāṁsā refer to certain doctrines as special to the author of the Nibandhana and almost all of them could be traced in the extant Bṛhatī. Doctrines referred to as special to the author of the Vivaraṇa are not to be traced in this work. A certain amount of reservation is necessary here, for there are doctrines common to both the Vivaraṇa and the Nibandhana. We must leave them out of account. The following references will clear my position.

I have given in parallel columns certain references to the Nibandhana and the corresponding portion of the Bṛhatī. A perusal of these extracts will convince any reader that the references to the Nibandhana are only to the extent Bṛhatī.

इह अविशेषेणेत्यनेन द्रव्यगुणभावार्थानां त्रयाणामपि कार्यत्वमवशिष्टं इत्यनध्यवसायेन पूर्वपक्षो विवक्षितः। अनध्यवसायपूर्वपक्ष एव **निबन्धन**टीकायां दर्शितः। भाष्यगतस्याविशेषेणेति पूर्वपक्षे हत्पन्यासस्य चाध्यवसाय एव तात्पर्यं वर्णितम् ॥	किं तावत्प्राप्तमविशेषेणेति। कोऽभिप्रायः द्रव्यं वा भवतु क्रियार्थम्, क्रिया वा भवतु द्रव्यार्थां ॥
यद्वा **विवरणटीका**नुसारेण प्रतिपदाधिकरणशरीरमत्र लिखितम् ; तन्मते हि प्रतिपदाधिकरणे कर्मैव विषयो न द्रव्यगुणौ इति निर्धारितम् ।	
विवरणे त्विति। तन्मते क्रत्वपूर्वाधीनप्रवृत्तिपुरुषफलाधीनप्रवृत्त्योरेवाविचार्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञातत्वात् तयोरेवात्र लक्षणमुच्यते । यत्र तु फलरागात् प्रवृत्तिः तत्पुरुषाधीनप्रवृत्तिः । इतरत् क्रत्वर्था न प्रवृत्तिः इति । एवं च	
सूत्रे अर्थपदं फलपरम्, लिप्सापदं च प्रवृत्तिपरम् ॥	
निबन्धने तु अर्थपदमुपादानपरम् । लिप्सापदं तु शेषत्वपरमित्यर्थः ॥	अर्थस्य नियोगे सिद्धिः। तच्चोपादानमित्युक्तम् ॥
ननु **विवरणमतेन** कामाधिकारता, **निबन्धमतेन** जीवाधिकारता ॥	किंभूतः पुनरधिक्रियते ? एतावता हैनसा युक्तो भवतीति श्रवणात् जीवत एवाधिकारः ॥
अग्निष्टोमसाम कृत्वा यजेतेति वचनं स्फुटशास्त्रभेदचिन्तेयम् इति सङ्गतिः **निबन्धने** ॥	अथेदानीमेतस्येति का कथा । स्पष्टोऽत्र शास्त्रभेदोऽतद्धर्मकस्य इति मन्तव्यम् ॥
विवरणे तु किं साध्यभेदमात्रात् उतानुबन्धभेदात् इति चिन्तेयमिति सङ्गतिः ॥	

In all these instances one can clearly see that what is referred to as *Nibhandhanamata* is found in the Bṛhatī and what is stated to be the *Vivaraṇamata* is not to be traced in it. Does it not follow from this that the work we have *i.e.* the Bṛhatī,

should be the same as the Nibandhana and different from the Vivaraṇa?

I have referred to a few correspondences alone. There are many more but they have not been recorded here for want of space.

Instances can be multiplied but they are unnecessary.

Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar's internal evidence is based on the following passages in—

i. Vidhiviveka and the Nyāyakaṇikā.

न ह्येष प्रयोगो विधेर्विषयः, अननुष्ठेयत्वात्, अशब्दार्थत्वात्, क्रमवद्व्यतिरेकेण इदंतया अनिरूपणात्

P. 413, Vidhiviveka.

......तत्र विवरणकृतो हेतुमाह—अननुष्ठेयत्वात् ....
निबन्धनकृतो हेतुमाह—अशब्दार्थत्वात्।

P. 413, Nyāyakaṇikā.

ii. Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathi Miśra—

तस्मात्सर्व एव तार्तीयः पाञ्चमिकश्च क्रमो न विधेयः इति विवरणकारः। निबन्धकारस्त्वाह—भवतु तार्तीयक्रमस्य संख्यायाश्चैकादशादिकाया अभिधानसंभवात् ग्रहणेन विध्यैदमर्थ्ये सति विध्याक्षिप्तानुष्ठानतया विधेयत्वम् etc.

P. 148, Nyāyaratnamālā.

Now these two passages explain the same idea relating to *krama* and the professor says that these are in perfect agreement with what is stated in the Bṛhatī at the beginning of Chapter V.

नन्वयमनारम्भणीय एव क्रमस्याविधेयत्वेनानङ्गत्वात्, अनङ्गलोपे च प्रधानस्यावैगुण्यात्। कथं पुनः क्रमस्याविधेयत्वम्? तदुच्यते।

स्वरूपेणाविधेयः सन् विधेयस्याविशेषणम्।
अभिधाविधुरत्वेन ग्राहकेणावधीरितः॥
विध्यङ्गभावविधुरो विध्याक्षेपबहिष्कृतः।
क्रमः केन प्रकारेण वैधानीयकमृच्छति॥

न तावत्क्रमः स्वरूपेण विधातुं शक्यते, अनुष्ठेयत्वात्। न हि स्वतन्त्रक्रमोऽनुष्ठातुं शक्यते। द्रव्यादिवदिति चेन्न, अतद्विशेषणत्वात्। अथापि स्यात् यथा द्रव्यादीनां स्वतोऽननुष्ठेयानामप्यनुष्ठेयभावार्थविशेषणतया विधिगोचरत्वम्, एवं क्रमस्यापि भविष्यति इति तन्न, अविधेयविशेषणत्वात्। द्रव्यादयो हि विधेय-

भूतभावार्थविशेषणभूताः युक्तं यद्विधीयन्त इति । क्रमस्तु न तथा, संघात-विशेषणत्वात्, तस्य चाविधेयत्वात् न हि संघातो विधीयते, पदार्थास्तु निर्धा-र्यन्ते, न च ते क्रमस्य भूमयः । न ह्येकैकत्र क्रमः संभवति, तस्मादविधेय इति संख्यावदिति चेत् न, उपलक्षणत्वात् । तत्रैतत्स्यात् "एकादश प्रयाजान् यजति" इति । यथा संघातवर्तिन्यपि संख्या विधीयते तद्वत्क्रमोऽपीति । तन्न, उपलक्षण-त्वात् संख्यायाः । न हि तत्र एकादशसंख्या विधीयते, सङ्ख्योपलक्षितास्तु अभ्यासा विधीयन्ते; ते च क्रियात्मका एवेति युक्तमेव विधीयन्त इति । तस्मात्सर्व एव तार्तीयः पाञ्चमिकश्च क्रमो न विधेय इति **विवरणकारः** । **निबन्धनकार**स्त्वाह—भवतु तार्तीयक्रमस्य संख्यायाश्चैकादशादिकाया अभिधानसंभवात् ग्रहणे विध्यैदमर्थ्ये सति विध्याक्षिप्तानुष्ठानतया विधेयत्वम् । न त्वेवं पाञ्चमिकस्य क्रमस्य संभवति न हि तस्य किञ्चिदभिधानमस्ति ; अनभिहितं च न ग्राहको ग्रहीतुमीष्टे ॥

तत्र प्राभाकरमतेन पूर्वोत्तरपक्षावारचयति—**नन्वयमिति** । ननु अनङ्गत्वेऽपि क्रमविशेषितप्रयोगसाध्यत्वात् प्रयोगविधेस्तदाधारः [रम्भः,] स्यादित्य-त्राह—**अङ्गलोपे चेति** । यत् साङ्गं तदेव प्रयोगविधिः स्ववैगुण्यपरिहारार्थः [र्थं प्रयुङ्क्ते] । नन्वन्व[नङ्गं] तल्लोपेऽपि स्वस्यावैगुण्यादतो न तदादर इत्यर्थः । प्रश्नो-त्तरमुखेन क्रमस्याविधेयत्वमुपपादयितुमुपक्रमते—**कथमिति** । तत्र प्रथमं **विवरण-कारमते** पूर्वपक्षमाह—**स्वरूपेणेति** । स तु वस्तुबलत्वादिताया वस्तुस्वभावपर्यालोचनेन सर्वस्यापि क्रमस्याविधेयत्वं मन्यते । **निबन्धनमतेन** पूर्वपक्षमाह—**अभिधेति** । वैधानीयकं विधेयं [यत्वम्] । तत्र प्रथममर्धं व्याचष्टे—**न तावदिति** । स्वरूपेण स्वातन्त्र्येणाननुष्ठेयत्वात् अनुष्ठातुमयोग्यत्वान्न हि कर्म—क्रमः स्वातन्त्र्येणानुष्ठीयते । पदार्थेष्वनुष्ठीयमानेषु स्वयमवर्जनीयतया निष्पद्यत इति न विधिगोचरत्वमश्नुत इत्यर्थः । शङ्कते—**द्रव्यादिवदिति** । "दध्ना जुहोति" इत्यत्र सिद्धरूपस्यापि दध्नो यथा होमोपरञ्जनाद्विधेयत्वं तन्नात्रा[थास्याः]पि स्यादित्यर्थः । न हि संघातो विधीयत इति युगपदनेकपदार्थसंघातगोचरे विधिर्न क्वचिदपि दृष्टचरः । विशिष्टविधिरपि नानाविशेषणविशिष्टैकपदार्थगोचरो न तु संघातगोचरोऽतो यः क्रमाश्रयः नासौ विधेयः, यस्तु विधेयो नासौ तदाश्रय इति भावः । संघातविशेषणतया विधेयत्वं दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भेन शङ्कते—**संख्यादिवदिति** । नामोपात्तायास्तत्र विधेयत्वमेव नास्तीति परिहरति—**तन्नेति** । एवंलक्षणत्वात् एवंस्वभावादित्यर्थः । न हि तत्र पञ्चप्रयाजानुद्दिश्यैकादशत्वं विधातुं शक्यते । पञ्चानामेकादशत्वायोगात् । किं तु संख्यया अभ्यासमुपलक्ष्य स विधीयते । ततश्चाभ्यासे क्रियमाणे श्रुत-

मेकादशत्वं स्वयमेव संपद्यत इति न विधेयत्वं तस्येत्यर्थः । पूर्वपक्षमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति । तार्तीयः पाञ्चमिकश्चेति । "वषट्कर्तुः प्रथमभक्षः" इत्यादिषु प्रथमादिशब्दावगम्यः पदार्थद्वयाश्रितः[श्रयः] पौर्वापर्यलक्षणस्तार्तीयः क्रमः, पाञ्चमिकस्तु बहुपदार्थाश्रयो विततिलक्षणः शब्दानभिधेयः, उभयस्यापि अभिधेयत्वानभिधेयत्वलक्षणवैषम्यसद्भावेऽपि वस्तुस्वभावपर्यालोचयनायां[या] न [भि] विधेयत्वं इत्यर्थः । **विवरणं नाम प्रथमं गुरुणा प्रणीता लघ्वी टीका इति तत्संप्रदायः । निबन्धनं नाम पश्चादनेनैव प्रणीता बृहती टीका ।** तन्मतेनेदानीं पूर्वपक्षमाह—**निबन्धनकारस्त्विति** । स तु शब्दबलवादितया शब्दस्वभावपर्यालोचनाभिधेयस्य क्रमस्य संख्यायाश्च विधेयत्वमङ्गीचकारेत्यर्थः । **ग्राहकग्रहणेति** । प्रथमं ग्राहकग्रहणं तदनुग्राहकशेषत्वं तदनन्तरं पूर्वकाले वर्तमानाद्धातोः क्षरणशेषत्वं, पश्चात् तद्द्वारशेषत्वं, ततः प्रयोगविध्यनुष्ठाप्यत्वं, तदेव च विधेयत्वमिति तन्मतपरिपाटी; तार्तीयस्य क्रमस्य संख्यायाश्चाभिधानसंभवात्तत्सर्वं संभवतीत्यर्थः । पाञ्चमिकस्य तु तद्वैपरीत्यमाह—**न त्वेनमिति** । तदेवोपपादयति—**न हीत्यादिना** ॥

Now let us compare this with what is found in the opening portion of the 5th Adhyāya of the Bṛhatī.

ननु च क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थचिन्ता प्रवृत्ता किमिदं प्रयोजकाप्रयोजकलक्षणं प्रवृत्तमिति, उच्यते । क्रमचिन्ताया मध्ये (?) शवोपयोगात् वक्ष्यमाणौपयिकतया सङ्कीर्त्यते न प्रवृत्तैकतया । एकयोगप्रवृत्तौ प्रयुक्तानां (?) हि क्रमो नाप्रयुक्तानामिति प्रयोजकसङ्कीर्तनं यदि प्रयोजकाप्रयोजकप्रयुक्तानां क्रमश्चिन्त्यते । अभिधेयः तर्हि प्रयुज्यते, नाप्रयुक्तस्य विधानम् ॥

केन वोक्तं क्रमो विधीयत इति । विहितविधानमेवात्र चिन्त्यते । किं यथा प्रतिपन्नविहितविधानमनुष्ठेयम्, उतानियमेनेति । कथं पुनरयथाप्रतिपन्नानुष्ठानमाशङ्क्यते, विनियोगशून्यत्वाद्विधानावगमस्य । नान्तरीयको हि विधेयावगतौ विधानप्रत्ययः । अतो यस्तादर्थ्येन स चोदनार्थ इति मन्वानः पूर्वपक्षवाद्यनियमं मन्यते ॥

ननु च "अध्वर्युर्ब्रह्माणं दीक्षयित्वा" इत्यत्र क्रमविधानमेवोपन्यस्तं भाष्यकारेण—"विधेयान्तराभावात्"—इति वदता । यद्येवमयुक्तमिदमस्त्येवात्र विधेयान्तरम्, अनेनामी दीक्षयितव्या इति; कर्तृविशेषविधानमध्वर्युविधावपि नियम एव; किं हेयमेवेदं भाष्यम्? नेति वदामः । यदिदं चेति

अयोवयुत्याभिधाने च गम्यते कर्तृविशेषविधौ तदयौ(?)तौयिकतायेव कर्तृविधावुपयुज्यते (?) न सम्बन्धिविधौ, इति तन्निष्ठा श्रुतिरित्युक्तम् । अप्रयुक्तस्याविधेयत्वं हेतुरुक्तः । एवं तर्हि " हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यत्यथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः" इति एतदप्युदाहरणं स्यात्, नेति ब्रूमः । पाठगतस्यायमथशब्दोऽनुवादः । कर्तृविशेषविधौ अनन्यान्यतः क्रमोऽवगन्तुं शक्यते क्त्वाप्रत्ययादिति सूत्रम् । किं पुनः कारणं, नान्तरीयको नियमः आद्रियेत । पुनर्व्रीह्यचोदनालक्षणानिवृत्तौ योगनिवृत्ता-वाशङ्कोपपद्यते, सत्यं नोपपद्यते । अत एव च नानुष्ठीयते किं त्वर्थप्राप्त एव क्रमान्तरं निरुणद्धि, अन्यस्यानवगमादित्युच्यते । अतोऽनपेक्षत्वमेवाप्यभि-धीयमानमप्युकारायैव भवतीति न दोषः । पुनरुक्तस्याद्याशङ्का त्यक्ता ॥

A careful comparison of the passage quoted from the Bṛhatī and the Nāyakaratna leads me to believe that the *Nibandhanapakṣa* of the Nyāyaratnamālā could be clearly traced to the Bṛhatī. In the same breath Rāmānuja tells us that the Nibandhana that is referred to is the same as the Bṛhatī and that the Vivaraṇa is otherwise known as Laghvī.

From the discussion above, is it not proper to argue that the Nibandhana of Prabhākara is the same as the work that we have at present ? I would request my revered Professor to reconsider his position in the light of the remarks made in this paper and let us have his decisive views on the point.

STUDIES IN THE IMAGERY OF THE RĀMĀYAṆA.

BY

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I

Despite the Dhvanivāda, which assigns a subordinate place to Alaṅkāras or figurative images, both poets and critics have always shown immense interest in them in India. Bharata, the earliest of the known writers who deal with the subject of Alaṅkāras, recognises four of them in his Nāṭyaśāstra,[1] but their number went on increasing, until it reaches the respectable number of 125 in the Kuvalayānanda of Appayya Dīkṣita, without, of course, counting the Sub-divisions. The last great work belonging to the Alaṅkāraśāstra, the Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannāthapaṇḍita, written long after the Dhvanivāda had received almost universal recognition at the hands of poets and critics, is primarily a detailed study of the Alaṅkāras. It is not merely critics who take delight in defining and analysing these figures of speech, but poets also exhibit a weakness for them throughout the whole period of Sanskrit literature. Nor is there anything surprising in this. Figurative imagery is bound to have its place in all good poetry. Even critics like the Dhvanivādins, who have declared that poetry has a higher function to perform than the mere presentation of beautiful imagery, have admitted that imagery, if carefully used, can serve this very higher purpose.

The interest of our critics, from Bharata to Jagannāthapaṇḍita, has, however, been in the *form* of the Alaṅkāras. It must be admitted that our Ālaṅkārikas have bequeathed to us a very deep, penetrating and detailed analysis of the *forms* that Sanskrit imagery can assume. Great efforts were made to distinguish one form from another. In later times, all the devices provided by the Navīnanyāya for reaching extreme accuracy in definitions were adopted for the purpose. The history of the Alaṅkāraśāstra is, to a very great extent, the history of the discovery of newer and newer forms of images, of a more and more scientific

1. Bharata-Nāṭyaśāstra, XVI. (Benares Edition).
   S. K. De. Sanskrit Poetics II, p. 6.

basis for classifying them and of the formulation of more and more accurate definitions of them. Appayya Dīkṣita's "Citramīmāṁsā" and Jagannāthapaṇḍita's "Rasagaṅgādhara" are indications of the kind of controversies that must have been carried on in circles of critics in ancient India.

There is, however, something more than *form* in any given image. An image usually involves a comparison and a comparison presupposes three things :—the object of comparison (the upameya) the standard of comparison, (the upamāna) and the point of similarity (the samānadharma). These might be called the *contents* of an image. The contents might remain the same while the form varies and the form might remain the same, while the contents vary. The following passage from the "Citramīmāṁsā" would make this quite clear :—

चन्द्र इव मुखमिति सादृश्यवर्णनं तावदुपमा । सैवोक्तिभङ्गीभेदेनानेकालंकारभावं भजते । तथा हि—"चन्द्र इव मुखं मुखमिव चन्द्रः" इत्युपमेयोपमा । "मुखं मुखमिव" इत्यनन्वयः। "मुखमिव चन्द्रः" इति प्रतीपम्। "चन्द्रं दृष्ट्वा मुखं स्मरामि" इति स्मरणम् । "मुखमेव चन्द्रः" इति रूपकम् । "मुखचन्द्रेण तापः शाम्यति" इति परिणामः । "किमिदं मुखमुताहो चन्द्रः" इति सन्देहः । etc.[1]

In the above passage, the contents of all the figures of speech are the same, namely, the face and the moon; but the *form* varies according as it is upamā, or rūpaka or something else.

The Alaṅkāraśāstra is essentially an analysis of the *form* of the images. This analysis was undertaken partly to satisfy a natural intellectual curiosity and partly, because, it was felt that it had something to do with the aesthetic pleasure we feel when we come across a beautiful image. It may be admitted that it *has* something to do with it. How else can we explain the different effect on us of the different figures of speech even when the contents remain the same? But one may also ask the question : have not the contents also something to do with it? When Kālidāsa writes :—

अथ वा कृतवाग्द्वारे वंशेऽस्मिन् पूर्वसूरिभिः ।
मणौ वज्रसमुत्कीर्णे सूत्रस्येवास्ति मे गतिः ॥[2]

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1. Citramīmāṁsā, p. 6, (Nirnaya Sagara Press Edition).
2. Ragh. I, 4.

Do we like the comparison only because it has taken the form of upamā, or also, because, of its appropriateness *i.e.*, for its contents ?

We cannot doubt that our Ālaṅkārikas had recognised the share of the contents in making an image beautiful. According to Bhāmaha, the defects of an upamā, as mentioned by Medhāvin, are as follows :—

हीनतासंभवो लिङ्गवचोभेदो विपर्ययः ।
उपमानाधिकत्वं च तेनासदृशतापि च ॥[1]

Vāmana's list is almost identical :—

हीनत्वाधिकत्वलिङ्गवचनभेदासादृश्यासंभवास्तद्दोषाः[2] ।

It will be observed that these are defects in the *contents* of the upamā and not in the *form*. Appayya Dīkṣita puts the whole thing in a more positive form when he says :—

उपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरर्थयोर्द्वयोः ।
हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमेत्युच्यते काव्यवेदिभिः ॥

कविसमयप्रसिद्ध्यनुरोधेनोपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरेव साधर्म्यमुपमा । न त्वतथाभूतयोः । अत एव "कुमुदमिव मुखं प्रसन्नं" इत्यादि नोपमा । तथाभूतयोरपि वस्तुत्वद्रव्यत्वादिकृतमहृद्यं साधर्म्यं न तथा । किं तु हृद्यमेव कान्तिमत्त्वादिकम् । सर्वोऽपि ह्यलंकारः कविसमयप्रसिद्ध्यनुरोधेन हृद्यतया काव्यशोभाकर एवालंकारतां भजते । अतः "गोसदृशो गवयः" इति नोपमा । "गौर्वाहीकः" इति न रूपकम् । "स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा" इति न सन्देहः । "इदं रजतं" इति न भ्रान्तिमान् । "नायं सर्पः" इति नापह्नुतिः । "पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते" इति न पर्यायोक्तम् । "पर्वतो वह्निमान्" इति नानुमानम् । "स देवदत्तः" इति न स्मरणम् । "तस्थ-स्यमिपां तांतंतामः" इति न यथासंख्यम् । "पुत्रेण सहागतः पिता" इति न सहोक्तिः । "तेन विना गतः" इति न विनोक्तिः । "श्वेतो धावति" इति न श्लेषः[3] ।

The meaning of this passage cannot be mistaken. There is here recognition, in theory at least, of the importance of the *contents* in an image, of their share in the production of the pleasure we feel when we come across a good image. A recent

1. Bhāmahālaṅkāra, II. 39.
2. Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra Vṛtti, IV, ii, 8.
3. Citramīmāṁsā, p. 6.

English writer says:—"What precisely is the origin of the pleasure we take in the pictures of metaphor and simile, as distinct from unfigurative word-picture ? I think that, over and above the delight in a picture, there is a little shock of surprise caused by the unexpected rapprochement of two notions that seemed, a moment before, unconnected and remote from one another. The noticing of likenesses (need I refer to babies ?) would seem an ever-fresh source of pleasure—we call comparisons odious, but love them none the less. And when the likeness is perceived in the midst of unlikeness, perhaps even despite obvious and preponderating unlikeness, the pleasure is proportionately greater. "[1]

In spite of this theoretical recognition of the importance of the *contents* for the beauty of an image, we find in our Alaṅkāraśāstra no study, no analysis of them. But if it is true that the contents have something to do with the pleasure we derive from beautiful images and if it is true that imagery has played a conspicuous part in all periods of Sanskrit literature, then such an analysis of the contents of the images might yield interesting results. It should, it seems to me, throw some light on the history of Sanskrit literature. It would show to what extent the contents vary or remain the same in the different authors and periods of Sanskrit literature. Explanation would have to be sought for the variation or the repetition, as the case may be. It would show the range of the poetic power of the different writers and their relation to one another. It might throw some light on the relation between *form* and *content* in the evolution of the images. In short, no history of Sanskrit literature could be considered complete which did dot include a historical treatment of Sanskrit imagery, from the point of view of form as well as of content. In the existing works on the History of Sanskrit literature, such as those of Professors Keith and Winternitz, there are, no doubt, many interesting remarks on the imagery of Sanskrit poets, but no systematic treatment. The task is a big one, but a beginning has to be made. The following pages are no more than a humble attempt at such a beginning. I have thought it best to begin with the Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa[2], because it is there that we find the beginnings of Kāvya.

1. Stephen. J. Brown. " The World• or Imagery." London 1927.

2 The Bombay Recension of the Rāmāyaṇa has been used for this study.

The first step in the study of the imagery of the Rāmāyaṇa is to determine the occasions on which the images appear in the work. As every one knows, the work is an immense one. As one reads it, all sorts of scenes pass before our eyes. There are descriptions of cities and landscapes, fierce rākṣasas and mighty monkeys. There are moving scenes in which husband and wife, father and son, master and servant, king and subject, prince and priest take part and give expression to their innermost feelings. There are accounts of duels and battles, devastation of countries, burning of cities and ruthless destruction of armies by weapons, human and divine. There are speeches born of indignation and anger, lamentations expressive of profound sorrow, and exhortations of wisdom. With all this, the work is mainly a continuous narrative of events, big and small. Into the main story of Rāma and his exploits are woven countless episodes centering round the minor characters of the work. The question before us however, is : In all this variety and richness of subject-matter, what are the occasions which particularly call forth imagery from the poet ? In answer to this, it may be stated, in a general manner, that images are found throughout the work. There is hardly a sarga in which at least a few comparisons do not occur. They may not always be very striking, they are often mere repetitions of quite commonplace images like कमलपत्राक्ष, इन्दीवरश्याम, राजीवलोचन, नरशार्दूल , मुनिपुंगव, देवसंकाश etc. Our interest lies not in these, but in those which occur on special occasions. For, there are some occasions on which these images seem to come in quick succession and in greater abundance. It is these which are striking and arrest our attention. It is these which seem to have been introduced by the poet deliberately, with a full knowledge of the effect they will have on the hearer or the reader. I give below a list of passages in which the images are thus more striking. It is by no means an exhaustive list, but, I hope, sufficiently complete, not to invalidate any conclusion that may be drawn from it.

I. 18, 50-52.	...	Daśaratha describes his joy on the arrival of Viśvāmitra and compares the occasion to others.
I. 48, 2-5.	...	Sumati asks Viśvāmitra who Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa are, while describing them.
I. 49, 14-15.	...	Description of Ahalyā as Rāma sees her.

I. 55, 9-10.	... Description of Viśvāmitra, defeated and humiliated by Vasiṣṭha.
II. 1.	... Description of Rāma by Daśaratha.
II. 2.	... Description of Rāma by the people.
II. 3, 27-29.	... Description of Rāma as Daśaratha sees him coming.
II. 4, 5, 6.	... Description of the preparations for the abhiṣeka of Rāma as Yuvarāja.
II. 7, 1-30	... Mantharā's speech to Kaikeyī on hearing of Rāma's coronation.
II. 8.	... Mantharā's speech.
II. 9, 41-46.	... Kaikeyī's description of Mantharā.
II. 10, 23-26.	... Description of Kaikeyī in distress.
II. 12.	Speech of Daśaratha on hearing of Kaikeyī's two boons.
II. 15.	Sumantra's description of Rāma's palace.
II. 16, 9 f.f.	Sumantra's description of Rāma.
II. 16.	Poet's description of Rāma as he goes out to meet Daśaratha.
II. 18, 4-7.	Description of Daśaratha in distress.
II. 20, 32-34.	... Description of Kausalyā in distress.
II. 20, 49-55.	... Kausalyā's lamentation on hearing of Rāma's exile.
II. 34, 2-3.	... Description of Daśaratha in distress.
II. 40.	... Departure of Rāma.
II. 43.	... Lamentation of Kausalyā.
II. 59, 28-30.	... Lamentation of Daśaratha.
II. 65, 66.	... Lamentation of Daśaratha's wives after his death.
II. 73, 1-5.	... Bharata's indignatian on hearing Rāma's exile.
II. 93, 8-15.	... Description of Citrakūṭa by Bharata.
II. 94.	... Description of Citrakūṭa by Rāma.
III. 16.	... Description of winter in Pañcavaṭī.
III. 19, 3-4.	... Khara's speech on seeing Śūrpaṇakhā mutilated.
III. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30...	Description of battle between Rāma and the Rākṣasas.
III. 31, 41-44.	... Mārīca's advice to Rāvaṇa not to take Sītā away.

III. 37, 12-20	... Mārīca's second speech to the same effect.
III. 47, 32 f.f.	... Sītā's reply when Rāvaṇa proposes marriage.
III. 51.	... Battle between Jaṭāyus and Rāvaṇa.
III. 52.	... Description of the ravishment of Sītā.
III. 56.	... Sītā's reply to Rāvaṇa's proposal of marriage.
IV. 14, 19-23.	... Sugrīva going out to battle.
IV. 15, 19-21.	... Description of Rāma by Tārā.
IV. 17, 1 f.f.	... Description of fallen Vālin.
IV. 19, 21-26.	... „ „ by Tārā.
IV. 23, 22-28.	... Lamentation of Tārā.
IV. 28.	... Description of the rainy season.
IV. 29.	... „ „ autumn.
V. 1.	... „ Hanumān's leap across the ocean.
V. 2.	... „ Laṅkā by Hanumān.
V. 4.	... „ Laṅkā.
V. 5.	... „ A moonlit night.
V. 6.	.. „ Rāvaṇa's palace.
V. 7.	... „ „ „
V. 9.	... „ „ harem.
V. 10.	... „ „ „
V. 14.	... „ Aśōkavana.
V. 15.	... „ Sītā in distress.
V. 18.	... „ Rāvaṇa's visit to Sītā.
V. 19.	... „ Sītā in distress.
V. 21.	... Sītā's reply to Rāvaṇa's proposal.
V. 22.	... Speeches of Rāvaṇa and Sītā.
V. 28.	... Sītā's lamentation.
V. 56.	... Description of mountain.
V. 57.	... „ Hanumān's return leap.
VI. 5.	... Rāma's lamentation.
VI. 16.	... Rāvaṇa's indignant speech to Vibhīṣaṇa.
VI. 24.	... Rāvaṇa's angry speech to Śuka.
VI. 53.	... Battle between Vajradaṁṣṭra and Śuka.
VI. 58.	... „ Prahasta and Nīla.
VI. 59.	... Description of Rākṣasas.

VI. 61.	...	Description of Kumbhakarṇa.
VI. 71.	...	„ Atikāya.
VI. 102.	...	Fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa.
VI. 103.	...	„ „
VI. 111.	...	Vibhīṣaṇa's lamentation on the death of Rāvaṇa.

Before explaining the above list, it must be stated that the bulk of the Rāmāyaṇa is made up of narratives, written in a simple style, in which the story progresses from incident to incident and episode to episode. Interspersed among these narratives and forming, on the whole, *only a minor portion of the work* are some speeches and descriptions. It is quite clear from the above list that the images, when they do occur in greater abundance and in a striking manner, occur in these speeches and descriptions and not in the narrative portion of the work, which is devoted to the telling of the story. It is in these speeches and descriptions that we have to see the beginnings of the later Kāvyas, in very many of which the narrative portion is reduced to the absolute minimum and the speeches and descriptions occupy the whole work.

Taking the speeches first, it will be found that they are generally uttered by the characters under the stress of some *emotion*. Sometimes it is *jealousy*, as in the case of Mantharā who addresses Kaikeyī when she hears of Rāma's impending coronation as Yuvarāja. Sometimes it is *sorrow*, as when Daśaratha and Kausalyā lament about Rāma's exile or when Tārā laments on the death of Vālin. Sometimes it is *righteous indignation*, as when Bharata hears of Rāma's exile or when Sītā rejects Rāvaṇa's proposal of marriage. Sometimes it is *pity*, as when Mārīca tries to dissuade Rāvaṇa from his scheme of taking Sītā away. These emotions spontaneously call forth imagery from the poet. The images are generally of a homely nature and therefore very effective in expressing the emotion in question. Sītā's speech in III, 47—when Rāvaṇa proposes marriage is a very good example.

This connection between image and emotion is, by the way, quite interesting, because it is one of the topics dealt with in the Dhvanyāloka.[1] Ānandavardhana is, on the whole, rather suspicious. He is afraid that too many images in a passage

1. Dhvanyāloka, p. 85 f.f.

meant to evoke sentiment might distract the attention of the reader away from the latter. He advises caution, without barring images altogether. He sums up his views as follows :—

> ध्वन्यात्मभूते शृङ्गारे समीक्ष्य विनिवेशितः ।
> रूपकादिरलंकारवर्ग एति यथार्थताम् ॥
> विवक्षा तत्परत्वेन नाङ्गित्वेन कथंचन ।
> काले च ग्रहणत्यागौ नातिनिर्वहणैषिता ॥
> निर्व्यूढावपि चाङ्गत्वे यत्नेन प्रत्यवेक्षणम् ।
> रूपकादेरलंकारवर्गस्याङ्गत्वसाधनम् ॥[1]

This errs perhaps on the side of caution. The English writer quoted above goes much farther when he writes :—"The more emotion grows upon a man, the more his speech, if he make any effort to express his emotion, abounds in figures—exclamation, interrogation, anacoluthon, apostrophe, hyperbole (yes certainly, hyperbole !) simile, metaphor. His language is what we sometimes euphemestically describe as 'picturesque'. Feelings swamp ideas and language is used to express, not the reality of things, but the state of one's emotions."[2]

I must not be understood to say that *all* emotional speeches in the Rāmāyaṇa abound in figurative images. I only mean that they have a *strong tendency to do* so. There are some exceptions. For example, there is the first reply of Daśaratha to Viśvāmitra when the latter asks for Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa to be sent with him for the protection of his sacrifice. The request must have given a shock to Daśaratha and his reply is no doubt full of emotions, but there is hardly any image in it.

The descriptions in the Rāmāyaṇa are of a most straightforward nature, much as we would expect them to be when art is in the first stage. All the things contained in the thing to be described are enumerated in detail. No attempt seems to have been made to pick and choose. One could say they are almost like catalogues, if the word did not connote absolute absence of poetic merit. The following description of Citrakūṭa by Rāma might be considered a typical one :—

1. Dhvanyāloka, p. 88.
2. The world of Imagery, p. 90.

पश्येममचलं भद्रे ! नानाद्विजगणायुतम् ।
शिखरैः खमिवोद्विद्धैर्धातुमद्भिर्विभूषितम् ॥
केचिद्रजतसंकाशाः केचित् क्षतजसन्निभाः ।
पीतमाञ्जिष्ठवर्णाश्च केचिन्मणिवरप्रभाः ॥
पुष्पार्ककेतकाभाश्च केचिज्ज्योतीरसप्रभाः ।
विराजतेऽचलेन्द्रस्य देशा धातुविभूषिताः ।
नानामृगगणैर्द्वीपितरक्ष्वृक्षगणैर्वृतः ।
अदुष्टैर्भात्ययं शैलो बहुपक्षिसमाकुलः ॥
आम्रजम्ब्वसनैर्लोध्रैः प्रियालैः पनसैर्धवैः ।
अङ्कोलैर्भात्यतिनिशैर्बिल्वतिन्दुकवेणुभिः ॥
काश्मर्यारिष्टवरणैर्मधूकैस्तिलकैरपि ।
बदर्यामलकैर्नीपैर्वेत्रधन्वनबीजकैः ॥
पुष्पवद्भिः फलोपेतैः छायावद्भिर्मनोरमैः ।
एवमादिभिराकीर्णः श्रियं पुष्यत्ययं गिरिः ॥[1]

This passage illustrates not only the detailed, catalogue-like nature of the descriptions, but also their *directness*. When the poet wants to say that there are wild animals on the mountain, he says, *quite directly* : " नानामृगगणैर्द्वीपितरक्ष्वृक्षगणैर्वृतः". This point will become still clearer when we compare this with what Kālidāsa does in similar circumstances. When he wants to say that there are lions and elephants on the Himālaya, he does not say so directly, but says :—

पदं तुषारस्रुतिधौतरक्तं यस्मिन्नदृष्ट्वापि हतद्विपानाम् ।
विन्दन्ति मार्गं नखरन्ध्रमुक्तैर्मुक्ताफलैः केसरिण किराताः ॥[2]

It is into such direct and detailed descriptions that the poet introduces his imagery, which therefore serves, chiefly, to add vividness to the details and lend a certain picturesqueness to the whole description. How this is done can be best understood if we now study the contents of the images.

To be continued.

1. R. II. 9, 4—10.
2. Kumārasambhava, I, 6.

'PROFESSOR SRINIVASACHARI'S "RĀMĀNUJA'S IDEA OF THE FINITE SELF" AN EXAMINATION OF CHAPTER I.'
A REPLY

by

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Under the above title Prof. Sundararama Aiyar has written a fairly long article in the April-June number of this journal. In case any one of the readers of the journal interested in philosophy has not yet read Prof. Srinivasachari's book we would strongly recommend a study of it as, in the words of the introduction, it "renders the fundamental tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school intelligible to all average students of philosophy." The central aim of the whole exposition is a constructive criticism of the different categories employed in metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics with a view to correlating them into a synthetic whole of the relation between the Jīva and Īśvara. In attempting, therefore, to analyse the book into chapters and propositions, the critic is very likely to lose the wood in the trees and may not succeed in conveying a true impression of the author's views. Another feature of the book is the transparent aim of the author to understand and present his subject in as fair and full a manner as possible without slavishly exalting his hero or condemning other systems. An appreciative exposition of Rāmānuja's views is given and the reader is left to form his own impressions of the place that his philosophy should occupy in the world's systems.

The learned critic opens his article with the sentence: "Prof. Srinivasachari puts forward (in the first chapter of his work) a severe criticism of the various points in what he considers to be the Advaita doctrine of Śaṅkara. He labours under serious misconceptions regarding that doctrine, and his criticisms are altogether unjustifiable and misleading." He follows this up later with many similar passages.

Advaita, like other great systems of philosophy, has been expounded in various ways by various persons. One of these expositions which is generally admitted to be a very fair one is found in the Mahāpūrvapakṣa of the Śrī Bhāṣya. Whenever Prof. Srinivasachari uses the word Advaitin he has evidently this exposition in view. But the learned cirtic has obviously a very different exposition in view, which he attributes to Śaṅkara. There are but three references to the Advaita doctrine in this chapter and we shall show that they are all taken from Rāmānuja's Mahāpūrvapakṣa.

(i) " The Advaitin and the Dvaitin distinguish between primary texts and secondary texts ". (*Vide* pp. 18 and 19 of the Ananda Press Edn. of the Śrī Bhāṣya.)

(ii) " To the Advaitin experience is rooted in inexplicable illusion (Anirvacanīya) and contradiction (Bādha)". For this, *see* pp. 16 and 75 and p. 22 of the same Edn.

(iii) " A judgment like 'this is that Devadatta' does not establish bare identity, as the Advaitin says, by the removal of contradiction between the subject and the predicate ". This is based on the Advaitin's view of Sāmānādhikaraṇya in p. 19 of the same edn.

There are also described in the book under review two direct references to Śaṅkara to which the learned critic has taken exception. We shall show that in dealing with these passages, he has not only misunderstood the author's view, but also misled the reader. It is necessary that the passages referred to should be studied in their context and so we give the full paragraphs below :—

(1) Rāmānuja insists on the equal validity of all the Upaniṣadic texts and claims for his interpretation the authority of timeless tradition and logical satisfactoriness and verifies it by a quotation from Dramiḍācārya for whose authority Rāmānuja has the highest esteem. The Śāstra speaks of things as they are in reality. This method of interpretation is not accepted by the Advaitin and the Dvaitin who distinguish between primary texts and secondary texts, Pradhāna texts and Gauṇa texts. Śaṅkara, for example, directs attention to the Mahāvākyas and derives his chief thoughts

therefrom. But Rāmānuja lays stress on Śruti as a whole and relies on logical stability. It is in this way that he deduces his first principles of realism (Satkhyāti) and co-ordination (Sāmānādhikaraṇya) and establishes the truth of Jīva as a Prakāra of Īśvara. The reality of God is to be conceived on the analogy of organic unity in consonance with the criteria of sense-perception and inference. Both sentient and non-sentient beings (Cit and Acit) are shown to be modifications of Brahman and of a tissue with Him.

(2) The philosophy of Rāmānuja is a synthesis of metaphysical, moral and religious experience and is rooted in the thought that Brahman is the ground of experience as well as the goal of experience. The Supreme Being is also the supreme good and the ultimate goal of all religious endeavour (*Kāraṇam tu dhyeyaḥ*). The Absolute of thought is also the "Inner Ruler Immortal" and the Lord of love and bliss. The glory of God and this goodness are fulfilled in His redemptive grace. The theory of being is vitally related to the theory of knowledge, will and feeling. Brahman is the ideal of experience in which the ideals of truth, goodness and beauty are related and realised. Reason is both pure and practical, and the dualism that we find in the systems of Spinoza, Kant and Śaṅkara disappears in the synthesis of Rāmānuja. His governing idea is that Brahman is the first cause and the final cause and there is no contradiction between the Absolute of thought and the God of religion. Brahman constitutes the real Reality of the universe (Tattva), the means of realisation (Hita) and the realisation itself (Puruṣārtha)

The first passage is extracted by the critic thus : "Rāmānuja insists on the equal validity of all the Upaniṣadic texts and claims for his interpretation the authority of timeless traditions and logical satisfactoriness and verifies it by a quotation from Drāmiḍācārya etc. On the other hand, according to our author the Advaitin distinguishes between primary texts and secondary texts, Pradhāna texts and Gauṇa texts. Śaṅkara, for example,

directs his attention to the Mahāvākyas and derives his chief thoughts therefrom."

A reference to the full paragraph quoted above will show that the object of the author is to explain the well-known claim of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins that whereas the Advaitins emphasise the *abheda śrutis* like *tat tvam asi* and explain away *bheda śrutis* like *pṛthagātmānam preritāram ca matvā juṣṭastatastena amṛtatvameti* and the Dvaitins do the reverse, they themselves attach equal importance to all the texts by interpreting them in the light of the *ghaṭaka śrutis* which declare the world of sentient and non-sentient beings to be related to Brahman in the same way as the human body is related to the human soul.

In the original, the sentence "Śaṅkara directs attention to the Mahāvākyas and derives his chief thoughts therefrom" is contrasted with the very next sentence "But Rāmānuja lays stress on the Śruti as a whole." The learned critic, by completely omitting both the latter sentence and all reference to the Dvaitin and by contracting the intermediate passages, leads the reader to infer that Rāmānuja's insistence on the validity of all upaniṣadic texts is contrasted with Śaṅkara's view. This misleading suggestion is then strengthened by the sentences: "We can assert in reply that

(1) Śaṅkara also insists on the equal validity of all the upaniṣadic texts and

(2) that he does not distinguish anywhere between what our author calls 'primary texts and secondary texts'. Śaṅkara himself never in his Bhāṣyas makes mention of the term Mahāvākyas." He thus leads the reader to infer erroneously that the author has made these incorrect statements. After some further explanation, he announces "On the grounds above stated, we hold that Prof. Srinivasachariar is in error in saying that Śaṅkara or any of his followers do (*sic*) not admit the equal validity of all Vedāntic texts." But the author never said any such thing. What the author said is that whereas Rāmānuja derived his chief thoughts by considering the Upaniṣads as a whole, Śaṅkara derived his chief thoughts from what are usually called the Mahāvākyas. The sentence "Śaṅkara for example directs his attention to the Mahāvākyas" does not imply that Śaṅkara himself calls these passages 'Mahāvākyas.' It only means that he attaches more importance to

those passages which have since been called Mahāvākyas though not by Śaṅkara himself. This the learned critic also admits in a way when he says that even if Śaṅkara has not used the term Mahāvākyas, he is fully aware of the fact that sentences like *tattvamasi, aham brahmāsmi* are important in the Upaniṣads. In fact, every impartial student must accept that Śaṅkara attached more importance to *abheda śrutis* than to *bheda śrutis* from the mere fact that he is the well-known apostle of pure unadulterated monism which cannot in its very nature give full value to the *bheda śrutis.* The criticism of Prof. Sundararama Aiyar based on this passage is therefore wholly unfounded.

Now for the second extract: The reference to dualism and Śaṅkara occurs in the 7th sentence. The entire passage contains 9 sentences all of which except the 7th describe Brahman in the triple light of metaphysics, ethics and æsthetics or religion. He is described as the ground of existence in metaphysics, the supreme good of ethics and the ultimate goal of religion, and again, as the Absolute of thought in metaphysics, the Inner Ruler Immortal in ethics and the Lord of Love and Bliss in religion. This latter description in the 3rd sentence is repeated in the 8th sentence and the 9th forms the closing sentence. In the midst of these, the 7th sentence "Reason is both pure and practical and the dualism that we find in Spinoza, Kant and Śaṅkara disappears in the synthesis of Rāmānuja" describes one of the effects of this synthetic view and forms practically a self-contained statement. It consists of two parts each explaining the other. The learned critic in making his extract omits the first half of the sentence and joints its second half to the second half of the eighth sentence (dealing with the general subject of the paragraph) to form a misleading combination thus :—

> "The dualism that we find in the systems of spinoza, Kant and Śaṅkara disappears in the synthesis of Rāmānuja. His governing idea is that there is no contradiction between the Absolute of thought and the God of religion."

The original 7th sentence clearly shows that the dualism objected to is of the kind that exists between pure and practical reason *i.e.* the building up of metaphysics and ethics on separate bases as Kant did. The creation of a distinction between *paramārthadaśā* for pure reason or metaphysics and *vyāvahārikadaśā* for practical reason or ethics by Śaṅkara is

also a case of this kind. Now this could give the learned critic no cause for quarrel. By manipulating the extract, he creates in the minds of his readers the illusion that the author attributed to Śaṅkara a contradiction between the Absolute of thought and the God of religion, a dualism " in the universally[1] recognised sense of that term as referring to *two* distinct (and pluralistic) realities of *the same order.*" It must be obvious that the author's sentence refers to dualism, not as the admission of " two distinct realities of the same order", but to the very admission of the existence of two different orders of reality as *Paramārtha* and *Vyāvahārika.*

The critic has also attempted to ridicule some of the doctrines of Rāmānuja expounded in the book by considering them from his own standpoint and without trying to understand the original. He has evidently forgotten that Prof. Srinivasachariyar's exposition is of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and not of his own independent views and he has not realised that he has represented it as faithfully and truly as he could, bearing in mind the fundamental principle that the best way to understand a philosopher is to realise his point of view. In the criticisms under reference, the author's statements of Rāmānuja's position are attacked as if they were the opinion of the author himself. Here is an instance of such a criticism :—

> " It is strange that Prof. Srinivasachari should propound such an astonishing paradox as is contained in the following. 'The cognition of silver in the shell, when the latter is mistaken for the former, arises from defective perception, owing to which the element of silver alone is seen and not of the shell.' "

It is strange that Prof. Sundararama Aiyar should have failed to see that the author is only setting forth Rāmānuja's view

[1] In this connection the following passage from Hans Driesch may be of interest :—" Dualism, in our opinion, must be the last word of metaphysics even if we should like to be monists. For there is the diversity and discrepancy between what is *whole* and what is *not whole* or contingent ; the logical contradiction between wholeness and contingency being, in our opinion, the very foundation of all dualism." Here the word " dualism " is used only in the author's sense and not in what the critic claims to be " the universally recognised sense of the term." Philosophy of To-day, p. 429.

without expressing his own opinion thereon. Further one cannot see what there is paradoxical or strange in Rāmānuja's view itself. Thus, when I mistake a piece of rolled gold for genuine gold, I perceive the element of gold (*i. e.*, the qualities that raise in me the belief of its being gold) in it, but omit to perceive the elements of rolled gold (*i.e.*, the qualities that with the presence of those already percieved would establish it as rolled gold). When I perceive both sets of qualities, I see it truly as rolled gold.

The learned critic takes objection to the author's statement that "to the Advaitin, experience is rooted in inexplicable illusion (Anirvacanīya) and contradiction (Bādha.)" He first objects to the translation of the word *anirvacanīya* as "inexplicable". To say that this is the translation generally adopted (*Vide* p. 106 Thibaut) may not probably carry much weight with him. But, it is significant that he himself has not offered a better rendering that would convey the import of the word with greater accuracy. And, does not the word "inexplicable" connote the idea of incapacity of logical proof or deduction as explained in p. 75 of the Śrī Bhāṣya ?

By a very regrettable *suggestio falsi* the learned critic makes it appear that the author said that to the Advaitin, "phenomenal existence"...........is "*known* as an "illusion" *while* it lasts as an experience, as an actual happening, in our waking and conscious life." Further on he asserts: ".........Śaṅkara distinctly says that phenomenal existence is "true" while it lasts, —*not* that our experience of it is an "*illusion*" or "rooted in contradiction (Bādha)" *while our experience of it lasts*,[1] as Prof. Srinivasachari assumes from his insufficient knowledge of Śaṅkara." Nowhere has the author of the book conveyed the idea that according to the Advaitin the illusion is *known as an illusion* while it lasts. An illusion and *the knowledge of it as an illusion* are so mutually incompatible at the same time that none with any pretension to psychological knowledge would think of making such a statement. Moreover Prof. Srinivasachari does *not* assume 'that our experience of phenomenal existence is an "illusion" or "rooted in contradiction" *while our experience of it lasts*'. The author's sentence does not bear out the allegation and the words we have italicised have been added by

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[1] Italics mine.

the learned critic to the author's statement to give point to an otherwise pointless criticism. I have very carefully gone through this section of the book after reading Prof. Sundararama Aiyar's review and cannot find any passage therein which could even distantly mean '*while our experience of it lasts.* To an unbiassed reader of the sentence, its indubitable meaning must be clear, namely, that experience is the *result* of an inexplicable illusion and contradiction. To say this is not the same as saying that the experience *knows* it to be an illusion af the time of experiencing it which is what the learned critic attributes to the author.

The criticism is made further on : "The Professor, as we have already shown is *entirely wrong* in thinking that Śaṅkara holds that in our perception of the external world we experience an "illusion." How the learned critic divined the author's "thinking" is a mystery. But is it not obvious that what the Professor was "thinking" is "that Śaṅkara holds that in our perception of the external world we experience (*what* is *from the pāramārthika point of view*) an illusion? What an unhappy instance of *suppressio veri !*

We need not dwell at length on the concluding portions of the learned critic's article where he tries to bring the author to ridicule by saying that "he has entirety failed to understand the Advaitin's position," that he has "got into this muddle," "has discovered a mare's nest of his own or like Don Quixote, is tilting with the creations of his fertile powers of fancy, poetic or philosophic." It is to be regretted that in his ardent advocacy and defence of the Advaitic position, the learned critic has so far forgotten himself as to make personal references to the author of a not very edifying character. It would certainly be presumptuous for any one to remind so eminent and cultured a gentleman as Prof. Sundararama Aiyar of the well-known conventions of literary and philosophical criticism. One can only hope that the Professor did not mean all that he has said. As regards the doctrines that he has called in question, it is enough to point out that they are the views of Rāmānuja the clear exposition of which alone was the main purpose of the author in writing his book. In conclusion, we submit that the method of criticism adopted by the learned critic is fair neither to the book nor to the author.

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS.

BY

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Continued from page 44 Vol. I—

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.

SECTION II—SYMBOLS AND UPASANAS.

How far the Vedic thinkers had progressed in their cosmological and psychological speculations we have not the means of exactly determining, but we have seen that they had already found the First Cause latent in the heart of man. The great equation had already been accomplished. There followed a long series of attempts to realize it. Of these the Upaniṣads give us the faithful but incomplete records, and show how on these conceptions teacher after teacher who had attained the goal shed his own light for the guidance of his successors. It has been remarked before that it is very important for us to remember that the attitude of the Upaniṣads towards all knowledge Vedic or Vedāntic (Upaniṣadic) is that it is nothing without realization.

तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः ।
नानुध्यायाद्बहूञ्शब्दान् वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत् ॥

says Yājñavalkya. Janaka who has studied the Vedas and listened to the Upaniṣads (*See* Bṛh. Up. 4. 2. 1;) receives from Yājñavalkya, as a priceless boon, the instruction that enables him to 'attain fearlessness.' Similarly Śvetaketu, who had spent twelve years in vedic study, is instructed by Uddālaka in that *One* with whose knowledge all is known—other instances are Bṛh. 2. 1; and Kauṣī. 4, and the instruction of Nārada in Ch. Up. 7. All this cannot be taken to mean that the fundamental conceptions of the Upaniṣads were foreign to the vedas. They only teach that knowledge without realization is vain indeed. In Ch. Up. 4. 14. 1, the fires, having instructed Upakosala, say to him "you have this knowledge of ourselves and the know-

ledge of the soul, but the teacher will tell you the way." And that teacher himself, in the days of his discipleship had. had a similar experience. Having, by miraculous means, been fully instructed in the sixteenfold Brahman embracing the earth, atmosphere and the heavens, as well as the self of man, he comes at last to his teacher for the teaching that will help him "to attain his end." We cannot say that the Upaniṣads disdain the Vedic gods, and rituals. We also find them expounding in all seriousness many seemingly inadequate symbols and upāsanās, even after these had been superseded by others embodying fuller conceptions. They had served their turn, and might do so again.

Symbols and Upāsanās.

Prāṇa and Vāyu.—In two of the earliest Upaniṣads, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya (Bṛh. Up. 1. 3) (Ch. Up. 1. 2) we find versions of an ancient story glorifying the Prāṇa, the breath in the mouth as the only one among the bodily functions that is not afflicted with evil—with death.

Another narrative glorifying Prāṇa is a favourite theme of the Upaniṣads. (*see* Bṛh. 6. 1. 7-14 ; Ch. Up. 5. 1. 6—5. 2. 2; Kauṣī. 2. 14). Cp. Praśna, 2. 3. 4. In this the Prāṇa is adjudged the greatest among the vital organs. All the others depend upon it. Every thing is its food. Water is its garment. In these stories the psychical Prāṇa is identified with the Cosmical Prāṇa.

In Bṛh. (1. 5. 21-23) this story appears again in a more elabcrate form, with the personal and cosmical relations of the vital airs and their corresponding divinities made explicit. The functions all become a form of the *Breath,* the Cosmical forces of the Wind. Similarly in Kauṣī. Up. (2. 12) the cosmical powers revert into Wind—the vital airs into Breath. (*See also* Kauṣī. Up. 2. 14) where the vital breath is already identified with the intelligential Self of all beings (in agreement with Kauṣī. Up. 3 which will be fully treated later on).

In Bṛh. Up. (3. 9. 8-9) Yājñavalkya reduces the 3306 gods to one and a half—the wind and finally to one,—the Breath, called Brahma, the Yon *tyat.* The Taitt. Up. (1. 14) praises Vāyu as the perceptible (Pratyakṣam) Brahma. (*See also* Maitrī. Up. (4. 4. 5-6).

Bṛh. Up. (2. 2) describes the Prāṇa as the new-born *Infant*, whose abode is the body, the covering the head, the post breath, the rope food. (*See also* Bṛh. 1. 5. 14) Cp. Ch. Up. (6. 7) Praśna (6. 3. 4). Bṛh. Up. 1. 5. 14 speaks of the sixteenfold Prajāpati with his changing fifteen parts and the constant 16th part (which is the breath in all creatures. (Cp. Ch. Up. 6. 7). Praśna. Up. 6. 3. 4 describes the sixteenfold Person. Here all the sixteen parts disappear at last in the Puruṣa, which is, therefore, something over and above the breath—an advance on the carliar conception, that is due to the later date of the Upaniṣad.

Very soon the Prāṇa symbol was combined with others to keep pace with advancing ideas. (*See* Bṛh. Up. 1. 5. 3). Here the Self is conceived as a Triad of Speech, Mind and Breath. Thus—

1.	Speech	Earth	Fire	These enter Union, from that
2.	Mind	Sky	Seen	the Breath is born.
3.	Breath	Water	Moon.	

Ch. Up. (4. 10. 4) shows perhaps a more advanced stage. Here the Fires instruct Upakosala thus "*Prāṇo Brahma, Kam Brahma, Kham Brahma*' and he replies 'I understand that Brahma is Life. But Joy and Space, I do not understand.' He is then instructed in the Prāṇa and Space. The finishing touch is given by his teacher who tells him of the Ātman as the person in the Eye—'the Immortal the fearless' and his mystic names Saṁyadvāma, Vāmanī, Bhāmanī—as a means to final release. To this may be compared the gradual instruction of Nārada in Ch. Up. (7th Prapāṭhaka) where the inquirier is led onwards through a series of conceptions to Prāṇa—the individual self, in which everything is fastened as the spokes in the hub, and from thence to the Bhūman which is the same as Sukha.

We will now consider two other instances. One of these (Ch. Up. 4. 1-2) shows the Prāṇa-vāyu doctrine in its early form, and at the height of its popularity, if such an expression can be applied to any Upaniṣadic teaching. The other (Bṛh. Up. 3. 7), shows its position with the greatest philosophers in the most active period of Upaniṣadic thought—In Ch. Up. 4. 1. 2 the great Jānaśruti seeks instruction from a wandering beggar with gifts of a thousand cows, a chariot, a gold necklace, and his own daughter. Raikva instructs him in the doctrine of Prāṇa-vāyu

as 'snatchers-unto-themselves' (as Hume puts it) and the five-fold nature of the Self and the Universe, the knowledge that gives the Knower the benefit of all the good actions that people do. This is a very old story belonging to a period when the doctrine of Prāṇa-vāyu was held in very great repute. In Bṛh. (3. 7) Wind is declared to be the string that holds the worlds together, and, among a series that enumerate one by one the cosmic forces and the bodily functions, the Antaryāmin is described as that *One* who, ' dwelling in the wind, yet is other than the wind, whom the wind does not know, whose body the wind is, who controls the wind from within-" the Soul, the Inner Controller, the Immortal.

In Bṛh. Up. 1. 4. 7 also, the breath, the eye, the ear, the voice and the mind are the names of the acts of the Self. " Whoever worships one or the other of these, he knows it not." And this same self is the 'padanīya' of the All. By the self one knows the All—'as by a foot-print.' We are reminded of R. V. X. 46. 1; 2;

प्रहोता जातो महान्नभी विन्तृषद्वा सीददपामुपस्थे ।
दधिर्यो धायि स ते वयांसि यन्ता वसूनि विधते तनूपाः ॥
इमं विधन्तो अपां सधस्थे पशुं न नष्टं पदैरनु ग्मन् ।
गुहा च तं तमुशिजो नमीभिरिच्छन्तो धीरा भृगवोऽविन्दन् ॥

See also Praśna Up. 3. which teaches the source, the entrance, the location—the fivefold extension and the cosmical and personal relations of the Prāṇa. Before leaving the subject we will consider one more instance which combines the Prāṇa with the Prajñātman or Intelligential Self in the conception of the Ātman. It gives a very complete exposition of the doctrine of Prāṇa, and is most appropriately put into the mouth of Indra, as he gives instruction to Pratardana Daivodāsi.

1. The Prāṇa is the Prajñātman—both dwell together in the body and both depart together.

2. This Prāṇa is superior to the vital Breaths :—
(for the reasons given in the Prāṇasaṁvāda.)

The seeing and understanding of this.

The person becomes unitary in the Prāṇa. Speech with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the breaths with all odors, the mind with all thoughts goes to it. On awakening,

In deep sleep.

From the self the vital airs disperse
to their several stations. From these
The sense powers arise, From these
The Universe appears.
The proof or *siddhi* thereof.

When a person is about to die, he loses the power to speak, hear, see etc.

Then the vital airs merge once more into the Prāṇa, and depart from the body when that departs.

3. *The Sarvāpti* in *Prāṇa* by means of the *Vital Airs.*

Prāṇa, with the Intelligence mounts the functions and obtains the existential elements or the Bhūtamātrās.

Functions.	*Bhūtamātrās.*
Speech	Name.
Breath	Odor.
Eye	Form
Ear	Sound
Tongue	Taste
Hands	Karma
Body	Pleasure and pain.
Generative organ	Bliss, procreation.
Feet	Goings.
Mind	Thoughts and desires.

4. Apart from the intelligence, none of the organs could do their appointed work. One should, therefore, desire to understand this knowing subject.

5. The ten Bhūtamātrās and the ten Prajñāmātrās are correlated. From either alone no appearances could result.

All these Bhūtamātrās are fixed on the Prajñāmātrās, these on Prāṇa, as in a wheel the felly and spokes on the hub.

In this section some important developments occur.

1. The life-force is one with the knowing subject.

2. All objects of knowledge exist only when cognised by this knowing subject.

Āditya and the eye.

The Sun and the Eye are often found connected in the symbolism of the Upaniṣads. Bṛh. Up. 2. 5. 5, Ch. Up. 3. 18. 3, Ch. Up. 3. 19. 1—teach the worship of the Sun as Brahma—apparently an old form of Upāsanā even in the period when that Upaniṣad came

into existence. Maitrī. Up. 6. 16 with special reference to this passage teaches the same, with amplifications. Here the Sun is identified with Time and the Year. Maitrī. 6. *See also* Praśna 1. 8 and Maitrī. 6. 8. 9. In these the Sun is connected with Prāṇa. These references in the later Upaniṣads show that this symbol continued to exercise a great influence throughout this period.

The golden Puruṣa in the Sun, correlated with the person in the eye is a favourite Upāsanā of the Upaniṣads, and is one of the earliest forms in which the Brahman-Ātman idea was symbolised for the purposes of realization. Bṛh. Up. 5. 5. The Sun is the Real (Sat). The person in the Sun and the Person in the Right Eye depend on one another through the Sun rays and the life-breaths. The mystic name of the former is 'Aham' that of the later 'aham'. *See also* Bṛh. 2. 3. Ch. Up. 1. 6 seems to be one of the earliest forms of this Upāsanā. In Maitrī. 6. 7 the person in the Sun and in the eye is Bharga (Splendour) because with light-rays (*bha*) is his course (*gati*).

Fire and speech.

In the honey section of the Bṛh. Up. 2. 5. 3 Speech and Fire are connected. In Ch. Up. 3. 18. 3 Speech, a fourth part of Brahma, shines with Agni as its light. *See also* Bṛh. 1. 5. 11.

Both Fire and Speech conceived as Universal had occupied a high place in Ṛgvedic thought. *See* RV. X 125, where Vāk says:—

4. Through me alone all eat the food that feeds them,
each man who sees, breathes, hears the word outspoken.
They know it not, but yet they dwell beside me,
Hear, one and all, the truth as I declare it.

8. I breathe a strong breath, like the wind and tempest,
the while I hold together all existence,
Beyond this wide earth and beyond the heavens,
I have become so mighty in my grandeur.

Manas and the Ākāśa.

Another pair is Mind and Space. Mind is also sometimes correlated with the Moon and Space with Hearing. *See* Bṛh. Up. 2. 5. Again Space is often connected with the space in the heart. Bṛh. Up. 5. 1.

pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇamevāvaśiṣyate

Om ! Brahma is the ether primeval, the ether that blows !

In Ch. Up. 3. 18. 1, Mind and Space are connected as Symbols personal or Cosmic of the Brahma whose 4 quarters are (Speech-Agni) (Breath-Vāyu) (Eye-Āditya) (ear and the quarters of heaven).

Ch. Up. 1. 9. 1 describes Space as the Ultimate world ground.

> Sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāni, ākāśādeva samutpadyanta ākāśam prati astam yanti ākāśo ha vā ebhyo jyāyan, ākāśa parāyaṇam.

So also Bṛh. Up. 5. 1. 1 which identifies Space with Brahma. Based upon such conceptions, upāsanās equating the space within man with the space without are frequent.

Space is the cosmic equivalent of the Ātman. *See* Bṛh. Up. 3. 2. 12 where the Ātman goes into Space and breath into wind, and Ch. Up. 3. 14. 2 where Brahma is called 'ākāśātmā', *also* Maitrī. 7. 16. In Kauṣi. Up. 2. 14 also the soul is ākāśātman.

Space is sometimes conceived of as the body of the Universal Soul. *See* Ch. Up. 3. 15. Taitt. Up. 6. Brahman is Ākāśaśarīra. Space is once called the *nirvāhita* of name and form—(individuality) Ch. Up. 8. 14. 1.

It is under the aspect of Full—Non-active, that space symbolises Brahma according to Ch. Up. 3. 12. 7-9.

> यद्वै तद्ब्रह्मेतीदं वाव तद्योऽयं बहिर्धा पुरुषादाकाशो यो वै स बहिर्धा पुरुषादाकाशः ॥
>
> अयं वाव स योऽयमन्तः पुरुष आकाशो यो वै सोऽन्तः पुरुष आकाशः ॥
>
> अयं वाव स योऽयमन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तदेतत्पूर्णमप्रवर्ति पूर्णामप्रवर्तिनीं श्रियं लभते य एवं वेद ॥

See also Bṛh. Up. 2. 1. 5. Kauṣī Up. 4. 8.

The same symbols also stood for the blissful nature of the Ātman. In Ch. Up. the fires instructing Upakosala say to him "*prāṇo brahma, kam brahma, kham brahma*" and here Kham is equated with joy. And in Ch. Up. 7. 22. 23 Sukha-pleasure is the same as Bhūman. "There is no pleasure in the small" says the teacher.

Besides these four, there are other correlated pairs less important. Of these, Bṛh. Up. 2. 5, gives a list in a section called the honey-doctrine which is traced back to the Ṛgveda. Here

the correlativity of all cosmic forces with corresponding bodily functions is made clear, and the Absolute Soul is immanent in all these and in Law, Truth and Humanity.

1.	Earth	The Body.
2.	Waters	Semen.
3.	Fire.	Speech.
4.	Wind	Breath.
5.	Sun	Eye.
6.	Quarters of Heaven	Ear.
7.	Moon	Mind.
8.	Lightning.	Heat.
9.	Thunder	Sound.
10.	Space	Space in the heart.

This is the *honey-doctrine* taught by Dadhyñc Ātharvaṇa to the two Aśvins.

Bṛh. Up. 4. 2 discusses six Upāsanās of Brahman *viz.*, Speech, Breath, Sight, Hearing, Mind and Heart which are one by one dismissed as incomplete by Yājñavalkya. Being connected with Brahman in a section in which Brahman and Ātman are interchangeable terms, we have to understand by Speech, Breath etc., the personal functions as well as their cosmical equivalents.

Yājñavalkya explains the aspects which each of these 'one-legged' Brahma symbols is meant to teach.

Speech	Prajñā.
Prāṇa	Priya.
Sight	Satya.
Hearing	Ananta.
Mind	Ānanda.
Heart	Sthiti.

Hence the Āditya and Eye symbols stood for Truth (Satya); the mind, either with Ākāśa or the moon, for bliss (Ānanda); the ear and the Quarters of Heaven for Endlessness (Ananta); Prāṇa for the dear (Priya)—*na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvaṃ priyam bhavati ātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṃ priyam bhavati*" declares Yājñavalkya—Bṛh. Up. It also stood for existence; the heart for Sthiti—steadfastness. That is to say, all the important aspects under which Brahman is later on conceived are comprised in these symbols—Intelligent, dear, true, endless, blissful, unchanging (Sat-cit-ānanda) (Satyam-jñānam-anantam).

Bṛh. Up. 2. 3 expounds the two forms of Brahman—(1) the formed mortal, stationary, actual, (2) the formless, immortal, moving, yon. Thus—

	Mūrta.	Amūrta.
Adhidaivatam.	Whatever is different from Wind and Antarikṣa the essence of this is the Sun	Wind and Antarikṣa the essence of this is the Person in the sun-disk.
Adhyātmam.	Whatever is different from Prāṇa and the Space within the Self the essence of this is the Eye.	Prāṇa and the Space within the Self the essence of this is the Person in the right Eye.

The whole is concluded by the formula 'Neti Neti' and 'Satyasya Satyam.'

In this Upāsanā (Bṛh. Up. 2. 3) all the elements of the afterwards famous formula Sat-cit-ānanda (existence-knowledge-bliss) seem to be present. *Sat* symbolished by Prāṇa and Vāyu—*Cit* by Āditya and the eye—*Ānanda* by Antarikṣa and the Space in the Self.

The middle period of Upaniṣadic Thought.

Agni, Vāyu and Āditya—Time, Breath and Food—Brahmā, Rudra and Viṣṇu—these are the foremost forms of the Supreme. To whichever one the worshipper is attached, he wins its world. These forms one should meditate upon, praise, and then deny, says the later Maitrī. Upaniṣad (*Sec* 4. 6).

In the middle period of Upaniṣadic philosophy which culminated in the teachings of great teachers Uddālaka, Yājñavalkya and their contemporaries, there was a growing tendency to transcend symbols and upāsanās.

In the first period doctrines and philosophical theories had appropriate Upāsanās attached to them by their originators—perhaps it is even true that in those days philosophy had not yet learned to stand on its own feet. In the second and most active period of Upaniṣadic philosophy, thought moved too quickly to formulate new symbols and upāsanās to fit every new idea. In the third period which inherited this rich legacy of thought and experience, the old Upāsanās were still maintained with

characteristic loyalty, and we find them made to serve as the vehicles of thoughts and theories that came long after them.

It must have been towards the close of this middle period that the earlier Upaniṣads assumed their present form—many of them bear the marks of the great teachers under whose auspices they must have been collected. For instance in Kauṣītakī, (4. 20) the doctrine, in which that Upaniṣad specialises, of the Prāṇa equated with Prajñā, is introduced into its version of the Gārgya and Ajātaśatru story. And in Bṛh. 2. 3, the Upaniṣad *'Satyasya Satyam'* of Ajātaśatru is interpreted again in keeping with a more advanced idealism.

We will arrange the doctrines of this middle period in their probable order of development and wherever possible, indicate the great teachers who were responsible for them. Some of these were contemporaries, but one or two were legendary or even mythological figures.

1.	Kauṣītakī and Paingya	Prāṇa.
2.	Vāmadeva (Ait. Up. 5. 1-3)	Prajñāna.
3.	Sanatkumāra	Sukha-Bhūman
4.	Śāṇḍilya	Tajjalān.
5.	Pratardana	Prāṇa-Prajñā.
6.	Aśvapati Kaikeya	Food and the Eater.
7.	Satyakāma and Upakosala	The fourfold Brahma in the world and the individual.
8.	Ajātaśatru	'Satyasya Satyam'
9.	Uddālaka Āruṇi	The Antaryāmin-Being and Becoming.
10.	Tittiri (Brahmānanda Valli-Taittirīya Up. 2)	Ānanda.
11.	Yājñāvalkya	'Neti—Neti !'

Prāṇo Brahma. The doctrine of Prāṇa is a special feature of the Kauṣī Up. According to Kauṣītakī, of Prāṇaas the Self, the Mind is the messenger, the Eye the watchman, the Ear the announcer, Speech the handmaid. All these bring offerings to the Prāṇa. Therefore he who knows himself as this Brahma (Prāṇa) must refrain from begging, consistently with his belief. Paingya's conception is that the Prāṇa is the Self, *enclosed* by

Paingya and Kauṣītaki.

mind, Ear, Eye and Speech in successive layers. The Upaniṣad is the same, 'na yācet' —a sort of complement to Aśvapati's mystical Agnihotra.

Vāmadeva—The Pantheistic Self of the Aitareya Upaniṣad.

Prajñānam Brahma—Idam adarśan iti —tasmāt Idamdro nāma. The Self is that whereby one hears, sees, smells etc.—that which is heart and mind—in a word, Prajñāna. He is the Self and the whole world. All this is guided by Intelligenee (Prajñānetra) based on Intelligence (Prajñāpratiṣṭhita). He is *Idamdra*—the Self other than speech, breath, sight, hearing, touch, mind etc.—with three conditions and three dwelling places, the witness—*Idamdra* (*It-seeing*) mystically called Indra; because, as the Upaniṣads often assert, the gods prefer what is hidden, and dislike the obvious.

Sanatkumāra. Sukha-Bhūman.

Yo vai bhūmā tat sukham, na alpe sukham asti. Sanatkumāra leads the inquirer onwards through a long series of upāsanās such as name, speech, strength, food etc. to Prāṇa the individual self, and thence through Satya, Mati, Śraddhā and Kṛti to Bhūman (the Plenum) which is the same as Sukha—"There is no pleasure in the small, only a Plenum is pleasure." It is established on its own greatness, or rather not on greatness at all ? For there is nothing other than it. It is above, below and everywhere—and it is our Self. He who knows this has pleasure and delight in the Ātman—only he is free—for him everything rises from the Self. The conception of the Ātman in this comes up to nearly the later Advaitic level. But Mokṣa has not advanced beyond the idea of an unlimited happiness expressed nearly in terms of the happiness we all know. A satisfaction of all possible desires. "Yam yam antam abhikāmo bhavati, yam kāmam kāmayate, so asya saṅkalpādeva samuttiṣṭhati, tena sampanno, mahīyate." Ch. Up. 8. 2. 10.

Śāṇḍilya Vidyā.

Tajjalān. The doctrine of Śāṇḍilya is a culmination of these three lines of thought, of the Ātman as Prāṇa, as Prajñāna, as Sukha-Bhūman. In the earlier period of Upaniṣadic thought, we have seen how the symbols and upāsanās that expressed their highest thought, also showed similar development of the Brahman-Ātman concept along these three main lines, and how these three sets of symbols were combined in a greater conception (Bṛh. Up. 2. 3). In the

Śāṇḍilya Vidyā another such merging of the three ideas takes place again, and the expression of this is not yet free from the conventions of early Upaniṣadic thought. Brahman is made of mind—therefore blissful *prāṇa-śarīra*—therefore the Real—*bhā rūpa*,—therefore of the nature of Intelligence. He is Ākāśātmā, and above every distinction of great and small. "This soul of mine within the heart is smaller than a grain of rice or a barley corn or a mustard seed or a grain of millet or the kernel of a grain of millet; this soul of mine within the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the sky, greater than these worlds."

But the historical value of the doctrine of Śāṇḍilya is not just this. In it, a definite turn is given to the development of the Brahman-Ātman concept. The Self of Śāṇḍilya is a Saguṇa Brahma—*satyasaṅkalpa, sarvakarma, sarvakāma, sarvagandha, sarvarasa, sarvamidam abhyātta*—no advance along this line can lead to anything but a Self without limitations but with every great attribute.

We come forth from Him, live in Him and are reabsorbed into Him—Liberation is entrance into this all-containing Being. "Into him I shall enter on departing hence." Śāṇḍilya's pantheism strikes an almost deistic note.

Pratardana and the Inner Agnihotra—the doctrine of Prāṇa-Prajñā.

Prāṇo asmi Prajñātmā. Prāṇa equated with Prajñā is the Self.

Speech, breath, eye etc. are the portions of Prajñā (Prajñāmātra). Name, Odour, Form etc. are its externally correlated existential elements (*parastāt prativihitabhūtamātra*).

The Bhūtamātras are fixed on the Prajñāmātras, these on the Prāṇa like the felly and spokes in the hub of a wheel.

The Bhūtamātras and Prajñāmātras are correlated. From either alone no *rūpa* would result. The Prāṇa-prajñā is the one who speaks, smells, hears etc., yet he remains untouched by good and evil.

Through the intelligential elements into which Prajñā divides itself, one obtains all the existential elements which form the world. In deep sleep (Suṣupti) the intelligential elements together with the existential elements are unified in the Prāṇa. On awakening, from the Ātman the vital breaths disperse to their proper stations, from them the senses, from those the worlds.

Attention is centred on the Prāṇa. It is on Prāṇa that the Prajñāmātras as well as the Bhūtamātras are fixed. Prāṇa is the hub of the wheel of existence, and Prāṇa is Prajñā—what the nature of this Prāṇa is, of which even here, Prajñā is only the externally correlating factor, we are not told. Only this—speech, smell, form etc. are not what one should desire to understand, one should know the speaker, smeller, seer etc.

But, *vijñātāram arē kena vijānīyāt ?* says Yājñavalkya. And as a natural outcome of this idealism it is boldly declared—"by no deed of His is His world injured, He does not become greater by good action nor indeed lesser by bad action," but it is immediately added—the doer of good goes upwards and the doer of evil goes downwards.

Satyakāma and Upakosala.
The four-fold Brahma and the Individual soul.

Prāṇo brahma kam brahma kham brahma. We know from Bṛh. Up. (4. 1. 6) that Satyakāma Jābāla was a contemporary of Yājñavalkya. But there is nothing very new in the teaching associated with him and his disciple Upakosala. The fourfold Self in the world and in the individual is Brahma. He is to be worshipped as Prāṇa, Kam (Joy) and Kham (Space). His mystic names are *Saṁyadvāma, Bhāmanī, Vāmanī.* This Self is untouched by good and evil. The idea of our real Self standing aloof from the good and the evil of our lower natures is suggested and is clearly and boldly stated in Pratardana's teaching. From now on, it becomes a generally accepted theory, but without any prejudice to the value of virtue and morality.

Ajātaśatru and Gārgya.
The Knowing Subject in Sleep.

Satyasya Satyam. The reality of the Real—this is Ajātaśatru's definition of Brahma. Setting aside as inadequate all the twelve (in the Kauṣī. Up. Sixteen) upāsanās advanced by the learned Bālāki, Ajātaśatru expounds the Ātman by means of the illustration of a sleeper. The vijñānamaya puruṣa has withdrawn into the Space in the heart, having taken to himself the intelligence of all the Prāṇas. In sleep he enters the high and the low, free from the limitations of the body. But in deep sleep he reaches the summit of bliss. From this knowing subject come forth all the Prāṇas, all worlds and all beings. He is the Real of the Real—a concession is here made to our empirical consciousness—All is real, but only in Him, and

by Him. The element of reality is this Subject that projects from itself all objects. The bolder stand-point that faces the 'unreality' of the Soul is not Ajātaśatru's.

In Bṛh. Up. 2. 3. the *satyasya satyam* of Ajātaśatru is interpreted from this stand-point, no doubt in the light of the teaching of the master-mind that dominates the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Here the formed (Mūrta) Brahma is *Sat* (in the sense of actual not true) and the Amūrta Brahma is the *Tya*—(Yon)—But the Self—*it is neti neti*; and *satyasya satyam,* we feel, is a weak anticlimax to this. But we will not anticipate Yājñavalkya.

Uddālaka Āruṇi
The Antaryāmin—Being and Becoming.

Yena aśrutaṁ śrutaṁ bhavati amataṁ mataṁ avijñātaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt. The teaching of Uddālaka occupies an intermediate position between the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā and the philosophy of Yājñavalkya. Tradition makes Uddālaka Āruṇi the teacher and rival of Yājñavalkya. According to him, creation is an evolution from Being which was *in the beginning one only,* without a second. He emits heat, from that water is engendered, from water food. The highest Being then enters these divinities as the Jīvātman and separates out name and form. Everything is a combination of these three, the difference is just a matter of name. This highest divinity pervades the world, like salt dissolved in water. Elsewhere, (in Bṛh. Up. 3. 7) Uddālaka questions Yājñavalkya about the Antaryāmin who " dwelling in all things, yet is other than all things, whom all things do not know, whose body all things are, who controls all things from within "—the Soul—the Inner Controller, the Immortal.

As for the material world, all things are combinations of Heat, Water and Annam ; these three are the reality, everything is made up of these ; differences are only a matter of name. " Whatever red form fire has, is the form of heat; whatever white the form of water, whatever dark the form of food. The fire-hood has gone from fire; the modification is merely a verbal distinction—a name. *The reality is just 'the three forms'.*" The reality is, it should be noted, not just 'Being' but the 'three forms'. Heat, Water and Food which were first engendered by 'Sat' and which after they were created, became real.

Our condition here is one of ignorance and bondage. We get a fore-taste of our real state in deep sleep. All creatures have Being as their root, have Being as their home, have Being as

their support. "*Sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatnāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ.*"

It was the life, not the light within us, that engaged the attention of Uddālaka—that which is the finest essence, "*aitadātmyam idam sarvam, tat satyam sa ātmā tat tvam asi Śvetaketo.*" The life-force reduced to its ultimate aspect of Being, is his last resort. Uddālaka stopped short at Pantheism, as Śāṇḍilya had done before him. He did not follow the implications of the doctrine of an only Reality—'*ekam eva advitīyam*' to their natural conclusion.

Tittiri—the Ānandamaya Brahma.

Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha. As in Uddālaka's teaching, but with greater detail, the Taitt. Upaniṣad traces the course of evolution from the Primal Ātman to the person. Then follows an analysis of this person—the Annamaya Puruṣa, within that, the Prāṇamaya Puruṣa, then the Manomaya, the Vijñānamaya, and finally as the very self of Brahma—the Ānandamaya Puruṣa. This Ātman creates the world, and then enters into it. He becomes both the *Sat* (actual) and the *Tya* (Yon) both the real and the false.

The Taitt. Up. goes beyond the *Sat* (Being) of Uddālaka to the non-existent, in the sense that, strictly speaking, the source of all is not the existence that we know. Just as it was the aspect of Being that engaged Uddālaka's attention, it is that of bliss in which the Taitt. Up. finds the very highest aspect of the Ātman. This bliss is not to be expressed in words, and unthinkable. This the knower attains—the man free from desire. Neither good nor evil can affect him, who is lost in bliss.

Yājñavalkya.

Neti neti. The individual soul is *Indra* or *Indha* and his wife *Virāj*. They meet in the space within the heart. This is the person who consists of knowledge among the senses. Brahma is beyond all attributes —and can only be described by *neti neti* and by negative epithets such as Asaṅga Agṛhya and so on.

The soul and the Brahman are one, not merely in the sense that the soul comes from it, and goes back to it, but in the uncompromising sense that here and now, it is Brahma—and never was anything else. The whole world is a creation of the Self, what the individual soul desires He creates. The difference between sleep and waking is just this—in sleep he is self-illumi-

nated *svayañjyotiḥ.* There, just as he has created this world out of his desires and his Karma, even so he created the world of dreams. 'For he is a creator.'

> Svapnānta uccāvacamīyamāno rūpāṇi deva kurute bahūni
> Udeva strībhiḥ saha modamāno jakṣadutevāpi bhayāni paśyan.

The highest form of His is when in deep sleep He has no desires and sees no dream—That is his "*āptakāmam, ātmakāmam, akāmam rūpam śokāntaram.*" There He is free from all bonds, and is not followed by either good or evil. This state is not annihilation. There is no destruction of Himself as the knowing subject—'yad vai tanna paśyati, paśyan vai tanna paśyati, *na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate,* avināśitvāt.'

The chief feature of Yājñavalkya's teaching is a clear recognition of all the implications of the doctrine of an only reality. The stand-point of idealism had been reached before him as we have seen, but his was the bold mind that soared above all its pitfalls. When like Maitreyī we tremble before the abyss of utter annihilation, he draws us tenderly and surely away, assures us that Mokṣa is not a ceasing to be—but only a great bliss of which one gets a foretaste in deep sleep, or in union with a beloved one.

The deepest feeling in us is love. Yājñavalkya traces it back to its source and sweeping aside all that is small and unworthy in our human love, shows that it springs from the essential element of dearness that is the nature of the soul. As a later Upaniṣad says—it is to be worshipped as '*Tadvana.*' (It-is-the-desire). Good and evil do not adhere to the soul, because the world in which they played their parts has been only a dream, unreal when the Reality is known. Desires must cease because as long as we desire, we continue to create our world. Desires will cease in realization when all objects pass away, and the knower becomes one with the Ātman—that is, of all things, the only one desirable.

This Ātman can only be described thus '*neti neti*'. It is one only—therefore above Space. One only, therefore above Causality. Unborn—undying, therefore not of Time. What is it? *It cannot be known.* "*Vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt?*" Of the individual soul we can say it is the person consisting of knowledge

among the senses, *Indha* and *Virāj* in the Space in the heart; but of the Soul, as it really and truly is, nothing but 'It is not thus, it is not so'—for our words limit the unlimited.

Thus the summit of Upaniṣadic thought has been reached. What remained to be done was—(1) a systematising, which was carried out partly by the later Upaniṣads, and fully in the Vedānta systems, (2) a further investigation along the same lines, from the point where Upaniṣadic thought turned, once and for all, away from Nihilism. This was accomplished by the Buddhist philosophers.

The Individual and Universal souls.

The later Upaniṣads. The later Upaniṣads speak of the individual soul as the Honey-eater (Experiencer) the enjoyer, Kaṭha Up. 4-5.

> Ya imam madhvadam veda ātmānam Jīvam antikāt.
> Īśānam bhūta bhavyasya na tato vijugupsate.

In the Kaṭha also we find the famous figure of the soul as a chariot-driver, which perhaps suggested the episode of the Mahābhārata where Īśvara as Kṛṣṇa expounds the Gītā to Arjuna, the individual soul.

> Ātmānam rathinam viddhi śarīram ratham eva tu
> Buddhim tu sārathim viddhi manaḥ pragraham eva ca
> Indriyāṇi hayān āhurviṣayāṁsteṣu gocarān
> Ātmendriyamanoyuktam bhokte tyāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ

Under the same figure the later Maitrī Up. speaks of the Individual soul, as the Kṣetrajña, but distinguishes another soul the Bhūtātman, who is over-come by good and evil and transmigrates. He does not see the Causer of action who stands within himself.

The metaphor of the two birds on the tree of life is a very old one—(Ṛ. V. 1-164—20). The two birds are the Individual soul that enjoys the fruit of action, and the witness that looks on without being affected by good and evil.

The Māṇḍūkya Up. shows a further development. In it, in addition to the three states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, a fourth state is recognised, and in relation with these four, a four-fold Ātman. The first state is the Jāgaritasthāna—It is outwardly cognitive and enjoys the gross. This is Vaiśvānara.

The second state—the Svapnasthāna is inwardly cognitive (Cp. Bṛh. Up. 4. 3. 9, 141) and it enjoys the fine—(Cp. Bṛh. Up.

4. 2. 3). This is Taijasa. The Suṣuptasthāna is the third state. It is unified, Prajñānaghana-ānandamaya—and enjoys bliss. This is Prājña—and is described as Sarvajña, Sarveśvara—and the Antaryāmin—the origin and end of all beings. This is not the highest however.

The Turīya is indescribable, except by negatives. It is not Antaḥprajña, nor Bahiḥprajña nor Prajñānaghana—it is unseen, ungraspable, unthinkable without marks. It cannot be designated, it cannot be dealt with; it is *ekātmapratyayasāra*—its essence the realization of oneness with the self.

This realization of the essential unknowableness of the Supreme Self is ever present in the later Upaniṣads.

Kaṭha Up. 6. 12.

> Naiva Vācā na manasā prāptum śakyo na cakṣuṣā
> Astīti bruvato nyatra, katham tadupalabhyate ?

and Kena Up. 2. 1.

> yasyāmatam tasya matam matam yasya na veda saḥ
> avijñātam vijānatām—vijñātamavijānatām

See also Īśā Up. 9. 10. Muṇḍ 3. 1. 8.

The doctrine of the absolute oneness of the soul, excludes the reality of anything other than it. That the universe of names and forms has only a seeming reality is implied in the doctrines of the great Upaniṣadic teachers. In Ch. Up. 6 Uddālaka assures his son "*Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, trīṇi rūpāṇītyeva satyam*" and in the idealism of Yājñavalkya even this is transcended and reality is predicated only of the Ātman who creates all objects from Himself. "For He is a creator" In Bṛh. Up. Yājñavalkya says of the Person made of intelligence, that He, remaining of the same, goes along both worlds, *appearing* to think, *appearing* to move. This doctrine is perhaps even earlier than Yājñavalkya. The phenomenal is distinguished from the noumenal not by an uncompromising denial of all reality to the world but by conceding to it a secondary reality as in Bṛh. Up. 1. 6. 3 the world of name, form and work is the real —actual (Satya) which veils the Immortal. So also in Ajātaśatru's *Satyasya Satyam*.

The first occurrence of the term Māyā is perhaps in the Śvet. Up. 1. 10 and 4. 9. 10.

> Māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt,
> Māyinam tu maheśvaram (4. 9. 10).

The individual soul is enmeshed in the Māyā of the Lord.

In the three-fold Brahma of the Śvetāśvatara a place is conceded to Pradhāna (Matter), Pradhāna and Hara (the individual Soul) and the Actuator (Preritā) "*Bhoktā bhogyam preritāram ca matvā sarvam proktam trividham Brahmametad.* Śvet. Up. 1, 11. *See also* Kaṭha Up. 4, 5, 6, 7 where the Bhoktā, the cosmic person, and Aditi are mentioned. *See also* Śvet. Up. 4. 5 which is even more Sāṅkhyan in tone.

> "Ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām
> Bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ
> Ajohyēko juṣamāṇonu śete
> Jahātyenām bhuktabhogām ajo nyaḥ"

There is an ever-increasing consciousness of the vanity of human wishes in the later Upaniṣads. As long as we desire, we perform actions and have to enjoy the fruits thereof. In other words we *create* the world of our desires and remain bound down by bonds of our own making. Karma can give rise only to good or bad results. The Self is above good and evil—Mokṣa is not a state that is brought into being as the fruit of any action, being eternal. "*nāsti akṛtaḥ kṛtena.*" That which is not made cannot be won by action. Good deeds will win the heavenly world, bad deeds will lead us downwards, but Mokṣa is a state above these two.

In the very nature of things we perform actions, voluntary or involuntary. How then shall we obtain release. Indifference, desirelessness, actions performed without desire cannot bear fruit of any kind. Desires will cease only when we realize that there is nothing other than the Self.

> He who in fancy forms desires,
> Because of his desires, is born here and there.
> But of him whose desire is satisfied, who is a perfected Soul.
> All desires even here on earth vanish away. Muṇḍ. Up. 3. 2. 2.

> Īśāvāsysm idam sarvam
> Yat kiñca jagatyām jagat
> Tena tyaktena bhuñjīthā
> Mā gṛdhaḥ kasya sviddhanam
> Kurvanneveha karmāṇi
> Jijīviṣecchatam samāḥ

Evam tvayi nānyatheto sti
Na karma lipyate nare. Īśā. Up. 1. 2.

Thus the problem was solved by work without attachment.

This is at last exaggerated into a positive dislike for the world which is expressed in the later Maitrī, Up. (1. 3). Here the indifference towards the world advanced in the older Upaniṣads with so much moderation and judgment has degenerated into a pessimism that is unlovely, and unlike the free and joyous spirit of the early Upaniṣads.

To be continued.

DEFINITION OF POETRY OR KĀVYA*.

BY

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(Continued from page 223 of Vol. III, part III, J. O. R. M.)

CHAPTER III.

THE ĀLAṄKĀRIKAS.

Now I should come to our own Ālaṅkārikas. Things, we know, are generally defined in three ways :—by their causes, by some special features, inherent and permanent in them, or by their effect. To exemplify in order:—that which is produced by fire is smoke; that which burns is fire; that whose creation is this whole universe is Brahman. Now if you consider the different definitions of poetry given by our Ālaṅkārikas you may easily find that everyone of them belongs either to the second or the third of these categories of definition. But nowhere can we meet with a definition that belongs to the first category. The reason perhaps is this. We know taht things unknown are defined by things known. The reverse is impossible. If so, it is very plain that poetry cannot be defined by its cause. We cannot know what its cause is until we know what poetry is. Power of imagination, high talents, great scholarship, all these and such other phrases are too general to give a correct idea of that recondite faculty of man which gives birth to poetry. When we wish to specify that faculty, or the constituent parts of that faculty, we cannot do so otherwise than by phrases like *poetic* faculty, *poetic* imagination and so on—a fact which decisively proves the case in question, namely, without knowing what poetry is, it is impossible to know what the cause ot poetry is. I maintain that Daṇḍin and Mammaṭa were fully conscious of this fact and therefore they first defined poetry without referring to its causes, and pointed them out afterwards so that those who wished to become poets might know the directions in which

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* Thesis approved by the Madras University for the degree of Master of Oriental Learning.

they should move for the achievement of their object. Since, thus, the causes of poetry have nothing to do in our attempt to get at a definition of it, we may well pass over them.

It is somewhat curious that in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra, the earliest extant work on Poetics, we cannot find a definition of poetry, though, as he says at the end, "षष्ट्या शरीरं निर्णितम्", the whole of the first Pariccheda is devoted to describing 'body of poetry.' When Bhāmaha says—

शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम् ,

[The word and and sense taken together are poetry.]

it cannot be deemed that he intends to define poetry. Rather the idea underlying these words seems to be that neither the word nor the sense alone is poetry, but both of them taken together. In spite of such unaccountable silence of Bhāmaha in the matter of defining poetry, we are not wholly left in the dark as to what, in his opinion, makes a literary composition fit for the name of poetry and differentiates it from other kinds of literary productions. Since, as is shown by Sovani in his 'Pre-dhvani schools', (BCV., p. 393-4) Bhāmaha repeatedly says that *Vakrokti* embellishes the poetic speech and sense, it may be concluded that according io Bhāmaha the indispensably essential requisite of poetry is Vakrokti. But we should first determine what Bhāmaha's Vakrokti means. When we consider the few *ślokas* scattered here and there through the *Kāvyālaṅkāra* which speak of Vakrokti (and which are, all of them, specifically pointed out by Sovani), we are generally of the impression that it is, in Bhāmaha's view, the all-embracing principle of poetry, and thus it is more or less synonymous with Alaṅkāra in the old Ālaṅkārikas' sense of the word. But such conclusion I can hardly persuade myself to accept. At the end of the second Pariccheda, Bhāmaha does mention and illustrate what is called the *Svabhāvokti* Alaṅkāra. Although this Alaṅkāra is there introduced with 'some say that' "इति केचित् प्रचक्षते", it will not be reasonable to say that he does not accept it as one of the poetic figures. If so he would have stated expressly as he had done in the case of *Hetu*, *Sūkṣma* and *Leśa*. While Sovani, ignoring II. 93 of Bhāmaha, declares that according to him Vakrokti is the life-giving principle of poetry, Dr. De not only does not take notice of it but goes to the length of asserting that

'such Svabhāvokti, or natural mode of speech to which Daṇḍin is so partial, is not acceptable to Bhāmaha, who refuses to acknowledge Svabhāvokti as a poetic figure at all.' [*See* his introduction to the Vakrokti-Jīvita, p. XIV.] I would say 'he does not take notice of it', not he is ignorant of it. We know, from a foot-note of his in page 21, that Dr. De has seen that *śloka.* There he means to say that Kuntala refutes Svabhāvokti, following Bhāmaha's theory of poetry. Where, we should ask Dr. De, does Bhāmaha refuse to acknowledge Svabhāvokti? So far as our study of the Kāvyālaṅkāra goes, nowhere in its six chapters can we find any statement of Bhāmaha to that effect. As I have already said, "इति केचित् प्रचक्षते" is not sufficient to prove the non-acceptance of Svabhāvokti by Bhāmaha. If it be said it is sufficient, many Alaṅkāras would have to be struck off from Bhāmaha's list. For instance take *Āśīs.* Bhāmaha says आशीरपि च केषाञ्चिदलङ्कारतया मता. No one would say that the *āśīs* Alaṅkāra is not acceptable to Bhāmaha because he adds 'some accept', 'केषांचिन्मता'. Just the same is the case with Svabhāvokti. And further there is not a single Ālaṅkārika, except indeed Kuntala, so far as we know, who denies Svabhāvokti a place in poetry. Udbhaṭa, the famous commentator of Bhāmaha, treats of this Svabhāvokti in the very place and order in which Bhāmaha has treated it. Daṇḍin's list of Alaṅkāras is headed by Svabhāvokti, or Svabhāvākhyāna, as it is called there. As Daṇḍin criticises Bhāmaha's views on many a point, he would have, when explaining the Svabhāvokti Alaṅkāra, surely uttered at least a few words of censure—which is not the case—had he thought in the least that Bhāmaha refused to recognise Svabhāvokti as a poetic figure. All the difference we can perceive between Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's treatment of Svabhāvokti is this. Bhāmaha, though not, like Daṇḍin, expressly classifying Alaṅkāras, yet, having in mind the same division as Daṇḍin's and having regard to the predominance of 'Vakroti' Alaṅkāras,—I mean the Alaṅkāras other than Svabhāvokti—in poetry, gave priority to such of them as he intended to illustrate by his own *ślokas*, 'स्वयं कृतैरेव निदर्शनैः' and treated Svabhāvokti at the end of the chapter. But Daṇḍin following a more scientific method and having in mind the division he is going to make at the end 'भिन्नं द्विधा स्वभावोक्तिर्वक्रोक्तिश्चेति वाङ्मयम्', mentions and treats of Svabhāvokti first of all.

Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, therefore, are indubitably of one mind and in full agreement in dividing Alaṅkāras into two kinds, Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti, and consequently the Vakrokti of the one means as much as that of the other, nothing less, nothing more.

Dr. De, however, tries to show in his introduction to the Vakrotijīvita (pp. XIV—XVIII) that there is some difference between Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's Vakroktis. But he is not there very clear and my impression after a very careful perusal of these pages is that he has missed the true significance of II. 362 of Daṇḍin and that he is unnecessarily troubling himself to interpret in his own way the word Vakrokti, which Daṇḍin only once uses there. Though I do not now propose to go any further in proving the truth of my statement, yet I wish to say one word as to Dr. De's understanding of the views of the two commentators of Daṇḍin about the *śloka* referred to. After quoting Hṛdayaṅgamā, Dr. De writes:—'Taruṇavācaspati agrees with this interpretation but differs as to what group of Alaṅkāras Daṇḍin signifies by this collective name : *Svavyākhyānavyatiriktā sarvālaṅkṛtir vakroktir ityucyante'* (this should be in singular *ityucyate*). It is here obvious that *svavyākhyāna* is an erroneous reading for *svabhāvākhyāna.* For, among the Alaṅkāras mentioned in the beginning of the chapter by Daṇḍin or anywhere in the Kāvyādarśa we cannot find one with the name of *svavyākhyāna.* Even if one should perversely insist upon the correctness of the reading, yet there is no alternative except to take it to mean *Svabhāvākyāna.* So, there exists no difference of opinion between these two commentators of Daṅḍin as to what group of Alaṅkāras is meant by Vakrokti.

Now coming to our present consideration it is shown that, according to Bhāmaha too, Svabhāvokti is a poetic figure. That Kuntala vehemently attacks this theory is a fact which we plainly see through the creditable edition of the Vakroktijīvita by Dr. S.K. De. But his statement (P. 21, f. n.) that, in rejecting Svabhāvokti, Kuntala follows Bhāmaha is unauthorised and unsustainable. When Kuntala says यतश्चिरन्तनैरपरं स्वभावोक्तिलक्षणमलंकरणमाम्नातम्, (because the ancients have mentioned another figure named Svabhāvokti), he meant by 'the ancients', it seems to me certain, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. We know that Kuntala does not as a rule agree on everything with Bhāmaha. For, we are informed by Sovani (BCV, p. 396) that he rejects the

yathāsaṅkhya Alaṅkāra and some others which are accepted by Bhāmaha. Why cannot that be the case with Svabhāvokti ? As I said before nobody among the preceding or succeeding Ālaṅkārikas seems to be willing to support Kuntala on this point. He is left pitiably alone. His *Sāstraic* and somewhat pedantic arguments against Svabhāvokti come into conflict with experience. Let everyone that has taste for poetry see whether there is any difference or not between these two compositions :—

गोरपत्यं बलीवर्दस्तृणान्यत्ति मुखेन सः ।

(quoted in Rudrata's com. VII. 10.)

and,

आक्रोशन्नाह्वयन्नन्यानाधावन् मण्डलैरुदन् ।
गा वारयति दण्डेन बालः सस्यावतारिणीः ॥

(Bhāmaha II. 94.)

In convincing ourselves as to the fitness of Svabhāvokti to be treated as an Alaṅkāra of poetry, these words of Leigh Hunt may be advantageously borne in mind :—

" Nay the simplest truth is often so beautiful and impressive of itself that one of the greatest proofs of his genius consists in his leaving it to stand alone illustrated by nothing but the light of its own tears or smiles, its own wonder, might or playfulness". (ECE. p. 303).

Now there is a line in Bhāmaha which gives room for doubt about his acceptance of Svabhāvokti as a poetic figure. After declaring that *hetu*, *sūkṣma*, and *leśa* are not accepted as Alaṅkāras, he subjoins his reason thus : समुदायाभिधानस्य वक्रोक्त्यनभिधानतः (II-86).

I am not clear about what is meant by समुदायाभिधानस्य. Yet it may be roughly translated thus :—

" Because taken as a whole it does not involve Vakrokti. "

This reason of Bhāmaha for his non-acceptance of the three Alaṅkāras at once leads us to think that according to Bhāmaha there can be no Alaṅkāra where there is no Vakrokti. But I do not think that is the meaning of Bhāmaha. As is shown above, in Bhāmaha's view, all the Alaṅkāras other than the one, Svabhāvokti, are governed by the Vakrokti principle. An Alaṅkāra, if it is to be really so, must belong to the one or the

other of the two kinds of Alaṅkāras—Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti. When the real nature of a *pseudo-Alaṅkāra* is to be explained, what we should do is to show that there is neither Svabhāvokti nor Vakrokti. It would be quite wrong if, speaking of a particular poetic expression, we say that this is not an Alaṅkāra because it is not a Svabhāvokti. For there are Alaṅkāras such as *upamā*, yet they are not Svabhāvoktis. In the same way it would be wrong if, taking a passage, we say that because it is not a Vakrokti it cannot be an Alaṅkāra. For there is an Alaṅkāra called Svabhāvokti and it is not a Vakrokti. So before we can pass judgment upon a certain expression as not having any Alaṅkāra, we should satisfy ourselves as to its coming under neither of the two heads of Alaṅkāras—Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti.

Now Svabhāvokti has no subdivision, while Vakrokti has so many. When this is well borne in mind, it will appear quite reasonable that whenever the names of Alaṅkāras such as *upamā* and *dīpaka* are heard, we at once understand that they are not of the Svabhāvokti kind. If thus, the very names of the other Alaṅkāras invariably give the idea of their not being Svabhāvoktis, there is no use of stating it expressly. In this light should be interpreted the line in question. *Hetu*, *Sūkṣma* and *Leśa* by their very names imply that they are not the species of the Svabhāvokti Alaṅkāra. Then, if these non-Svabhāvokti Alaṅkāras are really Alaṅkāras, they should involve some kind of Vakrokti in them. But they do not. Bhāmaha thinks so. Therefore, they are not accepted as Alaṅkāras. This is, I believe, the real meaning of Bhāmaha.

When the foregoing remarks are kept in mind it will be clearly seen that the word *vakrasvabhāvoktyā* in the second line of Bhāmaha I. 39, युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते, need not be necessarily interpreted as Sovani has interpreted it. He takes the word to mean the same as Vakrokti, ignoring the second element "Svabhāva" in that compound word. According to him the word is to be parsed वक्रस्वभावा उक्तिः ; but it may be as well parsed so as to mean वक्रोक्ति and स्वभावोक्ति. Since in his interpretation, the word Svabhāva becomes purposeless in the sentence, my interpretation, it may be seen, according to the interpretative laws of *Mīmāṁsā*, is preferable. I should like here to point out, though it has no direct bearing upon our present consideration, that Sovani is misconstruing the line

quoted above when he explains it thus:—'All the sub-divisions of poetry I mentioned (by him 16-30) are admissible to the designation of Kāvya in so far as they possess *Vakrasvabhāvokti* or imaginative speech.' (BCV. p. 394.)

Bhāmaha after further dividing a four-fold division of poetry into two, three, four and lastly five kinds and explaining what the first four kinds of the last division are, writes :—

> अनिबन्धं(द्धं) पुनर्गाथाश्लोकमात्रादि तत्पुनः ।
> युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते ॥

We see that in this *śloka* there are three separate sentences ending with (1) श्लोकमात्रादि (2) तत्पुनर्युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या and (3) सर्वमेवैतादिष्यते. Of these three sentences the first describes what the fifth kind of the last division is. A metric composition in Prākṛt dialects is generally called a *gāthā*, and that in sanskrit a *śloka*. This *anibaddha* of Bhāmaha is called *muktaka* by later Ālaṅkārikas. By the second sentence Bhāmaha means to tell us this; *ślokas* such as

> भोजनं देहि राजेन्द्र घृतसूपसमन्वितम् ।

and

> गोरपत्यं बलीवर्दस्तृणान्यत्ति मुखेन सः ।

must not be brought under this kind. There is no Alaṅkāra here at all; neither Svabhāvokti nor Vakrokti. The third and last sentence indicates that he approves of all the species of poetry divided and described by him in the preceding *ślokas*. True, all that is not expressly rejected may readily be taken as approved by him. However, since he is next going to controvert another division of poetry, Bhāmaha thinks it proper, as all the experienced and able writers would think, to finish the previous topic in this way. Unless the *śloka* is interpreted in this way, the two words in the first line— तत् and पुनः, would remain without any connection either with the preceding or the succeeding sentence.

If thus both of these *uktis* are equally embellishers of poetry, does it not go without saying that one of them alone will not do for the purpose of defining poetry? The definition formed with one of these two principles is sure to leave out those pieces of poetry, the poetic essence of which is the other principle—a fact

which will render the definition faulty of *avyāpti.* So we should take leave of Vakrokti and look elsewhere in Bhāmaha for some such poetic principle as can help us in forming a definition of poetry. To the best of my belief, the following two lines, with a little difference in wording but the same in substance, may be taken to indicate what Bhāmaha considers the essence of poetry :—

अग्राम्यशब्दमर्थ्यं च सालङ्कारं सदाश्रयम् । (I-19.)

अलङ्कारवदग्राम्यमर्थ्यं न्याय्यमनाकुलम् । (I-35)

In these two lines, the words, other than सालङ्कार and अलङ्कारवत्, mean this—that poetic speech and sense should be free from blemishes. From the words सालङ्कार and अलङ्कारवत् we are to understand that Bhāmaha's theory is that Alaṅkāra is the life-principle of poetry. So I think 'अलङ्कृतौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्' is the definition of Bhāmaha. The name of the work itself, *Kāvyālaṅkāra,* is suggestive of Bhāmaha's theory of poetry. As Sovani has pointed out (BCV p. 305), Bhāmaha uses the word गुण in the sense of Alaṅkāra. Bhāmaha makes no difference between गुण and अलङ्कार, not through want of keen critical acumen. Since he is decidedly posterior to the sage Bharata, who with unmistakable distinctness, enumerates both poetic *guṇas* and alaṅkāras, it is impossible that the difference known to Bharata between these poetic embellishers did not come to his knowledge. He knew it full well but held the opinion which his commentator Udbhaṭa has expressly recorded about it. Therefore it is, and it is unaccountable otherwise, that he not only uses nowhere in the Kāvyālaṅkāra the word *'guṇa'* in the sense in which other Ālaṅkārikas use it, not even when he speaks of the three famous *guṇas* —माधुर्य, प्रसाद, and ओजस्, but also uses it in the sense of Alaṅkāra.

Just the same seems to be the case with Daṇḍin. Whereas Bhāmaha first cites भाविक as an Alaṅkāra and then calls it *guṇa,* Daṇḍin in the first chapter calls श्लेष etc., *guṇas*—

इति वैदर्भमार्गस्य प्राणा दश गुणाः स्मृताः— (I-42).

and then in the second chapter calls them Alaṅkāras—

काश्चिन्मार्गविभागार्थमुक्ताः प्रागप्यलङ्क्रियाः ।
साधारणमलङ्कारजातमद्य प्रदर्श्यते ॥ (II-3).

Commenting upon this *śloka*, Taruṇavācaspati tries in plain language to prove that the *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras are undistinguishable. I think the following few lines of his are worth quoting here :—

पूर्वं श्लेषादयो दश गुणा इत्युक्तम् ; कथं ते अलङ्कारा उच्यन्त इति चेत्—शोभाकरत्वं हि अलङ्कारलक्षणम् ; तल्लक्षणयोगात् तेऽप्यलङ्कारा: । शोभा-हेतवो गुणा:, शोभातिशयहेतवोऽलङ्कारा इति कैश्चिदुक्तम् ; शोभातिशयहेतुत्वस्यैव विवक्षितत्वान्नायं भेदहेतुरिति गुणा अलङ्कारा एवेत्याचार्या: । तत: श्लेषादयो गुणात्मकालङ्कारा: पूर्वं मार्गप्रभेदप्रदर्शनायोक्ता: । इदानीं तु मार्गद्वय-साधारणा अलङ्कारा उच्यन्ते ॥

To those who will carefully read the above *śloka* of Daṇḍin, it would be apparent that Taruṇavācaspati's exposition of the text faithfully brings out Daṇḍin's meaning. It is only Vāmana that has begun to demarcate distinctly *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras and their respective functions in poetry. Though, as I have already observed, Bharata separately mentions, defines and illustrates *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras, and implies thereby that *guṇas* and Alaṅkaras are different and cannot interchange their names, yet Bhāmaha, being of the opinion that the difference between them is only illusory and fanciful in as much as both groups in the same way function as poetic embellishments, tacitly disregards and rejects Bharata's views, and accepts only one category of poetic embellishers, Alaṅkāra, though sometimes called *guṇa*, which includes everything that may be thought an indispensable element of poetry. To this theory of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin gives his whole-hearted assent and indirectly indicates the undistinguishableness of *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras by giving a definition which comprehends both of them :—

काव्यशोभाकरान् धर्मानलङ्कारान् प्रचक्षते ।

But Bhāmaha differentiates कथा and आख्यायिका from each other, and refuses to distinguish वैदर्भ from गौडीय. This is not acceptable to Daṇḍin and here he attacks Bhāmaha with some vehemence. According to Daṇḍin, Alaṅkāras are to be divided into two classes—special and common. Most of the so-called *guṇas* Daṇḍin thinks, are Alaṅkāras of the special class; because they are accepted by Vaidarbhas alone; not by Gauḍas. Though, thus, with regard to some details, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin hold mutually

conflicting and opposite views, yet they are in full agreement as to the identity of *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras and about the acceptability of Svabhāvokti as a poetic Alaṅkāra, as I have shown in the foregoing pages.

The fact that Vāmana divides *guṇas* into two groups, as those of word and those of sense, and *rīti* into three kinds instead of two, leads, naturally, some to think that he has made some improvement upon Daṇḍin and therefore both of them are of the same school. (BCV, p. 398.) But the nomenclature of the ten *guṇas* being the same in Bharata too, why cannot the improvement be upon Bharata as well? In truth, though the names are the same, they are given very different meanings by each author. For instance, Daṇḍin's *śleṣa* is Vāmana's *ojas*; while Vāmana's *śleṣa* has nothing corresponding to it in Daṇḍin. And Vāmana's *śleṣa* too is further strained by Jagannātha so as to give it a more restricted sense. This process of innovation from Daṇḍin to Jagannātha may be shown in the case of each of the *guṇas*. Hemacandra has already made an attempt in his Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi to show the various meanings given by his predecessors to the names of *guṇas*. Similarly though Vaidarbha and Gauḍīya *mārgas* of Daṇḍin are accepted by Vāmana, they are fundamentally different as understood by him. While Daṇḍin accepts ten *guṇas* in Vaidarbha, Vāmana accepts only three. Further I do not think Daṇḍin's conception of these *mārgas* is the same as Vāmana's. In Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, we do not meet with the term *rīti*. Daṇḍin's *mārga* means kind or way. In many places he uses this word मार्ग, where it is quite impossible to take it in the sense of Vāmana's *rīti*. Moreover, he often indiscriminately uses also the words वर्त्म, पन्थाः, प्रस्थानम् instead of मार्ग. All this goes to show that *mārga* has not assumed any technical sense in Daṇḍin.

Nor do we see that Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin speaks of the essential principle of poetry as the *soul* of it. Such an idea seems to have never come to their mind, word and sense are embellished by what are called Alaṅkāras, and they are poetry, and they please the readers or hearers of taste. This much and no more is the idea of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, concerning poetry. True, Daṇḍin uses in the beginning of the *Kāvyādarśa*, in connexion with poetry, the word denoting body, which some may think, implies that the author meant to call the charac-

teristic principle of poetry its *soul*. But it seems to me that it will be almost impossible to answer if it be asked why the word should be taken in such a far-reaching sense. This word is annotated in the *Hṛdayaṅgama* as meaning स्वरूप. And in *śāstraic* discussions such phrases are very often used as लक्षणशरीर, अधिकरणशरीर etc., where शरीर is not intended to suggest any contrast with the soul. Exactly the same, I believe, is the case here. To Daṇḍin, Alaṅkāra or the embellisher is to poetry what sweetness is to milk (I. 102). If still on the sole authority of this single equivocal word, it be tenaciously held that Daṇḍin has conceived of a *poetic soul*, I am at a loss to know why the same cannot be said of Bhāmaha also, who at the end of his Kāvyālaṅkāra says—षष्ठ्या शरीरं निर्णीतम्. The general trend of the Kāvyālaṅkāra and the Kāvyādarśa will, if well understood, surely prove that the idea of a *poetic soul* is wholly foreign to the mind of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.

Now these considerations make it inevitable that I should once more disagree with Sovani, who writes :—

"The chief writers of this (*rīti*) school were Daṇḍin and Vāmana." (BCV, p. 396.)

According to Vāmana, the *guṇas*, not at all identifiable with Alaṅkāras, constitute what is called *rīti*—which is the soul of poetry, while the Alaṅkāras are mere accessories to it. This is all that marks his school as different fundamentally from that of Bhāmaha, who contemplates no *soul* of poetry, speaks of no *rīti*; makes no difference between *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras; but holds that the embellished word and sense taken together are poetry. If so, let one judge candidly, whether Daṇḍin belongs to Bhāmaha's or Vāmana's school. It is shown that Daṇḍin too contemplates no soul of poetry, speaks of no *rīti*, and makes no difference between *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras. Nor does Daṇḍin seem to maintain, as Vāmana does, that the absence of the so-called *guṇas* alone will render a literary composition unpoetic. When the consideration of these fundamental principles makes it clear that they do not and cannot belong to one and the same school, it is of little consequence that they use the same terminology such as Gauḍa and Vaidarbha, *guṇa* and Alaṅkāra. In the same way, the fact that Daṇḍin recognises the two *mārgas* of poetry, Vaidarbha and Gauḍa, which Bhāmaha rejects, can no more establish their belonging to different schools

than the fact that Daṇḍin accepts the three Alaṅkāras, *hetu*, etc., which Bhāmaha disfavours. Of this view we find a supporter in Jayaratha. Commenting upon the first passage of the *Alaṅkāra-sarvasva*—इह हि तावत् भामहोद्भटप्रभृतयः चिरन्तनालङ्कारकाराः—he observes :—

····इहेत्यादिना । प्रभृतिना दण्ड्यादयः । तावच्छब्दो विप्रतिपत्त्यभावद्योतकः । (p. 3,)

and again.

तदेवं चिरन्तनैः प्रतीयमानस्यालङ्कारान्तर्भाव एवोक्तः । तदुपस्कार्यः पुनरात्मा कैश्चिदपि नाभ्युपगतः । वामनेन प्रतीयमानस्यालङ्कारान्तर्भावमभिदधतापि तदुपस्कार्य आत्मा कश्चिदुक्त इत्याह वामनेनेति । (p. 7.)

and again in introducing the line—उद्भटादिभिस्तु गुणालङ्काराणां प्रायशः साम्यमेव सूचितम् he writes :—

तदेवं विशिष्टपदरचनात्मिकायाः काव्यात्मनाभ्युपगताया रीतेः तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलङ्कारा इत्याद्युक्तया अन्तर्भावितध्वनयोऽलङ्कारा उपस्कारका इत्येतन्मतम् । अन्यैः पुनरेतदपि प्रत्युक्तमित्याह—उद्भटादिभिरित्यादिना ।

(p. 7)

After quoting these words of Jayaratha which settle the case once for all, little remains for me to say by way of explanation regarding the question we are inquiring into. So we may, without any fear of contradiction, declare that Daṇḍin is a follower of the Alaṅkāra, not the pioneer of the *rīti*, school. The result we obtain from this conclusion is that we are in a position to know that Daṇḍin's definition of poetry is the same as Bhāmaha's.

Vāmana too, though following a school quite different from Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's, does not seem to reject this definition of poetry. Probably his first Sūtra is intended for giving a definition, though it is not in the usual form of a definition. His employment of the word Alaṅkāra there is in the same general sense of embellishment as in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. But in the next Sūtra he uses it in the restricted sense of "figures of speech", excluding *guṇas*. Nevertheless, as apparently this narrow sense would not do for the purpose of definition, he had necessarily to use it also in its formerly usual wider application.

Ignoring the first Sūtra we would naturally think that Vāmana's definition should be रीतिमत् काव्यम् or गुणवत् काव्यम्. It is only to prevent such a wrong notion about Daṇḍin's definition, arising in scholar's minds, that I have been so particular to show that Daṇḍin's school is that of Alaṅkāra, not of *rīti.* Vāmana also, though distinguishing between *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras as the factors that produce and those that heighten poetic beauty, did not wish it to be understood that, according to him, Alaṅkāras should be considered unimportant in poetry. Therefore he begins with defining poetry, not deviating from his predecessors.

Among the Ālaṅkārikas later than Vāmana, except a few commentators on older works, there are none who hold *guṇas* and Alaṅkāras as of one category. Consequently the term Alaṅkāra became since then settled in the sense of figures of speech; and sometimes it was used to mean the charm produced by them. But nobody employed it so as to include in its meaning the *guṇas*, or the beauty resulting from them, evidently to avoid confusion. So, it was no longer possible to make a definition of poetry with the help of Alaṅkāra alone, and the definition of the old Ālaṅkārikas began to be thought inadequate. And it needs hardly be told that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find another term general enough to comprehend all the charming elements of poetry. Under these circumstances it is but natural that Mammaṭa, and following him, others, should try to make a definition, putting into it separately the absence of blemishes, *guṇas*, and Alaṅkāras, all of which were at once denoted in the old Ālaṅkārikas' definition by the single word Alaṅkāra. Thus, it will be seen that though the wording is different, yet the substance is the same in the old and the new definition.

It would seem to many that, as becomes a devout adherent of the theory of Ānandavardhana, the father of the *dhvani* school, who seems to define poetry by its effect,

"सहृदयहृदयाह्लादिशब्दार्थमयत्वमेव काव्यलक्षणम्" (1 p. 7).

Dhvanyālōka.

Mammaṭa should have defined it otherwise than he has done. But in accordance with a tradition current among the *śāstraic* authors—शास्त्रादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः—he thought it necessary, perhaps, to point out first the objects of poetry: and

of the many objects mentioned by him, आह्लाद (pleasure) is one—सद्यः परनिर्वृतये ।

When, thus, he got at the idea of आह्लाद as producible by poetry, indeed it did not occur to him that he might define it by its effect. Therefore he searched in the body of poetry itself for some characteristic feature useful for the purpose of definition and found that the definition of the old Ālaṅkārikas was quite acceptable and required only a verbal change, which accordingly he did, as shown above.

Moreover there is some advantage in making such a definition, for it serves as 'the contents' for the whole book. That authors have such a convenience in their view may be plainly seen from the following *śloka* of Vāgbhaṭa :—

साधुशब्दार्थसन्दर्भं गुणालङ्कारभूषितम् ।
स्फुटरीतिरसोपेतं काव्यं कुर्वीत कीर्तये ॥(I. 2.)

Here lies, too, the explanation of the fact that all the authors on Poetics, posterior to Mammaṭa, with the exception of Viśvanātha and Jagannātha, give their definitions more or less in the same form as Mammaṭa.

Thus far, we were speaking of the definitions of poetry that belong to the second division of definition, mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. Regarding these definitions there may arise a question. What are the Alaṅkāras, *guṇas*, and *doṣas*, which form these definitions ? Unless and until we know what they are, we cannot understand the definition of poetry based on them. One is sure to be disappointed if one looks to Bhāmaha for a definition of Alaṅkāra. Perhaps Bhāmaha thought that the word Alaṅkāra is simple enough to indicate at once what is meant by it. I think what was in Bhāmaha's mind was expressly told by Daṇḍin in this extract :—

काव्यशोभाकरान् धर्मानलङ्कारान् प्रचक्षते ।

But this not only does not help us to answer the question "What is Alaṅkāra", but leads to a greater difficulty. In order to obtain a definition of poetry, that is Kāvya, we are now inquiring what Alaṅkāra is. If, now, the definition of Alaṅkāra involves the question of poetry, then it is obvious that both these definitions become subject to a serious defect which

is called अन्योन्याश्रय, which means interdependence; we cannot understand either of them without knowing the other.

There is another way of defining, familiar only to our *śāstraic* authors, and followed when any other attempt to give a definition fails. When the species of a genus to be defined are of a limited number, they define the genus as being any one (अन्यतम) of the species. Let us suppose there is the question to be answered : What is metal? The answer according to the above method will be this,—any one of gold, silver, iron etc., is metal. In the same way perhaps we may have a definition of Alaṅkāra : that which is identical with one or another of दीपक, उपमा etc., is Alaṅkāra. But such a kind of definition should be entirely discarded here. For ours should not be an endeavour to have somehow or other a definition of a thing, even though it be uninforming and unmeaning, but to find out the governing, pervading principle, and to define the thing through it. Otherwise, the definition will be a verbal and arbitrary one, and will not serve the purpose of definition. When we hear the above-mentioned definition of Alaṅkāra we are not in a position to know from it why *Upamā*, etc., should be called Alaṅkara and not otherwise, or why some other modes of speech cannot be accepted as Alaṅkāras. Alaṅkāra is not, we know, a term like our own names, merely conventional. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the ancient authors ever thought of such a kind of definition.

Such being the case we can declare that no earlier Ālaṅkārika has given us a workable definition of Alaṅkāra. So recent an author as Vaidyanātha, the well-known commentator on Appayya Dīkṣita's Kuvalayānanda, in the beginning of the commentary, thus defines Alaṅkāra in the verbose style of Naiyāyikas :—

"अलङ्कारत्वं च रसादिभिन्नव्यङ्ग्यभिन्नत्वे सति शब्दार्थान्यतरनिष्ठा या विषयितासंबन्धावच्छिन्ना चमत्कृतिजनकतावच्छेदकता तदवच्छेदकत्वम् ।"

It may be doubted that this definition is defective of *ativyāpti*, because it can as well apply to *guṇas* which are, in later Ālaṅkārikas' view, as is already explained, different from Alaṅkāras. But it should be borne in mind that all the later Ālaṅkārikas, except perhaps Jagannātha, accept *guṇas* as belonging to the *soul*, (*rasa*,) and not to the *body*, (the word and sense)

of poetry. Now the first part of this definition ending with सति need not be taken into consideration as it has no direct bearing upon the present question; and the last part may, for convenience sake, be stripped of its *śāstratic* garb and put thus into a more easily understandable form :—

यद्विशिष्ट(स्य)शब्दार्थान्यतर(स्य)ज्ञानं चमत्कृतिजनकं सोऽलङ्कारः ।

Roughly rendered into English, this means—that is Alaṅkāra, possessed of which, word and sense, through their cognition, produce pleasure. In poetry, word and sense are producers of pleasure: but what renders them capable of producing pleasure is Alaṅkāra. If the true significance of Vaidyanātha's definition of Alaṅkāra is fully grasped, it will be clearly seen that the definition of Alaṅkāra itself involves the definition of poetry. If, then,

यद्विशिष्टौ शब्दार्थौ चमत्कारजनकौ सोऽलङ्कारः

is the definition of Alaṅkāra, it goes without saying that

यौ शब्दार्थौ चमत्कारजनकौ तत्काव्यम्

is the definition of poetry. It is already stated that Ānandavardhana's definition seems to be contained in these words of his :—

"सहृदयहृदयाह्लादिशब्दार्थमयत्वमेव काव्यलक्षणम्" ।

Now we see very plainly that this definition of Ānandavardhana may be easily equated with that of Vaidyanātha deduced from his definition of Alaṅkāra. What is thus far said of Alaṅkāra equally applies to *guṇas* and *doṣas;* for, they too, cannot be defined without finally resorting to *camatkāra* (चमत्कार) of which *āhlāda* (आह्लाद) is another name.

'दोषास्तस्यापकर्षकाः' 'उत्कर्षहेतवः प्रोक्ता गुण....'

are Viśvanātha's definitions of them. So we may put aside the former definitions of poetry which include Alaṅkāra, *guṇa* and *doṣa* and take up the last mentioned one into consideration.

That this definition which is formed directly with the 'effect' of poetry belongs to the third class of definitions is too obvious to need mention. While enumerating the objects of poetry, Mammaṭa mentions five others along with this *camatkāra* or

paranirvṛti as he calls it there. Of these six, Hemacandra rejects three, wealth (अर्थ) worldly knowledge (व्यवहारवित्), and the removal of evil (शिवेतरक्षति), on the ground that poetry does not unfailingly bring wealth, nor is it the only means of obtaining the last mentioned two objects. Among the remaining three—pleasure (आनन्द), fame (कीर्ति), and sweet edification (कान्तासंमिततयोपदेश)—pleasure is the chief. Here, using the very words of Abhinavagupta, as he does in many places, Hemacandra writes:—

यशोव्युत्पत्तिफलत्वेऽपि पर्यन्ते सर्वत्रानन्दस्यैव साध्यत्वात् । तथा हि–कवेस्तावत् कीर्त्यापि प्रीतिरेव सम्पाद्या । यदाह 'कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलामाहुः' इत्यादि । श्रोतृणां व्युत्पत्तिर्यद्यप्यस्ति तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासादिभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जायासम्मितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति । चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि च आनन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यफलमिति ।

The material at our disposal cannot help us to trace the source from which "कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलामाहुः" is taken.[1] Whoever may be the author of this quarter[2], it is plain that he means to say that the fame results in Svarga. Uttuṅgodaya takes this Svarga as the pleasure enjoyable in this world itself. It is not strange that our authors interpret the word in this sense. I fail to see, however, why the word should be taken here in that secondary meaning, discarding its proper meaning, which is heavenly bliss. Now we are naturally induced, here, to ask a question 'How fame, instead of Dharma, can lead one to Svarga?' To this question there is an answer in Bhāmaha.

रुणद्धि रोदसी चास्य यावत् कीर्तिरनश्वरी ।
तावत् किलायमध्यास्ते सुकृती वैबुधं पदम् ॥

(I. 7.)

[As long as his undying fame fills the space between the earth and the sky, so long the man of good deeds occupies the world of Vibudhas, gods, (which is Svarga.)]

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1. Prof. H. Jacobi points out that it is taken from the third of the ślokas, quoted by Vāmana at the end of I. 7. in his com. on sūtra 5.

2. Vāmana himself might have been the author of this quarter. [S. K. Sastri.]

Most probably the author of the quarter कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलामाहुः had in his mind this *śloka* of Bhāmaha. The indeclinable किल shows that Bhāmaha too is referring there to some ancient authority and that authority is, I think, Indradyumna's episode in the Vanaparva of the Mahābhārata.

To be Continued.

KĀLIDĀSA AND HIS PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE.*

BY

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I am deeply greateful to the President and the members of the Sanskrit Academy, Madras, for giving me an opportunity to pay my humble tribute to the memory of one, who may, with ample justification, be regarded as the greatest poet of India, save Vālmīki. Indeed, I believe, the Academy will not be worth its name if it does not celebrate the anniversaries of the great masters who have made Sanskrit learning and literature the priceless treasure and abiding possession of us all. We may without fear of exaggeration say that Kālidāsa ranks among the illustrious galaxy of the world's greatest poets. Whether in the art of exquisite and chiselled poetic expression or in the dulcet symphony of sound or in vivid imagery and graphic portrayal and brilliant word-painting or in the wonderful artistic creation of immortal romantic types or in the true vein of prophetic vision and insight focussed on the fundamental problems of human nature, society and destiny, he is, to say the least, unsurpassed by the poets of other countries. If Shakespeare has created a Desdemona, Kālidāsa has evolved a Śakuntalā. It may be that each represents a distinct type consonant with, and characteristic of, the genius of the race to which the poet belongs, but each, surely, is the noblest product of poetic imagination. No wonder, therefore, that even in translation, Śākuntala inspired in the mind of a foreign poet and scholar like Goethe a profound æsthetic appreciation which took the form of a poem in her honour.

> " Wouldst thou the young year's blossoms
> and the fruits of its decline
> And all by which the soul is charmed
> enraptured, feasted and fed !

* A lecture delivered under the auspices of the Saṁskṛta Academy on the occasion of the celebration of the " Kālidāsa Day. "

Wouldst thou the Earth and Heaven itself
in one sole name combine
I name Thee O Śakuntalā
and all at once is said."

It is curious, however, that, like Shakespeare whose personality was so hidden behind the veil of time that it gave room to the Baconian controversy of later times, Kālidāsa too remains unknown except through his works. Even from his works, it is very difficult to evolve more than a bare conjectural outline of his personality and life. They contain very few suggestions about himself—his life, his activities and the contemporary events of his period. Such suggestions, as there may be, are so artfully interwoven into the fine texture of poetry that the casual and unwary reader fails to detect them. Keen controversy has raged among scholars in regard to every aspect about him—the age to which he belongs, the country in which he lived, the court in which he shone as a poet and even his name. Some scholars have made nim the contemporary of Agnimitra, the son of the Magadha Emperor, Puṣyamitra. This will carry his age as early as 186 B. C. Others have confirmed the traditional account of his being one of the nine gems of the court of Vikramāditya of the Vikrama Era *viz.*, 57 B. C.; while the trend of latter-day opinion, of scholars like Professor Keith and historians like Vincent Smith has heen that he must be ascribed to the glorious period ot the Gupta Emperors. They see in the very name, Kumārasambhava, a clever allusion and compliment to the birth of Kumāragupta and in the descriptions of the *Digvijaya* of Raghu a panegyric on the exploits and conquests of the far-famed Emperor Samudra Gupta whose victories are described in a pillar at Allahabad in verses said to be composed by Harisena. Different theories have been put forward as regards his birth-place, such as that he was a native of Magadha, Ujjain, Kashmir and Central India. Even the name, Kālidāsa, has been the subject of criticism and doubts have been thrown as to whether it is, after all, not an honorific appellation and suggestions have been made as regards the existence of three poets bearing that title. It is interesting to note that a *Nighaṇṭu* (dictionary) known as Trikāṇḍaśeṣa refers to three other names of Kālidāsa *viz.*, Raghukāra, Medhārudra and Koṭijit. The Śabdakalpadruma refers to a *śloka* by the great Ālaṅkārika, Udbhaṭa—

सीमन्तिनी च नलिनी च कुमुद्वती च
चन्द्रप्रभा च रघुकारसरस्वती च।
कान्तोज्झिता हिमहता रविरश्मितप्ता
मेघावृता जडधियाभिहता न भाति ॥

in which the name Raghukāra is mentioned by him. These controversies bid fair to remain unsettled for a good length of time to come.

One fundamental fact, however, emerges from the various discussions indulged in by numerous scholars that the poet must have lived in a period of transition which intervened between the ultimate decline of Buddhism and the victorious re-assertion of the ancient Hindu ideals of culture and civilisation. It is this fact, which, to a great extent, accounts for the picture which the poet has revealed to the men of his generation, of the life, ideals and the social fabric of ancient India of the Vedic and Purāṇic times, especially when we remember that the most effective doubt was thrown on the truth and soundness of the Hindu conceptions of religion, philosophy and society by the dissident religion of Buddhism and that, for a few centuries, Hindu religion and civilisation seemed to have entirely gone under, while Buddhism reigned as the State religion and the popular faith of the masses. It stands to reason that, during a period of transition, doubt and conflict when the Hindu mind was casting about for the proper ideals, standards and principles of religion, philosophy and society, the poet should give through the medium of his works, the proper lead to his countrymen. A re-statement of the whole position and a proper emphasis on the real spirit of the ideals of the past must certainly have been very helpful in the solution of the many problems that must have confronted the common man of his times. And it is the complete ignoring of this aspect of the matter that led scholars like Professor Keith to make the unfounded charge against our poet that "He seems to have been fully content with the orthodox views of his time and that we must not seek in him for any solution or the suggested solution of the mysteries of life". I am glad to say that the learned Professor has modified this view to a large extent in his recent book on "The History of Sanskrit Literature". Moreover, the all-absorbing and alluring quest for discovering various subtle references to contemporary views,

theories and incidents and the solutions which the poet might have given is, in itself, a difficult task and requires thorough acquaintance with the Sanskrit language and the technique of the learning and sciences that are embodied in it and all of us are handicapped by the absence of accurate chronicle of past events. If Kālidāsa's works are read carefully in the light of the aspects hereinbefore indicated, it is possible to find in many places in his works indications of the workings of the poet's mind in regard to these "Mysteries of life". However attractive the subject may be, I do not propose on the present occasion to embark upon this quest. Suffice it for me at the present moment to give two or three instances to make my meaning clear. In the tenth canto of the Raghuvaṁśa where the praises of the Lord are sung by the Devas when they approach Him for protection against their enemy, Rāvaṇa, you will find that the poet in two of the *ślokas* suggests the right point of view of approach with regard to the vexed question of the attitude of man towards religion and faith in God and the divergent systems and schools of thought obtaining in the country.

बहुधाप्यागमैर्भिन्नाः पन्थानः सिद्धिहेतवः ।
त्वय्येव निपतन्त्योघा जाह्नवीया इवार्णवे ॥
प्रत्यक्षोऽप्यपरिच्छेद्यो मह्यादिर्महिमा तव ।
आप्तवागनुमानाभ्यां साध्यं त्वां प्रति का कथा ॥

Raghu. X.

In the first of the *ślokas* it is evident that the poet who is alive to the fact that humanity has been honestly endeavouring to approach the God-head in many divergent ways, reconciles them all by pointing out that they all lead to the same goal and warns the followers of one sect of system of thought from being bigoted and narrow enough to imagine that theirs is the only way that leads to heaven and all others are groping in the dark and emphasises the supreme truth that "God fulfils himself in many ways." Such a spirit of tolerance was in the view of the poet, absolutely necessary especially in a period of great conflict of ideals and rival schools of thought in the country. In the second *śloka* the poet has explained the reason for such differences and points out how they would inevitably arise in a region where revelation and inference have to play the leading part.

The treatment of the topic of love will, more than any other, reveal to us the characteristics of the workings of the poet's mind in regard to the fundamental ideals and conceptions of humanity. The great human emotion of love which is as wide and all embracing as humanity itself, has been the constant theme of poets of all ages and climes. According to Indian literary critics, it is a very important *Rasa* and it is claimed for Kālidāsa that he is, pre-eminently a poet of this *Rasa*-vide the *śloka* ascribed to one Rājaśekhara in the anthologies.

एकोऽपि जीयते हन्त कालिदासो न केनचित् ।
शृङ्गारे ललितोद्गारे कालिदासत्रयी किमु ॥

It is, therefore, appropriate and necessary to see how far the poet is unique in the treatment of this soul-enthralling emotion. If we analyse carefully all the works of the poet with this particular object in view, certain very important considerations will emerge. As we all know, love is a peculiar sentiment subsisting between the two sexes necessarily diverse in kind and nature, yet pre-ordained by primordial instinct and by the will of Providence to come together. It is a feeling which is inextricably mixed with physical instincts and the sex impulse and has necessarily to adjust itself to the many complex and sometimes even irreconcilable elements of human nature and conditions of life and society. The emotion of love has to be divorced and kept apart from the grosser and material aspect of lust or passion. It has to be depicted in its relation to the various problems that tend to modify its effect on the mind under the stress and strain of the many varied and complex situations that arise in life. Though, therefore, the idea denoted by the word is apparently simple, like the kindred word "religion", it comprises almost all the different aspects and problems of human emotion and nature. Humanity from the very beginning has been trying to solve the many problems that this great emotion produces in its actual reaction on life. And justly, therefore, it has been the constant theme of poets all the world over. In our country it has been exalted to the pedastal of being one of the four main *Puruṣārthas* into which the goal of all human activity can be classified. And the Lord in the Bhagavad Gītā mentions *Kāma* as one among the many manifestations of the divine essence. In depicting the sentiment of love and in imagining and evolving the situations in which the characters are placed giving rise to the play of this

emotion, the poet has placed one important ideal before his mind's eye and worked his plot towards that. In the poet's own words it may be described as *Samānurāga*. This he holds as of the very essence of ideal love and capable of conferring untold happiness upon the parties and creating the atmosphere of peace and equipoise of mind. It is a situation which arises from mutuality of love, equal intensity of feeling and reciprocal knowledge that the one is beloved of the other. The mental state of the lover and the beloved is the product of the combination of all these forces, and the poet regards it as the acme of human happiness. In the Mālavikāgnimitra the hero says:—" If the *Samānurāga* is subsisting between the lover and beloved even the extinction of the body is preferable to them who have no hope of coming to gether;

परस्परप्राप्तिनिराशयोर्वरं शरीरनाशोऽपि समानुरागयोः ॥

Mālavikā. II.

and in Śākuntala, Duṣyanta is of the opinion that the mutual longing creates happiness even though the lovers have not the satisfaction of union.

कामं प्रिया न सुलभा मनस्तु तद्भावदर्शनाश्वासि ।
अकृतार्थेऽपि मनसिजे रतिमुभयप्रार्थना कुरुते ॥ Śāk. II.

As we can very well understand, in the mental consciousness of both, an equilibrium is reached wherein the great emotion of love is shorn of all its outward trappings and material aspects, and emerges out as the pure and spiritual emotion of love. The poet glorifies this *Bhāvabandha*, as he calls it in other places, to the exalted height of religion and offers the great spiritual consolation to the couple that even if the only fitting consummation of that love *viz.*, indisoluble marriage, is not an accomplished fact during their life on earth, it is of such an enduring character that it will subsist in the next birth as a Saṁskāra and produce the inevitable result of their union. The poet profoundly believed in this as a solution for all the tragadies that we see in the world follow in the wake of obstructed and unsatisfied love. Imagine for instance, this poetic and spiritual consolation offered to Ophelia in Shakespear's Hamlet and to Elaine the Fair in Tennyson's Lancelot and Elaine. As a devoted Hindu, the poet has deep faith in it as a fact and based the conception of the whole poem of Kumārasambhava on this central idea, *vide* the verse—

अथावमानेन पितुः प्रयुक्ता दक्षस्य कन्या भवपूर्वपत्नी ।
सती सती योगनिसृष्टदेहा तां जन्मने शैलवधूं प्रपेदे ॥

Kumāra. I.

In the Śākuntala the poet has explained the philosophical basis of the above truth in the words put into the mouth of king Duṣyanta when he was under the spell of a *Śāpa* which, in a much lesser degree, has the same effect on the human consciousness as death.

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्
पर्युत्सुकी भवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।
तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वम्
भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ॥

Śāk. V.

"A person even though pleased by hearing sweet sounds or seeing objects of beauty, still, feels a melancholy. The reason for this is that he remembers in his subliminal consciousness without being fully cognisant. The abiding affections are of such permanence that they endure even after life." This truth is, to some extent, echoed in English literature also. The Vicar says in Goldsmith's "Vicar of Wakefield" 'But the melancholy which is excited by the objects of pleasure or inspired by sounds of harmony soothes the heart instead of corroding the soul.' A. C. Benson is his "Essay on Beauty" says, 'I always feel that the instinct for beauty is, perhaps, the surest indication of some essence of immortality in the soul and, indeed, there are moments when it gives one the sense of pre-existence, the feeling that one has loved these fair things in a region that is further back even than the beginnings of consciousness.'

The poet has set the seal of disapproval on all sinful unions, 'gretna-green' marriages, secret unions and loves at first sight which are not based upon the slow and steady evolution of human passion under normal conditions amidst natural surroundings and between similar and equal natures but are the products of the sudden gush of passion which as often suddenly end in violent estrangement. In his opinion they are not at all conducive towards the well-being and happiness of humanity.

The drama of Vikramorvaśiya has been evolved with the distinct purpose of showing to the world the incompatability of

such loves and the many difficulties which they give rise to and may possibly engender in the world. The folly of the king falling in love with a celestial nymph and not a human being who, by her very allotted occupation in life, must be outside the bounds and restraints of marriage, suddenly in the course of rescuing her from Rākṣasas—a folly comparable to that of the Merman in Mathew Arnold's 'Forsaken Merman'—leads necessarily to complications which are the direct result of this out-of-the-way relationship and produces even temprorary insanity of the lover banishing him for a good length of time from home and his kingly duties in his capital city of Pratiṣṭhāna. Though the birth of a son affords some kind of consolation to this happy union, the very event under the peculiar circumstances of the case threatens to end the happiness. And it is only the convention of the Indian stage which does not allow a tragedy that comes to the rescue.

This aspect is also beautifully worked out in the plot of the Śākuntala where the miseries undergone by Śakuntalā are attributable to the folly of secret and sudden love which is only expiated by a fairly long stay in the hermitage of the sage Marīci. The poet has indicated this in the words of Śārṅgarava—

इत्थं आत्मकृतं परिहृतं चापलम् ।
अतः परीक्ष्य कर्तव्यं विशेषात् संगतं रहः ।
अज्ञातहृदयेष्वेवं वैरीभवति सौहृदम् ॥

Śāk. V.

The whole poem of Kumārasambhava has been devoted to depict the emerging of the exalted emotion of love stripped completely of all the encrustations of the grosser, sinful, and sensual passion and lust. This the poet has achieved by an allegorical and artistic delienation of the characteristics of the God of Love and the purification of his nature under the re-vivifying fire of the third eye of Lord Śiva from which he emerges as *Anaṅga* (the pure sentiment of love unattached to the material body which represents the grosser and sensual side of lust and passion). The God of Love, goaded by Indra to gain his object and imbued with gross and sinful thoughts about which he boasts in the beginning to Indra, was unable to achieve the purpose, failed miserably and was burnt to death. But the pure love of Pārvatī, inspired by the *Saṁskāra* of her chastity in her previous birth

re-inforced and purified in her present birth by extreme penances and austerity, succeeded entirely to the satisfaction of the Devas and the rest of the world. For the sinful thoughts of Kāma See the *Ślokas*

> कामैकपत्नीव्रतदुःखशीलां
> लोलं मनश्चारुतया प्रविष्टाम् ।
> नितम्बिनीमिच्छसि मुक्तलज्जां
> कण्ठे स्वयंग्राहनिषक्तबाहुम् ॥
> असम्मतः कस्तव मुक्तिमार्गं
> पुनर्भवक्लेशभयात्प्रपन्नः ।
> बद्धश्चिरं तिष्ठतु सुन्दरीणा-
> मारेचितभ्रूचतुरैः कटाक्षैः ॥

Kumāra. III.

The poem is a conclusive demonstration of the glorious ideals which the poet had in view and furnishes the true interpretation of the great Purāṇic story of *Kāmadahana* to mankind. The title of the poem has been misunderstood and people have been set athinking as to why Kālidāsa never finished the whole story and stopped with the eighth Sarga. There is even a tradition that the story was finished by his son. The real explanation can be comprehended if we bear in mind the main object of the poet as described above. To continue the story after depicting the marriage of Pārvatī and Parameśvara is a work of supererogation on his part. The title of the poem has to be understood not as the birth of Kumāra but as the union for Kumāra. But it may be well asked why then, the poet should not have named his work Pārvatīpariṇaya. The answer is that the reason for the marriage of Śiva and for his being dragged into the vortex of *Saṁsāra* from the exalted heights of his *Tapas* is an act of favour for the Gods in being the cause of the birth of a hero who will save the whole world from the ravages of Tārakāsura. She had been married once before to Śiva in her previous birth and to distinguish this marriage from the other one, some other title indicating the story has necessarily to be given for the poem.

On the whole it may be said, without fear of contradiction or exaggeration that this glorious ideal of chaste and unsullied

love, of indissoluble and inextricable union that is the essence of the great Ardhanārīśvara conception, has not been better described and set before the view of man-kind, समादिदेशैकवधूं भवित्रीं प्रेम्णा शरीरार्धहरां हरस्य. The credit for this achievement falls to the poet whose anniversary we are assembled here to celebrate.

Another aspect of this emotion of unsullied love broad-based on, and springing out of, the *Ekapatnītva* on the part both of the lover and beloved is self-abnegation and self-forgetfulness. This, in its intensified form, when applied to the attitude of mind towards God, has been extolled as the peculiar religious emotion of *Bhakti.*—the Vaiṣṇavite doctrine of *Nāyaka-Nāyikā Prema.* The poet has devoted the whole of that lyrical masterpiece, Meghasandeśa, to bring to the mind of the reader the full force of this self-surrender. A study of that poem will reveal to the reader how the Yakṣa completely forgets his own self and becomes insensible to his own sufferings but entirely imagines himself to be in the situation of his beloved from whom by the curse of Kubera he has been separated. The very thought of depicting the suffering, which his beloved, he fancies, is undergoing in the distant city of Alakā and the consequent satisfaction that her love, is as intense and equally matched with his, is enough for him and sustains him in the fateful hours of the long-drawn-out agony. Critics have often asserted that the Meghasandeśa has largely drawn upon the *dautya* of Hanumān in the Rāmāyaṇa. It may be the idea of the poem was suggested to him by the Rāmāyaṇa. But the situations described and the sentiments in Meghasandeśa are quite different in degree and in nature from those in the Rāmāyaṇa. This utter self-abnegation and forgetfulness which is so beautifully brought out in the Meghadandeśa is not at all a prominent feature in the Rāmāyaṇa, though the intensity of feeling due to separation and the sacredness of love arising out of the *Ekapatnītva* of the lover and the beloved are common to both. Unlike the Rāmāyaṇa, the *dautya* of the Yakṣa is a pure fantasy and an illusion born out of his own intensity of feeling. Though, in the terminology of Indian Alaṅkāra works, the *Rasa* depicted is *Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* it is a type peculiar and unique to Kālidāsa.

One criticism which may be offered in connection with the situations which the poet creates in his dramas is that so far as the *Nāyaka* is concerned, his affection cannot be of the same

chaste and pure kind as that of tne *Nāyikā*, especially because the horoes are all poligamous and the heroines are only second or third wives of the king. In the Mālavikāgnimitra, unlike as in the Śākuntala and Vikramorvaśīya, the king has even grown up issue by his other wives. That there must necessarily be some disparity between the lover and the beloved under such circumstances, must be readily granted. The social life of the age and the court surroundings in which the literary activity of the poet is placed and the necessity to enact the drama for the pleasure of kings may afford some explanation for this phenomenon. The poet is himself alive to this and tried to justify the situation by making his heroines mothers of great heroes who have brought glory to the dynasty.

अनसूया—वयस्य ! बहुवल्लभा राजानः श्रूयन्ते ! यथा नौ प्रियसखी बन्धुजन-
शोचनीया न भवति, तथा निर्वह ।

राजा—भद्रे ! किं बहुना ।

परिग्रहबहुत्वेऽपि द्वे प्रतिष्ठे कुलस्य मे ।
समुद्ररशना चोर्वी सखी च युवयोरियम् ॥

Śāk. III.

In that way the necessity for such marriges has been made out in the scheme of things. It may even be he might have thought that by enacting such scenes, some wholesome and salutary effect might be produced on the minds of kings so as to deter them from the unhealthy instinct of poligamy.

The 19th Sarga of Raghuvaṁśa is an apt description of lust, unbridled passion and sensual enjoyment which brought about the downfall of the solar race, and affords a striking illustration and warning to all, especially to the kings of his own generation. The poet has purposely given a detailed description of the amorous pleasures and sports of king Agnivarṇa which produced the terrible malady of consumption and brought about the ignominious end of a glorious line of kings who set the ideal of married love regulated by the *Aśramic* division and consecrated by the sole object of the continuation of the race. Contrasted with this, he gave the other picture in the same poem of the tragedy of king Aja where that *Ekapatnītva* of the lover towards the beloved is beautifully impressed upon the mind of the reader. In an age when people were loathe to set up rigid standards of

conduct for men, while emphasising absolute moral standards for women, the poet drew the picture of a man though high placed and surrounded by the temptations of his position, yet, so devoted to his wife that he refused to love again after the first love ended in misery. It reminds one of the Buddhist *Saṅga* rule that neither the widower nor the widow can remarry and the poet evidently showed his partiality for this higher ideal in the following *śloka* of the Raghuvaṁśa.

प्रमदामनुसंस्थितः शुचा नृपतिस्सन् इति वाच्यदर्शनात् ।
न चकार शरीरमग्निसात् सह देव्या न तु जीविताशया ॥

Raghu. VII.

If we apply the ordinary canons of criticism, we may say that both aspects of *Śṛṅgāra* viz., *Vipralambha* and *Sambhoga* the poet has dealt with in his works. A closer analysis and more subtle appreciation of the spirit of his works will reveal these distinguishing features indicated here. A strong religious nature and a profound belief in divine dispensation has given a peculiar Hindu colouring to the poet's manner of treatment. While one imbued with the modern spirt may wish that Śakuntalā would strongly protest against her treatment by Duṣyanta and do something in revenge against him at the very moment she is ruthlessly discarded, especially in her pregnancy we find her resigning herself to her fate and accepting the position of being a denizen in the hermitage of sage Marīci. It may also be pointed out that Kālidāsa has nowhere depicted that other concomitant of intense love *viz.*, Jealousy. Of course in the dramas to some extent this has been outlined in the jealousy of the *Devīs* for the new love of the king. But nowhere has it been introduced as a factor interfering between the hero and heroine and creating complications. It has not cleverly been worked into any plot by him as Shakespeare has done in the 'Othello'.

In fine, the picture of love presented by Kālidāsa is of the spiritual and aetsthetic type, so happily blended together that Religion is Beauty and Beauty is Religion.

A NOTE ON THE 102ND STANZA IN PUṞANĀṈŪṞU.

BY

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எருதே யிளைய நுகமுண ராவே
சகடம் பண்டம் பெரிதுபெய் தன்றே
யவலிழியினு மிசையேறினு
மவண தறியுநர் யாரென வுமணர்
கீழ்மரத் தியாத்த சேமவச் சன்ன
விசைவிளங்கு கவிகை நெடியோய் திங்க
ணாணிறை மதியத் தனையை யிருள்
யாவண தோநின் னிழல்வாழ் வோர்க்கே.

Erutē yiḷaiya nukamuṇa rāvē
Cakaṭam paṇṭam peritupey taṉṟē
Yavaliḻiyiṉu micaiyēṟiṉu
Mavaṇa taṟiyunar yāreṉa vumaṇar
Kīḻmarat tiyātta cēmavac caṉṉa
Vicaiviḷaṅku kavikai neṭiyōy tiṅka
Ṇāṇiṟai matiyat taṉaiyai yiruḷ
Yāvaṇa tōniṉ ṉiḻalvāḻ vōrkkē.

The learned commentator on Puṟanāṉūṟu interprets this stanza as follows:—Oh king renowned for your bounteous charity, serving as the spare axle attached to the cart full with merchandise by the salt merchants with the idea that the cart is likely to break when it has to go up or come down on the way since it is drawn by young and inexperienced bulls, you are like the full moon; how can the darkness (of poverty) envelop those who live under your shade?

He then writes that there is no comparison implied in the first two lines and that the youth and inexperience of the bulls and the fullness of the load are simply mentioned to show that the cart is likely to break.*

* 'எருதே யிளைய நுகமுணராவே, சகடம் பண்டம் பெரிது பெய் தன்றே' என்பது உவமங்கருதாது சகடத்திற்கு வரும் ஏதங்குறித்து உமணர் சேமவச்சுயாத்தற்குக் காரணமாய் நின்றது.

From this it is evident that, in his opinion, the renowned Avvai, the authoress of this verse, compares the king Pokuṭṭeḻiṉi to the spare axle. This would be possible only when this verse was composed in honor of Pokuṭṭeḻiṉi when he was *heir-apparent*. Then the suggested meaning would be " You are crowned heir-apparent since nobody knows when your father will be unable to hold the reins of government."

According to this interpretation the beauty of the first two lines, it seems to me, is marred. If, on the other hand, we take that this verse was composed when Pokuṭṭeḻiṉi just came to the throne and take the words '*icaiviḷaṅku kavikai neṭiyōy*' to mean 'oh king of noble descent from ancestors renowned for their bounteous charity' and the word '*icaiviḷaṅku kavikai*' is compared to the spare axle, it seems to me that the first two lines are very significiant and also a complete similie may be worked out of the first six lines :—

Just as the (foresighted) salt-merchants provide the cart full with merchandise with spare axles lest the cart, driven by young and inexperienced bulls, should break when it has to go up or come down on its way, so also the (foresighted) ancestors of the king have done bounteous charity lest the administration of the kingdom should break at the hands of an young and inexperienced king. The points of comparison are as follow :—

Upamēya.		*Upamāna.*
Young and inexperienced king	...	Young and inexperienced bulls.
Kingdom	..	Cart.
Burden of ruling over the kindom	..	Load in the cart.
King's (foresighted) ancestors	..	(Foresighted) salt merchants.
Bounteous charity (of the ancestors).	..	Spare axle.

The suggested meaning in this case would be :—Oh king of noble descent ! do not be disheartened in holding the reins of Government because you are young and inexperienced. The result of the deeds of charity of your ancestors will surely come to your rescue.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

DACCA UNIVERSITY ORIENTAL PUBLICATIONS SERIES NO. I.

THE KICAKA-VADHA OF NITIVARMAN.—With the commentary of Janārdanasena, edited from original manuscripts, with an introduction, notes and extracts from the commentary of Sarvānandanāga—Published by the University of Dacca—1929.

Dr. Suśīl Kumar De's scholarly industry has made available to the world of Sanskrit Scholars, *Nīti-varman's Kīcaka-vadha,* which is a rare Kāvya of the *śabda-citra* type, full of *yamakas* and *śleṣas.* From the references to the Kīcaka-vadha in Alaṅkāra-works like the *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* of Bhoja, it is obvious that it should have come to be recognised as a typical *yamaka-kāvya* before the 11th century A. D. In the history of *śabda-citra* in Sanskrit, the *Kīcaka-vadha* marks an important stage of development. Perhaps *Nīti-varman* wrote this *yamaka-kāvya,* to illustrate the extent to which *yamakas* might be used as accessories in the delineation of a *rasābhāsa,* like Kīcaka's *śṛṅgāra.* We are reminded in this connection of what Ānandavardhana says regarding *yamakas* :—

"यत्तु रसवन्ति कानिचिद्यमकादीनि दृश्यन्ते, तत्र रसादीनामङ्गता यमकादीनामङ्गितैव । रसाभासे च अङ्गत्वमप्यविरुद्धम्" ।

—[Dhvanyāloka-page 87-Nirṇayasagara edition.]

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

THE PANDYAN KINGDOM BY K. A. NILAKANTHA SASTRI.

This book is the outcome of a series of lectures delivered by Mr. Sastri under the auspices of the University of Madras in 1926. A scholar of repute, Mr. Sastri is well qualified for the task he had undertaken. Though the Pāṇḍyan kingdom has had a long record and also appears to have played a conspicuous part in the history of South India, still, the extant historical material is very meagre and obscure and furnishes ample scope

for investigation. Mr. Sastri, himself, says in the preface to his work "We are by no means sufficiently equipped to attempt a full and satisfactory account of the Pāṇḍyan kingdom". Often enough, this is the case with many a dark chapter of Indian history. Still, scholars are tempted to fill in the gaps with bold speculations based on inconclusive similarity of names and ingenious surmises from slender data. Sometimes wrong data are imagined purely on account of the want of sufficient knowledge of the language in which the historical material is embodied and on other occasions the judgment of scholars has been warped by racial prejudice, communal bias and preconceived theories. Mr. Sastri has avoided these pit-falls and approached the subject with the humility, honesty of intellect, sound judgment and impartial attitude which must characterise an ardent seeker after truth in Indian history. With commendable candour he has confessed his inability to put forward definite conclusions whenever the problems still admit of further material being discovered, sifted and analysed. He has endeavoured to give, in his book, a brief conspectus of the history of the Pāṇḍyan kingdom till the 16th century A. D. Though he may not have brought out new material or discoverd new facts, he has tried to test many conclusions already arrived at by former scholars in the light of the fresh material discovered such as "The Sinnamannur plates of Rajasimha" and "the Madras Museum Plates of Jatilavarman."

There have been already many distinguished scholars and orientalists who have done valuable work in South Indian history and have made important contributions on the subject such as Bishop Caldwell, M. Dubreuil, Kanakasabhai, Sundaram Pillai, L. D. Swami Kannu Pillai, Venkayya, Dr. S. K. Iyengar, T. A. Gopinatha Rao, Mahamahopadhyaya V. Swaminatha Iyer, Krishna Sastri and K. V. Subramania Iyer and we are glad to say that Mr. Sastri, by his work is qualifying himself to be added to this illustrious roll.

The edition is neatly printed and it is a pity that, though the lectures were delivered under the auspices of the University of Madras, still, the University authorities have not published them in book form but have left to the lecturer himself, the task of publication with the help of this own resources.

K. BALASUBRAHMANI AIYAR.

HINDU EXOGAMY BY S. V. KARANDIKAR, M. A.

This book delas with a subject which has not yet been thoroughly investigated by scholars. With the exception, probably, of Mr. P. Chensel Rao's work styled "*Gotrapravara Nibandha Kadambam,*" there has been no exhaustive treatise on the subject by well-qualified men. This book is, therefore, a very welcome addition to this branch of learning. The author has dealt with the subject very exhaustively and has traced the history of '*Gotras* and *Pravaras*' from Ṛgvedic times and also the development of the rule of *Sapiṇḍa* Exogamy. The whole subject has been approached by him from the attitude of a social reformer and he has come to the conclusion that the exogamous restrictions are really harassing and that the modern Brahmins will do well to re-examine them and introduce suitable changes in the rules. He also warns the Non-brahmin communities who, he thinks, have a tendency to imitate the Brahmins, from following these restrictions without analysing and sifting them. The work really deals with many very constroversial matters. Indeed it is a vigorous presentation of one aspect of the case and certainly cannot be called a judicial and impartial investigation of the whole matter. In some places, the author even betrays prejudice against Brahmins as a class, not only those of the present day, but also their distant forefathers. In justice to the author and the subject, a more exhaustive review is necessary in the future parts of this Journal.

We congratulate Mr. S. V. Karandikar, M. A., certainly upon his frank, lucid, and exhaustive manner of treatment of the subject from the point of view of the modern reformer and D. B. Taraporevala & Sons on their well-printed edition.

K. BALASUBRAHMANI IYER.

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PRINTED AT THE MADRAS LAW JOURNAL PRESS, MYLAPORE, MADRAS.